Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 923-936(14) Autore: Margit Tavits Abstract This study argues that organizationally stronger local party branches are more powerful within the party than organizationally weaker branches: they can better perform the tasks central to the party, which include communication with, and mobilization more »
Archivio per gennaio 2012
Power within Parties: The Strength of the Local Party and MP Independence in Postcommunist Europe
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Come vedono i toscani la politica? Che rapporto hanno con essa? C’è qualcosa di diverso rispetto alla «subcultura rossa» della Prima Repubblica? Da questa ricerca, commissionata dalla Regione Toscana e condotta dal Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali con un approccio misto, quantitativo e qualitativo, emergono risposte articolate. Da un lato, è viva e in salute la more »
Exit, Voice, and Cyclicality: A Micrologic of Midterm Effects in European Parliament Elections
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Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 907-922(16) Autore: Till Weber Abstract Very few theories of democratic elections can claim to overarch the field. One of them that has not been given due regard, I suggest, is Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. I aim to exploit more »
Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 869-885(17) Autori: Taylor C. Boas; Hidalgo, F. Daniel Hidalgo. Abstract: Direct influence over communication media is a potent resource during electoral campaigns, and politicians have an incentive to gain control of the airwaves to advance their careers. In this article, we more »
Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 852-868(17) Autori: Michael M. Bechtel; Jens Hainmueller Abstract Dominant theories of electoral behavior emphasize that voters myopically evaluate policy performance and that this shortsightedness may obstruct the welfare-improving effect of democratic accountability. However, we know little about how long governments more »
