

# The Italian General Election of 2013

*A dangerous stalemate?*

Edited by

Lorenzo De Sio  
Vincenzo Emanuele  
Nicola Maggini  
Aldo Paparo



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Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali

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# Introduction: a perfect storm?

Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini and Aldo Paparo

This book is dedicated to the Italian general election of 2013. Like a series of recent elections in other European countries (Spain in 2011, France, Greece – twice – and the Netherlands in 2012) it yielded unprecedented results in terms of incumbent's punishment and party system change. Such results have inevitably been related by most commentators to the emergence not only of the financial and economic crisis, but most importantly to the austerity measures that have been enforced in most countries as a reaction to such crisis. Political change stirred by such austerity measures has represented in all cases a serious challenge to the stability and performance of the party system.

This is clearly the case in Italy as well. However, in the Italian case we can argue that this external shock overlapped with (and to some extent reinforced and precipitated) other long-term processes. It has also combined with additional factors of instability.

The most relevant long-term process is undoubtedly the crisis of the Berlusconi leadership in the centre-right camp [Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte 2012]. After securing a comfortable majority in both chambers in the 2008<sup>1</sup> general election and a honeymoon period of roughly two years, Berlusconi ended up facing mounting scandals and judicial prosecution about his private life and business activity. This combined with an increasing malaise within his own party (the PdL) and with rising scepticism among other European governments and international financial institutions. A first parliamentary challenge occurred in December 2010 following a split inside the PdL led by Gianfranco Fini. Berlusconi survived the vote of no confidence by a very narrow margin. But his government was weakened further by mass protests over his sex scandals in February 2011, and fi-

nally fell in November 2011. By then he had lost his parliamentary majority also as a result of his lack of credibility in enforcing the austerity measures made necessary by the rapidly worsening financial situation. Berlusconi's fall, albeit still far from representing the actual end of his political career, inevitably marked a deep crisis of leadership and a change of equilibria in the centre-right coalition. This affected to some extent the centre-left opposition as well, testifying how Berlusconi's leadership had been a stabilizing force in Italian politics over the last twenty years.

The government crisis did not cause early elections. This was due to a lack of initiative by the leftist opposition and the strong belief held by President Giorgio Napolitano about the risk involved in an electoral campaign waged in the middle of a very serious financial crisis. Napolitano asked former EU Commissioner Mario Monti to form a technocratic government [Marangoni and Verzichelli 2012] supported both by the PdL and the Pd (the two large rival parties, respectively center-right and center-left) as well as the Udc (a minor centrist party). The Monti cabinet, after initially passing some controversial measures with the support of public opinion, lost its effectiveness after few months, paralysed by a series of vetoes of the two main parties on all controversial policy measures.

Two additional factors of instability need to be mentioned. On one hand, Berlusconi's crisis increased the distrust of rightist voters, thus weakening party-voter ties in that camp; on the other hand, as several commentators have observed [Bellucci and Segatti 2013] the formation of a technocratic government has strongly blurred in voters' mind the government-opposition cleavage. The responsibility of the Berlusconi government for the severe economic and financial situation became less clear. As a result the Monti cabinet strongly complicated the blame attribution process performed by voters. Perhaps, in our view, if elections had been held immediately the discontent of conservative voters would have been channelled into a normal incum-

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<sup>1</sup> The only time when such majority emerged, in the three elections held with this system, in 2006, 2008 and 2013.

bent-punishment mechanism, benefiting a constructive opposition (and perhaps ensuring a stable parliamentary majority) without challenging the structure of the party system. Instead, the installation of a technocratic government prevented the effective functioning of such mechanism, and gave way to a protest vote directed against all parties.

Finally, there is one more factor that made the 2013 Italian general election something close to a perfect storm: the Italian electoral system. Italy has a fully symmetrical bicameralism. The House and the Senate enjoy the same powers including that of giving and revoking the confidence to the government. However, the two chambers are elected by different electoral bodies: the voting age for the House is 18, that for the Senate is 25. In 2005 the Berlusconi government passed an electoral reform which introduced in both chambers a proportional electoral system with a strong majoritarian element provided by a majority bonus [D'Alimonte 2007]. In the House the party or coalition with the plurality of the vote at the national level gets 54% of the seats. In the Senate however the majority bonus is awarded at the regional level and not at the national level. This feature, combined with the difference in the electoral bodies of the two chambers, creates the possibility of different outcomes. In addition, the system provides no strong disincentives for third parties. In other words, what was clear before the elections was that the emerging anti-establishment Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, 5-Star Movement) would find no serious obstacles in the electoral law, and that – in case of a strong success – it could prevent the formation of any majority in the Senate.

And this is precisely what happened, as detailed more systematically in the book. For the first time in Western Europe (excluding founding elections of a new democracy), a new party has achieved a similar percentage of votes in its first election. The M5S obtained – in part unexpectedly, according to previous polls – 25,6% of valid votes (excluding the Aosta Valley and the foreign constituency) and it became the largest party of the country. With this performance it prevented any majority in the Senate which would not include two of the three largest parties. Having declared its unwillingness to enter into any coalition, the result was a *dangerous stalemate*. One of the consequences of such stalemate has been the re-election of Giorgio Napolitano as president for another 7-year mandate (in fact it just happened that his first term expired just at this time). In turn the reelection of Napolitano produced once again the formation of another

oversized-majority government (this time with a political majority, as ministers were drawn from all the supporting parties), with Enrico Letta. A government which currently appears to be facing similar problems to those of Monti.

Before introducing the actual analyses presented in the book, it is worth spending few words about the predictability of such perfect storm. Could all of this be expected? With some immodest honesty, we argue that most of these elements were previously anticipated by analyses published online by the CISE before the elections. In particular, before the elections we concentrated [De Sio and Emanuele 2013] on some key aspects connected to economic voting. First, we expected the economic crisis to play a role. The unprecedented results in all recent elections in a number of European countries provided ample evidence of that. At the same time, as we mentioned earlier it was plausible to expect that the blame-attribution mechanism might act against both the center-left and the center-right (and towards the new Monti list itself), given the sharing of responsibilities in the last year under the Monti government, and therefore that it would benefit the anti-system M5S.

We went further and also advanced some more articulated hypotheses about the actual causal mechanisms behind the effects of the economic crisis, drawing upon the electoral results of regional elections in Sicily in October 2012. Sicily is a geographically peripheral region of Italy, albeit with a crucial position in the Mediterranean Sea, which explains its historical strategic value and its long-standing close relationships with powers such as France, England and the United States. His political traditions, with the exception of limited rebellious populist movements immediately after WWII, have been consistently conservative. Sicilian voters supported consistently the DC (the large Christian-Democratic party uninterruptedly in government in Italy from 1948 to 1992), and later Berlusconi. Historically such continuous government support was exchanged for a very large degree of autonomy, and a generous distribution of resources from the central state, allowing for the development of a pervasive local patronage system. All this ended in the regional elections of 2012 (with very similar results in the general elections of 2013), as Sicily massively turned its cold shoulder to Berlusconi. The steep decline of electoral turnout (especially in urban districts more dependent from patronage) was coupled with the massive success of the M5S, leading to a new surge of anti-establishment

rebellious populism in Sicily, for the first time since 1948. This suggested to us an additional mechanism (compared to explanations based on traditional sociotropic or pocket-book economic voting) by which austerity measures impacted vote choices: the dramatic restriction of resources available for patronage politics. In our view, this might be a parsimonious explanation of political change in Sicily from Berlusconi's fortress to Grillo's stronghold. Moreover this might explain in more general terms how Berlusconi's appeal has decreased, although under his leadership – once he clearly reaffirmed it after the Sicilian elections – the PdL performed better than expected in the general elections. Along with the M5S performance this contributed to the dangerous stalemate that emerged.

The analyses included in this book give a more detailed picture of the outcome we outlined above. They are the product of the activity of the CISE – Centro Italiano di Studi Elettorali (Italian Center for Electoral Studies), which regularly publishes on its website (<http://cise.luiss.it/>) short online reports in Italian dedicated to Italian electoral politics. Such analyses, based both on aggregate data as well as on survey data collected independently by the CISE, are published first on line (shortly after the election day or the collection of survey data) and then have been put together into freely downloadable e-books since 2012, leading to four volumes. Such volumes (composing the CISE Dossier series) are dedicated respectively to the 2012 Italian local elections [De Sio and Paparo 2012], to the evolution in Italian public opinion before the 2013 general election [De Sio and Maggini 2012], to the results of various elections held in 2012 as anticipating trends for 2013 (covering Sicily, various European countries, and the Pd primary) [De Sio and Emanuele 2013] and finally to the results of the 2013 general elections [De Sio, Cataldi and De Lucia 2013].

This book is partially derived from the fourth CISE Dossier. It presents a selection of short analyses on the 2013 general elections, which have been translated and adapted for an international audience with little familiarity with Italian politics. Additional articles published by CISE scholars in international venues have been also included. This effort follows the same philosophy that led to the development of the CISE Dossier series. Our goal is to provide the large community of people interested in elections with short, simple yet rigorous empirical analyses. Such community ranges from journalists to practitioners of politics, to scholars (not nec-

essarily of elections) to ordinary citizens interested in politics. Different audiences will find different materials of interest. But even electoral scholars might find suggestions for hypotheses, to be tested in-depth more systematically. The idea is to provide fresh information that might help foster the development of more structured research questions.

The success of the CISE Dossier series in Italy prompted us to try a similar effort directed to an international audience, by providing a freely downloadable e-book on the latest Italian general elections. In this case we are aware of the additional challenge of documenting and explaining Italian electoral politics to foreign journalists, practitioners and scholars who might not be familiar with it. We lived up to it by using a broader scope, different from the more specialized and technical approach usually found in international publications on Italian elections. We think such a publication performs a useful function. Italy is – after all – the third largest economy in the Eurozone and too often its politics is portrayed abroad in a superficial fashion without the support of fresh data and a proper understanding of the deeper processes lying underneath it. With this book, in spite of its limited scope, we hope to contribute to filling this gap, at least partially.

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**Part 1**  
**Before the elections**





# How Berlusconi could yet pull off the unimaginable

Roberto D'Alimonte

*Published in the Financial Times, February 14, 2013*

Can Silvio Berlusconi do it? A few weeks ago the prospect that Italy's former prime minister would stage a comeback was laughable. Now, with less than two weeks to go before polling day, it may be the media magnate and playboy former premier who has the last laugh. The last opinion polls published before an official blackout period point to a closer race than many expected: the gap between Pier Luigi Bersani's left-of-centre coalition and Mr Berlusconi's right-of-centre alliance has narrowed to 5-6 percentage points.

In most western countries, such a lead in the last stretch of a campaign would be considered safe. Not in Italy. To start with, there are lingering doubts that the polls are a proper reflection of public opinion. For many people, voting for Mr Berlusconi is a guilty secret not to be shared with a pesky pollster. There are ways to correct for this bias but there is no way to know if they really work.

The real uncertainty, however, is Mr Berlusconi himself. The man is still by far the best campaigner around. He is not a statesman – he is a showman. The media is his natural habitat (and the source of much of his wealth). In spite of everything – the scandals, judicial indictments, poor performance in office – 8m voters are still willing to vote for him and his illusory promises of tax paybacks and job creation. Combined with his allies' supporters, they could be enough for a victory. Were this to happen, all the credibility Mario Monti's technocratic government has painfully won for Italy in the past 14 months would disappear instantly. As Europe slowly sorts out its financial crisis, this would be a very serious setback.

But the magic and tricks of the consummate performer are unlikely to work as they used to. Many are comparing this campaign to that of 2006, when Romano Prodi wasted a lead of 6 percentage points and ended up winning in the lower house with a margin of 0.1 per cent. Today the picture is different. Then it was a two-way race. Now

there are four competitors: running alongside the two main ones are Mr Monti and Beppe Grillo, an anti-establishment comedian.

It is true that Mr Berlusconi has been able to win back some of his lost supporters since his return to the scene after he was forced to resign in November 2011 in the midst of a dramatic financial crisis. But the easy gains are over; in a crowded field the extra, decisive votes are more elusive.

For this reason it is likely – though by no means certain – that Mr Bersani and his allies will win one vote more than anybody else in the lower house, which is all it takes to win a majority of the seats.

The senate is a different story. Here the majoritarian bonus is assigned region by region, creating a sort of US-style electoral college, where each region has a certain weight. To gain a solid majority, it is necessary to win the bonus in most of these regions and particularly in the big ones. Lombardy, in the north, is crucial. It is a combination of Ohio and California. Like Ohio, it is up for grabs by either coalition but it carries a weighting similar to that of California. If Mr Bersani loses here, it is highly unlikely he can win an absolute majority. This scenario will open the door for Mr Monti's participation in the next government. The paradox is that this will happen only if Mr Berlusconi wins Lombardy, since Mr Monti himself cannot.

A Bersani-Monti cabinet is the most likely outcome. Yet one cannot entirely discard the most disturbing possibility of all. Mr Berlusconi's chance of increasing his share of the vote are limited – but Mr Bersani's chances of decreasing his are not. If polls do not lie, the present leads should be safe. But, as I have said, polls may lie to some extent. What matters more now, however, is that in recent weeks the trend for Mr Bersani has been downwards.

A lacklustre campaign, Mr Berlusconi's brava-do and the derivatives scandal surrounding Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the Tuscan bank, have all contributed to this trend. Mr Grillo has been the

main beneficiary. His Five Star Movement will be the surprise success of this election but it will not change the outcome. If the slide of Mr Bersani's coalition continues, what was unimaginable just a few weeks ago could become possible: a victory by default for Mr Berlusconi in the lower house.

Even so, Mr Berlusconi will not win in the senate. Electoral arithmetic makes this a fact, not a guess. The outcome then would be a house-senate split. The government needs a confidence vote in both. Where would Mr Berlusconi find the extra seats he would need?

For Italy – and Europe – the answer to that question is no laughing matter. The reappearance of Mr Berlusconi is bad enough. The prospect of Italy plunging once more into chronic instability is worse.

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# 2013 Italian Parliamentary Election Pre-Election Report

Aldo Paparo

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On February 24th and 25th Italian parliamentary elections will be held. The electoral system in place is referred to in Italy as the “Calderoli law”, approved in 2005 and already used in the 2006 and 2008. Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are elected with a proportional system with a majority premium. The two systems however are not identical.

For the Chamber of Deputies it is a majority-assuring system. The party or coalition of parties that gets a plurality of the votes at the national level is guaranteed 54% of the seats (340) regardless of its percentage of votes. In the case of coalitions the votes of all its parties are counted for determining who gets the majority bonus. The remaining seats are allocated proportionally among the losers which meet the conditions for gaining representation. For parties running alone the threshold for getting seats is 4%. For parties running in coalition the threshold is 2%, provided their coalition gets at least 10% of the votes. For each coalition with more than 10% the largest party below the 2% threshold is entitled to receive seats. Party lists are closed.

For the Senate the system is similar to that of the Chamber but it is not majority-assuring. The major difference is that the majority bonus is allocated at the regional level. In 17 out of 20 regions the party or coalition of parties that gets a plurality of the votes is guaranteed 55% of the seats assigned to each region regardless of its percentage of votes. In the case of coalitions the votes of all parties in the coalition are counted for determining who gets the majority bonus. The remaining seats are allocated proportionally among the losers which meet the conditions for gaining representation. For parties running alone the threshold for receiving seats is 8%. For parties running in coalition the threshold is 3%, provided their coalition gets at least 20% of the votes. Party lists are closed.

The regional allocation of the majority premiums in the Senate makes it difficult achieving an

absolute majority of seats. Even a party or coalition with a 5-8 percentage point lead at the national level might not be able to get 158 out of 350 seats. This can happen if it loses in 2 of the largest regions and it is particularly true in a multipolar situation such as exists now.

An important element to consider is that in our parliamentary system the government must receive a confidence vote by both Houses. A non-confidence vote by either of the two legislative houses entails the resignation of the government.

Another important difference between the Chamber and the Senate electoral systems is voting age: all citizens above 18 years can vote for the Chamber, but only those who are at least 25 can vote for the Senate. So there are nearly 5 million Italians who only vote for the Chamber of Deputies. It's about 10% of total voters. There is no guarantee that the results will be the same in the two houses. In 2006 Prodi's coalition won a plurality in the Chamber but Berlusconi's received more votes in the Senate. It was only thanks to the 6 seats allocated in the constituency for “Italians living abroad” that Prodi was able to get a majority of one.

Five years ago, in the previous general election, Berlusconi's coalition received 46,8% of valid votes for the Chamber gaining the 340 seats. His party, PdL, had 37,4% and 272 seats. His older and most loyal ally, the Northern League, gained 60 seats with 8,3% of the votes; the Movement for autonomies (MpA), the third party of the coalition, gained 8 seats even though it had only 1,1% of the vote. The Democratic Party (PD) had 33,2% of valid votes and 211 seats, its coalition ally, Di Pietro's IdV got 28 seats with 4,4% of the vote. The only other party who obtained representatives was Casini's UdC: 5,6% of the votes and 36 seats. A total of 6 national parties entered the Chamber<sup>1</sup>. This was a

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<sup>1</sup> See D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte [2010]

very low number for Italian political system. Only two years earlier, in the 2006 general elections, 10 parties gained representation with the same electoral system<sup>2</sup>.

In the Senate Berlusconi won 12 regions. This was enough to gain an absolute majority because the 5 regions where he lost contributed less than 20% of total senatorial seats. His coalition had a total of 174 seats against the 136 of the center-left and the 3 of UdC. So for the third time in Italian history he formed a government at the beginning of the legislature.

In late 2010 the government suffered the defection of the President of the Chamber Fini and a group of his followers who formed a new party: Future and Liberty for Italy (FLI). This defection forced a no-confidence vote on December 14th: the government barely survived thanks to defections from opposition groups.

In November 2011, after having lost an explicit majority in the Chamber and with the spread between Italian and German 10 year Treasury bonds above 500 points, Berlusconi finally resigned on the 12th. The President of the Republic Napolitano appointed as prime minister Mario Monti, an academic economist and former UE commissioner who had never run for office before. His government, entirely composed by experts, received a very large confidence vote in both Houses, being supported by PdL, PD, UdC and FLI. The tally in favor was 281 votes in the Senate and 556 in the Chamber.

The top priority of the new cabinet was reassuring financial markets and UE partners through austerity measures. The first and most important measure was the reform of the pension system. Another important reform was the reintroduction of a property tax that had been abolished by Berlusconi. In the first months the new government was perceived as the county savior and had an exceptionally high popularity rating, in spite of the tough reforms carried forward. Parties were unable to do anything but support the government's proposals.

During 2012 the government tried to make a series of reforms, but the parties gradually regained leverage and were able to stop or change them so as not to hurt their constituencies. This happened for example with the labor-market reform which fell short of what the government wanted to achieve

because of the resistance of the unions and the PD. The same is true of the new law on corruption which was diluted as a result of PdL opposition. In the meantime the economic recession hit even harder and the social crisis became worse, leaving the government in a difficult position that cost it much of its earlier popularity.

In November the center-left coalition organized primary elections to select its candidate for prime minister. The members of the coalition are the Democratic Party (PD), Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Democratic Center, and Left Ecology and Freedom (SEL). Pierluigi Bersani, the PD secretary, won against Florence major Renzi in the second round (December 2nd)<sup>3</sup>. At that time all polls showed his coalition with a large advantage over its rivals. It was running above 40% and remained at that level until the end of the year<sup>4</sup>. As a front runner Bersani considered himself the "rabbit on the run" and he developed a very conservative campaign strategy that has probably cost him some votes in the long run.

On December 6th PdL secretary Alfano announced in a parliamentary speech the intention of his party to withdraw its support to the Monti cabinet. Two days later Monti announced his resignation, to become effective after the budget bill for fiscal year 2013 had been approved.

A few days later Berlusconi said he would not run if Monti would accept an offer to lead a center-right coalition, formed by PdL, UdC, FLI and maybe Northern League. Monti refused the offer and soon after announced his decision to run. He presented his political program, referred to as the 'Monti agenda', declaring that his goal was to unite reformers both on the left and on the right of the political spectrum in order to overcome the rigidity of what he considered an obsolete bipolar pattern of competition. He followed the announcement with the creation of his own party, Civic Choice, which entered a coalition with UdC and FLI. In the Senate the three parties chose to run as a single list because of the 8 % threshold.

Berlusconi then recreated his traditional alliance with the Northern League. Originally the League had resisted this option but its resistance dropped when Berlusconi agreeded to support the

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed report of this primary election, see De Sio and Emanuele [2013].

<sup>4</sup> On this, see Emanuele [2013].

<sup>2</sup> See D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte [2007]

League leader, Roberto Maroni, in his bid to become governor of Lombardy, the most important Italian region. Lombardy regional election will be held the same day of the national elections. Besides the League the Berlusconi coalition includes other minor allies whose number varies from region to region. After organizing the coalition, Berlusconi started a massive campaign of television interviews and talk show appearances which paid off in the polls. His main issue has been tax relief, including the reimbursement of the property tax introduced by the Monti government for whom his party had voted in Parliament. He also started to blame Monti and his policies for the worsening of the economic situation, describing him (Monti) as his (Berlusconi's) biggest political regret.

In the last weeks of the campaign the one candidate who has been very visible, and the only one who is bringing the crowds out, is Beppe Grillo. He is a former television comedian and the founder of the 5 star movement (M5S). For the past two years this movement was present only in local elections. Being a populist and anti-establishment movement it is very hard to locate on a right-left axis. It has attracted votes both from former center-left and cen-

ter-right voters. Thanks to the "Tsunami tour" of its leader, it is gaining attention and votes and is now in third place with a chance to move to second. The recent corruption scandals like the Monte dei Paschi and Finmeccanica have given to it a big boost.

As of February 9th no polls can legally be published in Italy. The last data published (see above) show a lead of 5-6 percentage points in favor of Bersani, with Berlusconi around 28 % and Monti and Grillo at 15%. If they are correct the most probable outcome of the vote is a Bersani win in the Chamber. At least 10 parties will get seats, even if Civil Revolution (the union of parties on PD's left) should remain below the 4% threshold.

It is tougher to predict the result of the Senate since the electoral system creates a sort of lottery of 17 regional premiums. Berlusconi is expected to win in Sicily and Veneto. If he manages to conquer one of the other battleground regions (Lombardy, Campania, Friuli, Apulia, Piedmont), Bersani would not have an absolute majority. In that case a Monti-Bersani cabinet is the most likely outcome. This is a key point in the campaign strategy of all major parties. Bersani has repeatedly said that even if he won an absolute majority, he would ally himself with all

Figure 1. Weekly polls by IPSOS for the TV program Ballarò.




Table 1. Senate seats according to regional polls by Tecnè for SkyTv published on February 7th.

Region	Region seats	Majority premium seats	Bersani's coalition seats	Monti's coalition seats	Berlusconi's coalition seats	Grillo's 5 star mov. seats	Other parties seats
Piedmont	22	13	13	2	5	2	0
Lombardy	49	27	27	5	12	5	0
Veneto	24	14	5	2	14	3	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	7	4	1	1	4	1	0
Liguria	8	5	5	1	1	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	22	13	13	2	4	3	0
Tuscany	18	10	10	1	5	2	0
Umbria	7	4	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	8	5	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	28	16	16	3	6	3	0
Abruzzo	7	4	4	1	1	1	0
Campania	29	16	16	3	6	4	0
Apulia	20	11	11	2	4	3	0
Basilicata	7	4	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	10	6	6	1	2	1	0
Sicily	25	14	4	3	14	4	0
Sardinia	8	5	5	1	2	0	0
Molise	2	-	1	0	1	0	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	7	-	4	2	1	0	0
Aosta valley	1	-	0	0	0	0	1
Foreign constituency	6	-	3	1	1	0	1
Total	315		157	34	86	36	2

NOTE: in red the regions where the majority bonus is assigned to the Bersani's coalition; in blue the regions assigned to the Berlusconi's coalition.

truly Europeanist and anti-populist forces in order to solve together Italy's huge problems. His major ally, SEL's leader Vendola, has taken a different position, questioning the possibility of governing with Monti. The incumbent prime minister replied that if Bersani wants to cooperate with him he needs to choose between him and the extremists. All of this sounds however as campaign posturing. At the end of the day, if polls do not lie, after February 25th Italy will be governed by a coalition that will include Vendola, Bersani and Monti with Bersani as prime minister. How long will it last is a different matter.

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# Even in the Chamber of Deputies, the result is not to be taken for granted

Roberto D'Alimonte

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There is an electoral scenario that up to now almost nobody has taken seriously into account, and this is Silvio Berlusconi's victory at the Chamber of Deputies. The issue whether Pierluigi Bersani should win in this arena was, and still is, something taken for granted by most people. For several weeks, analyses have been focused on the lottery of the Senate, where, as a matter of fact, there is no assurance that the Bersani-Vendola (PD-SEL) coalition will win the absolute majority of seats. It will depend on the results of the elections in the following identified and monitored key regions: Lombardy, Sicily, and Campania. Further, what if the real unknown was the Chamber of Deputies? Several exit polls published last Friday gave a margin of five to six percentage points between the two major coalitions. In times of normality and a few days before the elections, there should be a safety margin to win at the Chamber of Deputies, where a single vote that separates one coalition from its competitors is enough for that coalition to get the majority bonus. But these are not times of normality. It is possible that the exit polls do not give us a fully accurate picture of the public opinion's climate. Within the numbers could be the so-called Berlusconi effect, similar to the Bradley effect in the United States. Bradley, the first black mayor of Los Angeles, was a gubernatorial candidate in the 1982 California elections. His popularity in the exit polls was systematically overestimated because many white electors felt ashamed in admitting that they were not prone to voting for a black man. Nowadays, with Berlusconi, something similar to the *Democrazia Cristiana* at the time of the First Republic could happen. And maybe, to some extent, it could also be true for Beppe Grillo. There are "techniques" to correct this bias, but it is not certain whether they will work. This is also a reason why exit polls give differences that could be very significant. Together with the above-men-

tioned examples is another poll that recorded a difference of only four points last week and another one, that of Euromedia Research (the company closest to Berlusconi), that estimated a difference of less than two points. Such minor differences that were unimaginable a few weeks ago are no longer unimaginable.

There are two ways to win the elections: One is by running after your competitor and overtaking him by getting one vote more. Another way is by looking at your competitor losing votes. Up to now, the analytical perspective for winning these elections has been the first. With the PD-SEL coalition gaining over 35% of the votes at the Chamber, it was not conceivable that Berlusconi could win. He could not get there, and he cannot. But what we have witnessed during these last weeks of the electoral campaigns is not only the largely foreseeable regain of *Il Cavaliere*, but also the slow wearing away of the PD and its ally, SEL. It is the combination of these two phenomena that puts into discussion some given certainties. We do not believe, and we have already written in this newspaper, that there are wide recovery margins for Berlusconi. This time, compared with 2006, he has too many competitors, among whom is Grillo, in a big reclamation in this phase. Nonetheless, if the fall of the PD and SEL continues, Berlusconi gaining a bit more than what he has now will be enough to make a comeback in the game being played at the Chamber of Deputies. If the threshold for winning drops and stays a bit above 30%, it is a totally different issue. At this point, an important difference can be made by the useful vote both at the Chamber and at the Senate.

As of mid-December, the PD has lost almost six percentage points, and the coalition as a whole has lost almost eight points (data provided by Ipsos). A series of different factors have contributed to this trend. Some are understandable, with others less

understandable. It was obvious that after the big deployment of the primary elections, things would be a blur. But it has lasted too long. It is fine to have a campaign branch out of Bersani, but why is the PD not among people like Grillo? Where are the volunteers that have given life to the confrontation for the primary elections? Social media are not enough to make an electoral campaign. One also needs the masses and the door-to-door campaign. Obama is a good example. And then, obviously, there are the scandals and omissions. It goes without saying that among the first of these scandals is *Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena*, which undoubtedly has caused damage to the image and bucket of consensus of the PD. As for the omissions, one should know that they are many, but one clamorously stands out: a convincing and obsessively communicated proposal on the costs of politics. This is a reform that stands at the top of the Italians' wishes and costs nothing.

These elections will be won not by the stronger, as it has always been during the Second Republic, but by the party less weak. With a few votes, the winner will receive the whole jackpot. It is a conflict between two weaknesses in a changing world.

The end of February will be pretty hot despite the temperature these days. But who knows, perhaps the resignation of the pope will change something.

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# The uncertainty of Monti's electoral hold

Roberto D'Alimonte

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The country's next government will depend on the vote at the Senate. This is true in both of the following cases: if Silvio Berlusconi wins at the Chamber of Deputies or if Pierluigi Bersani wins, which seems pretty likely, given the most recent trends. In this branch of the Parliament, anything can happen. In 2006, Berlusconi's CdL<sup>1</sup> placed first in 7 out of 17 regions, and this was enough to give *Il Cavaliere* 155 seats against the 154 seats of Romano Prodi's *Unione*<sup>2</sup>. It went like that because the CdL won in many so-called heavy regions: Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto, Lazio, Apulia, and Sicily (together with Friuli-Venezia Giulia). Prodi saved himself, thanks to Campania, where he placed first with 49.6% of the votes against 49.1% of the center-right coalition. Without that margin of 0.5 percentage points, the history of the country would have taken another direction.

In 2013, if Berlusconi wins in the same seven regions, he will get 124 seats (i.e., 31 less than last time)—this without considering his percentage of votes. This data alone tells how much the present situation has changed compared with 2006. The difference is represented by Mario Monti and Beppe Grillo. In 2006, the competition had two major players. Today, there are four. Indeed, there are four coalitions which are able to get more than 8% of the votes at the Senate, thus getting seats. This means that the coalition that loses the bonus in a region loses many more seats than it had in 2006 because it does not get all the seats meant to be given to the losers. In fact, it has to share these with the other two competitors. Hence, in order to win today, one should place first in many more regions. Actually, one should win in virtually all regions. Only in this way can one hold a solid majority.

With that said, there are three possible outcomes of the Senate's lottery. The first is that Bersani and Nichi Vendola get the absolute majority of the seats as Berlusconi did in 2008, when he managed to elect 174 senators. It is difficult but not impossible that this happens again this time. In any case, there are different kinds of majority. Also, that of Prodi was a majority. But it was very narrow. Let us imagine that the center-left wins in all 17 regions. In this case, it would total up to 178 seats. A good result. But Lombardy, Veneto, and Sicily are unanimously considered regions in a precarious balance. It would suffice that Bersani loses Lombardy and would go down to 162 seats, only four seats above the majority threshold. To lose 16 seats in a single region is drastic and illustrates well the line of reasoning above. Losing the bonus in heavy regions—with Lombardy being the heaviest—means going from heaven to hell. But Lombardy alone is not enough. As a matter of fact, even if the center-left won here but with Berlusconi winning in Veneto and Grillo (or Berlusconi) in Sicily, the center-left coalition would stop at 159 seats: definitely too few for a safe navigation. Winning in Sicily would not be enough for Bersani to have the absolute majority, even if he very narrowly loses in Lombardy and Veneto. In other words, the possibility that Bersani and Vendola succeed in winning the majority themselves exists, but it is very fragile.

The most likely outcome of the elections is that the center-left needs Monti to form a government. This result may stem from different combinations of gained or lost regions. In the table below, we have made some hypotheses, but obviously, one could make others. The last two simulations show what would happen if the center-left lost all three regions in a precarious balance: it would have 143 seats, but with 33 from Monti's list, the eventual government's coalition could count on a majority of 176 seats. As is shown, we have also considered the hypothesis that Grillo and not Berlusconi might win the majority bonus in Sicily, but this circumstance would not change anything for the center-left. For Bersani,

<sup>1</sup> CdL (Casa delle Libertà – House of Freedom) was in 2006 the name of the center-right political coalition led by Berlusconi.

<sup>2</sup> L'Unione (The Union) was in 2006 the name of the center-left political coalition led by Prodi.

Table 1. Distribution of seats in the Senate based on different scenarios for uncertain regions

Winning coalition in uncertain regions			Distribution of seats, Senate				Distribution of seats, Senate with Monti under the threshold in Liguria, Emilia, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche			
Lombardy	Veneto	Sicily	CL	Monti	CR	M5S	CL	Monti	CR	M5S
C-L	C-L	C-L	178	33	60	42	178	27	64	44
C-R	C-L	C-L	162	33	76	42	162	27	80	44
C-L	C-R	M5S	159	33	70	51	159	27	74	53
C-R	C-R	C-L	153	33	85	42	153	27	89	44
C-R	C-R	M5S	143	33	86	51	143	27	90	53
C-R	C-R	C-R	143	33	95	42	143	27	99	44

Note: The other 14 regions with the bonus are assigned to the center-left. One of the seats of Molise is given to the M5S and one to the center-right. Four of the seats of Trentino-Alto Adige are given to the center-left (together with SVP), two to the coalition of Monti, and one to the center-right. Three out of the six seats of the Italians residing abroad are given to the center-left, one to the center-right, one to Monti, and one to an independent party. The seat of the Aosta Valley is given to a local independent party of any other coalition. The simulations are built on the basis of hypothetical percentages.

the victory in these regions is very important, but provided that he is not the winner, it is irrelevant who the winner will be between the other two.

On the contrary, what really matters for Bersani is Monti's electoral hold. In the table, we have considered the hypothetical case that the premier's list goes below 8% in some regions. This way, its total would go down from 33 to 27 seats. A loss of six seats reduces the majority of the eventual future government with Bersani but does not jeopardize it. Everything would change, though, if Monti does not go above the threshold of 8% in other heavy regions. For instance, if we added Lombardy to the regions considered in the table, Monti's list would go down to 22 seats, making the foreseeable postelectoral majorities with Bersani much more difficult as well as opening the way to the third possible outcome of these elections.

If Berlusconi wins in the uncertain regions and reverse the forecasts in others where he is currently taken as a loser and if, at the same time, Monti's list was below expectations, the sum of Vendola's, Bersani's, and Monti's seats could not be 158. In this case, the only possible governments would be either the big coalition (without Grillo) or a government together with Grillo. There is no need to highlight the risk of instability with such a scenario. Luckily, it is the least probable scenario.

These days, nothing is really certain with the exception of one thing: Berlusconi cannot get the absolute majority of the seats at the Senate. This

is one of the few absolute certainties of these elections. For this to happen, it should be enough that the center-left wins—and this will be the case—in Tuscany, Emilia, Marche, Umbria, and Basilicata. But this leads us to a final question: if Berlusconi won at the Chamber of Deputies, how could he form a government given that he could not get the absolute majority of seats at the Senate? With whom could he form an alliance? And with which perspectives for the country?

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# The 2013 Senate lottery: Possible scenarios

Aldo Paparo

February 23, 2013

A few days before the elections, it is already clear that a decisive match is to be played at the Senate and, in particular, in some key regions, the victory of which may move many seats. The result of the elections in these regions will be decisive in the gaining or losing of the majority and thus the formation of the next government. In this article, we try to sum up which scenarios we might see on Monday evening. First of all, we present the Senate's compositions resulting from simulations which differ from one another on the basis of the results of the three big uncertain regions: Lombardy, Veneto, and Sicily. For the analysis of these, the basic data are from the last regional polls published before they were banned by law. On the basis of these data, we have partially moved up the M5S's percentages in accordance with the hypothesis of an underestimation in the surveys and with a possible rise in the last two weeks before the elections. Besides this, we have classified the seats not allotted with the bonus (Aosta Valley, Trentino, Molise, and abroad) according to our own evaluations. We have then considered, in the subsequent simulations, the hypothesis to have minimum variations of the original data in order to get the desired result.

As one can see, the center-left can get the theoretical maximum of 178 seats in case of victory in all 17 regions with the bonus and maintain a good majority despite losing one (either Sicily or Veneto). In case of loss in another region besides Lombardy, Bersani could no longer do without the support of the present premier, Monti: the sum of the seats of the center-left and of Monti would also ensure a majority of 175 senators in case of losses in the three regions taken into consideration. We have also considered the hypothesis of a slight drop in Monti's list that would preclude the attainment of 8% in some regions. In the middle of the table, this debacle happens in the five regions where the polls preceding the blackout used to show its big-

ger weakness. All in all, the loss involves six seats, where four are taken by the center-right and two by the M5S. None are taken by the center-left, which gets, in these regions, the seats of the majority bonus, regardless of Monti's result. In the right part of the table, we have added Lombardy to the regions where Monti goes above the threshold. In this case, five seats would be lost all at once: two taken by the M5S and three by the big coalition losing the region (center-right or center-left in the different hypotheses). In reality, Friuli-Venezia Giulia is also uncertain. We have not included it as a variable in the table because it would have made the table overly heavy and also because of the scarce number of electoral seats of the region. In any case, for each scenario of the table, it is enough to subtract three seats from the center-left and add them to the center-right in order to get the result if the latter wins in Friuli.

As we have seen, the first row of the above table shows the best possible result for the center-left, and on that basis, the different possible debacles are considered. We now want to show the extreme limit on the other side: how it would end up in case of an extraordinary success of the center-right, the most realistic according to our view. In these simulations, Bersani would win only in the four regions of the "red zone" and in Liguria, Lazio, Sardinia, and Basilicata. Berlusconi would instead conquer the bonus in the majority of the regions, the remaining nine. How the seats are distributed in this case is shown in table 2.

In this case, we have also considered the hypothesis of the defeat of Monti's list, with respect to the background scenario. In an attempt to sketch the best possible scenario for Il Cavaliere, we have put together the results below the threshold in the regions allotted to the center-left in a way to maximize the conquest by the center-right of the seats lost by Monti: first, only in four regions of the "red zone" and then in all eight regions of Bersani. We

Table 1. Distribution of the seats in the Senate based on different scenarios for uncertain regions

Winning coalition in uncertain regions			Distribution of seats, Senate				Distribution of seats, Senate with Monti below the threshold in Liguria, Emilia, Piedmont, Umbria, and Marche				Distribution of seats, Senate with Monti also below the threshold in Lombardy			
Lombardy	Veneto	Sicily	C-L	Monti	C-R	M5S	C-L	Monti	C-R	M5S	C-L	Monti	C-R	M5S
C-L	C-L	C-L	178	33	60	42	178	27	64	44	178	22	67	46
C-L	C-R	C-L	169	33	69	42	169	27	73	44	169	22	76	46
C-L	C-L	C-R	168	33	70	42	168	27	74	44	168	22	77	46
C-L	C-L	M5S	168	33	61	51	168	27	65	53	168	22	68	55
C-L	M5S	C-L	168	33	59	53	168	27	63	55	168	22	66	57
C-R	C-L	C-L	162	33	76	42	162	27	80	44	165	22	80	46
C-L	C-R	C-R	159	33	79	42	159	27	83	44	159	22	86	46
C-L	C-R	M5S	159	33	70	51	159	27	74	53	159	22	77	55
C-L	M5S	C-R	158	33	69	53	158	27	73	55	158	22	76	57
C-L	M5S	M5S	158	33	60	62	158	27	64	64	158	22	67	66
C-R	C-R	C-L	153	33	85	42	153	27	89	44	156	22	89	46
C-R	C-L	C-R	152	33	86	42	152	27	90	44	155	22	90	46
C-R	C-L	M5S	152	33	77	51	152	27	81	53	155	22	81	55
C-R	M5S	C-L	152	33	75	53	152	27	79	55	155	22	79	57
C-R	C-R	C-R	143	33	95	42	143	27	99	44	146	22	99	46
C-R	C-R	M5S	143	33	86	51	143	27	90	53	146	22	90	55
C-R	M5S	C-R	142	33	85	53	142	27	89	55	145	22	89	57
C-R	M5S	M5S	142	33	76	62	142	27	80	64	145	22	80	66

Note: The other 14 regions with the bonus are assigned to the center-left. One of the seats of Molise are given to the M5S and one to the center-right. Four of the seats of Trentino-Alto Adige are given to the center-left (together with SVP), two to the coalition of Monti, and one to the center-right. Three of the six seats of the Italians residing abroad are given to the center-left, one to the center-right, one to Monti, and one to an independent party. The seat of Aosta Valley is given to a local independent party. The simulations are built on the basis of hypothetical percentages.

can observe how the center-right cannot get the absolute majority of the seats at the Senate. Also, in the best hypothesis, they would miss more or less 20 seats to reach 158. In case Bersani wins as Veltroni had in 2008, winning in Lazio, Liguria, and Sardinia would not be enough. The maximum result reachable by the coalition led by Berlusconi seems to be that of making the formation of any government impossible, unless this government was supported by an unlikely reedition of the big coalition.

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Table 2. The Senate's composition in the best foreseeable case for the center-right

Regions	Monti above 8% in all 17 regions					Monti below 8% in Emilia, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche					Monti below 8% also in Liguria, Lazio, Basilicata, and Sardinia				
	C-L	Monti	C-R	M5S	Others	C-L	Monti	C-R	M5S	Others	C-L	Monti	C-R	M5S	Others
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0	4	2	13	3	0	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	11	5	27	6	0	11	5	27	6	0	11	5	27	6	0
Veneto	5	2	14	3	0	5	2	14	3	0	5	2	14	3	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1	1	4	1	0	1	1	4	1	0	1	1	4	1	0
Liguria	5	1	1	1	0	5	1	1	1	0	5	0	2	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	2	4	3	0	13	0	5	4	0	13	0	5	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	5	2	0	10	0	5	3	0	10	0	5	3	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0	4	0	2	1	0	4	0	2	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0	5	0	2	1	0	5	0	2	1	0
Lazio	16	3	5	4	0	16	3	5	4	0	16	0	7	5	0
Abruzzo	1	1	4	1	0	1	1	4	1	0	1	1	4	1	0
Campania	6	3	16	4	0	6	3	16	4	0	6	3	16	4	0
Apulia	4	2	11	3	0	4	2	11	3	0	4	2	11	3	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0	4	1	1	1	0	4	0	2	1	0
Calabria	2	1	6	1	0	2	1	6	1	0	2	1	6	1	0
Sicily	4	2	14	5	0	4	2	14	5	0	4	2	14	5	0
Sardinia	5	1	1	1	0	5	1	1	1	0	5	0	2	1	0
Molise	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	4	2	1	0	0	4	2	1	0	0	4	2	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Abroad	3	1	1	0	1	3	1	1	0	1	3	1	1	0	1
Total	107	33	131	42	2	107	28	134	44	2	107	22	139	45	2

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**Part 2**  
**The electoral results**



# The live coverage on the CISE website on election day

CISE

February 25-26, 2013

February 25, 2013, 12:58: *The geographical data regarding the electoral turnout seems to be favorable to the center-left.*

While waiting for the polls to close and for the scrutiny to begin, we present here an analysis on the electoral participation that may allow us to foresee how things are going to turn out.

We correlated the variation in the turnout from previous general elections—registered yesterday night at 2200 in various provinces—with the results obtained by the two coalitions (and their respective major parties) in the political elections of 2008.

As can be seen in table 1, all the correlations calculated are both high and extremely significant. For instance, the variance in turnout, which can be explained by the difference between the center-left and the center-right in 2008, almost reaches 17%. In general, it can be observed that the electoral strength enjoyed by the center-left and by the PD in 2008 is positively correlated to the increase in turnout. On the contrary, the correlation between votes obtained by the center-right and by the PdL in 2008 and the growth in participation is negative. This means that the decrease in electoral turnout has been extremely pronounced in areas where, five years ago, the center-right had been more suc-

cessful; on the other hand, it has been more moderate in areas where the center-left obtained its best results. We cannot conclude that the center-right voters truly represented the majority of those who stayed away from the polls; however, based on these analyses, it is possible to presume the existence of an asymmetric abstention that could benefit Bersani.

February 25, 2013, 16:18: *The result at the Senate is still very much uncertain.*

The simulations for the composition of the Senate based on the instant polls presented in these first hours (very favorable for the center-left), in reality, still leave results at the Senate considerably uncertain. Too many important regions are still hanging in the balance, and we do not know yet in how many and which regions Monti's Scelta Civica will go beyond the 8% threshold. For instance, if Berlusconi wins only in Veneto and Friuli and Bersani reaches the majority in all other regions, the center-left seats would be 167. On the other hand, if Berlusconi also reaches the majority in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Sicily, the center-left seats would decrease to 134. In this case, not even a postelectoral agreement with Monti could ensure a majority.

Table 1. Ecological correlations (at the provincial level, N=109) between turnout variation (2008-2013) and various indicators (measured in 2008):

	C-L – C-R gap in 2008 (%)	C-L 2008 (%)	PD2008 (%)	C-R2008 (%)	PdL 2008 (%)
r	0.41	0.38	0.34	-0.4	-0.37
R <sup>2</sup>	0.1674	0.1409	0.1155	0.1614	0.1339
p-value	0.0000	0.0001	0.0003	0.0000	0.0001

February 25, 2013, 17:27: *The first simulation of the Senate, with 15% of the polling stations already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Senate with 15% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the number of scrutinized polling stations is not homogeneous among various regions; in particular, polling stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are far below the average.

Table 2. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 17:27

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	12	4	27	6	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	0	1	2	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	6	0	16	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	7	0	16	6	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	0	2	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	105	16	138	54	2

February 25, 2013, 17:45: *At the second simulation of the Senate, 20% of the polling stations are already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Senate with 20% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the number of scrutinized polling stations is not homogeneous among various regions; in particular, polling stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are far below the average (2% and 7%, respectively).

Table 3. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 17:45

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	12	4	27	6	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	0	1	2	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	6	0	16	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	6	0	2	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	108	19	133	53	2

February 25, 2013, 17:56: *At the third simulation of the Senate, Piedmont now goes to Bersani (25% of the polling stations already scrutinized).*

The simulation of the Senate with 25% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the number of scrutinized polling stations is not homogeneous among various regions; in particular, polling stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are far below the average (3% and 9%, respectively).

Table 4. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 17:56

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	13	2	4	3	0
Lombardy	12	4	27	6	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	0	1	2	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	6	0	16	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	7	0	16	6	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	0	2	1	0
Calabria	6	0	2	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	118	16	125	54	2

February 25, 2013, 18:04: *At the fourth simulation of the Senate, Calabria goes to Berlusconi (30% of the polling stations already scrutinized).*

The simulation of the Senate with 30% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the number of scrutinized polling stations is not homogeneous among various regions; in particular, polling stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are far below the average (4% and 13%, respectively). In all other regions, this proportion is at least 20%.

Table 5. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 18:04

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	13	2	4	3	0
Lombardy	12	4	27	6	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	0	1	2	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	6	0	16	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	0	2	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	113	18	129	53	2

February 25, 2013, 18:35: *There has never been such a low turnout in political elections since 1946.*

The historical series of electoral participation for political elections points to an unmistakable fact: today's electoral turnout stops at 75%, an all-time low in the history of the republic (the graph has been later used in the article "Turnout: An accelerated decline").

February 25, 2013, 18:46: *The simulation of the Senate, when 50% of the polling stations are already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Senate with 50% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: The regions certainly going to the center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, and Sardinia. Those certainly going to the center-right are Lombardy, Campania, Apulia, and Veneto. The regions hanging in the balance (for which the result is still uncertain) are Lazio, Piedmont, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily.

Table 6. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 18:46

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	12	4	27	6	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	0	1	2	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	0	6	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	0	2	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0

Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	114	18	128	53	2

February 25, 2013, 18:53: *Turning point elections.*

In these first hours, there is an endless stream of contradictory results: exit and instant polls, projections, and simulations based on official data. Simulations, in particular, show a remarkable instability: notwithstanding the high proportion of already-scrutinized polling stations, whenever data relative to new polling stations is made available, the simulation results change significantly. What is the reason for this instability and contradictory behavior? There are at least three elements for this reflection: First, the number of regions hanging in the balance is very high. Results for Piedmont, Friuli, Lazio, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily are still so very uncertain that whenever new polling stations get scrutinized, more than one region switches from one coalition to the other. This significantly changes the composition of the Senate. In the past, it had been possible to predict the overall result with only 15% of polling stations already scrutinized; today, not even 50% seems enough to clearly define the situation. However, in reality, there is a more important problem.

Second, the reference points of Italians' voting behavior seem to have radically shifted. In particular, Grillo's jump into the political stage seems to have cut through the traditional political spectrum in a completely cross-cutting way. From a social, political, and territorial point of view, he was so transversal that it created huge problems for the current analytical models of electoral projections based on sample polls.

Third, the crisis in the relationship between Italians and political parties seems to have reached a critical level, whereby even the traditional tools used for the analysis of political behaviors (i.e., statistically representative samples, interviews, surveys) appear to be poorly suited to understand and interpret change. This is an absolutely fundamental point when considered that the methodologies used in Italy are the same ones applied in the



United States and in other European countries, which almost always allow the prediction of electoral results with a fair amount of accuracy. Why were these same instruments unable to reflect the change in Italians' electoral behavior? What affected the public opinion so deeply?

February 25, 2013, 19:19: *Maps of the electoral turnout for the Chamber of Deputies by province.*

(The maps have been later used in the article "Turnout: An accelerated decline")

Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	113	20	127	53	2

February 25, 2013, 19:35: *Simulation of the Senate, with 66% of the polling stations scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Senate with 66% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: The regions certainly going to the center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and Lazio. Those certainly going to the center-right are Lombardy, Campania, Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. The regions hanging in the balance are Piedmont, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Abruzzo, and Calabria. In all these regions, the margin between the two coalitions does not go beyond one percentage point. If Berlusconi also won in Friuli, the center-right would reach 130 seats; if Piedmont, Abruzzo, and Calabria went to Bersani instead, the center-left would gain 128 seats in total.

February 25, 2013, 20:05: *The simulation of the Senate, when 75% of the polling stations are already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Senate with 75% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: The regions certainly going to the center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and Lazio. Those certainly going to the center-right are Lombardy, Campania, Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. The regions hanging in the balance are Piedmont, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Abruzzo, and Calabria. In all these regions, the margin between the two coalitions does not go beyond one percentage point. If Berlusconi also won in Friuli, the center-right would reach 130 seats; if Piedmont, Abruzzo, and Calabria went to Bersani instead, the center-left would gain 128 seats in total.

Table 7. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 19:35

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	11	4	27	7	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	1	1	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	0	6	6	0

Table 8. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 20:05

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	11	4	27	7	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	1	1	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0

Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	0	6	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	113	20	127	53	2

Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	0	6	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	113	20	127	53	2

February 25, 2013, 20:41: *The simulation of the Senate, with 80% of the polling stations already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Senate with 80% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: The regions certainly going to the center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and Lazio. Those certainly going to the center-right are Lombardy, Campania, Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. The regions hanging in the balance are especially Piedmont (0.5) and Friuli Venezia-Giulia (0.5). The coalition winning in Piedmont would gain nine seats, therefore obtaining the plurality of the seats in the Senate.

Table 9. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 20:41

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	11	4	27	7	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	1	1	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0

February 25, 2013, 20:43: *The simulation of the Chamber, with 50% of the polling stations already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Chamber composition with 50% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: It is worth noting that, even at this stage, victory in the Chamber and the consequent achievement of the majority prize is still uncertain. In this count, 13 seats (one for Aosta Valley and 12 seats for the overseas constituency) are still excluded.

Table 10. Simulation for the composition of the Chamber, according to scrutiny results at 20:43

List	Seats at the Chamber
PD	297
SEL	35
CD	5
SVP	3
<i>Tot. C-L</i>	340
PdL	92
LN	18
Fdl	9
<i>Tot. C-R</i>	119
Scelta Civica	39
UdC	7
<i>Tot. Monti</i>	45
M5S	112
Total	617

February 25, 2013, 21:13: *The simulation of the Chamber, with 66% of the polling stations already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Chamber composition with 66% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: It is worth noting that, even at this stage, victory in the Chamber and the consequent achievement of the majority prize is still uncertain. In this count, 13 seats (one for Aosta Valley and 12 seats for the overseas constituency) are still excluded.

Table 11. Simulation for the composition of the Chamber, according to scrutiny results at 21:13

List	Seats at the Chamber
PD	293
SEL	36
CD	4
SVP	7
<i>Tot. C-L</i>	340
PdL	94
LN	19
Fdl	9
<i>Tot. C-R</i>	122
Scelta Civica	38
UdC	7
<i>Tot. Monti</i>	45
M5S	110
<b>Total</b>	<b>617</b>

February 25, 2013, 21:28: *The simulation of the Senate, 90% of the polling stations are already scrutinized.*

The simulation of the Senate with 90% of the total number of polling stations already scrutinized is as follows: The regions certainly going to the center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and Lazio. Those certainly going to the center-right are Lombardy, Campania, Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. The regions hanging in the balance are especially Piedmont (0.5) and Friuli Venezia-Giulia (0.5). The coalition winning in Piedmont would gain nine seats, therefore obtaining the plurality of the seats in the Senate.

Table 12. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 21:28

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	4	2	13	3	0
Lombardy	11	4	27	7	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	1	1	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	0	6	6	0
Abruzzo	2	0	4	1	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>2</b>

February 25, 2013, 22:33: *Berlusconi wins at the Chamber if ...*

According to our calculations, assuming that in the remaining 7.327 polling stations, the turnout will be equal to that of the 54,119 already-scrutinized polling stations, Berlusconi will win at the Chamber if he achieves a 6.6 percentage point margin over Bersani in the remaining polling stations.

February 25, 2013, 23:09: *The simulation of the Senate, Bersani takes the lead back in Piedmont.*

In Piedmont, the center-left surpassed the center-right in the vote count. With these results,

although not yet final, Bersani would gain the relative majority at the Senate.

Table 13. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results at 23:09

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	13	2	4	3	0
Lombardy	11	4	27	7	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0
Liguria	5	1	1	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	0	6	6	0
Abruzzo	1	0	4	2	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	3	1	1	0	1
Total	121	20	118	54	2

February 25, 2013, 23:17: Update: Berlusconi wins at the Chamber if ...

With more than 95% of the scrutinized polling stations, Bersani has an advantage of roughly 215,000. This means that if the turnout in the remaining polling stations equals that of the already-scrutinized polling stations, Berlusconi should gain a margin of over 10 percentage points in order to surpass the rival and gain the 340 seats given as the majority bonus at the Chamber.

February 25, 2013, 23:38: Update: Berlusconi wins at the Chamber if ...

In the last 3.5% of the polling stations (2,136), Berlusconi should win over Bersani with a margin of over 16 percentage points in order to surpass Bersani and therefore gain the majority bonus at the Chamber.

February 26, 2013, 00:11: The Chamber goes toward Bersani.

Only 1,234 polling stations (2% of the total) are missing. Bersani has roughly 150,000 votes in his favor. Berlusconi should win with a margin of more than 22 percentage points over Bersani in order to get the majority in the Chamber. At this point, this occurrence seems very unlikely.

February 26, 2013, 00:32: At the Senate, only the overseas constituency votes are missing. Bersani gets closer to gaining the relative majority.

Scrutiny in Piedmont has ended; therefore, the Italian result is final (only a few polling stations are missing, and they are not decisive for any region). The final data for the six seats elected overseas are still missing, but it seems highly unlikely that Berlusconi could invert the trend there. In order to achieve this, he should win in the North American, African, Asian, and Oceanian constituencies. For this reason, it appears that, with a high probability, the relative majority at the Senate will go to Bersani; he, however, will be very far from having the absolute majority (even with a possible agreement with Monti's senators).

Table 14. Simulation for the composition of the Senate, according to scrutiny results on Feb 26, at 00:32

Region	Bersani	Monti	Berlusconi	Grillo	Other
Piedmont	13	2	4	3	0
Lombardy	11	4	27	7	0
Veneto	4	2	14	4	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4	1	1	1	0


Liguria	5	1	1	1	0
Emilia-Romagna	13	1	4	4	0
Tuscany	10	1	3	4	0
Umbria	4	1	1	1	0
Marche	5	1	1	1	0
Lazio	16	0	6	6	0
Abruzzo	1	0	4	2	0
Molise	1	0	1	0	0
Campania	6	2	16	5	0
Apulia	4	1	11	4	0
Basilicata	4	1	1	1	0
Calabria	2	0	6	2	0
Sicily	5	0	14	6	0
Sardinia	5	0	1	2	0
Trentino-Alto Adige	5	1	1	0	0
Aosta Valley	0	0	0	0	1
Overseas	4	2	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>1</b>

M5S	108
<b>Total</b>	<b>617</b>

February 26, 2013, 01:00: *The map for the Chamber: Differences in the electoral results between Bersani and Berlusconi, by province.*

Here is the map of the differences in the electoral results between the center-left and the center-right coalitions at the provincial level. The number in each province represents the percentage points of such difference.

Figure 1. map of gap between center-left and center-right (percentage points) by province



February 26, 2013, 00:46: *Almost definitive seats at the Chamber.*

The simulation of the seats at the Chamber—with only 421 polling stations still to be scrutinized—is as follows: the seats for Aosta Valley and the overseas constituency are still missing.

Table 15. Simulation for the composition of the Chamber, according to scrutiny results on Feb 26, at 00:46

List	Seats at the Chamber
PD	292
SEL	37
CD	6
SVP	5
Tot. C-L	340
PdL	97
LN	18
FdI	9
Tot. C-R	124
Scelta Civica	37
UdC	8
Tot. Monti	45

February 26, 2013, 01:05: *The sign of change: Some “biggs” remain outside the Parliament.*

From our calculations, some notable candidates remain outside the Parliament. Among them are some members of FLI, such as Fini, Bocchino, Granata, Briguglio, Perina, Bongiorno, and Baldassarri (only Della Vedova should be elected in Fini’s party), and those of Rivoluzione Civile, such as Ingroia, Di Pietro, Diliberto, Bonelli, and Ferrero.

Outside of the Parliament also remain the former president of the Senate, Franco Marini (PD), and important elements of the center-right, such as Napoli, Paniz, Crosetto, Storace, Lombardo, and Micciché.

February 26, 2013, 11:24: *Senate, the final seats by list.*

The table with the composition of final seats at the Senate, divided by list, is as follows:

Table 16. Final composition of the Senate

	PD	SEL	Crocetta	SVP	C-L	PdL	LN	GS	C-R	M5S	Monti	VDA
Piedmont	13				13	3	1		4	3	2	
Lombardy	11				11	16	11		27	7	4	
Veneto	4				4	9	5		14	4	2	
FVG	4				4	1			1	1	1	
Liguria	5				5	1			1	1	1	
Emilia R.	13				13	4			4	4	1	
Tuscany	9	1			10	3			3	4	1	
Umbria	4				4	1			1	1	1	
Marche	5				5	1			1	1	1	
Lazio	14	2			16	6			6	6		
Abruzzo	1				1	4			4	2		
Molise	1				1	1			1			
Campania	5	1			6	16			16	5	2	
Apulia	3	1			4	11			11	4	1	
Basilicata	3	1			4	1			1	1	1	
Calabria	2				2	5		1	6	2		
Sicily	4		1		5	14			14	6		
Sardinia	4	1			5	1			1	2		
TAA	3*			2	5		1		1		1	
VDA												1
Overseas	4				4						2	
Total	112	7	1	2	122	98	18	1	117	54	21	1

\* Two out of three senators elected with the center-left in Trentino (here assigned to PD) are in reality autonomous personalities, independent from the party to which they were assigned.

February 26, 2013, 11:24: *Chamber, the final seats by list.*

The table with the composition of final seats at the Chamber is as follows:

Table 17. Final composition of the Chamber

	PD	SEL	CD	SVP	C-L	PdL	LN	Fdi	C-R	M5S	SC	UdC	Other
Piedmont 1	11	2			13	3	1		4	4	2		
Piedmont 2	10	1			11	3	1	1	5	4	2		
Lombardy 1	21	2			23	5	2	1	8	6	3		
Lombardy 2	20	2			22	7	6		13	6	4		
Lombardy 3	8	1			9	2	1	1	4	2	1		
TAA	3	1		5	9	1			1	1	1		
Veneto 1	13	1			14	5	3		8	6	2	1	
Veneto 2	9	1			10	2	2		4	4	2		
FVG	6	1			7	1	1		2	2	1		
Liguria	9	1			10	2			2	3	1		
Emilia-R.	28	2			30	5	1		6	7	2		
Piedmont	23	2	1		26	4		1	5	5	2		
Umbria	5				5	1			1	2	1		
Marche	9	1			10	2			2	3	1		
Lazio 1	21	3			24	6		1	7	8	2	1	
Lazio 2	7	1			8	3		1	4	3	1		
Abruzzo	6	1			7	3			3	3	1		
Molise	2				2								
Campania 1	14	2	1		17	7		1	8	5	1	1	
Campania 2	12	2			14	6		1	7	4	2	1	
Apulia	15	5	1		21	9		1	10	8	2	1	
Basilicata	3	1			4	1			1	1			
Calabria	9	1	1		11	4			4	4		1	
Sicily 1	10	1			11	6			6	6	1	1	
Sicily 2	10	1	1		12	6			6	7	1	1	
Sardinia	8	1	1		10	3			3	4	1		
VDA													1
Estero	5				5	1			1	1	2		3
<b>Total</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>





# Turnout: An accelerated decline

Federico De Lucia and Matteo Cataldi


March 7, 2013

For almost 50 years, Italy has had rates of participation in the elections considered absolutely high and unknown in almost all the other liberal democracies. From 1948 to 1976, the participation rate of the political elections has remained above 90%. As of the 1979's elections (and including up to those of 2001), diachronic comparisons with preceding and following phases unfortunately become pretty difficult because in the calculation of the electors, Italians residing abroad are also taken into account. The latter, having very low rates of electoral participation, significantly lower the voters' percentage. The graphic below, which shows with a line the data concerning the period of calculation of Italians residing abroad, makes it clear

that the rates—even though still pretty high—enter a declining phase during the early 1980s. However, if in the final phase of the First Republic one has experienced sudden falls (1983, 1992), but also important bounces (1987), as during the start of the so-called Second Republic, the fall, on the one side, has become a constant variable. On the other side, it has shown itself in a much stronger way in the occasion that the elections are fixed ahead of the normal expiry of the legislature (1996, 2008).

A significant component of such a fall in turnout, which has affected both the Second Republic and the final part of the First Republic, is connected to the unavoidable decline of the ideological tension of the Italian political system after almost


Figure 1. Turnout trend in elections for the Chamber of Deputies (1948–2013)



50 years of struggle between fiercely opposing visions of the world. It is, in other words, a phenomenon linked to the generational turnover. Older age cohorts, socialized in periods of strong ideological contrast and great organizational strength by the

parties (and thus characterized by extremely high rates of electoral participation), have been progressively replaced by younger age cohorts, often not ideologically characterized and pretty far from the active political militancy.

Figure 2. Turnout by province – elections for the Chamber of Deputies (2013)




Another component, which has particularly characterized the last 20 years, seems instead linked to the perception of the inefficiency of the new political system and to the disillusion that such a perception has slowly created in the elec-

toral body. The fall of turnout would accelerate on the occasion of the anticipated elections because it is then that the above inefficiency and disillusion show themselves more clearly.

However, both these interpretations are not

Figure 3. Turnout variation 2008–2013 (percentage points)



enough to explain the phenomenon registered in 2013: a participation rate of 75.2%, 5.3 percentage points less than that of 2008. And this occurs at the end of a legislature that has lasted almost the whole expected five years. An impressive, unprecedented phenomenon in the country's history: the last five years' legislatures ended with a fall in turnout that was three times smaller. It is then impossible not to connect this fast acceleration with the deep political crisis experienced by the country and, in particular, with what happened in the final part of the last legislature: the absolute and unconditional drawback of the parties facing the financial instability of November 2011; their acceptance of austerity policies by the technocratic government during the following year, but with their electoral campaign strongly critical of these policies at the same time; the nonrenewal of the two main poles; the incapacity of reforming the electoral law; the continuous succession of every sort of judiciary scandal; and a populist climate against every caste that has characterized these last years. The combined effect of these elements has produced a sort of failure of the political system of the Second Republic, even in its last configuration as being almost bipartisan (the electoral order generated by the elections of 2008) and its almost total delegitimation. The electorate has reacted: Turnout has declined by 2.5 million voters.

In figures 2 and 3, we can see the turnout for each province over the national territory. In the first map, we take the percentage of voters at the Chamber of Deputies in the most recent elections; in the second map, we consider the difference between the turnout registered in 2013 and that of five years ago. The differences marked in color regroup the provinces in quartiles.

In one province out of four, the turnout has been smaller than 70%. The totality of these cases is found in the south and in the islands, where there are only few exceptions. In the central regions, the turnout presents data above the average (75.2 %) in

Lazio and in the "red zone," with peaks at its heart: eastern and central Tuscany, Marche and northern Umbria, Romagna, and Emilia up to Reggio. In the north, there is instead a clear distinction between the northeast (in particular, eastern Lombardy and Veneto), where the turnout remains at around or above 80% and the northwest (Varese, Como, and eastern Piedmont), where turnout falls below the national average. Above that average remain, but only slightly, the metropolitan provinces of Milan and Turin. Considering the second map, very similar to the first, the geographical articulation of the turnout with respect to 2008 shows how the most hit zones are the following two: the south and the islands, notably Sicily, and the zone between Lombardy and Piedmont. Instead, the turnout has remained steady in most of the "red zone" and in the Triveneto, as in the metropolitan areas of Rome and Turin.

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# An electoral tsunami hits Italy: 50 provinces washed away from PD and PdL

Matteo Cataldi and Vincenzo Emanuele

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The tsunami that came to shore during last Sunday's and Monday's elections was named Beppe Grillo. His exploits were the main novelty of the 2013 elections. With 8,689,000 votes (26.6%) M5S became the first party in Italy at the expense of the PD and PdL. It is unprecedented in the history of Western Europe that a new party obtained such an extreme level of support in its first national elections. In order to find a similar example, we must look back upon the successes of FI in 1994; however, even then, Silvio Berlusconi's party only obtained 21% of the Italian vote. Considering the history of the Italian Republic, it is worth highlighting how similar percentages have only been obtained by the two main parties of the period. In the First Republic, the DC and the PCI were the only parties to reach similar numbers. Only later during the Second Republic, starting after 1992, were FI, the PdL, and the PD able to attain such numbers. The success of M5S in 2013 is therefore a monumental result in Italian politics.

At this point, it is interesting to analyze the territorial characteristics of Grillo's success. The map below shows how the territorial distribution has changed looking at the percentage of votes for the leading party in each Italian province. In recent elections, the PD and the PdL dominated the political scene. In 2008, Berlusconi's party was victorious in 67 provinces, winning almost everywhere but in the "red zone," where the PD was strongest. Today, M5S is the party that won the most provinces (50) and also the majority of regions (11). Grillo was hugely successful in Sicily, where his party came in first everywhere but Messina, reaching 40% in Trapani and 39% in Ragusa. Grillo's wave did not just stop on the island, where he had already obtained first place with 15% during the regional elections last October. Instead, he went on to win in many other areas of the country, taking 41 provinces that were previously center-right as well as 9 that were

center-left. Furthermore, M5S was able to win in some regions that were thought to be strongholds of FI and LN, such as the northeast, Cuneo, and western Liguria. It was also victorious in other areas like Marche, Torino, and Genoa, which were previously pro-PD.

The PD, led by Pierluigi Bersani, maintained its traditional strongholds in the "red zone," where it won with percentages between 30% and 44% in Emilia-Romagna, Umbria, and Tuscany (with the exception of Lucca, ex-enclave of the DC, won by Grillo). In the entire midsouth, Bersani's party only had the relative majority in three provinces. Interestingly, in Lombardy, the Democrats won almost everywhere, perhaps taking advantage of the decisive regional bonus in the Senate, benefiting from regional elections and the unusual structure of the election (five parties winning above 10% of the vote and therefore reducing the winners' quota well below 30%). The exceptions there are Sondrio (LN) and Como (PdL). The latter represents the only province in the midnorth where Berlusconi has the relative majority, whereas five years ago, he had 22. The remaining 16 provinces in which the PdL holds a lead are concentrated in the south, particularly in Apulia and in the provinces of Lazio and Campania.

Grillo's tsunami has swept away the historical stability of the Italian electoral map,<sup>1</sup> where, election after election, the different areas of the country followed similar trends. Only time will tell us if these are temporary changes or if we have witnessed the emergence of new Italian electoral characteristics.

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
<sup>1</sup> On the historical characteristics of the Italian electoral geography, see the analysis of Dogan [1967], Galli et al. [1968], Corbetta et al. [1988], Caciagli and Spreafico [1990], and Diamanti [2009].

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Figure 1. Map of winning parties by province (values are percentages)



# The center-right and center-left coalitions lose almost 11 million votes

Roberto D'Alimonte and Nicola Maggini

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One of the most relevant results of the 2013 general elections, compared with those from 2008, is, without any doubt, the electoral decline of the two coalitions of the center-left and the center-right.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the two main coalitions have collectively lost nearly 11 million votes. In particular, the center-right has lost a little more than 7 million votes (i.e., 42% of its 2008 consensus), while the center-left has lost more than 3.5 million votes (i.e., 27% of its 2008 consensus). Once again, almost half of the center-right's electorate decided not to vote for Silvio Berlusconi's coalition. This is mirrored by the center-left, which was abandoned by almost a fourth of its electorate. This electoral meltdown has involved both coalitions, even though the center-right is the political coalition that registered the biggest losses, winning 46.8% in 2008 but free-falling to 29.2% in 2013. Furthermore, in 2008, the two coalitions together represented 84.4% of the total valid votes, while in 2013, they represent "only" 58.7%. All this indicates strongly how the Italian party system<sup>2</sup> has entered a restructuring phase with increasing electoral volatility.<sup>3</sup>

The center-right lost votes in all regions of Italy, but particularly in Liguria (-51%), Sicily (-49%), Sardinia and Trentino-Alto Adige (-48%), Marche (-46%), and Emilia-Romagna and Friuli-Venezia Giulia (-45%). Conversely, the losses registered in the majority of southern regions and in Umbria are below the national average. In similar fashion, the center-left electoral decline occurs in all the re-

gions in Italy (with the exception of Trentino-Alto Adige). The most significant losses, those above the national average, occur in the southern regions, especially in Molise (-40%), where it was known that Antonio Di Pietro's party no longer belongs to the coalition. The losses continued in Abruzzo (-38%), Sicily (-34%), Sardinia, Apulia, Campania, Calabria (-31%), Liguria (-32%), and Marche (-36%). The losses registered in many of the former "red zone"<sup>4</sup> regions and in the north are either near the average or below it.

The inability of the main political coalitions to gather support may be caused by some concurrent phenomena. First, with respect to 2008, the electoral turnout<sup>5</sup> decreased by approximately 5 percentage points (i.e., almost 2.6 million votes). This drop is deeper than just the physiological decline of participation due to the generational turnover (to be estimated at two percentage points in the downward). One can therefore hypothesize that a good portion of the total votes for the two main coalitions in 2008 ended in abstention in 2013. Moreover, during the most recent general elections, the M5S was incredibly successful, obtaining more than 8.5 million votes in the Chamber, winning 25.6% of the seats. This is can be attributed to the success of M5S and Beppe Grillo to obtain votes from the other two main center-left and center-right coalitions. Grillo has been able to collect votes nationally at a pretty homogeneous level, represented most strongly in Sicily (33.5%), Marche

<sup>1</sup> For a thorough analysis of the 2008 election results, see D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte (2010).

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of the evolution of the party system in Italy, see Chiaramonte (2007, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> For further information on the concept of electoral volatility, see Pedersen (1979) and Bartolini (1986).

<sup>4</sup> For a thorough examination of the characteristics of the red subculture and of the electoral behavior of the regions within it, see Baccetti and Messina (2009), Diamanti (2010), Floridaia (2010), and De Sio (2011).

<sup>5</sup> For an analysis of the evolution in Italian electoral turnout, see Tuorto (2010).



Table 1. Electoral performance of the main coalitions at the Chamber of Deputies, by region (2008 and 2013 general elections)

Region	Berlusconi 2008	Berlusconi 2013	Var. %	Veltroni 2008	Bersani 2013	Var. %	Casini 2008	Monti 2013	Var. %	M5S 2013	M5S %	Voters 2008 (%)	Voters 2013 (%)	Diff % 2008 vs. 2013
Abruzzo	357,502	229,883	-36%	335,226	204,285	-39%	48,534	69,158	42%	232,542	29.87	80.95	75.95	-5.01
Basilicata	127,972	76,407	-40%	151,576	106,002	-30%	23,430	34,925	49%	75,258	24.27	75.38	69.50	-5.88
Calabria	465,996	283,163	-39%	384,693	265,685	-31%	87,580	98,480	12%	233,169	24.86	71.41	63.15	-8.26
Campania	1,719,068	1,063,495	-38%	1,132,314	775,822	-31%	217,284	337,682	55%	661,075	22.14	76.20	67.88	-8.32
Emilia-R.	1,019,805	557,071	-45%	1,401,094	1,073,209	-23%	119,789	248,579	108%	658,443	24.64	86.18	82.10	-4.08
Friuli-V. G.	364,484	201,865	-45%	272,092	198,175	-27%	46,051	92,813	102%	196,218	27.23	80.78	77.20	-3.58
Lazio	1,517,620	924,641	-39%	1,420,058	987,872	-30%	165,868	291,334	76%	928,175	28.04	81.28	77.51	-3.77
Liguria	435,748	215,186	-51%	425,054	290,502	-32%	37,830	92,593	145%	299,966	32.10	78.00	75.12	-2.89
Lombardy	3,390,037	2,047,431	-40%	1,974,158	1,614,458	-18%	261,806	691,402	164%	1,126,147	19.65	84.69	79.61	-5.08
Marche	364,064	196,884	-46%	449,049	288,278	-36%	59,848	99,002	65%	298,141	32.13	82.94	79.84	-3.11
Molise	82,561	53,469	-35%	89,959	54,296	-40%	11,459	20,105	75%	52,057	27.67	78.60	78.13	-0.47
Piedmont	1,279,363	721,239	-44%	1,021,428	726,631	-29%	141,404	309,999	119%	706,297	27.53	80.76	77.26	-3.49
Apulia	1,129,886	727,376	-36%	847,294	584,125	-31%	189,454	231,718	22%	563,243	25.53	76.21	69.94	-6.27
Sardinia	421,420	219,197	-48%	393,078	272,519	-31%	54,665	87,243	60%	274,834	29.69	72.30	68.32	-3.98
Sicily	1,531,324	786,484	-49%	813,202	538,093	-34%	264,454	215,042	-19%	842,617	33.55	75.02	64.59	-10.43
Tuscany	797,428	459,697	-42%	1,193,321	922,300	-23%	98,573	187,287	90%	532,875	24.01	83.71	79.19	-4.52
Trentino-A. A	186,293	96,246	-48%	170,843	271,088	59%	25,594	84,242	229%	88,622	14.62	84.26	81.03	-3.22
Umbria	204,124	127,962	-37%	267,641	187,197	-30%	25,582	50,603	98%	143,004	27.16	84.15	79.53	-4.62
Veneto	1,669,234	935,404	-44%	944,380	686,970	-27%	171,126	349,353	104%	775,862	26.35	84.72	81.71	-3.01
Total	17,063,929	9,923,100	-42%	1,368,6460	1,004,7507	-27%	205,0331	359,1560	75%	8,688,545	25.55	80.51	75.20	-5.32



and Liguria (32.1%). It is important to highlight that both Liguria and Sicily are the regions where the center-right lost the most votes compared with the 2008 elections (almost half of the votes), and at the same time, they are two regions where the center-left (always compared with 2008) saw losses above the national average. As for the center-left, it is important to note how the coalition's smallest loss was recorded in Lombardy (-18%), where the M5S only reached 19.6%, the worst percentage obtained by Grillo's movement with the exception for Trentino-Alto Adige (14.6%). The only region of the former "red zone" where the losses for the center-left are above the national average, as we have already seen, is Marche, one of the regions where the M5S was most successful.

Finally, Mario Monti's coalition, compared with the UdC in 2008, increased, in absolute terms, its votes in all regions except in Sicily, where it lost almost 50,000 votes compared with 2008 (-19%). In Sicily, Monti and his coalition could not surpass 5.9% in the Senate and failed to get any candidates elected. At the national level, the center coalition led by Monti obtained almost 3.5 million votes, while the UdC obtained more than 2 million votes by itself in 2008. In the diachronic comparison, it is important to point out that Monti's coalition showed a territorial distribution of votes notably different from that of the UdC in 2008. The regions where it saw an increase in votes are Trentino-Alto Adige (+229%), Lombardy (+164%), Liguria (+145%), Piedmont (+119%), Emilia-Romagna (+108%), Veneto (+104%), and Friuli-Venezia Giulia (+102%). The biggest electoral growth occurred in these northern regions. In this respect, it is remarkable that the regions where Monti's list does not reach the electoral threshold of 8% minimum in the Senate are all midsouth regions: Lazio, Sardinia, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily.

Therefore, these elections mark an evident electoral decline for the two main coalitions of the center-left and center-right, both incapable of keeping a significant share of their own electorates. This increased electoral volatility can be explained

to some extent by the growing disaffection toward politics and the subsequent increase in abstentions. On the other hand, there is now a different competitive dynamic in Italian politics: no longer are there only two main coalitions (bipolar); rather, now there are four (quadripolar). In particular, a new political force, the M5S, has been highly competitive and a viable and popular choice for many electors who had previously cast their ballot for the center-right or center-left in 2008.

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# Italian parties' loss of support and the success of a new political actor

Nicola Maggini

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One of the most relevant elements emerging from the political elections of 2013 is the backward trend of the two main center-right and center-left parties, PdL and PD, with respect to the previous election of 2008. In this paper, we will try to analyze the trends of the main Italian parties with a diachronic comparison, which includes the 2006 elections as well. As can be seen in Table 1, M5S was the party to receive more votes at the Chamber “(excluding Aosta Valley and the foreign constituency); this party obtained little more than 8.5 million votes, with a percentage of 25.6%, despite its first time at these political elections. This is indeed an impressive feat: never in the history of the republic after the elections of 1946 has a new party obtained a similar percentage at its first political elections. The success of Beppe Grillo’s movement, for certain, occurred to the detriment of the other main parties, PD and PdL. The draining of votes from PD and PdL can be explained only partially by the competition represented by the M5S; the second relevant factor is the decrease in electoral turnout of roughly five percentage points with respect to 2008 (dropping from 80.5% to 75.2%). This decline equals slightly more than 2.6 million voters, a figure that exceeds the physiological reduction in the turnout given by the generational turnover (estimated at around two percentage points). The decline will be even more consistent if the data from 2006, when turnout was 83.6%, is considered. For this reason, it is possible to assume that part of the votes given to PD and PdL in 2008 turned to abstention.

In fact, Pierluigi Bersani’s party went from 33.2% in 2008 to 25.4% in 2013, dropping almost 3.5 million votes along the way. The comparison with the *L’Ulivo* list<sup>1</sup> is unflattering as well: the lost votes

in this case are again roughly 3.3 million. The decrease for Silvio Berlusconi’s PdL has been even more marked, both as a percentage and as an absolute value. PdL indeed went from 37.4% in 2008 to 21.6% in 2013, a decrease of 15.8 percentage points. More than 6 million voters abandoned Berlusconi’s party. In 2006, FI and AN together obtained almost 14 million votes. Today, this support declined by half. Even by summing the votes gained by the two “splinter” parties (FLI and FdI), only a little more than 8 million votes are reached, which is far less than the 13.6 million of 2008. Today, PdL has less votes (both in absolute terms and as a percentage) than FI in 2006. The other new political actor of these elections is Mario Monti’s list, which gained almost 3 million votes, representing 8.3% of the total. At the Chamber, Monti’s list has surely damaged its allies: FLI and UdC. In particular, Pierferdinando Casini’s list currently does not even reach the 2% threshold, from 6.8% obtained in 2006 and 5.6% in 2008: it lost 2 million votes in the past seven years. If we sum the votes of the LN and those of GS-MpA, it could be said that Roberto Maroni’s party regained more or less the levels of 2006 (when it allied itself with MpA). Regarding center-right minority parties, Francesco Storace’s LD, with its 0.6%, reached the same percentage obtained by FT in 2006.

Considering the center-left, it can be noted that the SEL obtained roughly the same amount of votes (and the same percentage) of SA in 2008, while RC obtained less votes of both IdV in 2008 (one of the parties converged in RC) and SA (also formed by parties now part of RC). In 2006, the PRC, the PdCI<sup>2</sup>, and the *Verdi*<sup>3</sup> gained—when summed to-

<sup>1</sup> L’Ulivo (Olive Tree) is an electoral list of the center-left coalition formed in 2006 by the merger of DS and DL.

<sup>2</sup> PdCI (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani – Party of the Italian Communists) is a left-wing party founded in 1998.

<sup>3</sup> I Verdi (The Greens) is an environmentalist party founded in 1990.

gether—almost 4 million votes. Today, the SEL and RC together do not reach 2 million. This represents an overall draining of support for the “radical” left parties.

If we consider the results of the Senate (Table 2), the most important differences with respect to the Chamber include the PD being the first party with 27.4% of votes, followed by the M5S with 23.8%. The worst performance of the M5S at the Senate (and the better performance of PD) might be due to the different electorate (citizens have to be 26 or

older to vote for the Senate) and the possibility of expressing different preferences for the Senate and Chamber. Faced with the option to vote differently for the two institutions, the perception of what was at stake in some regions might have provided an incentive for some of Grillo’s voters to vote for the PD at the Senate in order to achieve the regional majority bonus.

In addition to this, Monti’s coalition ran with a united list, which obtained 9.1% at the Senate (almost the same percentage reached by UdC, FLI,

Table 1. Votes to parties at the Chamber (general elections of 2006, 2008, and 2013)

Chamber lists	2006		Chamber lists	2008		Chamber lists	2013	
	absolute values	%		absolute values	%		absolute values	%
L’Ulivo	11.928.362	31.3	PD	12.092.973	33.2	PD	8.644.187	25.4
PRC	2.229.604	5.8	SA	1.124.435	3.1	CD	167.170	0.5
PdCI	884.912	2.3				SEL	1.089.442	3.2
Verdi	783.944	2.1				RC	765.172	2.3
IdV	877.159	2.3	IdV	1.593.487	4.4			
RnP <sup>1</sup>	991.049	2.6	PS <sup>2</sup>	355.513	1.0	PSI	–	–
Socialisti Craxi <sup>3</sup>	115.105	0.3						
SVP	182.703	0.5	SVP	147.666	0.4	SVP	146.804	0.4
FI	9.045.384	23.7	PdL	13.629.068	37.4	PdL	7.332.667	21.6
AN	4.706.654	12.3				Fdi	665.830	2.0
AS Mussolini <sup>4</sup>	255.410	0.7				FLI	159.332	0.5
FT	231.313	0.6	FT-LD	885.226	2.4	LD	219.769	0.6
LN-MpA	1.748.066	4.6	LN	3.024.758	8.3	LN	1.390.156	4.1
			MpA	410.490	1.1	GS-MpA	148.552	0.4
UdC	2.579.951	6.8	UdC	2.050.331	5.6	UdC	608.210	1.8
						SC Monti	2.824.065	8.3
						M5S	8.689.458	25.6
						FiD	380.756	1.1
Total Others	173.263	0.5	Total Others	2.527.104	6.9	Total Others	770.954	2.3
Total valid	38.151.407	100	Total valid	36.452.259	100	Total valid	34.002.524	100

Note: This summary excludes the foreign constituency and Aosta Valley.

<sup>1</sup> RnP (Rosa nel Pugno – Rose in the Fit) is a center-left electoral list formed in 2005 by the merger of SDI (Socialisti Democratici Italiani – Italian Democratic Socialists) and RI (Italian Radicals).

<sup>2</sup> PS (Partito Socialista – Socialist Party) is a center-left party founded in 2007 by the merger of some minor social-democratic parties and groups (among them the most important one was SDI). In 2009 the party was renamed PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano – Italian Socialist Party) as the old Italian Socialist Party founded in 1892.

<sup>3</sup> I Socialisti (The Socialists) is a center-left party founded by Bobo Craxi (son of Bettino Craxi) in 2006.

<sup>4</sup> AS (Alternativa Sociale – Social Alternative) is a coalition of right-wing parties. It was founded in 2004 by Benito Mussolini’s granddaughter Alessandra Mussolini and in the 2006 general elections AS was a member of Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition.

Table 2. Votes to parties at the Senate (general elections of 2006, 2008, and 2013)

Senate lists	2006		Senate lists	2008		Senate lists	2013	
	absolute values	%		absolute values	%		absolute values	%
DS + DL	9.701.748	28.4	PD	11.042.452	33.7	PD	8.400.161	27.4
						CD	163.375	0.5
						Il megafono <sup>1</sup>	138.581	0.4
PRC	2.518.361	7.4	SA	1.053.228	3.2	SEL	912.308	3.0
Insieme con L'Unione <sup>2</sup>	1.423.003	4.2						
						RC	549.995	1.8
IdV	986.191	2.9	IdV	1.414.730	4.3			
RnP	851.604	2.5	PS	284.837	0.9	PSI	57.688	0.2
Socialisti Craxi	126.431	0.4						
FI	8.202.890	24.0	PdL	12.511.258	38.2	PdL	6.829.587	22.3
AN	4.235.208	12.4						
AS Mussolini	214.526	0.6				FdI	590.083	1.9
FT	204.498	0.6	FT-LD	686.926	2.1	LD	221.114	0.7
LN-MpA	1.530.667	4.5	LN	2.642.280	8.1	LN	1.328.555	4.3
			MpA	355.361	1.1	GS+PDS-MpA <sup>3</sup>	170.718	0.5
UdC	2.309.442	6.8	UdC	1.866.356	5.7	SC Monti	2.797.486	9.1
						M5S	7.285.850	23.8
						FiD	278.396	0.9
Total Others	1.858.046	5.4	Total Others	916.911	2.8	Total Others	893.648	2.9
Total valid	34.162.615	100	Total valid	32.774.339	100	Total valid	30.617.545	100

Note: This summary excludes the foreign constituency, Aosta Valley, and Trentino-Alto Adige.

<sup>1</sup> Il Megafono (The Megaphone) is a center-left electoral list presented by Rosario Crocetta (governor of Sicily) in the 2013 general elections only for the Senate in Sicily.

<sup>2</sup> Insieme con l'Unione (Together with the Union) is a center-left electoral list formed by Verdi, PdCI and Consumatori Uniti (United Consumers) for the 2006 Senatorial election.

<sup>3</sup> PDS (Partito dei Siciliani – Party of the Sicilians) is the regional section of MpA in Sicily.

and SC together at the Chamber, 10.6%). Monti's list at the Senate gained more votes, both as a percentage and in absolute terms, than UdC both in 2008 and 2006 (when Casini's party, still allied with Berlusconi, performed best out of all the three previous political elections). In general, when compared with the past, the observations made for the other parties at the Chamber is also valid for the Senate.

In conclusion, these political elections registered an increased electoral volatility that affected the majority of Italian parties forced to face the increasing disenchantment and alienation of the citizens with respect to politics in general (outlined by a significant increase in abstention) and the emergence of new political actors in particular (first of

all, Grillo's M5S).

All these elements suggest that we are undergoing a phase of electoral realignment and the possible deconstruction of Italian political system.

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# Votes to coalitions at the local level: Berlusconi takes the lead in small towns, and Bersani wins in the cities

Vincenzo Emanuele

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This article analyzes the electoral performance of the four main coalitions in the 8,018 Italian municipalities (Aosta Valley is excluded) ranked according to categories of demographic dimension. At the national level, Pierluigi Bersani's coalition won by a small margin (29.5% against 29.2% of the center-right), while the M5S gained third place with 25.6%. The result of the coalition headed by Mario Monti was disappointing: it reached only 10.6% (see Table 1). However, looking more in depth at the demographic dimension of the municipalities, the previous picture shows interesting details.

The center-right lost votes with the increase in the municipality dimension, especially thanks to the contribution of LN, whose voters are mainly gathered in small urban centers. The center-left experienced the opposite, even though the presence of the separatists of Südtirol of SVP attenuated the underrepresentation in municipalities with up to 5,000 inhabitants (SVP is so strong in the small municipalities of the Bolzano province that it managed to reach 1.4% at the national level). The consequence of this dichotomy between city and countryside that affects the two main coalitions is highlighted in Figure 1: Silvio Berlusconi's coalition placed first in municipalities with up to 50,000 inhabitants, while the center-left managed to surpass the rivals and win the majority premium at the Chamber, only thanks to the votes obtained in middle and big urban centers. In big cities, the center-left achieved four percentage points more than in middle-sized urban centers, reaching 33.4%, while the center-right conversely dropped down to 25% and was surpassed by even the M5S.

If results are disaggregated for the various geopolitical areas, further empirical evidence emerge that are worth noting here.

The most striking difference can be seen in the northwest. Here, the various coalitions seem

to achieve remarkably different results whether the three major cities or the dense regional net of tiny municipalities<sup>1</sup> (especially in Piedmont and Liguria) are considered. Up to 5,000 inhabitants indeed, the center-right is ahead with respect to Beppe Grillo's party, while the center-left places only third, almost seven points behind. Starting from small centers, while the center-left begins its recovery, the center-right, however, experiences a loss of votes. So in this category, it is the M5S that wins first place. On the other hand, in the municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, the center-left closes the gap and surpasses its two rivals; its head start increases in the next two "urban" categories until reaching, in big cities, more than 12.5 points over the center-right, which slides down to 21.6%. In the northeast, a similar trend can also be observed, but here, Grillo's relative weakness and the Northern League's hold over the region, support the center-right in maintaining first place until the middle-sized urban centers. On the other hand, in big cities, Bersani manages to overcome Berlusconi and gain an advantage of more than five points over him. The northeast is also the area where Monti's coalition is stronger; in fact, it has reached 12.2% and 14.2% in big cities, while it remains confined to single-digit percentages south of the Po river.

In the "red zone" (namely, an area where the center-left is historically dominant, which comprises Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche), the supremacy of the center-left is unchallenged, even taking into account the loss of 10 percentage points with respect to Veltroni's performance in 2008. The center-right, already historically weak in this area, drops to 21.1% and is

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<sup>1</sup> Municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants.

Table 1. Votes to main parties and coalitions by town size

Italy	Town size	Center-left	Center-right	M5S	Monti
	0–5,000	28.5	31.8	23.6	11.1
	5,001–15,000	28.0	31.0	25.4	10.4
	15,001–50,000	28.5	29.6	26.6	10.2
	50,001–100,000	28.9	28.4	27.3	10.4
	Above 100,000	33.4	25.0	25.2	10.7
	Total	29.5	29.2	25.6	10.6
Northwest	0–5,000	24.9	31.7	28.3	11.5
	5,001–15,000	27.0	28.3	29.8	11.3
	15,001–50,000	29.4	26.1	29.2	11.3
	50,001–100,000	29.7	25.5	28.8	11.8
	Above 100,000	34.2	21.6	28.0	11.7
	Total	29.1	26.8	28.8	11.5
Northeast	0–5,000	26.6	35.9	20.3	11.8
	5,001–15,000	25.2	34.8	23.1	11.5
	15,001–50,000	28.0	31.4	23.3	11.9
	50,001–100,000	30.0	31.3	21.0	12.7
	Above 100,000	32.6	27.4	20.0	14.2
	Total	27.7	32.8	21.9	12.2
“Red zone”	0–5,000	34.7	24.7	27.2	9.0
	5,001–15,000	38.6	21.3	26.6	8.7
	15,001–50,000	38.8	21.0	26.3	9.1
	50,001–100,000	37.5	20.7	27.0	9.6
	Above 100,000	42.1	19.7	23.0	9.8
	Total	38.9	21.1	25.7	9.2
South	0–5,000	30.0	29.9	23.8	10.9
	50,01–15,000	25.6	32.7	26.4	10.0
	15,001–50,000	23.9	33.4	28.3	9.5
	50,001–100,000	25.2	30.9	29.2	9.8
	Above 100,000	29.6	27.3	27.9	9.3
	Total	26.8	30.8	27.3	9.8


surpassed by the M5S. In big cities, the divide between progressives and conservatives goes beyond 22 points (42.1% vs. 19.7%).

These results underline how, after 15 years of center-right supremacy, Bersani’s coalition improved its competitiveness in the northeast by reducing Berlusconi’s advantage to roughly five points. At the same time, the “red regions” still remain off-limits, and the leadership of the left there remains unchallenged. The trend for the three main coalitions in the south is quite curious. When the overall result for the south is considered,

the center-right places first by far with respect to the rivals, and the center-left places third, surpassed even by Grillo. If, on the other hand, the results for the different municipalities are disaggregated based on their demographic dimension, Bersani seems to have the advantage, although small, in municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants (30% to 29.9%). In small urban centers (5,001-15,000 inhabitants), however, it suffers from a relevant loss of 4.5 points, while both Berlusconi and Grillo gather more consents and become first and second, respectively, for all the middle demo-



Figure 1. Trend for the three coalitions in Italian municipalities



graphic categories (municipalities with between 5,000 and 100,000 inhabitants). In big cities, as usual, the center-left recovers and gains first place, while the center-right is surpassed by the Five Star Movement and places third.

Considering all 20 categories of demographic dimension in which the municipalities have been divided (five demographic ranges in each one of the four geopolitical regions), the following can be observed: the center-left is first in 11 categories (including big cities in all regions, the entire “red zone”, “belt municipalities”<sup>2</sup> and middle-sized urban centers in the northwest, and tiny municipalities in the south), the center-right takes the lead in eight categories (including tiny municipalities in the northwest, the entire northeast except for big cities, small centers, belt municipalities, and middle-sized urban centers in the south), and Grillo’s party surpasses all the others in small centers in the northeast.

Another useful tool to understand electoral results achieved by the coalitions in the Italian municipalities are position indexes, such as the quartiles. These are obtained by ordering the 8,018 Italian municipalities based on the percentage of

votes obtained by each coalition and then considering the 25% of municipalities where the coalition performed best and the 25% where it performed worst. Table 2 reports for the three coalitions the total number of municipalities included in the top and bottom quartiles, divided by categories of demographic dimension. The center-left confirms its markedly urban character: the top quartile includes 24 out of 46 big cities, while only 4 are in the bottom quartile (Giugliano in Campania, Andria, Latina, and Catania). This city-oriented profile of the progressive coalition is sidetracked by the presence of SVP, which, as mentioned before, is rooted in the tiny municipalities of the Alto Adige. In fact, it always reaches more than 50% of the votes in these municipalities, bringing about an overrepresentation of the category of municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants in the top quartile of Bersani’s coalition. The center-right, on the other hand, witnesses a strengthening of its rural character with respect to 2008: only two cities (Giugliano in Campania and Andria) with more than 100,000 inhabitants and eight middle-sized urban centers appear in its top quartile.

In general, among 141 municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants, only 10 (7%) appear in the center-right top quartile, while 45 (almost one-third) appear in its bottom quartile (this list includes some of the most important cities of the country: Venice, Florence, Bologna, Genoa, Turin,

<sup>2</sup> Municipalities with between 15,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, often belonging to the greater metropolitan area of the main urban center.

Table 2. Municipalities included in the top and bottom quartiles for the three main coalitions

Municipalities by category		Center-left		Center-right		M5S	
BEST 25%							
Italy	N	N	%	N	%	N	%
0–5,000	5,629	1,482	26.3	1,542	27.4	1,249	22.2
5,001–15,000	1,666	356	21.4	362	21.7	503	30.2
15,001–50,000	582	120	20.6	91	15.6	203	34.9
50,001–100,000	95	23	24.2	8	8.4	38	40.0
Above 100,000	46	24	52.2	2	4.3	12	26.1
TOTAL	8,018	2,005	25.0	2,005	25.0	2,005	25.0
WORST 25%							
Italy	N	N	%	N	%	N	%
0–5,000	5,629	1,442	25.6	1,394	24.8	1,665	29.6
5,001–15,000	1,666	429	25.8	410	24.6	270	16.2
15,001–50,000	582	113	19.4	155	26.6	57	9.8
50,001–100,000	95	17	17.9	25	26.3	6	6.3
Above 100,000	46	4	8.7	20	43.5	7	15.2
TOTAL	8,018	2,005	25.0	2,004	25.0	2,005	25.0

and Rome). If we consider all the municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, only 101 out of 722 (14%) appear in the center-right top quartile, while double that number (200) is present in its bottom quartile.

In this picture, the result obtained by the M5S resembles more that of the center-left than that of the center-right. Although, as was said before, Grillo's party is generally unrelated to demographic dimension, it appears weak in tiny municipalities (only 22% of these appear in its best quartile), while it is overrepresented in the other four categories, especially in the belt municipalities and in the middle-sized urban centers. Considering cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, Grillo's party appears more city-oriented than Bersani's coalition, with 50 municipalities in its top quartile and only 13 in its bottom quartile. If we consider all

municipalities with above 15,000 inhabitants, this feature is even more marked: 35% is included in Grillo's top quartile, while only 10% is included in the bottom quartile (the difference for the center-left is less notable, 23% to 19%).

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# Volatile and tripolar: The new Italian party system

Alessandro Chiaramonte and Vincenzo Emanuele

February 27, 2013

The extraordinary success of Grillo and the electoral collapse of the PdL and the PD deeply transformed the landscape of the Italian party system.

A “limited bipolar” party system emerged after the 2008 general elections, with two parties, PdL and PD, collectively getting more than 70% of the votes [Chiaramonte 2010]. This represented a great innovation with respect to the “fragmented bipolar” system that had characterized the recent years, a system in which many small parties could exert considerable power upon the two main political coalitions. Additionally, this represents an innovation with respect to the First Republic, in which the competitive dynamic between the two main parties (the PCI and the DC) played on strong ideological polarization and an international context that hindered any sort of alternation.

The Italian party system has once again changed its nature with the most recent election. A party undergoing its first electoral test was able to achieve 25.6% of the vote, a truly unique event in Western European history (excluding the foundation of democratic regimes). Even the unprecedented success of FI in 1994 (21%) was exceeded. Moreover, for the first time, three parties each received more than 20% of the vote, thus transforming the Italian political system from a bipolar system, which characterized the Second Republic, into a tripolar system.

The index of bipolarism (Figure 1) is the sum of the vote shares (or seats) received by the two main coalitions. As it appears in the figure, the two curves register a true breakdown. The total votes assigned to the two largest coalitions had grown throughout the Second Republic, reaching its peak in 2006 (99.1%), in an election characterized by a perfectly bipolar competition. Then in 2008 the bipolar nature of the system lost some strength (84.4%); however, it remained at about the same level from 1994 to 2001. Today, it registers a breakdown of almost 26 points, as only 58.7% of the votes were won by the two main political options, and more than 40%


of voters betrayed the classic bipolar dynamic of the election. The same trend can be observed through the variation in seats, although in a less striking way due to the disproportional mechanism of the electoral law that favors the main political options. Today, one-fourth of the seats in the Chamber are assigned to the representatives of the third (and the fourth) pole.

The sizable drop in the two-party index, which measures the shares of votes and seats collected by the two main electoral lists, is an obvious consequence of a system where three parties surpass more than 20% of the votes. Today, the index has dropped to 51%, from 70.6% in 2008 (representing the peak since 1979). This share is greater than those encountered during the Second Republic (figure 2) but still is not comparable to the numbers seen in other Western democracies. Today, approximately half of the voters do not vote for either of the two main parties.

If we widen our analysis beyond the three main political options, we observe the reappearance of small parties in the 2013 elections. In fact, 10 lists received 1% of the vote, the same number represented in the Parliament. These lists, however, are not the same: RC (2.2%) and FiD (1.1%) will not enter into the Parliament, while the CD, led by Tabacci, and the South Tyroleans of the SVP had access to seats despite having only 0.5% and 0.4%, respectively, of the votes.

These numbers signal an inversion with respect to the tendencies registered in 2008, when there were nine parties receiving over 1% of the votes, but only six of their lists were represented in Parliament. The political choices of party leaders had produced a drastic reduction of the fragmentation compared with the previous election. Today, even though the same electoral system is in place, different choices have generated an increasing number of political parties. The effective number of electoral lists (namely, the Laasko-Taagepera index [1979])

Figure 1. Index of bipolarism (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013).



Note: The index of bipolarism is the sum of the votes (or seats) of the two strongest coalitions. In particular, in the elections between 1994 and 2001, it is the joint percentage of the majoritarian/uninominal votes of the “enlarged” coalitions (including eventual territorial differences and partial alliances) of the center-right and center-left. For the 2006 and 2008 elections, it represents the joint percentage of the proportional votes of the two strongest coalitions (as defined by the same coalition leader).


provides a synthetic measure of the number of parties competing in the electoral arena (in terms of votes) or in Parliament (seats). It is an effective way to count parties while highlighting their actual electoral strength. For instance, in the case of a perfect two-party system, if the two electoral lists each receive 50% of the votes, then the index has a value of 2. As it appears in figure 4, the number of effective parties in 2013 has increased to 5.3% from 3.8% in 2008, closer to the 2006 value of 5.7%. As for the number of effective parties in the Parliament, it has increased only slightly compared with 2008, remaining at 3.5%.

The complex and sometimes contradictory dynamics in the Italian electoral system is very restrictive for the parties outside of political coalitions (the representation threshold in the Chamber is 4%), but quite open for those within a coalition

(2% with an admission clause for the first-place finisher under the threshold). This can essentially explain the difference in the fragmentation between the electoral and the parliamentary arenas. In fact, this system, which allows parliamentary representation of up to 10 parties, produced the highest disproportionality of our republic’s history in the conversion between votes and seats (figure 5). This disproportionality can be measured through the Gallagher Index (1991), which examines the difference between the votes and seats attributed to the various political parties: the greater this difference is, the greater the bias induced by the electoral system and therefore the higher the Gallagher Index.

As it appears, the index retained extremely low levels throughout the First Republic (1948–1992) due to the almost purely proportional electoral law.

Figure 2. Two-party index (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013)




Note: The two-party index represents the sum of the votes (or seats) cast for the two biggest electoral lists. In 2006, DS and DL were considered separately instead of a unitary list of the center-left (Ulivo).

The introduction of the 4% representation threshold for all the electoral lists in 1994 produced an increase in the index, which reached its maximum in 2001 (10.2). With the introduction of the Porcellum electoral law, the system became more proportional again as the two main political coalitions tried to ensure representation of the smaller lists, enabling them to avoid the 4% threshold. Today, the Disproportionality Index has shot up to 17.3, more than three times the 2008 value. This was made possible by the fact that the winning coalition has received 54%, with only 29.5% of the votes. On the contrary, in the 2006 elections, the center-left coalition (L'Unione) had a majority in the Chamber with 49.8%, while the PdL and the LN received 46.8% of the votes. This bias in the representation mechanism ranked Italy second in Western Europe, just below France (17.7) and ahead of the UK (15.1) in 2010. Notwithstanding, both France and the UK have majoritarian electoral systems, while Italy has a (formally) proportional one.

There are no doubts that the 2013 elections has created a turning point, bringing with it the crisis of the two-party system, an increase in fragmentation, and disproportionality at an all-time high. Despite these, the evidence indicates that the greatest change is not one of the previous; rather, it is the index of aggregate volatility. This index simply measures the net aggregate switch in votes between two successive elections [Pedersen 1979; Bartolini 1986], and it is calculated by summing up the differences in terms of votes shares among parties between an election and the previous one. Volatility is therefore a measure of stability for a political system.

In 2013, Italian volatility reached an incredible value of 39.1 (the index ranges between 0 and 100), more than four times the value registered in 2008. Mair (2011) indicates that a highly volatile election is one scoring higher than 20, making the value of 39.1 very significant. Looking at a sample of 279 elections in 16 countries since WWII, only the dramatic Greek elections of May 2012 and the

Figure 3. The fragmentation of the electoral lists (Chamber of Deputies, 2006–2013)




Spanish elections in 1982 have shown a greater volatility than that of Italy in 2013. These numbers provide an idea of the historical extent of the ongoing realignment of party system changes that seem to change with each election. In 1994, the index scored an analogous peak (Figure 6) and that election was characterized by the fall of the old parties (primarily the DC) and the rise of new ones (FI being the main one). In that moment, the First Republic was brought to a close, and the Second Republic was born. Only time will tell if the 2013 elections will be the catalyst for the birth of the Third Republic.

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Figure 4. Number of effective electoral lists (Chamber of Deputies, 2006–2013)



Note: The effective number of electoral lists in terms of votes was calculated taking into account the votes from the proportional component of the electoral representation. For the 2006 elections, the two separate lists for the DS and the DL (center-left Christian-democrats), rather than the joint list of the Ulivo, have been used. We obtained this data by interpolating the relative strength of the two lists at the Senate (where they were divided). In 2008, both PD and PdL were considered as unique lists since the PdL's constitutive parties would have merged only a few months after, even though they were still officially split. As for the effective number of electoral lists in terms of seats, for the elections between 1994 and 2001, it was calculated taking into account, separately, all the parties that received at least one seat in the proportional component (either with their own list or with an associated one) or in the majoritarian one (either on their own or in coalition with other political parties). Analogously, we have taken into account all the parties' seats irrespectively from the fact that they were assigned to their own lists, to associated lists, or as "guests" on other lists.

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
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
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Figure 5. Disproportionality Index (Chamber of Deputies, 1948–2013)



Note: The index was calculated with only the proportional component for the elections held in 1994, 1996, and 2001.

Figure 6. Total volatility (Chamber of Deputies, 1948–2013)





# A “media divide” in the vote of February 25?

Lorenzo De Sio

March 20, 2013

The M5S is undeniably the main winner of the elections of February 24 and 25, with an achievement that has consigned to a new political party more than 8.5 million votes. One of the central aspects of the M5S’s success lies in its crosscutting nature: in geographical terms, cutting across the traditional Italian geopolitical areas (see Cataldi and Emanuele in this volume); in political terms, with the ability of attracting votes from the center-left and the center-right coalitions in a completely crosscutting manner (see the analyses of various vote shifts in Turin and Palermo; Monza, Pavia, and Varese; and Florence and Rome); finally, in social and demographic terms, with its great interclass spreading ability (see the analysis by Luca Comodo with Ipsos data in *Il Sole 24 Ore*, March 10, 2013).

The consequence is thus a curious paradox. The M5S stands out for the apparent lack of any characterization of its own electorate: not political nor geographical nor sociodemographic, if we are to exclude a strong underrepresentation among retirees. But what is then the main feature identifying Grillo’s voters? To answer this question, it is necessary to make use of survey data: we take into account the data from the third wave of the CISE Electoral Panel. These are preelectoral interviews (the fourth postelectoral wave is still ongoing), but they reveal important dynamics that are coherent with other analyses and the electoral result. The first hypothesis that we have advanced is that generational features might be relevant: a sort of generational revolt, with the M5S triumph in the youngest social strata. Apparently, this hypothesis is substantially confirmed, but some aspects differ from expectations (see Table 1).

The border between “youngster” and “less-young people” is curious: among the former, we find those up to 54 years old (whose votes for the M5S are seven percentage points greater than the whole sample), while the M5S performs much

Table 1. Vote intentions for the main parties by age cohorts: Preelectoral data from the CISE Electoral Panel, reweighted for the actual results (N = 1,673)

Vote intention	Age cohorts					Whole sample
	18–29	30–44	45–54	55–64	65+	
PD	20.2	20.4	23.6	29.8	32.9	25.4
SEL	5.9	3.2	2.5	3.9	1.8	3.2
PdL	15.2	16.7	19.3	22.0	33.7	21.6
LN	1.3	5.2	4.5	4.4	3.5	4.1
M5S	38.4	35.4	32.3	14.2	8.8	25.6
Monti	9.5	8.7	6.7	8.9	8.2	8.3
Others	9.6	10.4	11.2	16.8	11.1	11.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	187	452	347	321	366	1673

worse in the last two age-groups. More importantly, generational effects do not affect the other parties, as the PD is not dramatically underrepresented among younger voters, and the SEL is even overrepresented (while the PdL is suffering more among younger citizens). In other words, it does not look like we are in the presence of a proper generational divide. So we have started to suspect that there could have been something more behind Beppe Grillo’s success. We have thus examined what we deemed as another key variable: the respondents’ declared prevalent source of political information. The key hypothesis was that those who informed themselves through the Internet would have rewarded the M5S more, for it is wide-

spread and systematically present on the Internet, indigenous to the web.

As predicted, not only were we right, but we have also found much more predictive power than what was expected. Table 2 shows the very strong relationship between the main information source and the voted party.

Table 2. Vote intentions for the various parties by the prevalent media source of political information: Preelectoral data from the CISE Electoral Panel, reweighted for the actual results (N = 1,592)

Vote intention	Prevalent media source of political information			Whole sample
	Newspapers	TV	Internet	
PD	34.5	23.3	21.7	25.4
SEL	3.2	2.2	5.5	3.1
PdL	21.9	26.3	9.4	21.9
LN	4.5	4.4	2.7	4.1
M5S	17.2	23.1	42.5	25.7
Monti	8.4	7.8	9.6	8.3
Others	10.4	12.9	8.7	11.5
Total	100	100	100	100
N	351	919	323	1592

The relationship is so powerful that it is already visible in qualitative terms: the three main political parties are neatly divided according to the leading role for three different publics. The PD is neatly the most preferred party among newspapers readers, with an advantage of twelve percentage points over the PdL and even seventeen percentage points over the M5S (such percentage values are particularly similar to those frequently mentioned in the public debate in newspapers, close to the elections!). Among TV viewers, the leading party is instead the PdL, with three percentage points more than the PD and the M5S. More importantly, it is especially among those using the Internet as their main source of information that the strongest characterization is more evident. In first place stands M5S,

with 42.5%, which is seventeen percentage points greater than the whole sample and even twenty-one percentage points more than the second party (the PD, with 21.7%). The PdL registers a percentage even smaller than 10% (9.4%). This is not a small share of the electorate: The share of respondents that inform themselves mainly through the Internet has already reached one-fifth of the sample in our case<sup>1</sup>. Such a powerful effect clearly cannot depend simply on a spurious generational effect (e.g., the younger generations of “Internet natives” voting for the M5S actually because of their younger age). In fact, we can observe that the choice of media stands as a more powerful explanation by disaggregating the vote for Grillo by information source and age cohort (see Table 3).

Table 3. Vote shares for the M5S by main media source of political information and age cohorts: Data from the preelectoral wave of the CISE Electoral Panel, reweighted for the actual results (N=1592)

Age cohort	Main media source of political information			Whole sample
	Newspapers	TV	Internet	
18–29	33.3	33.6	43.0	37.8
30–44	30.5	32.8	42.4	35.6
45–54	28.6	29.7	53.6	33.0
55–64	7.2	15.6	27.6	14.0
65+	7.0	7.9	34.6	9.0
Whole sample	17.2	23.3	42.5	25.8

As it appears, a strong difference between those who inform themselves mainly through the Internet and the others persists within age cohorts: the difference is greater than 10 percentage points in every age cohort, reaching even 25 percentage points for those aged 45–54.

<sup>1</sup> Our sample is, however, the third wave of a panel study, implying some self-selection bias towards respondents with a higher level of political involvement. Other polls report figures around 10% for the share of voters with the Internet as their main source of political information.

In a nutshell, this early evidence seems to suggest the existence of a “media divide”: what differentiates the electorate of various parties (particularly the M5S) seems to be the styles and sources of political information. Although this hypothesis will have to be scrutinized more in depth, our impression is that we have assisted different electoral campaigns, especially during the 2013 elections, because the voters were informing themselves through different media sources. Each media source had its agenda, its discourse, and its own salient issues. This is also partly visible in other analyses (not presented here), showing the absence of marked differences in the basic political attitudes (e.g., interest in politics, ideological positioning, position regarding specific issues) between the three “publics” analyzed. As such, our guess is that these marked differences in vote choice must somehow be related to different perceptions of the credibility of political parties. The PdL shows minimum levels in all three publics, while the PD is deemed credible by the three publics in terms of economic issues, but much less in relation to the reform of politics according to Internet users. At

the present stage, we found clues to the existence of a “media divide”: intuitions which we deem worth developing.

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Part 3  
Vote shifts



# Vote shifts in Turin and Palermo

Roberto D'Alimonte and Lorenzo De Sio

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Beppe Grillo's movement is the first party at the Chamber of Deputies. As emphasized in another article,<sup>1</sup> the geographical distribution of the M5S's success shows unprecedented features. To confirm a fundamental trait of the present elections, we are in the presence of a real paradigm shift that throws consolidated territorial alignments into crisis. At this point, the doubt that not only the territorial alignments but also the social and political ones are in a transition phase emerges. Where does Grillo's support come from then? What are the social strata that have rewarded him? What are their political choices?

It is clear that answering these questions requires thoughtful analyses and reflections that involve not only the change in the Italians' choices but also the crisis of trust in the whole political system. Notwithstanding, what we can do initially is answer the following simple questions: From which parties do the M5S's votes proceed? Which ones have suffered more from Grillo's electoral competition?

To start answering these questions, we have conducted some analyses of vote shifts for the cities of Turin and Palermo, respectively. Piedmont and Sicily (along with Veneto) are the big Italian regions where Grillo represents the first party in almost every province. Nevertheless, they represent, at the same time, two extremely different cases: Turin is an industrial and postindustrial city, with a strong tradition of grassroots political participation, traditionally rewarding left-wing parties. Palermo has a complex and problematic social reality, plagued by unemployment, crime and a key role of patronage politics, and is traditionally dominated by the center-right. Two tables are presented reporting the vote shifts matrix for the two cities, estimated through the Goodman model on polling-station-

level data.

Each column refers to the 2008 electorate of a single party: values on the various rows report how many voters from that party have switched to various parties or coalitions in 2013 (to make the analysis compact, we have aggregated parties belonging to the same 2013 coalition). Obviously, we will focus on the M5S's row.

We start from Turin. In this case, the fundamental fact is that Grillo hit hard, especially on the left. Values are very high for both SA and for IdV (both leftist parties): out of the 2008 voters, about 42% for SA and even about 60% for the IdV (although with a considerable margin of error) would have switched to Grillo in 2013. The PD's coefficient is remarkable as well: it has been estimated that about 14% shift toward Grillo. Given the noteworthy dimension of the PD, this fact appears as a determinant factor for the electoral success of the M5S in Turin. In this sense, the neat contrast with the center-right is evident. On this political side, the one who suffers more from Grillo's competition is not only the LN (losing about one-fifth of its voters), but also the PdL, which loses apparently one-tenth of its 2008 electorate. The picture arising from Turin suggests that Grillo's support proceeds to a greater extent from the center-left (about 50%) and that it has penalized to a lesser extent the center-right.

The case of Palermo appears radically different. In fact, excluding the electorate for the SA (although the estimates for smaller parties are often unstable), Grillo's electoral spreading cuts extraordinarily across political parties: all political parties lose symmetrically toward the movement of the comedian from Genoa, with shares of their electorate ranging between 23% and 30%.

The two situations are thus divergent. The ability to collect different (and potentially conflicting) requests and extremely heterogeneous points of view testifies the actual strength of the M5S. In Turin, maybe also as a consequence of protest movement

<sup>1</sup> See Cataldi and Emanuele in this volume.

Table 1. Vote shifts in Turin: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008

Vote 2013	Vote 2008							
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote
Civil Revolution	10%	3%	3%	0%	0%	1%	5%	0%
Bersani coalition	38%	18%	64%	9%	5%	13%	9%	1%
Monti coalition	4%	4%	4%	44%	20%	24%	2%	0%
Berlusconi coalition	0%	5%	2%	9%	51%	33%	12%	3%
Five Star Movement	42%	60%	14%	10%	10%	19%	36%	16%
Others	2%	1%	1%	1%	3%	5%	4%	0%
No vote	3%	9%	11%	26%	11%	5%	31%	80%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 2. Vote shifts in Palermo: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008

Vote 2013	Vote 2008							
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote
Civil Revolution	21%	15%	6%	2%	3%	1%	4%	2%
Bersani coalition	22%	22%	51%	11%	2%	1%	27%	4%
Monti coalition	1%	6%	12%	10%	5%	3%	12%	1%
Berlusconi coalition	0%	7%	3%	13%	23%	35%	7%	10%
Five Star Movement	48%	25%	27%	30%	26%	22%	23%	6%
Others	2%	1%	0%	1%	2%	1%	3%	1%
No vote	6%	23%	1%	34%	39%	38%	24%	77%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

against the TAV (high-speed railway construction), it becomes visible that the original participatory and bottom-up nature of the movement grows in a postindustrial context characterized by a tradition of political participation. It is not by chance that the first successes of Grillo in the previous municipal elections took place in the center and the north, namely, in contexts characterized by high civic traditions. Vice versa, the top-down component of Grillo's success seems to manifest in Palermo, namely, the personal appeal of the leader (often with strongly populist elements). It leverages on antiestablishment protests (gaining support from the right as well) in a crosscutting way in contexts characterized by strong social exclusion and a lack of a specific tradition of participation. These are the two fundamental components from which Grillo's success originated; up to this point, they managed to coexist without damaging the move-

ment, although with some tension. It is undeniable that the entrance of a numerous group of the M5S in the Parliament and the need to face complicated political challenges could rapidly lead to the maturation of this inconsistency. In any case, this is a picture that has to be analyzed with different lenses than those of the past.

*Note:* The estimates have been produced with the Goodman model on polling-station-level data. Greater levels of uncertainty characterize the values for the smaller parties.

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## Appendix

Analysis of vote shifts in Monza, Pavia, and Varese

Aldo Paparo and Matteo Cataldi

March 1, 2013

Table 1. Vote shifts in Monza: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008

Vote 2013	Vote 2008							
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote
Bersani coalition	15%	25%	75%	11%	0%	8%	41%	0%
Monti coalition	0%	9%	2%	25%	23%	10%	0%	0%
Berlusconi coalition	0%	0%	6%	0%	54%	32%	16%	0%
Five Star Movement	45%	59%	7%	0%	0%	46%	41%	10%
Others	0%	7%	0%	0%	10%	4%	2%	1%
No vote	39%	0%	10%	64%	13%	0%	0%	89%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 2. Vote shifts in Pavia: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008

Vote 2013	Vote 2008							
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote
Bersani coalition	40%	77%	55%	37%	0%	13%	48%	10%
Monti coalition	0%	11%	9%	24%	17%	0%	0%	3%
Berlusconi coalition	3%	3%	0%	39%	41%	46%	52%	11%
Five Star Movement	49%	0%	22%	0%	0%	36%	0%	7%
Others	0%	10%	4%	0%	5%	0%	0%	1%
No vote	7%	0%	10%	0%	36%	5%	0%	67%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 3. Vote shifts in Varese: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008

Vote 2013	Vote 2008							
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote
Bersani coalition	40%	33%	69%	24%	0%	7%	0%	1%
Monti coalition	0%	34%	0%	38%	21%	9%	3%	2%
Berlusconi coalition	0%	0%	2%	0%	50%	58%	0%	4%
Five Star Movement	51%	17%	12%	38%	2%	21%	18%	4%
Others	7%	0%	3%	0%	3%	5%	12%	0%
No vote	1%	16%	14%	0%	23%	0%	67%	90%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4. Sources from 2008 electorates of 2013 votes for the M5S in the analyzed provincial capitals

Municipality	Vote 2008								Total
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote	
Monza	7%	16%	12%	0%	0%	44%	6%	14%	100%
Pavia	10%	0%	47%	0%	0%	31%	0%	12%	100%
Varese	9%	5%	23%	13%	5%	33%	4%	8%	100%

Analysis of the vote shifts in Florence  
Alessandro Chiamonte  
March 1, 2013

Table 1. Vote shifts in Florence: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008

Vote 2013	Vote 2008							
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote
Civil Revolution	21%	13%	0%	1%	0%	6%	3%	2%
Bersani coalition	15%	59%	80%	25%	0%	0%	7%	3%
Monti coalition	0%	12%	1%	46%	21%	31%	0%	0%
Berlusconi coalition	0%	0%	2%	0%	49%	17%	6%	3%
Five Star Movement	12%	13%	17%	0%	0%	42%	31%	18%
Others	6%	0%	0%	2%	5%	4%	5%	1%
No vote	45%	2%	0%	26%	24%	0%	47%	74%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A "media divide" in the vote of February 25?

Table 2. Vote shifts in Florence: Sources from 2008 electorates of 2013 votes for various parties

Vote 2013	Vote 2008							
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN	Others	No vote
Civil Revolution	0%	0%	6%	2%	0%	3%	8%	15%
Bersani coalition	2%	6%	87%	2%	0%	0%	1%	2%
Monti coalition	0%	6%	3%	20%	67%	4%	0%	0%
Berlusconi coalition	0%	0%	5%	0%	86%	1%	2%	5%
Five Star Movement	4%	4%	51%	0%	0%	3%	12%	26%
Others	11%	0%	0%	3%	60%	2%	14%	10%
No vote	7%	0%	0%	3%	22%	0%	10%	57%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%



# The elections in Rome through an analysis of vote shifts

Matteo Cataldi and Aldo Paparo

March 6, 2013

In the present article, we examine the results of the general and regional elections in the Italian capital by making use of the readings of electoral flows. In particular, our focus is on the reconstruction of the two concurrent elections as well as on the movements that occurred between them in terms of the pools of votes for 2008. This is particularly interesting in light of what has happened: the results for the general and the regional elections are very different, and both results are quite distant from those registered in 2008.

Five year ago, at the previous political elections, the center-left coalition led by Veltroni had prevailed by about 2% on the center-right in a neatly bipolar competition (43.7% against 41.4%). The PD got 39.2% of the votes, while its ally, Italia dei Valori, received 4.6%. The Sinistra Arcobaleno got 3.4%, and the Unione di Centro stood at 4.3%. Turnout resulted at 80.4%, equaling the nationwide level.

Today, the electoral competition has become multipolar also in Rome: Bersani's coalition has received exactly one-third of the valid votes, confirming the PD as the first party in Rome. The M5S has reached 24.3%; Berlusconi's coalition, 23.4%; and Monti did not do better than 9.7%. Finally, the abstention rate in Rome has increased, although less than in the whole country. A total of 22.7% of the Roman voters did not cast their ballot, while the Italians' share reached 24.8%. The concurrence of the regional elections has maybe determined this divergence.

The center-left candidate to the presidency of the region (Zingaretti) nearly achieved the absolute majority with 45.5%. Moreover, he has received 170,000 votes more than Bersani at the Chamber of Deputies. Also, Storace received more votes than Berlusconi, although these were less than 20,000; his percentage result equaled 24.9%. The candidate of the M5S (Barillari) was penalized, getting 20.1% of the votes and losing 120,000 vote preferences

with respect to the result for the Chamber. The result for Giulia Bongiorno was very negative, as she has received less than half of the 155,000 votes for Monti's coalition at the Chamber, namely, 4.3%.

From this picture evidently appears that many voters behaved differently in the two elections. At the regional ballot, the direct election of the president and the subsequent majority premium at the regional council have favored the bipolarity of the competition, namely, the concentration of the votes on the candidates of the two main political poles. The strategic call for a "useful vote" seems to have disproportionately favored the center-left more.

We shall now look at the flows of votes that have determined the observed result. Table 1 shows the destinations of the various electorates of 2008. PD has been confirmed by about two-thirds of its own votes and presents the highest level of loyalty. It has lost 1 out of 10 votes in favor of the M5S, a little more than that to the abstention, and 6% of the votes toward Monti. The PdL was voted again by about half of its voters in 2008, while one out of five has preferred the M5S instead, and 1 out of 10 voted in favor of Monti. The abstention rate's pattern is thus similar to the one for the PD. Among the voters for the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani, only one-third voted for Monti, while one-fourth did not vote. Finally, the M5S managed to mobilize a significant proportion of the abstainers.

Table 2 shows instead the electorates' composition for 2013. The M5S has received about one-third of its own votes from the PdL, one-fourth from the center-left, and the same share from the those who did not vote. Monti seems to have caught more votes from the center-right as well: about half of the votes proceed from this political area, while only one-third come from Veltroni's voters.

Studying the analysis relative to the regional elections (table 3), we observe that Zingaretti did not lose Bersani's votes. The former president of the province further received more than 40% of

Table 1. Vote shifts in Rome: Destination of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008

Vote 2013	Vote 2008						
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	Others	No vote
RC	15%	9%	2%	3%	0%	5%	1%
Bersani coalition	17%	33%	65%	13%	2%	2%	5%
Monti coalition	1%	11%	6%	35%	11%	1%	1%
Berlusconi coalition	1%	3%	2%	6%	48%	7%	5%
M5S	29%	37%	10%	14%	20%	53%	19%
Others	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	5%	1%
No vote	37%	6%	14%	26%	15%	27%	69%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 2. Vote shifts in Rome: Sources from 2008 electorates of the votes in 2013 Chamber elections for various parties

Vote 2013	Vote 2008						
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	Others	No vote
RC	19%	17%	34%	4%	3%	11%	11%
Bersani coalition	2%	5%	83%	2%	3%	0%	5%
Monti coalition	0%	6%	26%	16%	48%	1%	3%
Berlusconi coalition	0%	1%	3%	1%	85%	2%	8%
M5S	4%	7%	15%	2%	31%	14%	27%
Others	2%	1%	22%	3%	48%	12%	12%
No vote	3%	1%	14%	3%	14%	4%	60%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

the votes for Monti and one-fifth of those for the M5S. From these two sources proceed 9% and 13%, respectively, of his own votes. Anyway, Barillari has received the electoral support of two-thirds of M5S's voters at the Chamber, while Bongiorno received less than one-third, suffering a further defection in favor of Storace (14%).

Storace's confirmation rate in the flows of votes is quite high, although inferior to that of the winner. Overall, he is further widely defeated in terms of outflows from all the electorates: the ratio equals 3:1 among both Monti and Grillo supporters. The inflow rate in favor of Zingaretti also reaches double among former voters of smaller parties.

Table 4 shows the composition of the electorates for the regional elections in 2008. Comparing these values with those reported in table 1, we can observe how the current voters for Monti

and Grillo at the Chamber, but not at the regional elections, would have voted in 2008. Moreover, we can observe which pools of votes have determined the greater support for Zingaretti with respect to Bersani.

Giulia Bongiorno's electoral defectors are fairly distributed in the various pools for 2008: substantially, all the inflows got halved. As for the M5S, there are no significant differences between the coefficients for the votes toward the electoral list at the Chamber and Barillari at the regional elections among PdL, UdC, and SA voters. Conversely, both the votes proceeding from the Democratic Party and the former abstainers got halved. Voters for the IdV were much less attracted by Grillo at the regional elections, given the 10% reduction; half cast their ballot in favor of Zingaretti, with respect to one-third that voted for Bersani. The regional

Table 3. Vote shifts in Rome: Destinations in the regional elections of the electorates at the Chamber in 2013 for various parties

Regional elections 2013	Chamber of Deputies 2013					
	Bersani coalition	Monti coalition	Berlusconi coalition	M5S	Others	No vote
Zingaretti	94%	42%	5%	20%	19%	2%
Bongiorno	1%	29%	2%	2%	5%	0%
Storace	0%	14%	86%	6%	10%	1%
Barillari	0%	4%	1%	66%	7%	1%
Other candidates	5%	2%	2%	4%	48%	1%
No vote	0%	9%	3%	2%	11%	96%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4. Vote shifts in Rome: Destinations in the regional elections of the electorates at the Chamber in 2008 for various parties

Regional elections 2013	Vote 2008						
	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	Others	No vote
Zingaretti	26%	49%	75%	31%	11%	7%	6%
Bongiorno	2%	4%	2%	18%	5%	1%	0%
Storace	2%	6%	2%	14%	49%	9%	3%
Barillari	31%	27%	6%	11%	18%	49%	8%
Other candidates	15%	6%	3%	5%	4%	11%	1%
No vote	24%	9%	13%	21%	13%	23%	81%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

candidate of the center-left coalition has been voted by 10 percentage points of 2008 PD voters more than the party national leader in the elections for the Chamber. Moreover, it has also received a significant share of the center-right: 10% from PdL voters and one-third from the UdC. Finally, it has been favored more by remobilized voters.

In conclusion, we observe also in Rome the ability of the M5S to catch votes across the entire spectrum of 2008 ideological continuum. In this case, the greater share of its votes proceeds from Berlusconi's electoral pool. Given the absence of the LN, which seemingly stands as the greatest contributor to Grillo's electoral success, we observe a sizable shift of the PdL's voters.<sup>1</sup> This effect is anal-

ogous to the one observed in Palermo.<sup>2</sup>

We have finally emphasized some clear traces of an outflow of strategic votes affecting the M5S and Monti's coalition that granted advantage to Zingaretti with respect to Storace running for the presidency in the region.

Methodological note: All the analyses that have been presented were conducted on the basis of the Goodman model, corrected by the RAS algorithm. They have been performed separately for each of the 24 uninominal districts of Rome as defined by the Mattarella law and then aggregated in municipal matrices.

<sup>1</sup> . See. Paparo and Cataldi in the Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> . See D'Alimonte and De Sio in this volume.

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# Vote shifts between the Chamber and the Senate: The rise of the M5S and fall of the PD among young people

Aldo Paparo and Matteo Cataldi

March 14, 2013

We have already seen how the electoral results between the Chamber of Deputies (the House) and the Senate differentiate from each other.<sup>1</sup> In particular, we note how the coalitions led by Berlusconi and Bersani fared better in upper house elections: approximately 1.5% better for Berlusconi and over 2% for Bersani. Consequently, the M5S won 25.6% of the seats in the Chamber and 23.8% in the Senate, whereas Monti and his coalition fell from 10.6% to 9.2%.

We must keep in mind the differences in the electoral system of the two assemblies and the effect those differences have on the outcome. In the Senate, specifically in the important swing regions that are crucial for the victory of competing political coalitions, the need for strategic votes was much greater than in the Chamber. In fact, the center-left victory in the lower house could have been taken for granted, leaving more space for both genuine and protest voting. Another source of variation in the results from the two legislative branches lies in the different electorates. Over 4.5 million adults, age 18–24 who can only vote in Chamber elections, represent about 10% of the total number of voters for the lower house. Knowing the election results at a district level means it is possible to single out the electoral behavior of the 18- to 24-year-old demographic with statistical analysis. The fundamental element is that this group represents the exact difference between the electorates of the Senate and the Chamber. For this analysis, we have selected five regional capitals from various geographical areas: Turin, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Palermo. Table 1 shows the distribution of votes from the aforementioned demographic with respect to the distribution of municipal electorates as a whole.

The most evident characteristic is the overrepresentation of the M5S among young voters, which counters the underrepresentation of the PD. This appears in all five cases with varying, but never marginal, magnitudes. The number of younger citizens voting for the Democratic Party is barely greater than a third of the whole electorate in Palermo and Turin: therefore, the registered decline was greater than 60%; in the other three cases, the decline varied between 30% and 40%. The M5S saw increased support among young people in Florence and Milan by about 25% in each region, followed by an increase of approximately 40% in the southern capitals and even by 70% in Turin. Since the movement led by Beppe Grillo is ranked as the second most popular party in the overall electoral result of all five cities and with the Democratic Party being first among this young demographic, we note that the PD was only able to retain a majority in Florence. In the other cases, the M5S stands as the most popular party among voters aged between 18 and 24 years old. In Palermo, the M5S was able to reach the absolute majority of valid votes in this age-group, while in Rome and Turin, two out of every five people in the age-group voted M5S.

It is interesting to observe the results of SEL. The party led by Vendola also saw good results among young voters. In Florence, within the younger age-group, the SEL stands as the third most popular party with a vote share equaling a number about double that of the entire electorate. Also, in Turin, the SEL was significantly overrepresented; in Rome and in Milan, the overrepresentation is still evident but is somewhat diminished. It is well known that younger people tend to vote for more radical parties than the median-aged voter. This being true, the PD must have surely lost some younger votes by entering a coalition with a left-leaning party. In any case, it seems that the alliance with the SEL has allowed the party, led by Bersani, not to suffer

<sup>1</sup> . See. Maggini in this volume.

Table 1. Vote preferences (%) of young voters (aged 18–24) in five major cities, compared with whole electorates (source: Goodman model on polling station-level data)

		SEL	PD	Monti Coalition	PdL	LN	Others center-right	M5S	Others	No vote	Total
Turin	18–24	6.1	8.7	9.3	12.9	4.4		32.5	3.2	22.9	100
	Total	3.5	22.1	9.5	12.9	4.3		19.2	3.6	24.9	100
Milan	18–24	4.2	13.5	13.7	11.6	2.4	3.5	16.0	6.9	28.2	100
	Total	3.2	22.2	11.2	15.4	4.8	1.7	12.8	4.2	24.5	100
Florence	18–24	11.8	20.8	10.6	11.2	3.7		16.9	0.5	24.4	100
	Total	4.7	32.9	8.0	11.2	2.9		14.1	4.3	22.0	100
Rome	18–24	3.7	15.3	6.4	10.8	3.1		28.5	7.1	25.1	100
	Total	3.6	21.9	7.4	14.2	3.6		20.6	4.4	24.3	100
Palermo	18–24	0.9	4.5	4.9	12.0	1.2		27.5	1.8	47.2	100
	Total	1.5	12.0	4.9	15.0	2.3		19.5	4.2	40.6	100

heavy losses among young voters. The only exception is Palermo, where the slightly center-left coalition barely exceeds 10% of all valid votes.

Like the PD, the other formerly dominant party, the PdL, does not perform well with younger voters. Not only did the PdL fail overall to be represented well, but in Palermo, Rome, and Milan, the party, along with its coalition partners, had very little success among the 18- to 24-year-old demographic.

In the case of the Monti coalition, the results are more ambiguous. In Palermo, it gathered less than 5% among the whole electorate and younger voters; in Milan and Florence, the coalition is better represented by young people; however, in Turin and Rome, it suffered, although in a marginal way, to gather those votes.

Finally, the decision to abstain from voting is the last possible choice to compare younger voters with the whole electorate. Excluding Turin, the data shows that younger citizens have been more prone to abstain from voting. This was true to a lesser extent in the capital, with more significant differences in Milan and Florence and even more so in Palermo. In the Sicilian capital, almost half of the voters between the ages of 18 and 24 decided not to cast their ballot.

Methodological notes: All the analyses have been conducted through the Goodman model, corrected by the Ras algorithm. In Rome, Milan, Turin, and Palermo, they were collected separately in every uninominal district of the Mattarella elec-

toral law for the Chamber and then aggregated city matrices. In Florence, however, the municipal level coefficients have been directly computed.

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# Waves of support: M5S between 2010 and 2013

Aldo Paparo and Matteo Cataldi

April 9, 2013

The M5S has achieved a historical result in the last political elections. As we have already emphasized, its vote share is the highest ever reached in Western democracies in its first general elections.<sup>1</sup> However, the M5S did not present itself to the electorate for the first time in 2013. In fact, although in 2008 it was absent from electoral competition, during the 16th legislature, it had already run several local and regional elections.

In 2008, Grillo decided not to run for the general elections. But he had already joined, with his own candidates, some important electoral competitions, among which the regional one in Sicily and the municipal elections in Rome, although with modest results. Then in 2009 the 5-Stars gained momentum. Civic candidates could get the approval from the movement provided that they fulfilled some requisites: as the residence in the municipality where the elections are held and no crime sentences.

The movement was founded in September 2009, and its visibility grew in 2010. It presents its own candidates in 5 out of 13 regions having elections: Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, and Campania. The presidency candidate in Emilia-Romagna, whose name is Favia, got the best result with 7% of the votes. In 2011, it runs basically in every province capital in the center and north of Italy while participating only a third of the local elections in southern Italy.

The year 2012 represented the turning point: The movement's presence in northern Italy becomes consolidated, and it participates in half of the local elections in the south.<sup>2</sup> The movement scores its first successes: in Parma and in three other municipalities, 5-Stars' mayors are elected. The very last electoral test before the general elections

has been represented by the renewal of the Sicilian parliament. The 5-Stars' candidate came close to 20% of the votes, scoring the first significant success in the south.<sup>3</sup>

In the present article, we engage in an outline of the various growth phases of the 5Ss during the last few years, making use of the electoral flows technique. We have selected some regional capitals densely populated in various parts of Italy where there have been elections in 2010 and 2013. We have then reconstructed the composition of M5S's votes in the various elections in terms of the results of 2008. We are thus able to identify the source of the former electoral support for the movement and which groups have then increased it. For every regional or local analysis, we have taken into account the results from the majoritarian election of the president or mayor. This choice comes from various reasons of opportunity: the number of valid ballots is greater, thus reducing the non-voting voters portion and giving the most accurate result for each party or coalition in terms of shares of the whole electorate; competitors are fewer, and then the not-advisable aggregation of different political subjects is not needed; results for the candidates of the M5S are usually better than those of the party list, and they, thus, represent the greatest expansion in a given local election and time.

Table 1 synthetically presents the empirical results. In the first part, results from the M5S or from its own candidates in the various elections are shown. The central part of the table reports the electoral shares that cast their ballot for the M5S in that election. The last column shows the electoral shares for the center-left in 2008 (including PD, IdV, SA) and for the center-right (PdL, LN, MpA) with respect to the M5S's votes.

<sup>1</sup> . See. Cataldi and Emanuele in the present volume.

<sup>2</sup> . On this point, see also De Lucia (2012).

<sup>3</sup> . For a detailed analysis of the Sicilian electoral results, see Emanuele (2013a).

Table 1. Vote shifts for the M5S between the 2008 general elections and various ones in Turin, Milan, Genoa, Bologna, and Palermo

Municipality	Election	Electoral result		Destinations from 2008 electorates of various parties								Source c-l/c-r
		votes	% voters	SA	IdV	PD	UdC	PdL	LN/MpA	Others	No vote	
Turin	Regional el. 2010	17,217	2.4%	11	12	2	1	0	6	6	1	66/15
	Municipal el. 2011	22,403	3.2%	12	16	2	1	0	11	10	1	54/18
	Chamber of Deputies 2013	128,149	19.3%	43	60	15	10	10	19	36	16	48/18
Genoa	Mun. el. 2012	36,579	7.3%	23	35	10	10	1	22	1	1	77/16
	Chamb. 2013	112,124	23.6%	43	62	24	0	3	63	73	16	53/14
Milan	Reg. el. 2010	20,120	2.0%	6	10	3	2	0	3	4	1	64/19
	Mun. el. 2011	21,228	2.1%	8	10	1	3	0	6	7	1	41/33
	Chamb. 2013	121,408	12.8%	31	32	6	15	2	26	35	16	31/25
Bologna	Reg. el. 2010	18,602	6.2%	20	54	5	0	0	18	12	0	80/10
	Mun. el. 2011	19,969	6.6%	5	44	8	0	0	13	5	2	84/7
	Chamb. 2013	43,636	15.1%	17	45	14	0	0	35	45	15	58/9
Palermo	Mun. el. 2012	10,910	1.9%	7	7	5	0	1	0	6	0	67/23
	Reg. el. 2012	55,966	9.9%	25	30	22	10	5	6	15	0	70/20
	Chamb. 2013	105,714	19.5%	48	25	27	30	22	26	23	6	35/40

In chronological order, we start from the data of the 2010 regional elections. At the dawn of its electoral experience, the M5S seems to gain from the disappointed voters of the center-left bloc. We have to consider that at the time, the Berlusconi IV government was still in charge, and *Futuro e Libertà per l'Italia* had not left the center-right coalition. Therefore, the early M5S seems to derive from the center-left: as we can observe, they are about two-thirds of the total voters in Turin and Milan, while only about one-fifth come from the opposite political bloc (in particular, from the LN).

The fact that the M5S registered its best result in Emilia-Romagna, the only historically “red” region where its lists were presented, can be read as further confirmation of such consideration. Even in 2008, the share of left-wing voters for the M5S in Emilia-Romagna remains the highest, while the LN’s is minimal. Finally, the three parties of the

center-left coalition register the greatest coefficient toward the M5S in the Emilia-Romagna capital, Bologna. The first penetration of the movement appears to have affected particularly the smaller parties of the center-left coalition rather than the PD, and in particular, it involved the *Italia dei Valori* party. In fact, in Milan and in Turin, more than 1 out of 10 IdV 2008 voters cast their ballot for the M5S, and in Bologna, even half.

At the following year’s municipal elections, the electoral results of the 5S’s candidates had grown in all the three cases considered, although in a marginal way. In Turin and Milan, we can observe a convergence in the shares of former voters for the two main political coalitions: in both cases, the share of former LN supporters gets doubled, while the share of former PD’s voters decreases. Conversely, in Bologna, the former PD’s electorate represents an even greater share of the M5S’s voters

with respect to the regional elections: if the share of switchers of former IdV and Sinistra Arcobaleno decreases, as is the case for the LN, the one concerning the PD had substantially increased.

The cases considered for 2012 are the cities of Palermo and Genoa. They both confirm the feature of the first M5S's wave: more than two-thirds of its votes proceed from former center-left supporters, and this is even more true where the left was stronger (as in Genoa). It is interesting to emphasize this consideration as it holds even some years of the initial stage of the movement when it had already expanded its potential electorate. A few months later, at the Sicilian regional elections, the M5S's electoral support grew up to five times the earlier results, although it remains substantially unaltered in terms of the left-right composition.

If we look at the final wave of the 2013 general elections, we can observe that Grillo's supporters that had cast their ballot for the center-left in 2008 are directly proportional to the electoral strength of the left. This share is about one-third in Milan and in Palermo, about half in Turin and Genoa, and about 60% in Bologna. The same effect is discernible for the center-right: the proportion of its former supporter out of the total votes for the M5S is lower than one-tenth in Bologna, one-sixth in Genoa and Turin, one-fourth in Milan, and 40% in Palermo. During the six months between the regional and the general elections, there has been a sudden overturn in the political colors of the M5S's electorate.<sup>4</sup>

The correlation between the result of the 2008 coalition and the share of Grillo's supporters reaches 0.92 for the center-left and 0.93 for the center-right, both significant results at the 95% level. This dynamic seems to suggest the ability of the M5S in attracting different kinds of electorates in different contexts. This was also made possible with the use of differentiated political messages mobilizing more the locally stronger political coalition.

Obviously, the present analysis makes reference to a handful of cases chosen among big cities. We have seen that the M5S was able to mobilize across ideological lines and in a differentiated way: more from the center-left, where this coalition is more deeply rooted; more from the PdL in the Sicilian electoral barn; from the LN in the first stage, where it had recently grown; and finally also in Milan.

Precisely for this ability as well as for the substantially stable results with respect to the dimension of the municipalities, we can infer that in smaller cities the M5S could have attracted the electorate of the stronger parties in such kind of cities.<sup>5</sup> For all these reasons, it seems proper to argue that the nationwide composition results that have been presented here regarding the M5S's electorate can be hardly extended to other kinds of elections.

In any case, some empirical findings remain particularly significant: in almost every case considered, the smaller center-left parties lose more votes than the PD, which, on the other hand, has lost growing vote shares approaching the general elections. A gradual reduction in the percentage share of Grillo's supporters proceeding from the center-left in 2008 appears, while the former center-right share of voters increases progressively. Finally, the relative weight of the 2008 political coalitions on the total share of M5S's supporters in the various municipalities is strongly linked to the electoral results registered five years ago.

Methodological note: All the analyses that have been presented were conducted at the constituency level based on the Goodman model, corrected by the Ras algorithm. The estimates were computed separately by groups of homogeneous polling stations differently identified and then aggregated in municipal-level matrices.

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<sup>4</sup> . This is further underlined by Emanuele (2013c).

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**Part 4**  
**Elected parliamentarians**





# The 2013 Parliament: New and more gender-balanced

Federico De Lucia

March 2, 2013

The newly elected Parliament is a Parliament very different from the previous one. Data tell us that there was not one so different from the previous one from the 1994 elections. Back then, only 23.7% of the newly elected was made of outgoing parliamentarians. It was the end of the First Republic. In the four following elections, the political class has been structuring itself pretty rapidly, and the reelection rate has stabilized itself at around 50%. Today, data lowered significantly: only 35.8% of the newly elected is composed of outgoing parliamentarians.

New parties that were not represented in the outgoing Parliament contribute massively to such a renewal: they are, namely, Five Star Movement and the SEL. One should not forget, though, that some of the political forces already represented have also significantly contributed to this turnover: the PD, the biggest parliamentary political force, has brought 262 newly elected to Palazzo Montecitorio and Palazzo Madama, and they will represent almost 65% of the new democratic parliamentary groups. Also, Monti's list has contributed to the renewal with almost 50 newcomers. Who has not

succeeded in moving forward under this respect are the parties that have suffered the biggest reorganization with regard to the number of elected parliamentarians: 72.3% of the parliamentarians of the PdL is composed of outgoing reconfirmed, while for the Lega Nord, this share goes down to 63.9%.

As a result, of the 945 outgoing parliamentarians, only 339 have obtained to be reconfirmed. Of the others, 355 did not present themselves again: among them are Castagnetti, D'Alema, Parisi, Veltroni, Bianco, Rutelli, Cosentino, Frattini, La Malfa, Scajola, Dell'Utri, Dini, Pera, Pisanu, Castelli, and Maroni (pretty busy with other things). Even though they have presented themselves as candidates again, 251 people did not get the desired seats. Among them are three names of absolute national importance: the outgoing president of the Chamber of Deputies, Gianfranco Fini; the ex-president of the Senate, Franco Marini; and the leader of IdV, Antonio di Pietro. Together with them, among the rejected, one can find Napoli, Paniz, Crosetto, and Miccichè for the center-right; all of FLI, with the exception of Della Vedova; important exponents of the UdC like Galletti, Poli, and Rao; the ex-PdL

Figure 1. Percentage of outgoing parliamentarians reconfirmed over the total of elected parliamentarians in the Second Republic




Table 1. Parliament 2013: Outgoing, elected, reelected, and newly elected by party

	N outgoing (1)	N elected (2)	N reelected (3)	N new (4)	(4)/(2)	(3)/(2)	(3)/(1)
PD	290	407	145	262	64.4	35.6	50.0
SEL	0	44	0	44	100.0	0.0	0.0
Other C-L	26	16	7	9	56.3	43.8	26.9
PdL Area	382	206	149	57	27.7	72.3	39.0
LN	81	36	23	13	36.1	63.9	28.4
M5S	0	163	0	163	100.0	0.0	0.0
Monti coalition	102	67	14	53	79.1	20.9	13.7
Others	64	6	1	5	83.3	16.7	1.6
Total	945	945	339	606	64.1	35.9	35.9

Table 2. Parliament 2013: Fate of the outgoing parliamentarians disaggregated by political force

	PD		Others C-L		PdL Area		LN		Monti coalition		Others		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Reelected	145	50	7	26.9	150	39.2	22	27.5	14	13.7	1	1.6	339	35.8
Failed to be reelected	44	15.2	11	42.3	104	27.2	28	35	43	42.2	21	32.8	251	26.7
Withdrawn	101	34.8	8	30.8	129	33.7	30	37.5	45	44.1	42	65.6	355	37.6
Total outgoing	290	100	26	100	383	100	80	100	102	100	64	100	945	100

Cazzola for Monti's list; Donadi and the activist of civil rights Paola Concia for the center-left.

Another aspect of great relevance, besides the general renewal, is the huge percentage increase of women elected. They were 191 over 945 in 2008; today, they are 290. One move from 20.2% to 30.8%: it is a historical record and a big jump forward, more than double compared with the period between 2006 and 2008.

The parties with the higher percentage of women are the PD and the M5S, with 38%. After these follows the SEL, with 27%. PdL and Monti's list are a bit below 20%, while Lega is at 13.5%.

To conclude, the data for multiply elected candidates are as follows: they have been 20 in total. They are Bersani, Marino, Letta, and Nardelli for the PD; Vendola and Boldrini for the SEL; Tabacci for Centro Democratico; Alfano, Berlusconi, and Barani for PdL; Tremonti for the Lega; Meloni, La Russa, and Rampelli for Fratelli d'Italia; and Bombassei, Ichino, Casini, Cesa, Catania, and D'Alia for Monti's list.

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Figure 2. Women's percentage over the total of elected parliamentarians in the Second Republic




Table 3. Parliament 2013: Feminine representation in the Italian political parties

	Elected 2013			Outgoing 2013		
	F	Total	%	F	Total	%
PD	155	407	38.1	86	290	29.7
SEL	12	44	27.3			
Other C-L	1	16	6.3	3	26	11.5
PdL Area	40	206	19.4	58	383	15.1
LN	5	36	13.9	15	80	18.8
M5S	62	163	38			
Monti coalition	14	67	20.9	18	104	17.3
Others	1	6	16.7	24	62	38.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>945</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>945</b>	<b>21.6</b>

*all'adattamento: accesso, circolazione e carriera dal 1994 al 2006, in Rivista italiana di scienza politica, Il Mulino, 3/2006, December, pp. 455-478.*



# PD's elected parliamentarians: Reelection rate, women, and political composition

Federico De Lucia

March 3, 2013

PD, taking advantage of the majority's bonus at the Chamber of Deputies, has obtained 297 deputies (292 elected in Italy and 5 elected abroad). At the Senate, where it has won the majority's bonus in 10 regions over 17, it has obtained 110 senators (106<sup>1</sup> elected in Italy and 4 elected abroad). Hence, the overall PD's delegation in Rome is composed of 407 parliamentarians. The outgoing delegation was made of 290 members of the party. One should not consider here the other outgoing parliamentarians still registered in the PD's parliamentary groups at the moment of the breaking up: the nine radicals, the eight passing from PD to Monti, and Beppe Lumia, who, even if a Democrat, was a candidate and has been elected in the Crocetta's Megafono list.

Of the 290 outgoing parliamentarians, 145 (exactly half of them) have withdrawn their candidacy. Of the other 145, 101 have succeeded in being reelected, and 44 did not make it. This way, the reelected outgoing parliamentarians will be 145 over 407 in this legislature, or 35.6%. These data are on average with the overall data and are also very low if one considers that the party has massively increased its representation and that it could have placed in an eligible status a much bigger number of outgoing parliamentarians.

As the reader might recall, PD has had primary elections in order to establish the lists' composition, even if the party's secretary has reserved for himself the right to choose directly some of the candidates (124 to be precise). Of the 407 elected parliamentarians, 287 have been selected by the

Table 1. PD's elected parliamentarians: PD's outgoing parliamentarians' fate

	N	%
Reelected	145	50.0
Failed to be reelected	44	15.2
Withdrawn	101	34.8
Total of the outgoing	290	100

primary elections and 111 from the lists (to these, one should add the 9 parliamentarians elected abroad that cannot be included in any of the two categories). Hence, 72% of the Democrats elected in Italy have collected votes directly in the territory.

Of the 287 coming from the primary elections, 96 (33.4%) are outgoing parliamentarians. Of the 113 chosen by Bersani, 44 (39.4%) are outgoing parliamentarians, without considering the 5 parliamentarians (out of 9) reconfirmed abroad. Regarding the women, they are in total 155 out of 407, or 38.1%. This is the highest percentage together with that of the M5S. In the outgoing group, they were 29.6% (86 out of 290): the increase is remarkable, and this is a point on which the party has insisted a lot. They are 125 (43.6%) among the candidates coming from the territory and only 28 (25.2%) in Bersani's list and two elected abroad.

To conclude, let us try to investigate which is the political origin of the new democratic group in the Parliament in order to determine if something has changed with respect to the most recent past. In the total of the outgoing parliamentarians, the ex-DS represented almost 59% and the ex-DL almost 36%. There were also about 10 independents and some exponents of small parties. The changes that,

<sup>1</sup> . In this calculation, only one out of the six elected parliamentarians of the center-left in Trentino-Alto Adige—Giorgio Tonini—is considered part of PD. The other five belong to other parties: two belong to SVP, one to PATT, one is an independent, and one is from Monti's list.

Table 2. PD's elected parliamentarians: Disaggregation between lists and primary elections of the new PD's elected parliamentarians (women and outgoing parliamentarians in the two groups)

	List		Primary		Total	Abroad	
Women	28	25.2	125	43.6	153	38.4	2
Outgoing	44	39.6	96	33.4	140	35.2	5
Total	111	27.9	287	72.1	398	100	9

under this respect, were emerging in the new democratic group at the Chamber of Deputies are not relevant but are still present: The ex-DS maintain a position of absolute preeminence with 57.3% of the members. The ex-DL remain almost unchanged as far as the numbers are concerned; therefore, they go down in percentage. The presence of independents, with whom Bersani has filled up the lists, goes up in a significant way. The component of the so-called native Democrats made of politicians with no previous experience in the two founding parties makes its first appearance. These native Democrats come from the civic lists or are simply at their very first experience with politics. Socialists in the Parliament are five (plus one elected abroad).

The data concerning the supporters of Renzi have been foreseen: 50 elected in total, with 14 inserted in the lists by Bersani and 36 coming from the primary elections.

Finally, with the surprising exclusion of Franco Marini, there are only four democratic parliamentarians with more than 15 years' experience in

politics: Finocchiaro, Bindi, Fioroni, and Bressa. To these, one may add Beppe Lumia, a Democrat elected in Crocetta's list.

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Table 3. PD's elected parliamentarians: Political affiliation of the PD's parliamentarians before and after the 2013 elections

	Outgoing		Elected 2013	
	N	%	N	%
DS	167	59.0	228	57.3
DL	101	35.7	106	26.6
Independent	10	3.5	31	7.8
Civic-PD	2	0.7	27	6.8
PSI	1	0.4	5	1.3
Moderates	1	0.4	1	0.3
MRE	1	0.4		
Total	283	100	398	100
Abroad	7		9	

# Center-right's elected parliamentarians: PdL and Lega Nord

Federico De Lucia

March 4, 2013

The center-right's coalition was very broad at the last elections. The affiliated lists were numerous, and most of them had no chance of getting any seats. At the end, at the Chamber of Deputies, the succeeding lists were only three: PdL and Lega Nord as lists going above the threshold and Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) as "fished out." PdL has obtained 98 deputies; LN, 18; FdI, 9. At the Senate, on the other hand, only PdL has managed to go above the threshold in all the regions, as it was foreseeable, and has obtained 98 elected senators. LN has managed to get seats in Piedmont, Lombardy, and Veneto and has won the "fished out" in a proportional share in Trentino-Alto Adige, with a total of 18 senators. Among the other parties, the Grande Sud's list (GS) has managed to get a seat in Calabria. Hence, overall, PdL has gotten 196 seats; Lega, 36; FdI, 9; and GS, 1.

The PdL's outgoing parliamentarians were 302, but to these, one should have added a crowd of movements and small parties (among which the most important were FdI and GS) that, generally speaking, helped the PdL's area to reach a total of 383 deputies and senators. The space at disposal for such a political galaxy has been cut in half for the supporters of Berlusconi: from 383 to 206 (196 elected parliamentarians of the PdL, the 9 parliamentarians of FdI, and the single parliamentarian of GS). But let us see where the outgoing parliamentarians are now.

Of the overall 383 parliamentarians, 129 (33.7%) have found space in none of the lists affiliated to the center-right's coalition. Of the remaining 150 who have been reelected, one has gone out of the PdL's area: Tremonti, who is now with the Lega Nord. Therefore, 149 out of 206 newly elected parliamentarians (72.3%) of the so-called PdL's area are outgoing parliamentarians: this is a pretty high percentage, more than double compared with the overall average of the new Parliament. These reelected 149 parliamentarians are divided into 142 reelected in the lists of the PdL and 7 reelected in those of the FdI.

Focusing now on the elected of the PdL's list, there are 196 of them: among them, as we said, the outgoing parliamentarians are 142 (72.4%). The women are 39 in total, a bit less than 20%—a share significantly lower than the average in the new Parliament, but still higher than 16.5%, the old percentage of the outgoing PdL, an element that is not to be taken for granted considering the contraction of the representation.

In FdI, the outgoing parliamentarians are seven out of nine, and Giorgia Meloni is the only woman of the delegation. A man and a novice in the Parliament, Giovanni Bilardi from Calabria, is the sole elected of Grande Sud.

Let us consider the political composition of the PdL's area in order to see how much and in which

Table 1. The fate of the outgoing parliamentarians of the PdL's area

	PdL Area		PdL		Others (FdI, GS, etc.)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Reelected	150	39.2	135	44.7	15	18.5
Failed to be reelected	104	27.2	65	21.5	39	48.1
Withdrawn	129	33.7	102	33.8	27	33.3
Total outgoing	383	100	302	100	81	100



Table 2. Elected C-R: Women's representation and presence of reelected parliamentarians in the PdL's list

	N	%
Outgoing	142	72.4
Women	39	19.9
Elected 2013	196	

Table 3. Elected C-R: Parliamentarians' political affiliation of the PdL's area, before and after the 2013 elections

	Outgoing		Elected 2013	
	N	%	N	%
FI	219	74	150	81.1
AN	55	18.6	21	11.4
Neo-Christian Democrats	11	3.7	8	4.3
Independent	6	2	5	2.7
Others	5	1.7	1	0.5
Total PdL	296	100	185	100
PdL	296	77.3	185	89.8
Abroad	6	1.6	1	0.5
FdI	30	7.8	9	4.4
GS	15	3.9	1	0.5
Others/"Infiltrators" in PdL	36	9.4	10	4.9
Total area PdL	383	100	206	100

direction it has changed in comparison with the outgoing Parliament.

Let us start with PdL considered as a party. Of the 296 PdL's representatives elected in Italy (i.e., not considering the 6 parliamentarians elected abroad) that were holding their office until last week, 219 (74%) came from Forza Italia, 55 (18.6%) from AN, 11 from the neo-Christian Democrat components, 5 from microcomponents, and 6 were independents. Today, out of 185 reelected party's representatives, the component of Forza Italia has further increased in terms of percentages as to become substantially predominant. The ex-AN, already reorganized as a result of the resignation of Gianfranco Fini, have been divided into those that went with Meloni and La Russa to FdI and those that, together with

Gasparri and Matteoli, have chosen to stay at the court of Berlusconi. The demochristian component resists, while among the others, only the new PSI of Caldoro and Lucio Barani gets a representation. The independent are five.

Considering the residual component of the PdL's area, as it was foreseeable, it is pretty much reorganized after the elections. From almost 70 representatives, it goes down to a bit more than 20. In fact, many movements that used to be part of it were substantially coinciding with their founding parliamentarians, and therefore, they have disappeared once the founders have lost their place in the list or once the founders have found another place in lists too small to get a seat. Putting aside the ex-AN component that has found a home in FdI and the elected parliamentarian of Grande Sud in Calabria, only 10 candidates of other microcoalitions have gotten to be elected, infiltrated in the lists of the PdL: among them, Antonio Razzi and Domenico Scilipoti are worth mentioning.

To conclude, the Lega Nord has become pretty much changed and reorganized. It goes down from 80 parliamentarians to 36. Of the 80 outgoing, 30 have not been running for candidacy, and 28 have done it but have not managed to get a seat. Only 22 (27.5%) and the ex-PdL Tremonti have conquered the reelection.

The elected parliamentarians of the Lega Nord, who were already sitting in the outgoing houses of

Table 4. Elected C-R: Fate of the outgoing parliamentarians of the Lega Nord

	N	%
Reelected	22	27.5
Failed to be reelected	28	35.0
Withdrawn	30	37.5
Total outgoing	80	100

Table 5. Elected C-R: Women's representation and presence of reelected parliamentarians of the Lega Nord

	N	%
Outgoing	23	62.2
Women	5	13.9
Elected 2013	36	



the Parliament, are thus 23 out of 36, the 62.2%. The rechange rate is pretty low if compared with the average, but it is not that low if one takes into account the cut in half of all the seats at their disposal.

Finally, only five are the women of the Lega, and they are all at the Senate. Nobody of big relevance has been excluded: both Bossi and Salvini get elected at the Chamber of Deputies, and both Calderoli and Tremonti get elected at the Senate.

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**Part 5**  
**Post-vote scenarios**



# After Napolitano: The calculation of the votes

Roberto D'Alimonte

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Pierluigi Bersani, Mario Monti, and Nichi Vendola do not have the votes to form a government together. But they have the numbers to elect the president of the republic. This is one of the outcomes of the last elections. In a globally confused and unstable scenario, such an outcome is one of the few elements of certainty.

The president of the republic is elected by the Parliament in joint session of both houses. Three regional delegates for each region (elected by the regional council so as to guarantee representation for all localities and minorities) take part in the election. Aosta Valley only has one delegate. For the first three ballots, the law requires the majority of two-thirds of the assembly. After the third vote, the absolute majority suffices. These are the rules established by the constitution in Article 83.

Let us go now from the rules to the numbers. At the Chamber of Deputies, the coalition that has won the majority bonus, PD-SEL, has 345 parliamentarians. Its senators are 121. The total is 466 votes in the assembly that will elect the new president. To these votes, one should add the 49 deputies of the parties linked to Monti and the 22 senators of his civic list. The resulting total is 537. The regional delegates are 58 in total. They have not been elected yet. But knowing the political color of the majorities in the councils and taking into account the rules in the constitution that set the representation of minorities, one may rightly conclude that among the 58 delegates, 30 will belong to the center-left, 26 to the center-right, 1 to M5S, and 1 to Aosta Valley. Provided these calculations, the total of votes available to the Bersani-Monti-Vendola coalition to elect the president is 568. Without considering the senators with life tenure, the electoral body is composed of 1,003 big electors. Finally, the votes of PD, SEL, and Monti's list represent 56.6% of the assembly. Therefore, after the third ballot, these votes suffice.

The reason for all this is to be found in the elec-

toral system. At the Chamber of Deputies, there is not a proportional system. With 29.5% of the votes, the Bersani coalition has obtained 54.8% of the seats. At the Senate, it has gone differently. In this House of the Parliament, the leader of PD has taken 31.6% of the votes and 38.4% of the seats. But the bonus at the Chamber of Deputies, together with the 30 regional delegates, has been enough to create the conditions to determine a reasonably reliable majority for the election of the new president.

We wish that such a majority did not have to be used and that the substitute of Napolitano could be elected with a broad consensus, going far beyond the numbers that we have indicated. In such a difficult phase for the country, it would be good for the parties to give proof of their capacity to cooperate on the choice of an institutional figure that, given the present difficult circumstances, will be necessarily called to play an extremely delicate and decisive role for the coming months, maybe years. One should not underestimate, though, the fact that if a broad consensus was not to be found (with the consequence of the impossibility to put together a "supermajority"), a majority still exists. This "majority" should serve to overcome any dangerous impasse that would end up destabilizing even more the already-uncertain political framework.

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Table 1. The numbers for the elections of the President of the Republic

	Chamber of Deputies	Senate	Regional Delegates	Total N	Total %
PD+SEL+Monti	394	143	30	567	56.6
PdL	125	117	26	268	26.7
M5S	109	54	1	164	16.3
Others	2	1*	1	4	0.4
Total	630	315	58	1,003	100

\* Senators for life are not included.

# Back to elections? Porcellum would generate ungovernability again

Roberto D'Alimonte

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There is a problem that several protagonists of the Italian politics and financial markets have not completely understood yet. Nowadays, Italy is in worse conditions than Greece of the most recent past. After an unavailing electoral round, Greeks went back to voting in very short time with the same electoral system, and they managed to form a government. In Italy, it is not possible to do the same. Voting again without changing the electoral law applicable to the Senate is tantamount to betting on roulette. The ball could end up in the right pocket of the wheel, but it could also end up in the wrong one. Still, the likelihood of a negative result is much higher than that of a positive result. So what do we do? Do we keep on voting until luck smiles on us?

This is the third time that we have voted with the so-called *Porcellum*, and only in one circumstance—in 2008—has the system produced a real winner at the Senate. Back then, Berlusconi's coalition got 174 seats. It managed to get such a result because the competition was substantially two-faceted, and *Il Cavaliere*, with his allies, obtained 46.9% of the votes against 37.9% of Walter Veltroni's coalition. This asymmetry in the results was the decisive factor, even if not the only one, that allowed neutralizing the lottery's effect of the 17 regional bonuses. For these last elections, the scenario has been completely different. The competition has been four-faceted, and there has not been a pole that clearly outdistanced the others. On the contrary, three out of four poles were of pretty similar dimensions.

It has gone like this: If one returned to voting in a few months, would the political scenario be that of 2008 or more likely that of last February 24–25? And on which basis could one imagine that the vote produced a different outcome? Is it possible that the political offer and the Italian's preferences changed so drastically in such a short time as to

allow for the creation of a new majority at the Senate too? Maybe this is what Beppe Grillo thinks; he already sees himself as the winner for all the 17 regions. And this is also the belief of people who trust Matteo Renzi to do what Veltroni did not manage to do in 2008. These are two hypotheses that one cannot exclude *a priori*. But today, in a situation in such a state of flux, it is legitimate to raise some doubts about the possibility of this happening.

The main road toward governability is another. Before going back to new elections, the electoral reform and much more need to be done. Which reform and with which majority? These are questions that, at this very moment, have no answer. Introducing a bonus to be taken at the national level for the Senate would be the simplest thing to do. But this change alone would not be enough because in order to avoid the risk of having two different majorities in the two Houses of the Parliament, the right to vote should also be given to the 18-year-old people—a reform that should have been introduced a long time ago. This is a constitutional reform. Can it be approved in a short time? It is difficult. But again, even if one could do it, how could people go back to voting again with a system full of many other faults besides that of the regional bonuses?

The simplest path is not always the best. In order to set the foundations of a true governability, one should make clear choices on the voting system, the form of government, and bicameralism. These are things said over and over again. It is time to choose between the Italian model and the French model. The first is that of the communes, provinces, and regions: direct election of the leader of the executive power (with one or two shifts) and majority of the seats granted to the winner (thanks to the majority's bonus). The second is based on a double election: direct election of the president of the republic with two shifts and election of the parliamentarians in single-member constituen-

cies with a two-round system. In both cases, one has to cut the number of parliamentarians and go beyond a perfect bicameralism, leaving the vote of confidence to the government to the Chamber of Deputies alone. On the electoral level, the Italian model has an advantage compared with the French model: it creates a majority in any condition of fragmentation of the parties. It is majority assuring. The advantage of the French model, on the other hand, is the majoritarian single-member constituency.

Is it possible that the present crisis generates a government capable of facing issues like these? Let us hope so. Stability and functionality of our democracy depend on what the parties will be able to do with regard to the political and institutional reforms. These decisions cannot be postponed any longer. Also, M5S must assume its responsibilities under this respect. The alternative is to keep on betting on the roulette. And at the end, we—including the croupier—will all lose.

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# The vote of confidence hinders the minority government

Roberto D'Alimonte

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Minority governments are neither an anomaly nor a rarity. What Pierluigi Bersani is trying to do at this very moment is something pretty common in many countries. First of all, one may think of Denmark, where these governments have been, in the past, more frequent than those of majority. Neither one may say that these governments function worse than the others. Again, the Danish case teaches. Italy, though, is a much different case.

Minority governments are not formed by accident. They are born and function where there are favorable conditions. One of them is the vote of confidence required at the setup of the government. In Denmark, the government, once it is formed, does not have to ask for the Parliament's vote of confidence. It is assumed that it has it. Only if the oppositions approve a vote of no confidence can the government be dismissed. In Italy, it is different. Article 94, the third subsection of the Italian constitution, sets forth that "within ten days of its formation the Government shall come before the Houses to get their confidence."

This is the most relevant formal obstacle to the creation of a minority government in our country. At the Chamber of Deputies, though, this obstacle can be bypassed with the abstention. As a matter of fact, abstentions are not calculated against the government. Therefore, the case of abstention is implicitly to be considered in favor of the government. But at the Senate, it is not like that. The Senate is the House of Parliament where the damages of a chaotic electoral system add themselves to those of some particularly inflexible parliamentary rules. In this House of the Parliament, the abstention counts as a vote against. As a consequence, to get the vote of confidence, having the majority of the valid votes does not suffice. One must have the majority of the expressed votes. It is also true that here one may resort to some alchemy to bypass the obstacle, but right now, they do not work. It is thus impossible that a minority government

may be formed at the Senate. Also, those opposition's parties that would be in favor to this solution cannot act. It is a mess raising the following question: why on such a delicate point and in a system of perfect bicameralism are the two houses' rules so different?

For a series of reasons, if a newly formed government does not have to get the Parliament's confidence, the birth of a minority government is easier. In this case, the oppositions have to explicitly take the initiative. It is not to be taken for granted that political parties of different affiliations are able to do so. Besides that, for a party of the opposition, it is much simpler not to ask for the vote of confidence than to vote in favor or to abstain. In the first case, there is nothing to do; in the second one, the party has to take a position anyhow. This is not a difference without importance, as Bersani has experienced with the M5S. Without the third subsection of Article 94 of the constitution, the likelihood that the M5S may allow a minority government would be greater. Could it join the PdL to express a vote of no confidence against the government? In Sicily, it was not like that.

Rules make a big difference, but they are not everything. For a minority government to be formed and to also function, something more is needed. What is needed is a fundamental agreement among all the biggest parties on the fact that this formula represents the right solution. For the PD today, it is like this. Maybe it could be like that also for the M5S, if one could overcome the obstacle of the initial vote of confidence. But this is not the case for the PdL. Minority governments are based on the principle of mutual conveniences. A similar executive must be convenient not only to those who set it up but also to those who tolerate it. And which convenience could have the PdL form a minority government that would end up searching for consensus, especially from the M5S? In Denmark, the minority governments that have best

functioned are those alternatively supported by the different oppositions as to make approved measures on which establishing a broad consensus was not possible. In Italy, it would not be so. The obstacle is the fundamental mistrust that separates the PD and PdL. On the other hand, if such mistrust was not there, what would prevent the two parties to form a broad consensus government? The conclusion is that, with or without Article 94 of the constitution, we are not Hamlet's homeland.

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# First a reform of the Senate and then the electoral law

Roberto D'Alimonte

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It is time to say how things really are. Those who think that today's biggest problem is the reform of the electoral system are wrong. Indeed, the present system needs to be modified, but not before having reformed the Senate of the republic. This is the first reform to be put into being. And the alibi that such a reform implies a modification of the constitution does not hold. It is on this reform that the wise men should say firmly something clear to the parties and to the public opinion. The change of the electoral law comes afterward, or it is to be undertaken together with the transformation of the Senate into a Chamber of the Regions or of the Autonomies. The new electoral system must be constructed as to function in a single House of the Parliament. The solution to the problem of the governability must start from here.

There are good reasons to intervene on the reform of the Senate. The electoral system is one of them, but not the only one. But let us start from here. We have already said and repeated it all over again: it is impossible to elect two chambers having the same powers with two different electoral systems and two different electoral bodies. In the past (namely, in the First Republic), such a system could function because both the two electoral systems were proportional and young people between the age of 18 and 24 years who voted at the Chamber of Deputies and not at the Senate did not have political preferences highly different from the other generations of electors. They used to vote almost like their fathers. Besides that, there were structured political parties that were able to steadily orient the votes. Therefore, the results of the two chambers were very similar, even though not completely identical.

Back then, the problem of a divided Parliament did not exist. Today, everything is different. In 1993, a majoritarian voting system has been introduced both at the Chamber of Deputies and at the Senate. Moreover, with the reorganization of the parties' system of the First Republic, the electoral

preferences have become more volatile. Old parties disappeared. The youngest electors do not vote any longer like the others. The political offer has become more erratic and significantly diversified in the two chambers. In such a context, the use of majoritarian voting rules has the tendency to amplify the differences of small votes, creating big differences in seats. In this way, the risk of having a Parliament with two different majorities becomes bigger and bigger or, like nowadays, with a majority in a chamber, but not in the other.

Data show it clearly: both those of the elections between 1994 and 2001—under the Matterella law—and those of the elections between 2006 and 2013, which took place with Roberto Calderoli's law, the so-called *Porcellum*. And so what are we waiting for before tackling this problem? Given the present political situation, there is no electoral system that is able to eliminate the risk that new elections did not lead us to the starting point. Talking about an electoral reform which could provoke illusory expectations of governability does not make sense if we do not even tackle the reform of the Senate. Probably only with a radically new political offer, the present electoral system or eventually another better structured system could produce a clear result in favor of a certain political faction in both chambers. But this is an enormous risk that is not worth taking.

The reasons to reform the Senate go beyond the sole reform of the electoral system.

But is it possible that Italy is the sole Western parliamentary democracy with a Parliament with two houses empowered with the same competences? Why don't France, Spain, the UK, and Germany have a perfect bicameralism and Italy has one? These, and others, are countries where the upper chamber does not give a vote of confidence to the government. It does something else. Not to mention those countries which do not have a second chamber, like Sweden, Portugal, and even Greece. What are the reasons to justify our expensive and risky diversity?

There are various models of imperfect bicameralism. Let us choose one. Here, the wise men's committee on the institutional reforms could provide a useful contribution. A proposal of this kind, which must not necessarily indicate a sole model, would serve to assign the parties their responsibilities. People tend to talk about a reduction in the parliamentarians' number and the simplification of the legislative procedures. Well, the reform of the Senate would also reach these aims. And then one will see which position those who continuously speak about changes, including the new senators of M5S, will take on such a subject.

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# Conclusions: what lies ahead?

Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini and Aldo Paparo

We introduced this book by suggesting the idea of a perfect storm: a unique combination of factors that led to the outcome of a *dangerous stalemate*. The empirical analyses of this book have detailed a result which can be quickly summarized. Despite the large defeat experienced by Berlusconi's coalition (losing almost half of its 2008 votes), the center-left coalition led by Bersani has failed to achieve the clear success that was predicted by the polls, due (to a large extent) to the explosion of the anti-establishment M5S. This outcome in votes has then interplayed with the awkward electoral law, leading to the lack of a political majority in the Senate.

In terms of explanatory factors, how do the more detailed analyses of the book allow a more precise assessment of their relative importance? First of all, the largest phenomenon is the success of the M5S. The size of such success and its almost perfectly cross-cutting nature clearly suggest the emergence and relevance of a second spatial dimension, centered on anti-establishment stances. The choice by Mr. Napolitano, the Head of State, to not call early elections (which would reinforce a bipolar competition), assembling instead both camps into an oversized majority supporting a technocratic government, has inevitably created the potential for this dimension to become relevant. Such potential has grown together with a low-responsibility, anti-system opposition, somehow echoing memories of the party dynamics of Italy's First Republic [Sartori 1976, 131-132]. The tough austerity measures enforced by the Monti government, along with its clear loss of initiative after a few months (due to the inevitable mutual vetoes of its majority partners) have then converted this potential into actual political support, leading to the huge success of the M5S.

We want to emphasize once again how this potential explanation does not rest on particularly idiosyncratic, Italy-specific assumptions. It only assumes the common blame attribution, incumbent-punishment mechanism characterizing vot-

ers in virtually all contemporary democracies. It should be clear that, if *all* mainstream parties are involved in a government taking unpopular (and to some extent ineffective) measures, punishment of the incumbent will hit *all* of them, and reward an anti-system opposition. Said differently, this problematic vote outcome appears not as a strange behavior of Italian voters, but as a rational reaction by voters to a strange behavior of Italian political elites. Elites who apparently still assume that Italian voters behave differently from voters of other countries.

And this might also partially explain the sub-par performance of the PD. First of all, the PD has inevitably ended up paying some cost-of-government for supporting the Monti cabinet: a problem that already emerged in discussions within the PD in the year before elections. At the same time, the strategic campaign mistakes by the PD leadership cannot be overlooked. Crowned by successful and popular primary elections – where he also defeated the young competitor Matteo Renzi, mayor of Florence – Mr. Bersani was in the position to win elections without huge efforts. But then his campaign has appeared to not perform *any* effort: lacking clear policy choices, lacking media visibility, and most importantly with an unclear and ambiguous stance towards his centrist competitor Monti. Mr. Bersani even declared that the PD would behave as if having only 49% votes, even if obtaining a 51% – suggesting that they would seek an alliance with Mr. Monti even if not needed. No wonder then, that voters looking for clear-cut alternatives would turn to Grillo's M5S.

After the vote, Mr. Bersani's leadership finally collapsed after the collision with the impossibility to obtain the support of the M5S to a PD-led government (due both to the M5S rigidity and to a very cold reception of this scenario by the Head of State). As a result, the choice of an oversized majority revived, and PD and PdL were back in the

same government, headed by Enrico Letta, this time with a political majority where both parties express ministers.

What happened after is history of the present day. Berlusconi was – for the first time ever – officially condemned for a crime, with such verdict confirmed in all three degrees of judgment. This will likely result in its expulsion from the Senate, and an acceleration in the end of his political career. To some extent a crucial development of this process happened in early October 2013, when – for the first time ever – the leadership of Berlusconi's PdL (whose current secretary-general is Angelino Alfano) took a decision that was against Berlusconi's will. Mr. Alfano refused to comply with Berlusconi's request to withdraw the party's delegation from the current Letta government. Thus Alfano stopped Berlusconi trying this desperate move to possibly delay his expulsion as a senator.

The fact that a party places its very interests first – above those of its original founder – might signal the birth of an actual political party. However, the power struggle within the PdL is far from over. As the case of the French Fifth Republic shows, the institutionalization of a charismatic party [Panebianco 1988] might prove complex and problematic. As a result, the PdL has recently split in two on the issue of supporting the Letta government. Mr. Alfano along with all PdL ministers has formed the NCD (New Centre-Right), with Berlusconi, along with radical anti-government rightists, reviving the old Forza Italia name. To some extent, this has made visible the impossibility for Berlusconi to accelerate the fall of Enrico Letta and call early elections – as the NCD alone provides the government with a majority. But, at the same time, the NCD and the PdL are carefully containing mutual conflict only to the government issue. They are fully aware that, in case of early elections, they would have to run together. Perhaps that might even prove more productive, as centre-right voters would be offered two alternatives – one for and one against the Letta government. But it is clear that this would be inevitable, given the current electoral law. A law which does

not appear easy to reform, as mutual vetoes prevent the adoption of substantial changes.

What lies ahead? As Berlusconi's expulsion from the Senate should materialize in the coming weeks, leadership in the centre-left may be also close to a change. The coming open elections organized by the PD for the choice of its secretary-general<sup>1</sup>, to be held on December 8<sup>th</sup>, will likely see the victory of Matteo Renzi. Mr. Renzi, 38, is younger than most Italian political leaders and has openly challenged the current leadership of the PD. After last year's defeat against Bersani, he has both capitalized on Bersani's failure in the general elections, and slightly moved to the left his policy positions. However, its success will likely shift the party's positions towards the center, and in the direction of a major turnover of political personnel. This might increase the appeal of the PD among former supporters of Berlusconi and Grillo, but could create problems with part of the current centre-left electorate. Also, a success of Mr. Renzi will likely threaten the survival of the Letta government. Should Renzi become secretary-general, he might be interested into a premature end of that experience, although he assured his support to Letta, at least until the end of the Italian term for the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, in December 2014. In this scenario, spring 2015 – at the latest – could see new elections, where a more competitive PD could attempt to win a majority in both Chambers. However, with the current electoral law even a clear success might not be enough. And an electoral reform appears beyond the possibilities of the current parliamentary equilibria. As a result, two years after the fall of the last Berlusconi government, uncertainty is still the main keyword to describe Italian politics.

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<sup>1</sup> The election is open to all citizens above 16.







# List of Italian parties and abbreviations

## Main parties

PD – Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) was founded in 2007 by the merger of DS (Democratici di Sinistra - Democratic Left) and DL-Margherita (The Daisy – a Liberal and Christian-democratic party). It ran for the first time at the 2008 general election (33.2%). In the 2013 general election, its leader was Pierluigi Bersani. PD is the main center-left Italian party.

PdL – Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom) was launched by its leader Silvio Berlusconi for the 2008 general election (37.4%) and officially founded in 2009 by the merger of the former Berlusconi's party, FI (Forza Italia - Go Italy) and the post-fascist AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance). PdL is the main center-right Italian party.

M5S – Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) was launched by the popular comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo in 2009. It contested the Italian local elections of 2011 and 2012 and the regional elections of 2010. It ran for its first general election in 2013. The party refuses the left-right dimension and criticizes traditional political parties.

SC – Scelta Civica (Civic Choice) is a centrist political party formed for the 2013 general election. Its leader is the former Prime Minister Mario Monti. The 2013 general election represents its electoral debut. At the Senate SC formed a joint list named “Con Monti per l’Italia” (With Monti for Italy) along with UdC and FLI.

LN – Lega Nord (Northern League) is a regionalist party founded in 1991 by Umberto Bossi. Since 2001, it has been continuously part of the center-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. In the 2008 general election, it got 8.3% nationwide. Since 2012, its leader is Roberto Maroni.

SEL – Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (Left Ecology and Freedom) is a left-wing political party found-

ed in 2009 by its current leader Nichi Vendola. It emerged as a splinter from PRC (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista – Party for the Communist Refoundation) and grouped former socialist, green and other left-wing politicians. It ran for its first general election in 2013 as the main ally of PD in the center-left coalition led by Bersani.

## Minor parties abbreviations

### *Bersani's coalition*

CD – Centro Democratico (Democratic Center)  
SVP - Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrolean People's Party)  
PSI – Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)

### *Berlusconi's coalition*

FdI – Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy)  
LD – La Destra (The Right)  
GS-MpA – Grande Sud-Movimento per le Autonomie (Great South – Movement for Autonomies)

### *Monti's coalition*

UdC – Unione di Centro (Union of the Center)  
FLI – Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (Future and Freedom for Italy)

### *Others*

RC – Rivoluzione Civile (Civil Revolution)  
FiD – Fermare il Declino (Stop the Decline)

### *Old parties*

IdV – Italia dei Valori (Italy of values)  
SA – La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno (The Left – The Rainbow)  
DS – Democratici di Sinistra (Left Democrats)  
DL – Democrazia è libertà – La Margherita (Democracy is freedom – The Daisy)  
MRE – Movimento dei repubblicani europei (Movement of European republicans)  
FI – Forza Italia (Go Italy)  
AN – Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)



# Notes on Contributors

**Matteo Cataldi** is a member of the CISE (Italian Centre for Electoral Studies) and visiting lecturer in Italian Political System at the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome. Graduated from the Faculty of Political Science “Cesare Alfieri” at University of Florence, he has been researcher at *Tolomeo Studi e Ricerche*. In 2011 he won the XIII “Celso Ghini” award of the Italian Society of Electoral Studies. His main research interests include voting behavior and electoral geography in a comparative perspective. He has published in *Polena* and in *Quaderni dell’Osservatorio Elettorale*. He is the co-editor (with Lorenzo De Sio and Federico De Lucia) of the *Dossier CISE 4: Le Elezioni Politiche 2013* (CISE 2013). He is author of several research notes published in the Dossier CISE series.

**Alessandro Chiaramonte** teaches Italian political system in the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Florence. A founding member of the CISE, his research interests include the electoral systems, elections and voting behavior, parties and party systems, both with reference to Italy and in a comparative perspective. On these issues, he has written several essays. And he is the author of *Tra maggioritario e proporzionale. L’universo dei sistemi elettorali misti* (Il Mulino, 2005). He has edited (with Roberto D’Alimonte) *Il maggioritario regionale. Le elezioni del 16 aprile 2000* (Il Mulino, 2000); *Proporzionale ma non solo. Le elezioni politiche del 2006* (Il Mulino, 2007); *Proporzionale se vi pare. Le elezioni politiche del 2008* (Il Mulino, 2010) and (with Giovanni Tarli Barbieri) *Riforme istituzionali e rappresentanza politica nelle regioni italiane* (Il Mulino, 2007) and *Il premio di maggioranza* (Carocci, 2011). Between 2002 and 2004 he was a consultant of the Regional Council of Tuscany in the preparation of new electoral law and the new law on primary elections.

**Roberto D’Alimonte** is Professor of Italian Political System at LUISS Guido Carli University of

Rome. From 1974 to 2009 he taught at the Faculty of Political Science “Cesare Alfieri” of the University of Florence. He has been a visiting professor at the universities of Yale and Stanford. Since 1995 he has collaborated with the New York University in Florence. His most recent research interests concern electoral systems, elections and voting behavior in Italy. Since 1993 he has coordinated with Stefano Bartolini and Alessandro Chiaramonte a group of research on elections and transformation of the Italian party system. The results have been published in a series of books published by Il Mulino: *Maggioritario ma non troppo. Le elezioni del 1994*; *Maggioritario per caso. Le elezioni del 1996*; *Maggioritario finalmente? Le elezioni del 2001*; *Proporzionale ma non solo. Le elezioni del 2006*; *Proporzionale se vi pare. Le elezioni del 2008*. Among his publications there are articles published in *West European Politics*, *Party Politics*, as well as in leading Italian scientific journals. He is the Director of the Italian Center for Electoral Studies (CISE). And he is a columnist for *Il Sole 24 Ore*.

**Federico De Lucia** is a member of the CISE and graduated in Political Science at the University of Florence. He has collaborated with the regional administration of Tuscany and has participated to the “Silvano Tosi” Seminar of Parliamentary Studies and Research. His main interests are the study of the institutional framework, the electoral systems and the historical evolution of party systems, as well as the collection, and the comparison of election data at local, national and international level. He is the co-editor (with Lorenzo De Sio and Matteo Cataldi) of the *Dossier CISE 4: Le Elezioni Politiche 2013* (CISE 2013). He is author of several research notes published in the Dossier CISE series.

**Lorenzo De Sio** is an assistant professor at the LUISS Guido Carli University of Rome, and the coordinator of the CISE (Italian Center for Electoral Studies). Previously a Jean Monnet Fellow

at the European University Institute, a Visiting Research Fellow at the University of California, Irvine, and a Campbell National Fellow at Stanford University, he is a member of the Scientific Council of the ITANES (Italian National Election Studies) and is involved in international research projects such as *The True European Voter* and *EUandI* (formerly *EU Profiler*). In addition to LUISS University, he has taught at the Universities of Florence and Siena. His interests are in elections, public opinion and voting behaviour in comparative perspective, with a focus on models of voting behaviour and party competition. He is the author of *Elettori in movimento* (Polistampa, 2008), *Competizione e spazio politico* (Il Mulino, 2011), the editor of *La politica cambia, i valori restano? Una ricerca sulla cultura politica dei cittadini toscani* (Firenze University Press, 2011), and the co-editor of the first four volumes of the Dossier CISE series. He has published articles in *Comparative Political Studies*, *West European Politics*, *South European Society and Politics*, as well as on the main Italian scientific journals.

**Vincenzo Emanuele** is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the “Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane” (SUM) in Florence, a member of the CISE (Italian Center for Electoral Studies) and a lecturer in Italian Political System at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome. He has published articles on *Meridiana - Rivista di Storia e Scienze Sociali* and on *Quaderni dell’Osservatorio Elettorale*. He is the co-editor (with Lorenzo De Sio) of the Dossier CISE 3 (*Un anno di elezioni verso le Politiche 2013*, CISE 2013) and he is author of several research notes published in the Dossier CISE series. His PhD thesis deals with the process of vote nationalization in Western Europe and its possible determinants. His research interests focus on the

study of elections and party system in a comparative perspective.

**Nicola Maggini** is a research fellow at the University of Florence and a member of the CISE (Italian Center for Electoral Studies). He received his PhD cum laude in Political Science at the “Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane” (SUM). He has been teaching assistant at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome. He published articles on *Società Mutamento Politica-Rivista Italiana di Sociologia*, *Quaderni dell’Osservatorio Elettorale* and *Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli*. He also published (with Roberto D’Alimonte and Aldo Di Vrgilio) the chapter *I risultati elettorali: bipolarismo addio?* in *Voto amaro* (ITANES 2013). He is the co-editor (with Lorenzo De Sio) of the Dossier CISE 2 (*Crisi e Rimobilitazione*, CISE 2013) and the author of several research notes published in the Dossier CISE series. His research interests are the study of the electoral behavior and of electoral systems in comparative perspective.

**Aldo Paparo** is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the “Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane” (SUM) in Florence and a member of the CISE (Italian Center for Electoral Studies). He graduated in Political Science at “Cesare Alfieri” in Florence. His research project for his doctoral dissertation explores the relationship between election results for local levels of government and the national electoral cycle. His main areas of interest are electoral systems and electoral behavior, with a particular emphasis on the local level. He has published in *Quaderni dell’Osservatorio Elettorale* and co-edited with Lorenzo De Sio the first volume of the Dossier CISE series: *Le Elezioni Comunali 2012* (CISE 2012). He is the author of several research notes published in the Dossier CISE series.



The third Eurozone economy and one of the six founders of the EEC (the direct ancestor of the European Union) in 1957, Italy is experiencing in recent years a season of political instability and uncertainty, especially after the crisis of Silvio Berlusconi's leadership in the centre-right camp. A situation which has not improved after the results of the general election held in February 2013, whose overall outcome can be described as a dangerous stalemate. A new, anti-establishment party (the 5-Star Movement led by comedian Beppe Grillo) becoming the largest party with 25,6% of votes; the absence of any cohesive political majority in the Senate (whose vote of confidence is required); the installation – again – of a government based on an oversized, hardly manageable political majority, led by Enrico Letta. How did all this happen? What are the political and the institutional factors that produced this outcome? What is the size and scope of the success of Beppe Grillo? Where are his votes coming from? Who paid the “cost of government” for the previous legislature? What are the likely scenarios for the future? First answers to such questions are presented in this book, which collects revised versions of short research notes published in Italian on the CISE website between February and April 2013, along with additional material published in Italian and English by CISE scholars on the Italian and international media. The goal of this book is to provide – in a timely fashion – a set of fresh, short analyses, able to provide a non-technical audience (including journalists, practitioners of politics, and everyone interested in Italian politics) with information and data about Italian electoral politics. Even electoral scholars will find interesting information, able to stimulate the construction of more structured research hypotheses to be tested in more depth. Too often international commentators portray Italian politics in a superficial fashion, without the support of fresh data and a proper understanding of the deeper processes involved. With this book, in spite of its limited scope, we hope to contribute to filling this gap.

#### **CISE – Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali**

Directed by Roberto D'Alimonte, the CISE – Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali (Italian Centre for Electoral Studies) is an inter-university research center established jointly by the LUISS Guido Carli University of Rome and the University of Florence. Its activity focuses on the study of elections and their institutional framework. The CISE carries out a range of research activities with different points of view on the electoral process: from the analysis of individual voting behavior (investigated through an independent, regular series of CATI surveys) to analyses of election results based on aggregate data (also including the study of vote shifts and of electoral geography), to research on electoral systems and their related legislation. The CISE research activity is also carried out through partnerships with other Italian and international scholars, as well as with national and international research centers and research programmes.

The activities of the CISE, systematically documented on the website at <http://cise.luiss.it/>, are supported by Eni.

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