Party Identification and Party System Change: Italy Between the First and the Second Republic

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1. Introduction

Since WW II no Western democracy, with the exception of France, has experienced such a profound political change as did Italy after 1992. France shifted from the IV to the V Republic. Italy from the I to the II Republic. Actually the term Second Republic has not been used right away to define the regime change. Even now many object to its use. At the time what was going on was perceived as a *transition*. It seems hardly justifiable that almost 20 years later we should still be talking of a transition. There is however a reason why some people do not want to use the term Second Republic (from now on, R2). It is the fact that the new regime has developed without a clear constitutional break.

In France the change has been marked by a new Constitution. This is not the case in Italy. What has changed in Italy are parties, leaders and electoral rules. As a simple measure of the extent of the change at the party level suffice it to say that if we take as our point of reference the parliamentary elections of 1987, the last before the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, there is not a single party running in that election which has not changed one way or another between then and 1994 (Table 1).

What is even more remarkable is that the Dc and the Psi- the two most important governing parties during the First Republic (R1)- after 1994 have either disappeared (the Dc) or shrank to insignificance (the Psi). The same thing happened to all of the other minor parties which governed with them such as Pri, Psdi, Pli. As to the remaining parties of R1 the Pci, the main opposition party, went through a constant series of splits, mergers and change of symbols. Even the new parties such Berlusconi's Forza Italia (Fi) or Bossi's Lega Nord (Ln) have changed. The former (founded in 1994) has become in 2008 the Popolo delle libertà (Pdl), the latter was born as the Lega lombarda (Ll) in 1987 and became Ln ln 1992. However since then it has not changed. The only party that did so during R2. It is the most stable feature of the new party system .

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Table 1- A changing party landscape, 1987-2008

	1987	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**
Old parties							
	Pci	**Pds**	**Pds**	**Ds**	**Ds**	**Ds**	**Pd**
	Dc	**Dc**	**Ppi**				
	Psi	**Psi**	**Ps**				
	Msi	**Msi-Dn**	**An**	**An**	**An**	**An**	**Pdl**
New parties							
			Fi	**Fi**	**Fi**	**Fi**	**Pdl**
	Ll	**Ln**	**Ln**	**Ln**	**Ln**	**Ln**	**Ln**

At the institutional level the decisive change was the introduction in 1993 of a new electoral system. This was a mixed-member majoritarian system (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte 1995; D'Alimonte 2001; Katz 2001), with a predominantly plurality component. In both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 75 % of the seats were assigned in single-member districts with plurality rule. The rest being allocated with Pr on

the basis of party lists. As the new electoral rules were introduced at a time when the old party system was collapsing they provided powerful institutional incentives for parties to enter into pre-election coalitions. These coalitions have varied in their party composition over time but they have consistently produced a bipolar pattern of competition based on two blocs, and allowed for the development of a system of alternating governments, in spite of a high number of parties. Fragmentation remained high but it was constrained into a center-left and a center-right coalition. Third actors did compete but with no success. *Fragmented bipolarism* is the way the new party system can be described (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte 1995; D'Alimonte 2005; Bartolini, Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte 2002, 2004; Chiaramonte 2007)

The *modus operandi* of the new system remained fundamentally intact even when the Berlusconi's majority in 2005 passed a new electoral law. The new and current system did away with the single-member districts which had turned out to be difficult to manage for the center-right (D'Alimonte and Bartolini 1995; Bartolini, Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte 2002, 2004), but it did not do away with the need for parties to form pre-electoral coalitions and therefore it maintained the bipolar pattern of competition. In fact, though the new electoral system is formally proportional, it contains a powerful majoritarian mechanism: a majority bonus which allows the coalition with the plurality of the votes to gain a majority of the seats (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte 2006; Chiaramonte 2007; D'Alimonte 2007). The bonus is the incentive that forces parties to coordinate before the vote and not after.

The combination of new parties and new rules has changed radically not only the pattern of party competition but also the process of government formation, the style of political campaigning, the relevance of candidates and personalities, the influence of the media. In such a radically changed context, one of the most relevant questions inevitably concerns the presence and characteristics of the relationships between citizens and the political system; and the extent to which the concept of *party identification* is able to provide an appropriate theoretical lens to study both such relationships and how they changed between R1 and R2.

In the first decades of R1, the very establishment and consolidation of democracy in Italy was possible due to the presence of mass parties. Such parties – through their structured organization and their powerful ideological identities – were able to generate strong feelings of attachment in a large part of Italian citizens, which at least gave the new Italian democracy a partisan basis – what Morlino (1991, 1998) has called *party anchoring* – in the absence of a full legitimation of the democratic regime and of its institutions.

What happened to such relationships? Are they still strong and cross-cutting in R2? Do they still depict Italian democracy as a contrast between rival social groups? Moreover: how does the concept of *party identification* capture the change? Is it able to highlight long-term political predispositions in both R1 and R2, as it historically has done in the U.S. case where it was introduced? Are there any alternative conceptualizations that might prove appropriate?

This paper seeks to answer the aforementioned questions through an empirical investigation based on survey data concerning the 1968-2008 period. In particular, we have employed data from the Itanes[1] 1968, 1972, 1990, 2001, 2006 and 2008 election studies[2]. In the paper we first assess changes in levels of party identification through time,

[1] Italian National Election Studies.

[2] The inclusion of the 1990 study is crucial, as it is the only study providing a time point close (actually, three years earlier) to the transition from R1 to r2. However, 1990 was not a general election year, and the survey was conducted in light of the local elections (regional, provincial and municipal) of 1990. However, in R1 an almost complete isomorphism existed between the national Parliament and local assemblies at all levels (except for small towns), both in terms of electoral systems (PR) and post-election coalitional practices, so

and in relation to party system change. We then perform empirical analyses to discuss the usefulness of the concept of *party identification* vis-à-vis the concept of *ideological identification* (van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983) which suggests that in multi-party systems – often characterized by party instability and volatility – the presence of multiple, overlapping party preferences reveals that the underlying, genuinely stable anchor for political attitudes is actually a general *ideological* position on the left-right continuum.

We then elaborate this conceptualization, by introducing the possibility that the left-right space itself might present *discontinuities*, due not only to ideological factors, but also to the presence and structure of *pre-electoral coalitions*, which have become a crucial feature of the Italian party system in R2. We finally test a model with such features on both R1 and R2, detecting a significant presence of discontinuities, and marked differences between the two historical periods.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the trends of party identification in Italy, and suggest possible interpretations of this trend in light of general societal processes and specific party system changes. Section 3 moves on to discussing the usefulness of the party identification concept, by testing its ability to discriminate among respondents in a meaningful fashion, and to provide genuine and conceptually interpretable explanatory power to models of vote choice. Section 4 introduces an alternative conceptualization based on the concept of *ideological identification*, and discusses in general terms its applicability to the Italian case. Finally, Section 5 elaborates on the concept of a discontinuous left-right space and its operationalization, and presents empirical findings. Conclusions follow.

2. Party identification, partisan dealignment and party system change

As many studies have highlighted, the consolidation of the Italian democratic regime after WWII was based on the presence of mass integration parties, that were able to channel large masses of citizens into supporting the newly founded democracy (Galli et al. 1968; Morlino 1991; 1998)[3]. It is then not surprising that during R1 the two most important features of voting behaviour at the mass level have been a high turnout rate[4] and a high level of party identification. Since 1948 turnout has been consistently over 90 % of eligible voters until 1979. After that it has started to decline but it has never fallen below 85 %. It was still an impressive 87,3 % in 1992, the last election of R1.

Consistently with the party-mediated nature of the consolidation of the democratic regime, levels of party identification[5] were also very high in the earliest ITANES studies (1968 and 1972). However, since then the data show a somewhat different pattern. In 1968 almost 80 % of the respondents identified themselves with a party, but already four years later this

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that even local voting clearly showed a strong partisan character in connection with the national political climate.

[3] However, such support was mostly possible only through the development of party-directed loyalties, rather than full loyalties towards the democratic regime; a phenomen that as led Morlino (1991; 1998) to classify Italy as a case of democratic consolidation through *party anchoring* rather than through full *legitimation* of the institutions of the new regime. See also section 3.

[4] Compulsory voting was also present until 1993.

[5] In the ITANES studies, the presence of a party identification is measured by employing the question wording that is consistently employed across most multi-party European party systems, based on reporting – if present – the party towards which the respondent feels "closer than to other parties". In other words, *party closeness* is the genuine dimension that is measured by such item. For a discussion, see Bellucci and Bartle (2008). In the paper, however, we will always refer to party *identification* to avoid confusion, as measured based on closeness are generally accepted as the most appropriate measures of party identification in multi-party systems.

figure had dropped to 72.4 %. The decline has continued up to the collapse of R1, as it can be seen in 1990. The change has been even more dramatic if we take into consideration the 'strong identifiers'. In 1968 there was not a significant difference between identifiers and strong identifiers (79,3 % vs. 75,2 %). By 1990 the latter had dropped to a mere 31,8 %. Even taking into account that the 1990 data were collected at the time of a regional election, whereas the other data refer to parliamentary elections, the difference is quite striking.

Unfortunately we do not have comparable data for 1992, the last election of R1, nor for 1994, the first election of R2. Between 1990 and 1994 everything changed in Italian politics. Old and established parties disappeared. New parties and new leaders entered the scene. We do not know if during this time of turbulent change party identification continued to decline. What we do know is that in 2001 its level was similar to 1990 and then increased five years later as the new party system was stabilizing (Figure 1).

Figure 1 - Turnout, party identification and self-placement on the left-right dimension (%): 1968-2008



Sources: Ministry of the Interior; Itanes.

Our interpretation is that this trend is the combination of two separate phenomena. The first is a process of dealignment similar to what happened in most Western countries (Sarlvik and Crewe 1983; Dalton 1984; 2000; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). The second is related to the influence of party system change. The establishment and consolidation of a new party system usually brings about an increase in party identification after initially low levels (Converse 1969; van der Eijk and Franklin 2009). This process however was not smooth. After the turbulence of the 1992-1994 period, the major parties did not go through

significant changes, and party identification increased significantly between 2001 and 2006. Then in 2008 two new parties appeared on the scene: the Pd and the Pdl. The former was a merger of the Ds and a short lived catholic party named Margherita. The latter was a merger of Fi and An. For voters this was another shock and party identification reversed downwards again, setting new lows for both identifiers and strong identifiers.
In our view, this further change suggests the validity of our interpretation that two parallel phenomena are happening at the same time. The coexistence of a structural societal dealignment and of party system shocks is testified by two observations: the decline in the 1972-1990 period took place in the absence of any significant party system change; whereas the slight increase after 2001 and the sudden fall in 2008 testify the responsiveness of party identification to party system change.

More support for this interpretation emerges from the disaggregation of the presence of party identification by levels of political sophistication (Figure 2). If we distinguish respondents by their level of political interest, the presence of separate phenomena clearly appears. On the one hand, a dealignment process is clearly present in the R1 period, consistently across all levels of political interest. On the other hand, the transition to R2 marks a clear divergence. Citizens with the highest level of interest in politics (and presumably with more cognitive resources) show a reversal of the dealignment trend, by quickly developing new identifications, up to levels that essentially equal those of R1. On the contrary, less interested citizens show a continued dealignment trend, leading to levels of party identification that are consistently lower than those observed in R1.

Figure 2 – Party identifiers (%) by level of political interest: 1968-2008



In our view, this leads to two main points that will provide a guide for our subsequent analyses. On the one hand, the dealignment trend in R1 should be interpreted only to a limited extent in terms of a general process of *partisan dealignment* (due to

societal changes in terms of *cognitive mobilization*). A relevant part of the dealignment in the Eighties appears rather connected to the specific lifecycle of the Italian party system. This is a decade which progressively saw a loss of grip of the old parties on Italian society (Morlino 1991; 1998) and which ended with the disappearance of the cold war that had provided ideological legitimation to the contrast between the two main mass parties, Dc and Pci. As a result, the new party system in R2 shows a different trend. This trend , however, is not reversed among citizens with low levels of interest in politics.

This highlights another feature of the Italian political transition in the early Nineties. Not only R1 and R2 are based on a different type of party system and different parties; but the parties in the two Republics also have very different characteristics. In R1 most parties had a developed and structured organization that allowed an efficient mobilization of citizens at all local levels. To a large extent this mobilization was achieved through a network of ancillary organizations that dealt with most aspects of social life, in line with the model of the mass integration party (Neumann 1956). As a result, such organizations were able to generate ties with political parties even among citizens with very low levels of education and political interest. This organizational structure was already in crisis during the dealignment process and it definitely collapsed during the transition. In R2 essentially no Italian party has anymore a network capable to assure the old levels of mobilization of politically peripheral citizens (Bardi, Ignazi and Massari 2007; Biorcio 2007; Ignazi 2008). Thus, new parties are not anymore *mass parties* and it is not surprising that party identification has become strongly dependent on individual levels of political sophistication.

Given these caveats, the trends (at least among the most interested in politics) appear to confirm the expected dynamics for the consolidation of a new party system:
it takes time to build any kind of emotional attachment to any object, and what happened between 2001 and 2008 is an interesting example of how sensitive is party identification to changes in the party system. After the turbulence of the 1992-1994 period, the major parties did not go through significant changes, and party identification increased significantly between 2001 and 2006. Finally, the importance of the party system structure for party identification levels is testified by the systematic decrease of identification in 2008, as the two main parties of both main coalitions merged into the two new parties Pd and Pdl. For voters this was another shock. One of the consequences is that party identification decreased again, with a decrease that strongly affected even respondents with a high level of political interest. Trends appear to support the responsiveness of party identification levels to party system change.

3. Assessing party identification as an explanatory variable

As we have seen in the previous section, in the last twenty years the Italian party system has been unstable. Number and strength of parties varied, identities and symbols changed, and so did pre-electoral alliances. In this context it is hard to think of party identification as a concept capable of capturing long-term predispositions (perhaps the most important part of the original conceptualization proposed by the Michigan school). Party identification needs a stable environment. This is one of the reasons why the concept has turned out to be a useful tool to analyze voting behaviour in the U.S. where the party system has not substantially changed since the introduction of the concept. Italy is a different story.However, it would not be appropriate to question the use of the concept in the Italian case just on the grounds of *a priori* theoretical considerations. What really

matters is its empirical relevance. This is why we decided to test two features party identification must have, in order to prove a useful conceptual tool**.**

The first is its ability to discriminate citizens with different characteristics. To what extent these groups differ from each other? Is this distinction more relevant than the distinction between identifiers of different parties? The second feature is instead connected to the place and role of party identification in the "funnel of causality" model explaining vote choice. According to the traditional Michigan model (Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell et al. 1966), party identification occupies a central position in the funnel, but at a certain distance from the vote choice, explicitly assuming that it is a long-term predisposition which can differ even significantly from the actual vote choice due to short-term factors. Does this apply to the Italian case as well?

In order to answer these two research questions, we performed two separate empirical tests. In the first test, we checked the ability of party identification to distinguish groups of respondents that have significantly different characteristics. We operationalized such characteristics through a set of variables that were consistently measured across all surveys from 1968 to 2008. Such variables include basic socio-demographic aspects (geographical area of residence; town size; gender; age; education; social class; religious attendance), along with union membership and political interest.

Our basic test seeks to understand whether party identifiers in general are defined by common characteristics that differentiate them from non-identifiers (implying the existence of a common explanatory model of identification across all parties). The failure of this test could suggest that identifiers of different parties cannot be grouped together; an hypothesis which appears plausible in the Italian case, as the existing literature highlights how during R1 party attachments were to a large extent driven by rival group loyalties. This in turn would lead us to expect relevant differences across parties.

We performed this test by comparing two different models at the individual level. First, we estimated a binary logit regression model predicting party identification in general; secondly, we estimated a multinomial logit regression model predicting party identification towards specific parties. The purpose of this strategy is best understood by recalling that the multinomial logit setup allows the same predictors to have different effects depending on the outcome (in this case, different parties). As a result, the binary logit model corresponds to the hypothesis that identification shares for all parties the same explanation in terms of effects of the different predictors. The multinomial logit model corresponds instead to the hypothesis that different parties present different explanatory models. The comparison of the predictive power of the two rival models[6] should tell us whether parties essentially share a common model (if the two predictive powers are similar) or rather if identification with different parties has different explanations (in this case, mutually cancelling effects would depress the predictive power of the binary model). Table 2 reports the main results of this first analysis, in terms of predictive power of the respective models (values are Nagelkerke's pseudo R-squared's).

Let us first focus on R1 (surveys 1968 to 1990). Our first observation is that the binary model, predicting party identification in general, has a predictive power of no substantive interest. In other words, the characteristics of identifiers and non-identifiers do not differ to any substantive degree. The presence of party identification does not meaningfully distinguish groups of voters with different characteristics. This is in our view a relevant finding. We should have expected at least a weak relationship between party identification and some predictors that are related to socio-economic status and social centrality (gender, education, social class, religious attendance – traditionally interpreted as participation to the local community). Yet this is absent. The general presence of party

[6] Though only indicatively, as measures of goodness-of-fit for the binary and multinomial logit model cannot be directly compared.

identification appears unrelated to these characteristics. In comparison (still only within R1), the multinomial model shows a predictive power that is significantly higher and that satisfies criteria for substantive relevance.

The first and basic substantial interpretation of this finding is that identifiers of different parties differ between each other to a significant degree, and – more importantly – they do so much more than all identifiers do from all non-identifiers.

Table 2 – Goodness-of-fit of various model of generic and specific party identification (values are Nagelkerke's pseudo-R-squared's)

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
*Binary logit model of ***party identification in general****						
base model	0.020	0.020	0.023	0.035	0.038	0.022
+political interest	0.034	0.049	0.034	0.128	0.105	0.086
*Multinomial logit of ***party identification in specific parties**** *(different coefficients are estimated for each party, allowing causal heterogeneity)*						
base model	0.119	0.129	0.101	0.063	0.094	0.070
+political interest	0.126	0.144	0.108	0.106	0.123	0.106

[a]Geographical zones; town size; gender; age, age squared, education, social class, church attendance, union membership

The joint results of the two models are easy to understand when looking at the actual estimated coefficients (fully reported in the Appendix, and partly summarized below). What clearly appears from the results of the multinomial logit model is that several key predictors have *opposite* effects for different parties. For example, religiosity – by far the most important predictor of identification with a specific party in R1 – has a strongly *positive* effect on identification with the Dc, and a strongly *negative* effect on identification with the Pci. This explains why the overall (binary) model of generic party identification has such a low predictive power. For most variables effects simply cancel each other out among different parties. Moreover, a specific finding deserves particular emphasis. In R1, not even the inclusion of political interest in the model is able to substantially increase the predictive power of the binary model. This is interesting as we could have expected that such a indicator of a more general political sophistication dimension would be obviously related to party identification.

The first impression derived from these findings is that party identification does not appear to be able to successfully discriminate between groups of voters with significantly different characteristics. But before elaborating on this methodological aspect, it is necessary to advance a substantive interpretation of the above findings for R1.In general, we deem the above findings only partially surprising, in light of the political socialization model of R1, as described by the literature presented in the previous sections. In Morlino's terms, *party anchoring* rather then full *legitimation* was the main driving force of the democratic consolidation in R1 (Morlino 1991; 1998)**.** As effectively summarized by Biorcio (2007), mass parties were powerful organizations capable of socializing masses of citizens regardless of their level of education or political interest. Moreover the Fascist legacy of widespread party membership (*la tessera*) evolved into a widespread tendency to rely on parties as a common source of inclusion and patronage (Galli 1966; Galli et al. 1968). This could very well explain the very high identification rates in the early surveys of

the Itanes series, and the cross-cutting tendency to identify with a party, producing the lack of significant differences between identifiers and non-identifiers.

On the other hand, the significant differences between identifiers of different parties are understandable in light of the early studies of political culture in Italy (Almond and Verba 1963), which showed how citizens expressed high levels of trust in people of the same party, and strong distrust in others. Citizens essentially perceived themselves as bound to a party, not to the political system as a whole.

In addition, the surprising irrelevance of political interest for explaining general party identification represents an indirect confirmation of the nature of party affiliation (and conversely, identification) as a common (though often low-intensity) form of social and political inclusion, rather than a sign of strong commitment to political activity. This finding is confirmed by the little relevance of political interest *even for specific party identification*. Indeed in the multinomial logistic model, political interest produces a very small increase in predictive power.

Let us now focus on R2. How do these findings compare with the new party system? What remains stable and what changes? A first observation inevitably concerns the predictive power of socio-demographic variables. As we have seen, in R1 such variables had no substantive power in predicting party identification in general, but had some power in predicting party identification with specific parties[7]. The inability of socio-demographics to predict general party identification is confirmed in R2: but a difference with R1 is that now these predictors have a almost non-existent predictive power also in the multinomial model. In fact not only differences between identifiers and non-identifiers are minimal, but also differences between identifiers of different parties become definitely blurred. In other words, identification with different parties does not reflect anymore the contrast between different social groups.

Yet, a new element emerges when political interest is taken into account. In R2, this addition leads to a substantial increase of the binary model, whose values of predictive power almost equal the values of the multinomial model. In substantive terms, in R2 (unlike in R1) general party identification appears to be able to divide respondents in groups that share some common characteristics. The most important of these is political interest. This suggests that party identification can perhaps be regarded as a phenomenon that can be analyzed on its own, and as the outcome of a single process regardless of distinctions between parties. And this happens because of a typical indicator of political awareness, i.e. interest in politics. General party identification does not appear anymore as a widespread attitude of minimal political relevance. In R2 it becomes clearly a political attitude connected to commitment to politics.

The above findings can be quickly summarized by looking at the actual effects estimated by the multinomial logit regression model. While full results are reported in the Appendix**,** we summarize them for some specific predictors using z-value diagrams (Figures 3 and 4). Each diagram reports on the x-axis the actual effects of a specific predictor on party identification with a specific party (the -1.96 and +1.96 thresholds are highlighted, in order to show statistically significant coefficients). The y-axis expresses the time dimension, summarizing different surveys in a single diagram. The effects are summarized by using z-values in order to combine information about the strength of the effect and its statistical significance.

[7] Although the literature has recognized that party alignments in R1 were not fully interpretable in terms of sociodemographic characteristics, with an autonomous political dimension playing a key role already in R1 (Sani and Segatti 2002).

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Figure 3 – Effect of social class on identification in different parties across time (z-values)



Figure 4 – Effect of religion on identification in different parties across time (z-values)



We summarize the effect for social class and religion, the two main dimensions of conflict of R1 related to social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 1990). As we can see in Figures 3 and 4, the impact of these two key socio-demographic variables on identification with a specific party has strongly decreased between R1 and R2. In the latter, identification with different parties is much less the expression of a contrast with other social groups. The original strong contrast between the two main parties fades through time. For both the class and – especially – the religious dimension, in 1968 a clear polarization was visible between the Dc and the Pci. Today both dimensions appear essentially irrelevant for discriminating between the Pd and the Pdl[8].

The final diagram (Figure 5) concerns the role of political interest, and it confirms how party identification in R2 has become an attitude strongly connected with political commitment. While such effect was already partly present in R1, it becomes much more pronounced in R2, where it becomes by far the most important predictor of both generic and specific party identification. In line with what we highlighted in the previous section, this finding inevitably calls into question the strong organizational differences between parties in R1 and R2. Our interpretation is that in R2 the lack of mass parties has made cognitive resources a prerequisite for party identification. The corollary is that citizens lacking them are much less likely to have any party attachment.

Figure 5 – Effect of political interest on identification in different parties across time (z-values)



[8] Although in recent years the role of union membership goes in a somehow different direction, with statistically significant opposed effects for the Pd and the Pdl. Such dimension was not a factor of polarization in R1, as both main parties had strong ties with one of the major trade unions. In R2 the situation has radically changed especially for right-wing parties, which have no specific ties with trade unions, and often promote an anti-union agenda.

Concerning this first test, we conclude that it appears problematic to regard party identification as a concept with discriminatory power because it does not meaningfully separate groups of citizens with different characteristics. This is especially true for R1, where significant differences do not emerge between identifiers and non-identifiers, even when taking into account political interest. However, the situation appears to change partially in R2. In a context where strongly organized mass parties are not present anymore, political interest becomes a significant predictor of party identification in general. What this means is that in R2 identifiers of all parties start to have common characteristics that differentiate them from non-identifiers. The most important is the availability of cognitive and motivational resources towards politics.

Our first test concerned the role of party identification in identifying the presence of a relationship with the party system through one of its parties. The second test aims to explore another key feature of the concept of party identification, i.e.: its ability to provide a genuine and meaningful explanation of vote choice. As we discussed before, in the Michigan model factors influencing vote choice can be arranged in a "funnel of causality" (Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell et al. 1966), where the position of party identification is central, but still in a wide region of the funnel, leaving room for deviation from party identification due to short-term factors. A consequence of this is that party identification should help predict vote choice only to a limited extent. A very high predictive power would instead highlight an almost tautological correlation with vote choice, with party identification being simply a proxy.

In order to test which scenario applies to the Italian surveys used, we estimated conditional logit models of vote choice based on socio-demographics, left-right voter-party proximity, and party identification[9]. The summarized findings of this analysis – in terms of goodness-of-fit – are presented in Table 3. The table compares results for four models: (1) a base model including only socio-demographics; (2) the base model plus party identification; (3) the base model plus left-right proximity; (4) the base model plus both.

In general, socio-demographic variables have a substantive predictive power on vote choice in R1 but much less in R2. Partly the same scenario applies to a model which includes also left-right proximity (column 3). Predictive power of the model in these cases is understandably high, but definitely non-tautological. Striking results emerge instead when adding party identification to the base model. This model yields suspiciously high values of pseudo-R-squared. This is even more suspicious since the base model is strongly underspecified: in fact it completely lacks political predictors such as issue positions, evaluations on the state of the economy, perceptions of leaders and assessments of party competence. In this case, we deem absolutely implausible that a genuine party identification measure would reach such a high predictive power without incorporating the effects of such predictors. But if it does incorporate such effects, then it becomes essentially equivalent to a vote choice which is influenced by short-term factors. Then it can be hardly be used as a meaningful tool to provide real value added to the explanation.

Moreover, the final column shows that the addition of left-right proximity to the party identification model increases only slightly the goodness-of-fit. Much less than what this

[9] The conditional logit model requires a "stacked" dataset, i.e. a dataset where observations are not respondents but relationships between a single respondent and each party. This allows a simple coding of party-respondent-specific variables such as identification with the party and left-right proximity, but requires a special of treatment of respondent-level, sociodemographic variables. For this analysis, we followed the "y-hat" approach (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996), by generating, through separate party-specific bivariate logit regressions, predicted probabilities based on sociodemographic variables. These predicted probabilities (transformed back to linear propensities) were used in the final model for expressing the impact of sociodemographic variables.

variable added to the base model. This then suggests that much of the variance of party identification is shared with left-right proximity, confirming the impression that party identification incorporates the effect of several other predictors. This once again puts into question the ability of this concept to provide genuine and meaningful explanatory power.

Table 3- Goodness-of-fit of various model of generic and specific party identification (values are Nagelkerke's pseudo-R-squared's)

	Base	Base+party identification	Base+L-R	Base+party identification+LR
1968	0.196	0.877	0.537	0.894
1972	0.199	0.856	0.490	0.867
1990	0.148	0.817	0.377	0.835
2001	0.064	0.738	0.476	0.765
2006	0.093	0.766	0.435	0.789
2008	0.054	0.682	0.316	0.724

As a general interpretation, we essentially conclude that – in the Italian case – party identification does not play a meaningful conceptual role, as it does in the traditional analysis of voting behaviour in the U.S. In our view, there are at least two key strengths of this concept. On the one hand, party identification – being connected to social centrality and political interest – captures the relationship between the citizens and the political system as a whole, through the development of stable attachments with one of the parties. On the other hand, it is a long-term predisposition that provides an anchor for voting behaviour, before the influence of short-term factors.

According to our findings, both aspects appear absent in R1. Party identification is not related to social and political involvement, nor it presents meaningful explanatory power regarding individual vote choice. The situation is slightly different in R2, especially regarding the first aspect. Identification levels decrease (mostly among individuals with a low level of interest in politics), and party identification becomes a discriminatory aspect connected to political interest. In this regard it increasingly measures the respondents' level of involvement in the political system. However, the ability of party identification to provide genuine and meaningful explanatory power shows no significant change: the concept still appears too strongly related to vote choice, and as such it can hardly be considered as an appropriate indicator of long-term political predispositions.

4. From party identification to ideological identification

In the previous section we have seen how the one aspect of party identification that we deem meaningful in the Italian case is its ability to express the citizens' attachment to the political system as a whole, through a relationship with a specific party. In R1 this relationship was essentially a widespread expression of group loyalties aimed at social and political inclusion, while in R2 it becomes much more an individual attitude, strongly connected to the respondents' level of political interest.

In these terms, the strong decline of the overall level of identification between R1 and R2 reveals that almost half of the voters are now essentially devoid of any relationship with

one of the parties in the party system. This leads to a paradox. Given the continuing high turnout , in principle we should expect in R2 a much larger incidence of short-term factors combined with higher levels of volatility. On the contrary, most empirical analyses essentially reject this hypothesis (Caciagli and Corbetta 2002; De Sio 2006a, 2006b, 2008a, 2008b; Bellucci and Segatti 2010) and emphasize both the minor role still played by short-term factors, and the strong constraints affecting individual mobility.

In light of these findings, we must assume that some form of long-term political identification must also be present in R2. In our opinion, a concept that could capture such predispositions, applicable to the Italian case, is the concept of *ideological identification* suggested by van der Eijk and Niemoeller (1983). Working on a Dutch election study where appropriate question items highlighted how a large share of respondents actually identified with more than one party, these authors showed that such multiple party identifications were clearly understandable in left-right terms. Respondents who identified with multiple parties tended to mention parties that were close to each other on the left-right continuum, and close to the respondents' left-right position. Based on these findings, the authors suggested that the actual main source of identification was the underlying left-right dimension, leading to the idea of *ideological identification*.

As a first test of the applicability of the concept, we replicated such analyses on Italian data (both for R1 and for R2), looking at overlapping party identifications[10]. In particular, the 1985 Itanes survey included a battery of items aimed at measuring possible multiple party identifications. This allowed us to use in this case an approach similar to the Dutch example. For later surveys in R2 (2006 and 2008) we attempted to emulate multiple party identifications, by recoding items measuring the propensity to vote for specific parties (PTVs)[11].

Tables 4 and 5 show the results for 1985 and 2006. Each column of a table represents a group of respondents who identify with a party. The cells of each column indicate, within such group, the percentage that additionally identifies with each of the other parties, thus expressing overlapping party identifications. Parties are ordered according to their mean position in the left-right space[12].

If we look at the 1985 table, the general impression is that the greater the distance between two parties in the left-right space, the less likely is that they would be mentioned together by respondents as parties they identify with. Indeed, while cells on the diagonal obviously report 100%, cells that are closest to the diagonal almost always report the highest percentages. Thus, identifications appear at first to relate clearly to ideology.

However, significant differences appear among parties. The main parties, Dc and Pci present a polarized pattern: Dc identifiers show very low overlapping identification with left opposition parties, whereas Pci identifiers show low overlapping identification with moderate governing parties. A partial exception to this pattern is the Psi, which played a pivotal position in the Italian party system during R1.

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[10] From now on, we will use the term "identification" though the items actually measured closeness to specific parties. This is, however, consistent with measurements of party identification in the European context, which routinely rely on the closeness concept and lexical formulation.

[11] PTV items record the propensity that the respondent has to ever vote for a specific party, trying to measure (on a 0-10 scale) the underlying preference structure that leads to party choice (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; van der Eijk et al. 2006; van der Brug, van Der Eijk and Franklin 2007)
. For each party, we assigned a value of 1 (identified with) when the respondent reported a PTV above 5, otherwise we assigned a value of zero (not identified with). For the 2001 survey genuine PTV items were not available, but similar items were asked, coded: "I'll vote for", "I also could vote for", "I'll never vote for". For the first two categories we assigned a value of 1 (identified with), otherwise we assigned a value of zero (not identified with).

[12] Based on the left-right placements expressed by respondents.

Table 4 – Overlap in identification with parties: 1985. Boundaries of government and left opposition are highlighted

	DP	PCI	PR	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI
DP	100	22	41	10	9	7	4	8	7
PCI	73	100	34	35	24	19	9	11	20
PR	26	7	100	8	6	11	4	9	9
PSI	33	37	46	100	64	48	26	34	25
PSDI	11	10	13	25	100	29	17	23	14
PRI	13	11	33	27	42	100	22	52	21
DC	17	12	31	35	60	52	100	69	47
PLI	10	4	17	12	21	33	18	100	21
MSI	6	5	12	7	9	10	9	16	100
(N)	167	555	105	574	224	324	777	205	153

The results for R2 (Table 5) suggest a more complex elaboration of the concept**,** by showing patterns that are even more polarized. Voters identify with the closest party, but they also have preclusions vis-à-vis parties located in specific regions of the political space. From this point of view, the 2006 table is highly relevant. The 2006 elections were characterized by a very polarized pattern of competition based on two all-inclusive pre-electoral coalitions: the centre-left "Unione" and the centre-right "Casa delle libertà". Data in the table appear to reflect strongly this coalitional format. Multiple identifications occurs frequently among parties in the same coalition: much less so, across coalitions. Significantly, this is true also for the centrist parties of both coalitions: Udc and Margherita. Despite their common centrist position and christian democratic heritage, identifiers of both parties overlap much more with their coalition partners than with each other. The existence of pre-electoral coalitions appears to be a clear constraint for multiple identifications.

Table 5 – Overlap in identification with parties: 2006. Boundaries of the two main coalitions are highlighted

	Prc	Ds	Rosa nel pugno	Verdi	Margherita	Udc	FI	Lega Nord	AN
Prc	100	59	66	60	56	10	4	8	7
Ds	76	100	74	71	74	15	6	8	8
Rosa nel pugno	30	26	100	33	27	6	3	5	4
Verdi	45	41	54	100	45	14	7	10	9
Margherita	58	60	63	64	100	18	7	9	9
Udc	10	12	14	18	17	100	53	52	57
FI	5	6	9	11	9	65	100	75	74
Lega Nord	4	3	5	6	4	25	29	100	28
AN	9	8	11	14	11	71	75	73	100
100%	495	636	225	367	521	486	597	235	608

This aspect is a first anecdotal suggestion of the possible presence of discontinuities in the left-right space. Majoritarian electoral rules have helped structure a pattern of bipolar competition based on two dominant coalitions. These coalitions not only shape competition, but at the same time they appear to have created internal boundaries

that represents 'breaks' in the left-right continuum. This phenomenon does not appear as strongly in the original Dutch analysis (van der Eijk and Niemoeller 1983), nor in Italy during R1. The reason is that in both these latter cases proportional electoral systems did not provide any incentive for parties to coalesce *before* elections. On the contrary, this pattern appears consistently in R2: the results for 2001 (not reported here) and 2008 (Table 6) confirm the main findings of 2006[13]. Cross-coalition overlapping identifications are much less frequent than within-coalition. Again this applies to centrist parties too.

However, in 2008 the structure of party competition is more complex. As we mentioned earlier, two new parties entered the scene, the Pd and the Pdl. The center-right and center-left coalitions did not include , as in 2006, all parties. Some refused to join one of the two and preferred to run as 'third actors' (Sinistra Arcobaleno and Udc). We should expect that such developments would interfere with patterns of multiple party identification.

Our results confirm such expectation. In comparison with 2006 there is a larger presence of multiple party identifiers across the full range of the left-right dimension and across coalitional boundaries. Yet left-right distances and the structure of pre-electoral coalitions seem to matter still. Indeed, also in 2008 overlapping party identifications are much more common within coalitions than across them. With regard to third actors, "Sinistra Arcobaleno" identifiers overlap significantly more with centre-left parties. Udc identifiers instead are perfectly balanced, unlike what happened in 2006 when they tended to identify significantly more with centre-right parties. This is in tune with their party location in the middle of the political space and with Udc's decision to run alone.

Table 6– Overlap in identification with parties: 2008. Boundaries of main coalitions and third actors are highlighted

	SA	PD	IDV	Udc	PDL	Lega Nord
SA	100	28	29	18	9	9
PD	74	100	72	56	27	24
IDV	50	47	100	43	20	22
Udc	23	27	31	100	28	27
PDL	23	27	31	59	100	82
Lega Nord	15	15	21	36	52	100
(N)	423	1122	729	530	1121	710

In conclusion, both in R1 and R2 overlapping patterns of party identification seem to reflect an underlying map of the party system based on an ideological left-right dimension. They appear consistent with an ideological identification which defines, for each voter, a restricted set of parties that he/she can identify with, based on its (and parties') placement on the left-right dimension. However, in R2, the existence of pre-electoral coalitions plays an additional, crucial role. Not only voters identify with the party closest to them, but they also show preclusions vis-à-vis parties located in specific regions of the political space. This suggests the presence of discontinuities in the left-right space, especially in 2006 (apparently for the greater inclusiveness of the two main coalitions). Such discontinuities provide evidence that ideological identification cannot in general be considered devoid of a party component (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). In the Italian case, the presence of pre-electoral coalitions in particular appears having a feedback effect on the individual

[13] Although they are slightly less clear-cut than in 2006. This could be due for 2001 to the different formulation of the PTV questions (see above), and for 2008 to the more complex coalition structure, which is discussed in the next section,

perception of the left-right space. We will test this hypothesis more systematically in the next section.

5. Testing discontinuities in the ideological space

In the previous section we showed that overlapping party identifications in the Italian case essentially follow an ideological pattern based on the left-right dimension. We also showed that such pattern presents clear discontinuities and internal boundaries. We now aim to test such hypothesis more systematically, by developing an individual-level model of party choice based on left-right proximity, that also incorporates the possibility of spatial discontinuities, and allows for assessing their presence and statistical significance**.**

We develop the model by following a straightforward strategy. We start from a simple Downsian proximity model on the left-right dimension (the closer the voter to the party, the higher the probability of voting for it), and we modify it by constructing "wall" dummy variables that operationalize the presence of ideological preclusions in certain regions of the left-right space. Such "wall" dummy variables are constructed as follows. First, it must be specified that we analyze data in "stacked" form: the data matrix is restructured so that observations are not individual respondents, but respondent*party relationships: the relationship of each respondent with each party is coded in a separate observation, so that each respondent is present in *k* observations, each corresponding to a separate party.

Each observation then contains – for particular variables – values that are specific to the relationship with a specific party, in particular the spatial proximity. Such quantity is easy to compute, given the availability of the respondent's self-placement and of its placement of the party on the left-right dimension. We then coded dummy variables expressing whether the voter and a party – regardless of their distance – are separated by a specific position in the ideological continuum. As an example, a "wall" dummy variable for position 5 would be coded as 1 for a voter in position 4 regarding a party in position 6 (a hypothetical "wall" in position 5 lies between the voter and the party); it would be coded 0 for the same voter, regarding a party in position 2 (the same wall does not lie between the voter and the party). It must be noted that in this example the party-voter distance is equal for both parties: but one of them is separated from the voter by location 5, whose relevance as a "wall" is the subject of empirical testing.

According to our hypothesis, a "wall" dummy variable – for which we expect a negative coefficient – would add to the effect of the left-right distance a further (fixed) depression, which only applies to parties beyond the wall. Parties at the same distance (but on the same side of the wall as the voter) would not be affected by the negative effect. We coded "wall" indicators for all the 9 intermediate positions between all possible placements (1-10) on the left-right scale employed in the Itanes surveys. We finally tested the hypothesis that there are ideological walls in the left- right dimension by comparing rival spatial proximity models of vote choice, with and without wall indicators. All models obviously include left-right proximity, as well as various socio-demographics as control variables[14]. We performed the test by estimating conditional logit models (separately for each survey) and comparing goodness-of-fit measures of the two rival models, in order to assess the additional predictive power provided by wall indicators. We then examined the statistical significance of the specific wall indicators, to determine in which spatial positions there were discontinuities with statistically significant effects. The results of our analysis are reported in Table 7.

[14] As in the conditional logit models in previous sections, we adapted sociodemographics to the stacked setup using a *y-hat* approach. See previous notes.

A first comment concerns goodness-of-fit. In R1 the additional predictive power provided by wall indicators is very limited (though it would likely pass a LR test). On the contrary, in R2 discontinuity indicator variables provide a substantial increase. This testifies how, in general, ideological preclusions that introduce discontinuities in the left-right space appear more relevant in R2. This finding could appear partially surprising, given that traditional accounts identify R1 as more ideologically polarized than R2. However, it must be taken into account that in R1 party loyalties – as highlighted previously – defined models of vote choice based on idiosyncratic factors for each party, relying less on a shared conceptualization of a common, left-right dimension of conflict. Only in R2, with a strong decrease of party identification, the left-right dimension inevitably becomes more important, emerging as the comparison criterion where also ideological preclusions are expressed.

Table 7- Effects of sociodemographic variables, left-right distances and left-right discontinuities on party choice: 1968-2008.

	1968	1972	1985	1990	2001	2006	2008
Goegraphical zone (y-hat)	0.244*	0.584***	0.480***	0.556***	0.417**	0.349**	0.497***
Town size (y-hat)	0.403*	0.500**	0.227	-0.047	0.063	-0.369	0.257
Male (y-hat)	0.201*	0.482***	0.308	-0.003	0.434*	0.706**	-0.11
Age (y-hat)	0.229	-0.029	0.477	-0.002	0.251	0.732	0.083
Education (y-hat)	0.236*	0.166	-0.02	-0.283	0.693***	0.308	-0.199
Social class (y-hat)	0.322**	0.284*	0.406***	0.509*	0.279	1.72	0.298
Urban class (y-hat)	0.049	0.548	0.341	-0.091	-0.004	1.549	-
Religiosity (y-hat)	0.816***	0.969***	1.022***	1.252***	0.496**	0.526***	0.251*
Union membership (y-hat)	0.303	0.609***	1.045**	0.442*	0.866***	1.099***	0.794***
Left-right voter-party distance	-0.607**	-0.499	-0.677**	0.072	-0.556***	-0.472***	0.219
Left-right discontinuity at 1.5	-0.571(*)	-0.758	0.273	-0.325	-0.366	0.152	-0.413
… at 2.5	-0.454	-0.624	0.034	-0.746	-0.009	-0.043	-0.924***
… at 3.5	-0.664*	-0.413	-0.11	-0.891*	0.127	0.084	-0.41
… at 4.5	-0.399	-1.069*	-0.374	-1.208**	-0.781***	-1.300**	-1.076***
… at 5.5	-0.121	-0.608	-0.157	-0.82	-0.957***	-0.533	-1.798***
… at 6.5	-0.584*	-0.236	-0.26	-0.497	0.555*	-0.167	-0.922***
… at 7.5	-0.015	-0.581	0.071	-0.812	0.003	0.038	-0.632*
… at 9.5	0.145	-0.208	0.223	-0.67	0.302	0.088	-0.308
(… at 8.5: reference category)							
Full model (with wall indicators):							
Observations	8466	6029	5695	2792	4515	3139	5909
Pseudo R2	0.514	0.487	0.454	0.377	0.401	0.373	0.324
AIC	2494.218	1683.807	1913.613	1070.034	1716.721	1346.761	2511.557
BIC	2621.007	1804.485	2033.265	1176.855	1832.194	1455.691	2625.189
Plain proximity model (without wall indicators; b coefficients not shown):							
Observations	8466	6029	5695	2792	4515	3139	5909
Pseudo R2	0.505	0.48	0.449	0.363	0.375	0.357	0.273
AIC	2520.409	1691.005	1916.674	1077.018	1773.298	1364.083	2681.612
BIC	2590.847	1758.048	1983.148	1136.364	1837.449	1424.599	2741.77

This is confirmed by the substantive interpretation of the statistically significant spatial discontinuities. In general, in R2 there is an enduring presence of a discontinuity at 4.5 between centre-left and centre-right, that appears as a stable characteristic of the ideological space. However, additional discontinuities are found in specific elections, that

appear clearly understandable in light of the different coalition formats in different elections. This information is summarized in Figure 6, which combines information about statistically significant discontinuities with two additional pieces of information: dots representing mean party placements, and boxes drawing the boundaries of pre-electoral coalitions in R2.

In R1, weak (though significant) discontinuities apparently reflect coalitional **(**though post-electoral) dynamics, with 1968 showing the boundaries of the centrist area vs. the traditional left area (Psi participated in government in 1963-1968 but then took ambiguous positions, and went through a merger– creating Psu – and a following split with Psdi/Psli). In 1972 we see the shift of the same boundary, but only because of the Psi-Psdi split. The lack of boundaries between the centrist and right areas reflects voters' mobility registered between the Dc and the Msi in that election. The lack of significant discontinuities in 1985 is likely the result of the non post-electoral nature of the survey, which asked currently reported party placements, but used vote recall from the most recent general elections of 1983. The 1990 data confirm the strength of the centre-left/centre-right discontinuity, but highlight further divisions: between the Pci and the Psi (the latter, after a decade of strong government commitment and anti-Pci attitude), and between the Pri[15] and the rest of the governing parties.

Figure 6 – Effect of left-right discontinuities on party choice across time (dots are mean party placements and boxes draw the boundaries of pre-electoral coalitions in R2)



[15] In general, the imperfect correspondence between party placements and boundaries is also due to the fact that the ones reported are *average* party placements, that might differ even significantly across respondents.

In R2, all divisions present higher levels of statistical significance than in R1. But most importantly, they appear to clearly mirror pre-electoral coalition arrangements, highlighted with boxes. In 2001, discontinuities clearly delimit the three coalitional areas (centre-left; Idv; centre-right), with a small additional discontinuity between post-Dc parties and the new rightist parties. In 2006 (when only two coalitions disputed elections) only the traditional center discontinuity is left, clearly dividing the two rival coalitions. The much more complex coalition pattern in 2008 is paralleled by a proliferation of discontinuities, apparently combining the traditional centre-left/centre-right divide with further "walls" delimiting specific coalition boundaries.

6. Conclusions

In this paper we tried to pursue the two different goals of presenting a picture of the evolution of party identification in Italy across a party system change, and of assessing the ability of the party identification concept to meaningfully analyze such change. The first result of our research is about the nature of party identification in R1 and in R2. Our analysis suggests that behind the decline of party identification in R1 there was a process of dealignment, and that in R2 this trend clearly diverged between voters with different levels of political interest. Our interpretation is that during R1 the strong attachments between citizens and parties reflected the strength of party organizations and the presence of powerful and polarizing ideological identities. On the contrary, the lack of such features in the new party system would explain lower levels of identification among the least interested in politics. As a result, the most important aspect of the transition between R1 and R2 – paradoxically – is not the change to a new party system, but the fact that the parties in this new system lack both the ideological underpinnings and organizational structure of the old parties. This interpretation is partially confirmed by the multivariate analysis, highlighting how class and religion lose their capacity to predict identification with different parties, and how political interest becomes a common predictor for identification with any party.

This has important political implications. In R2, party identification has become a much more selective attitude, essentially excluding citizens with lower levels of political interest that – on the contrary – were successfully mobilized in the previous party system. This raises another paradox: a still mostly stable electorate, in presence of party identification levels much lower than in R1. In our opinion, such paradox can be explained through the use of the concept of *ideological identification*, which we deem more useful than party identification in explaining long-term predispositions that still appear relevant in R2, despite the radical change of the party system.

However, there are two objections that could be raised on the use of the concept of *ideological identification*. The first is empirical. Our analysis shows that the party system has a clear role in shaping the perception of the left-right dimension, through the emergence of spatial discontinuities that clearly relate to party competition patterns. In this regard, parties are still relevant, and left-right positions cannot be considered party-agnostic. The second objection points instead towards a conceptual problem that will need to be addressed by future research. The Italian case shows that there is a clear difference in the generic role of ideology in the two party systems. The contrast of two symbolically rich and structured ideological systems in R1; and – in R2 – the emerging importance of the left-right dimension, which cannot equal the ideological intensity of the cleavages of R1, being rather a generic mapping device more loosely connected to specific contents (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). This aspect should be taken into account when we refer to the demanding term *ideology*.

In sum, we think that in the Italian multi-party context, the concept of ideological identification – with the above caveats – could prove more useful in analyzing the future evolution of the party system. This implies not only the ability to measure long-term predispositions in a changing party system, but also to address the effects of possible changes in the electoral system. After all, Italy could be on the eve of significant changes in its political landscape.

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Appendix

Table A – results of a binary logit regression of party identification in general (1968-2008) – values are b coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
zgp5==2 Nord-est	-0.422*	0.073	-0.304	-0.414**	-0.716**	0.098
	(0.187)	(0.192)	(0.199)	(0.139)	(0.245)	(0.159)
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	-0.636***	-0.292	0.232	0.374**	-0.276	0.042
	(0.159)	(0.172)	(0.179)	(0.127)	(0.216)	(0.141)
zgp5==4 Centro	-0.323	0.148	0.100	0.096	-0.562*	-0.100
	(0.173)	(0.193)	(0.191)	(0.132)	(0.229)	(0.147)
zgp5==5 Sud	0.022	0.441**	0.287	0.143	-0.227	-0.215
	(0.150)	(0.165)	(0.162)	(0.112)	(0.185)	(0.123)
townsize	-0.089	-0.049	0.056	0.000	0.075	0.027
	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.062)	(0.105)	(0.067)
sexm	-0.189	-0.118	0.188	0.201*	-0.048	0.195*
	(0.115)	(0.129)	(0.124)	(0.084)	(0.144)	(0.094)
Age	-0.013	-0.008	-0.027	0.002	0.005	-0.021
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.015)
agesq	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
titstu	-0.152	-0.183	-0.193*	-0.117	-0.071	0.004
	(0.083)	(0.108)	(0.091)	(0.062)	(0.106)	(0.065)
Social class	-0.070	0.087	0.069	0.067	0.165*	0.043
	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.050)	(0.078)	(0.047)
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	-0.112	-0.058	0.208	0.156	-0.024	
	(0.140)	(0.187)	(0.213)	(0.158)	(0.268)	
religion	0.180*	0.135	-0.135	-0.113	-0.060	0.048
	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.063)	(0.109)	(0.070)
unionmembership	0.587***	0.064	0.410**	0.153	0.420*	0.152
	(0.165)	(0.173)	(0.150)	(0.096)	(0.181)	(0.101)
polint	0.507***	0.660***	0.346***	1.066***	0.905***	0.775***
	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.059)	(0.098)	(0.058)
o.Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class						0.000
						(.)
Constant	1.335*	-0.382	0.122	-2.032***	-1.581*	-1.349**
	(0.560)	(0.647)	(0.556)	(0.400)	(0.668)	(0.440)
Observations	2353	1553	1249	2991	1061	2214
Pseudo R^2	0.034	0.049	0.034	0.128	0.105	0.086
AIC	2335.686	1770.423	1683.772	3622.525	1316.385	2823.816
BIC	2422.138	1850.642	1760.723	3712.575	1390.889	2903.651

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B – results of a multinomial logit regression of party identification with specific parties (1968-2008) – values are b coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The reference category is the lack of any identification

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Pci_Psiup						
zgp5==2 Nord-est	-1.389***	-0.756*	-1.267**			
	(0.366)	(0.348)	(0.414)			
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	-0.038	-0.009	0.689**			
	(0.235)	(0.241)	(0.241)			
zgp5==4 Centro	-0.118	0.336	-0.269			
	(0.264)	(0.272)	(0.304)			
zgp5==5 Sud	-0.118	0.123	-0.276			
	(0.227)	(0.242)	(0.255)			
Townsize	0.054	0.112	0.292*			
	(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.128)			
Sexm	-0.206	0.049	0.101			
	(0.174)	(0.191)	(0.191)			
Age	-0.040	-0.047	-0.088**			
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.028)			
Agesq	0.000	0.001	0.001**			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)			
Titstu	-0.882***	-0.683***	-0.562***			
	(0.173)	(0.180)	(0.151)			
Social class	-0.495***	-0.401**	-0.091			
	(0.112)	(0.138)	(0.126)			
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	-0.187	-0.505	0.705			
	(0.200)	(0.271)	(0.369)			
Religion	-1.241***	-0.830***	-0.785***			
	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.162)			
Unionmembership	1.018***	0.485*	0.713***			
	(0.217)	(0.226)	(0.213)			
Polint	0.855***	0.951***	0.407***			
	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.124)			
Constant	4.203***	2.095*	1.635			
	(0.855)	(0.925)	(0.856)			

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Psi_Psdi_Psu						
zgp5==2 Nord-est	-0.590*	0.440	-0.624			
	(0.261)	(0.269)	(0.361)			
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	-0.643**	-0.101	0.210			
	(0.221)	(0.255)	(0.284)			
zgp5==4 Centro	-0.802**	-0.619	-0.512			
	(0.255)	(0.347)	(0.361)			
zgp5==5 Sud	-0.485*	-0.116	0.316			
	(0.208)	(0.267)	(0.251)			
townsize	0.053	-0.022	0.048			
	(0.112)	(0.128)	(0.135)			
sexm	0.246	-0.130	0.267			
	(0.165)	(0.199)	(0.206)			
Age	0.013	0.058	-0.036			
	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.030)			
agesq	-0.000	-0.000	0.000			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)			
titstu	-0.046	-0.156	-0.168			
	(0.117)	(0.167)	(0.150)			
Social class	-0.148	0.050	-0.077			
	(0.093)	(0.131)	(0.128)			
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	0.269	0.281	0.838*			
	(0.213)	(0.314)	(0.417)			
religion	-0.334*	-0.282	-0.318			
	(0.130)	(0.145)	(0.172)			
unionmembership	0.536*	0.204	0.316			
	(0.214)	(0.249)	(0.235)			
polint	0.528***	0.726***	0.516***			
	(0.121)	(0.133)	(0.128)			
Constant	-0.370	-3.187**	-1.586			
	(0.802)	(1.039)	(0.934)			

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Pri						
zgp5==2 Nord-est	-1.636	-0.360	-0.829			
	(1.092)	(0.615)	(1.150)			
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	-0.453	-0.334	0.310			
	(0.571)	(0.533)	(0.733)			
zgp5==4 Centro	-0.393	-0.364	-0.852			
	(0.657)	(0.556)	(1.154)			
zgp5==5 Sud	-0.297	-0.875	-0.262			
	(0.555)	(0.607)	(0.803)			
townsize	0.540	0.317	1.096			
	(0.323)	(0.276)	(0.568)			
sexm	0.240	0.898*	0.585			
	(0.466)	(0.442)	(0.592)			
Age	0.176	0.067	0.053			
	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.103)			
agesq	-0.002	-0.001	-0.000			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
titstu	0.297	0.524	0.641			
	(0.254)	(0.277)	(0.384)			
Social class	0.468	0.406	0.130			
	(0.252)	(0.256)	(0.332)			
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	-0.823	-0.427	-0.866			
	(0.597)	(0.686)	(1.212)			
religion	-0.326	0.165	-0.869			
	(0.357)	(0.297)	(0.462)			
unionmembership	0.921*	-0.356	-0.624			
	(0.464)	(0.538)	(0.800)			
polint	0.177	0.233	0.197			
	(0.306)	(0.266)	(0.373)			
Constant	-9.029***	-6.879**	-7.473*			
	(2.706)	(2.237)	(2.946)			

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Dc						
zgp5==2 Nord-est	-0.212	0.267	0.327			
	(0.203)	(0.224)	(0.270)			
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	-0.963***	-0.727**	0.047			
	(0.186)	(0.230)	(0.282)			
zgp5==4 Centro	-0.354	0.452*	0.626*			
	(0.192)	(0.229)	(0.267)			
zgp5==5 Sud	0.163	0.793***	1.014***			
	(0.165)	(0.195)	(0.227)			
townsize	-0.246**	-0.146	-0.214			
	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.112)			
sexm	-0.417**	-0.412**	0.086			
	(0.128)	(0.155)	(0.172)			
Age	-0.005	-0.023	0.023			
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.027)			
agesq	0.000	0.000	-0.000			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)			
titstu	-0.206*	-0.265*	-0.218			
	(0.094)	(0.133)	(0.125)			
Social class	0.045	0.274**	0.287**			
	(0.074)	(0.102)	(0.103)			
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	-0.202	-0.004	-0.037			
	(0.154)	(0.217)	(0.260)			
religion	0.902***	0.977***	0.552***			
	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.147)			
unionmembership	0.389*	-0.167	0.457*			
	(0.185)	(0.220)	(0.203)			
polint	0.341**	0.405***	0.208			
	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.113)			
Constant	-0.827	-2.614***	-3.497***			
	(0.634)	(0.787)	(0.809)			

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Pli						
zgp5==2 Nord-est	-2.364*	0.035	-15.647			
	(1.060)	(0.656)	(3335.118)			
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	-1.589**	-1.354	1.247			
	(0.553)	(0.761)	(1.260)			
zgp5==4 Centro	-0.118	-0.631	2.309*			
	(0.428)	(0.655)	(1.156)			
zgp5==5 Sud	-0.155	-0.514	0.359			
	(0.380)	(0.660)	(1.436)			
townsize	0.350	0.338	0.936			
	(0.232)	(0.332)	(0.625)			
sexm	0.042	0.132	1.331			
	(0.329)	(0.513)	(0.883)			
Age	-0.095	0.011	0.015			
	(0.052)	(0.083)	(0.126)			
agesq	0.001	0.000	0.000			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
titstu	0.352	0.471	0.307			
	(0.188)	(0.287)	(0.525)			
Social class	0.572**	0.964**	-0.094			
	(0.189)	(0.304)	(0.480)			
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	-0.953	13.261	15.425			
	(0.496)	(776.274)	(3543.598)			
religion	0.482	-0.262	0.399			
	(0.272)	(0.334)	(0.648)			
unionmembership	0.660	-14.548	-0.123			
	(0.382)	(545.177)	(0.881)			
polint	0.421*	0.897***	0.628			
	(0.214)	(0.272)	(0.436)			
Constant	-3.427*	-21.871	-26.816			
	(1.519)	(776.277)	(3543.599)			

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Msi						
zgp5==2 Nord-est	0.318	-0.054	0.026			
	(0.791)	(0.888)	(0.761)			
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	-0.196	-0.098	-0.190			
	(0.786)	(0.783)	(0.761)			
zgp5==4 Centro	1.534**	1.446*	1.123			
	(0.595)	(0.625)	(0.601)			
zgp5==5 Sud	1.591**	2.634***	0.407			
	(0.572)	(0.557)	(0.601)			
townsize	-0.524*	-0.295	0.614			
	(0.252)	(0.216)	(0.316)			
sexm	0.595	-0.031	1.004*			
	(0.367)	(0.336)	(0.452)			
Age	-0.042	-0.004	-0.091			
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.057)			
agesq	0.000	0.000	0.001			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
titstu	0.230	0.004	-0.297			
	(0.222)	(0.236)	(0.326)			
Social class	-0.057	0.225	0.188			
	(0.193)	(0.207)	(0.258)			
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	0.711	0.037	-0.911			
	(0.531)	(0.496)	(0.624)			
religion	0.094	-0.127	-0.309			
	(0.285)	(0.251)	(0.364)			
unionmembership	0.059	-1.791*	0.092			
	(0.489)	(0.758)	(0.536)			
polint	0.425	1.041***	0.139			
	(0.234)	(0.208)	(0.288)			
Constant	-3.270	-4.944**	-1.977			
	(1.732)	(1.610)	(1.799)			

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Others						
zgp5==2 Nord-est	-0.171	-0.111	-17.814	-0.497	-0.921	-0.180
	(0.378)	(0.379)	(3813.065)	(0.344)	(0.605)	(0.693)
zgp5==3 Zona rossa	0.098	-0.032	-1.404	0.116	-1.419*	0.274
	(0.304)	(0.330)	(1.120)	(0.293)	(0.664)	(0.535)
zgp5==4 Centro	0.024	-1.050*	-1.029	-0.175	-1.115	0.493
	(0.341)	(0.519)	(1.101)	(0.322)	(0.606)	(0.519)
zgp5==5 Sud	0.231	-0.096	-0.967	0.168	-0.918*	0.473
	(0.291)	(0.344)	(0.855)	(0.260)	(0.458)	(0.455)
townsize	0.074	-0.155	-0.432	0.039	0.343	0.189
	(0.151)	(0.170)	(0.438)	(0.146)	(0.289)	(0.239)
sexm	0.151	0.561*	0.471	0.362	0.140	0.718*
	(0.219)	(0.274)	(0.700)	(0.206)	(0.388)	(0.362)
Age	-0.021	0.063	-0.013	-0.019	0.014	-0.093*
	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.110)	(0.032)	(0.063)	(0.047)
agesq	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
titstu	0.031	0.079	0.356	0.032	-0.349	-0.012
	(0.154)	(0.214)	(0.498)	(0.146)	(0.280)	(0.223)
Social class	-0.178	-0.076	-0.058	-0.141	0.324	0.164
	(0.127)	(0.177)	(0.428)	(0.121)	(0.195)	(0.159)
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class	-0.120	-0.078	-0.475	-0.272	-0.189	
	(0.260)	(0.388)	(1.193)	(0.353)	(0.805)	
religion	-0.075	0.101	0.318	-0.518***	-0.337	-0.130
	(0.174)	(0.196)	(0.597)	(0.150)	(0.300)	(0.242)
unionmembership	0.420	-0.270	0.855	0.462*	0.392	-0.262
	(0.279)	(0.340)	(0.707)	(0.214)	(0.455)	(0.393)
polint	0.627***	0.641***	0.178	1.024***	1.037***	0.892***
	(0.152)	(0.174)	(0.439)	(0.130)	(0.238)	(0.207)
Constant	-1.653	-4.189**	-3.933	-3.209***	-3.738*	-4.271**
	(1.033)	(1.417)	(3.144)	(0.927)	(1.766)	(1.480)

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Greens						
zgp5==2 Nord-est			-0.270	-0.279	0.463	
			(0.572)	(0.706)	(1.056)	
zgp5==3 Zona rossa			-0.096	-0.227	0.063	
			(0.540)	(0.709)	(1.073)	
zgp5==4 Centro			0.183	-0.319	-0.896	
			(0.501)	(0.708)	(1.332)	
zgp5==5 Sud			-0.369	-0.408	0.070	
			(0.496)	(0.609)	(0.959)	
townsize			-0.019	0.185	0.252	
			(0.239)	(0.334)	(0.572)	
Sexm			-0.202	-0.501	-0.724	
			(0.358)	(0.467)	(0.728)	
Age			-0.055	0.192	-0.035	
			(0.069)	(0.135)	(0.166)	
Agesq			0.000	-0.003	-0.000	
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Titstu			0.614*	-0.031	0.813	
			(0.262)	(0.342)	(0.570)	
Social class			-0.147	0.554*	0.852*	
			(0.209)	(0.256)	(0.368)	
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class			15.932	-0.502	12.331	
			(2094.936)	(1.084)	(1345.050)	
Religion			-0.330	-0.278	0.234	
			(0.309)	(0.347)	(0.558)	
unionmembership			-0.133	0.269	0.749	
			(0.464)	(0.520)	(0.898)	
Polint			0.567**	0.796*	1.078*	
			(0.217)	(0.309)	(0.472)	
Constant			-18.054	-8.589**	-21.958	
			(2094.936)	(2.984)	(1345.055)	

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Lega Lombarda, Lega Nord						
zgp5==2 Nord-est			-0.881	0.455	-0.535	0.608*
			(0.857)	(0.355)	(0.477)	(0.239)
zgp5==3 Zona rossa			-1.417	-1.041	-16.005	-0.967**
			(1.095)	(0.640)	(790.670)	(0.330)
zgp5==4 Centro			-17.537	-16.991	-16.084	-15.858
			(3146.197)	(1644.500)	(813.258)	(491.159)
zgp5==5 Sud			-17.615	-16.966	-15.744	-3.151***
			(1974.830)	(1145.337)	(502.863)	(0.602)
townsize			0.412	-0.320	-0.193	0.127
			(0.458)	(0.248)	(0.329)	(0.154)
sexm			0.255	0.723*	-0.321	0.172
			(0.657)	(0.363)	(0.460)	(0.218)
Age			0.432	0.062	0.078	0.021
			(0.255)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.037)
agesq			-0.006	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
			(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
titstu			-0.601	-0.189	-0.495	-0.296
			(0.584)	(0.263)	(0.324)	(0.158)
Social class			-1.092	0.066	0.284	0.002
			(0.687)	(0.207)	(0.229)	(0.105)
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class			-1.592	-0.562	-0.146	
			(1.266)	(0.597)	(1.111)	
religion			-0.098	0.093	0.075	0.006
			(0.662)	(0.259)	(0.359)	(0.162)
unionmembership			-0.285	-0.055	0.151	-0.476
			(0.842)	(0.376)	(0.495)	(0.260)
polint			0.420	0.954***	1.231***	0.498***
			(0.408)	(0.240)	(0.292)	(0.129)
Constant			-6.905	-5.416**	-4.785*	-1.978
			(5.066)	(1.798)	(2.315)	(1.066)

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Ppi, Democratici, Margherita_						
zgp5==2 Nord-est				0.117	-0.200	
				(0.356)	(0.667)	
zgp5==3 Zona rossa				0.580	0.674	
				(0.340)	(0.527)	
zgp5==4 Centro				0.182	-1.165	
				(0.374)	(0.845)	
zgp5==5 Sud				-0.340	0.592	
				(0.368)	(0.499)	
Townsize				-0.378*	0.127	
				(0.178)	(0.279)	
Sexm				0.415	-0.172	
				(0.248)	(0.369)	
Age				-0.001	0.084	
				(0.041)	(0.070)	
Agesq				0.000	-0.001	
				(0.000)	(0.001)	
Titstu				-0.141	0.120	
				(0.167)	(0.258)	
Social class				0.295*	0.224	
				(0.139)	(0.186)	
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class				0.138	0.853	
				(0.475)	(1.071)	
Religion				0.630***	0.502	
				(0.186)	(0.284)	
Unionmembership				0.274	1.129**	
				(0.258)	(0.394)	
Polint				1.220***	0.853***	
				(0.161)	(0.230)	
Constant				-7.157***	-9.370***	
				(1.216)	(2.108)	

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Pds, Ds						
zgp5==2 Nord-est				-0.668**	-0.983*	
				(0.256)	(0.420)	
zgp5==3 Zona rossa				0.888***	0.249	
				(0.189)	(0.307)	
zgp5==4 Centro				0.422*	-0.658	
				(0.204)	(0.378)	
zgp5==5 Sud				0.501**	-0.308	
				(0.182)	(0.295)	
townsize				-0.029	0.062	
				(0.097)	(0.167)	
sexm				0.010	-0.204	
				(0.132)	(0.231)	
Age				0.021	0.039	
				(0.023)	(0.038)	
agesq				-0.000	-0.000	
				(0.000)	(0.000)	
titstu				-0.168	-0.125	
				(0.095)	(0.168)	
Social class				-0.019	-0.115	
				(0.078)	(0.129)	
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class				0.089	-0.090	
				(0.252)	(0.429)	
religion				-0.491***	-0.487**	
				(0.098)	(0.176)	
unionmembership				0.673***	0.812**	
				(0.140)	(0.254)	
polint				1.318***	1.129***	
				(0.088)	(0.147)	
Constant				-3.792***	-3.275**	
				(0.644)	(1.092)	

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Prc_Sa						
zgp5==2 Nord-est				-0.711	-0.756	-0.211
				(0.368)	(0.540)	(0.466)
zgp5==3 Zona rossa				0.118	0.273	-0.369
				(0.300)	(0.413)	(0.429)
zgp5==4 Centro				-0.371	0.130	-0.480
				(0.338)	(0.437)	(0.465)
zgp5==5 Sud				0.302	-0.131	-0.334
				(0.256)	(0.397)	(0.368)
Townsize				0.032	-0.212	0.183
				(0.147)	(0.209)	(0.204)
Sexm				0.224	-0.213	0.136
				(0.208)	(0.298)	(0.290)
Age				-0.040	0.004	0.006
				(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Agesq				0.000	-0.000	-0.000
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Titstu				-0.202	0.242	0.006
				(0.152)	(0.218)	(0.203)
Social class				-0.121	-0.191	-0.002
				(0.119)	(0.167)	(0.141)
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class				0.970	-0.797	
				(0.613)	(0.496)	
Religion				-0.691***	-0.930***	-0.715**
				(0.158)	(0.232)	(0.217)
unionmembership				0.530*	1.038**	1.019***
				(0.224)	(0.325)	(0.284)
Polint				1.354***	1.115***	0.878***
				(0.133)	(0.186)	(0.180)
Constant				-3.238**	-1.806	-3.745**
				(1.058)	(1.292)	(1.337)

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Fi						
zgp5==2 Nord-est				-0.583**	-0.732	
				(0.211)	(0.390)	
zgp5==3 Zona rossa				0.260	-1.060**	
				(0.178)	(0.396)	
zgp5==4 Centro				-0.134	-1.225**	
				(0.192)	(0.418)	
zgp5==5 Sud				0.101	-0.047	
				(0.155)	(0.266)	
townsize				0.023	0.126	
				(0.088)	(0.168)	
sexm				0.013	0.081	
				(0.121)	(0.226)	
Age				0.004	-0.019	
				(0.020)	(0.035)	
agesq				-0.000	0.000	
				(0.000)	(0.000)	
titstu				-0.242**	0.044	
				(0.089)	(0.164)	
Social class				0.043	0.274*	
				(0.071)	(0.117)	
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class				0.343	0.874	
				(0.229)	(0.567)	
religion				0.152	0.082	
				(0.091)	(0.175)	
unionmembership				-0.251	-0.096	
				(0.143)	(0.310)	
polint				0.891***	0.502***	
				(0.082)	(0.149)	
Constant				-3.232***	-3.513**	
				(0.573)	(1.084)	

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Ccd, Cdu, Udc						
zgp5==2 Nord-est				-0.130	0.413	0.506
				(0.726)	(0.628)	(0.550)
zgp5==3 Zona rossa				0.929	-0.120	-0.063
				(0.584)	(0.691)	(0.620)
zgp5==4 Centro				0.561	0.325	0.536
				(0.629)	(0.606)	(0.507)
zgp5==5 Sud				0.860	0.229	0.571
				(0.531)	(0.556)	(0.439)
Townsize				-0.348	0.101	-0.320
				(0.278)	(0.294)	(0.232)
Sexm				0.262	0.016	0.378
				(0.383)	(0.394)	(0.330)
Age				0.003	-0.054	0.062
				(0.065)	(0.058)	(0.060)
Agesq				0.000	0.001	-0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Titstu				0.084	0.507	-0.131
				(0.252)	(0.265)	(0.219)
Social class				0.331	0.391*	0.077
				(0.217)	(0.193)	(0.161)
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class				0.253	-0.977	
				(0.799)	(0.615)	
Religion				1.172***	1.193***	1.237***
				(0.329)	(0.316)	(0.296)
unionmembership				0.132	0.075	-0.436
				(0.413)	(0.502)	(0.407)
Polint				1.170***	0.666**	0.942***
				(0.245)	(0.237)	(0.205)
Constant				-10.610***	-7.310***	-9.364***
				(1.999)	(1.717)	(1.858)

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
An						
zgp5==2 Nord-est				-0.197	-1.169*	
				(0.265)	(0.493)	
zgp5==3 Zona rossa				0.398	-0.976*	
				(0.238)	(0.441)	
zgp5==4 Centro				0.636**	-0.008	
				(0.222)	(0.346)	
zgp5==5 Sud				0.321	-0.087	
				(0.205)	(0.297)	
townsize				0.053	0.157	
				(0.110)	(0.176)	
sexm				0.724***	0.375	
				(0.156)	(0.241)	
Age				0.003	0.005	
				(0.026)	(0.038)	
agesq				-0.000	-0.000	
				(0.000)	(0.000)	
titstu				-0.064	-0.281	
				(0.108)	(0.175)	
Social class				0.294***	0.245	
				(0.084)	(0.125)	
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class				-0.288	-0.137	
				(0.304)	(0.432)	
religion				-0.100	0.135	
				(0.113)	(0.185)	
unionmembership				-0.148	-0.146	
				(0.177)	(0.324)	
polint				1.114***	0.909***	
				(0.101)	(0.153)	
Constant				-4.502***	-3.347**	
				(0.720)	(1.083)	

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Idv						
Zgp5==2 Nord-est				0.319		-1.011
				(0.777)		(0.780)
Zgp5==3 Zona rossa				0.102		0.115
				(0.884)		(0.477)
Zgp5==4 Centro				0.748		-0.320
				(0.726)		(0.552)
Zgp5==5 Sud				0.009		-0.088
				(0.784)		(0.428)
Townsize				-0.371		-0.151
				(0.381)		(0.239)
Sexm				0.142		1.045**
				(0.531)		(0.397)
Age				0.157		-0.028
				(0.115)		(0.054)
agesq				-0.001		0.000
				(0.001)		(0.001)
titstu				-0.006		0.421
				(0.361)		(0.234)
Social class				0.382		-0.159
				(0.305)		(0.171)
Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class				0.093		
				(1.112)		
religion				-0.210		-0.298
				(0.385)		(0.249)
unionmembership				-0.146		0.008
				(0.573)		(0.383)
polint				0.968**		1.011***
				(0.346)		(0.220)
Constant				-10.607***		-5.276**
				(3.197)		(1.612)

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Pd						
zgp5==2 Nord-est						-0.186
						(0.242)
zgp5==3 Zona rossa						0.433*
						(0.191)
zgp5==4 Centro						0.064
						(0.209)
zgp5==5 Sud						0.039
						(0.177)
townsize						0.022
						(0.094)
sexm						0.189
						(0.133)
Age						0.027
						(0.022)
agesq						-0.000
						(0.000)
titstu						0.118
						(0.090)
Social class						0.023
						(0.066)
o.Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class						0.000
						(.)
religion						-0.058
						(0.098)
unionmembership						0.851***
						(0.135)
polint						1.008***
						(0.084)
Constant						-4.771***
						(0.656)

	1968	1972	1990	2001	2006	2008
Pdl						
Zgp5==2 Nord-est						-0.122
						(0.224)
Zgp5==3 Zona rossa						0.039
						(0.192)
Zgp5==4 Centro						0.083
						(0.194)
Zgp5==5 Sud						-0.032
						(0.164)
Townsize						0.046
						(0.089)
Sexm						0.136
						(0.126)
Age						-0.080***
						(0.019)
Agesq						0.001***
						(0.000)
Titstu						-0.067
						(0.087)
Social class						0.062
						(0.062)
o.Urban (vs. agr.) soc.class						0.000
						(.)
Religion						0.160
						(0.094)
Unionmembership						-0.457**
						(0.149)
Polint						0.659***
						(0.077)
Constant						-0.771
						(0.566)

Observations	2353	1553	1231	2849	1019	2109
Pseudo R^2	0.126	0.144	0.108	0.106	0.123	0.106
AIC	6804.914	4687.837	3730.730	8820.034	3507.809	5703.226
BIC	7410.076	5249.371	4421.334	9713.242	4172.897	6257.315

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$