Restructuring the West European Party Space in the Great Recession: continuity and change

Hanspeter Kriesi, Swen Hutter and Jasmine Lorenzini
European University Institute, Florence

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Abstract
The paper focuses on the impact of the Great Recession and the Euro crisis on the structuration of party competition in Western Europe. Has it served as a catalyst of long-term trends by boosting conflicts over new cultural issues and reinforcing tri-polar party configurations? Alternatively, does it invert the trends by reinvigorating economic conflicts and reconfiguring party systems in a classic bipolar left-right opposition? Theoretically, the paper combines structural and strategic approaches to party competition. Empirically, it examines six countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) from the 1970s to 2015 based on an original content analysis of mass media. Overall, the crisis has not fundamentally modified the long-term trends. Party competition continues to be structured by two dimensions, and the configurations are tri-polar at least. In addition to mainstream left and right, the populist radical right constitutes a third pole in all six countries by now.
Introduction

Arguably, the party systems of North-Western Europe have been undergoing a process of profound transformation since at least the 1980s. As a result of the joint impact of the successive mobilization of new social conflicts by the New Left and the New Right, the dimensions of the space of party competition have assumed new meanings and their relative weight has been changing. Moreover, the relationship of the parties within this space has been reconfigured, giving rise to a tri-polar configuration of party competition with the joint left opposing a split right, divided between the moderate center-right and the populist radical right (the New Right). Against the background of these long-term trends, what has been the impact of the Great Recession on the structuration of party competition in Western Europe? Has it served as a catalyst for changes that were already underway long before the current economic crisis hit Europe? Alternatively, has it been reversing the long-term trends and does it constitute a new critical juncture in the development of West European politics? In this paper, we propose to answer these questions by studying the structuration of party politics on the supply-side in six West European countries (i.e., France, Germany, the UK, Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland) in the period from the 1970s to spring 2015. We focus on this set of countries as we have closely studied the long-term trends in the structuration of their party competition before the onset of the crisis (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). Taking these trends into account allows us to put the impact of the current economic crisis in a historical and comparative perspective.

It is important to state from the outset that these are all countries that have gotten through the crisis much better than the countries from the European South and most of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe. It is likely that the Euro-crisis has had a very different impact on the party systems of Southern and Central and Eastern European countries than on the
countries of what, in order to be more precise, we shall subsequently call the North-West of Europe. Four of the countries we study here – France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands – belong to the Eurozone and have come to belong to the camp of the so-called ‘creditor’ countries. While the non-Eurozone member UK and the non-EU member Switzerland have not been as directly concerned by the Euro-crisis as the other four, they also broadly belong to the North-Western European countries which have managed the crisis rather well. Nonetheless, the Great Recession and the subsequent Euro crisis have had an impact on economics and policy-making in all six countries, and their consequences on the structure of party competition might well be more pronounced than their immediate economic fallout.

The paper is divided into five sections. At first, we restate our general view on the developments of the structuration of the party systems in the six countries in some detail since it has important implications for how we interpret the impact of the crisis. In this section, we highlight the long-term restructuring of the party competition in the North-West of Europe since the 1970s. Most importantly, we emphasize the increasing politicization of new cultural issues, which has restructured the second, non-economic dimension of the political space and has given rise to a tri-polar party configuration – constituted by the left, the moderate and the populist radical right (the New Right). Next, against the background of these long-term trends, we formulate our expectations about the impact of the deep economic crisis on this competition. Then, we introduce our data and operationalization, before presenting the results. The empirical analysis is based on a relational content analysis of newspaper coverage published before national elections. In this paper, we combine data for the period from the 1970s to 2007 with new data on all the elections that have taken place in these countries up to and including the British elections in spring 2015.
Overall, our results indicate that continuity prevails. While the crisis period reinvigorated conflicts over economic issues in all countries except France, we find no fundamental change. The electoral campaigns continue to be structured by two dimensions, and the party configuration continues to be tri-polar at least. In addition to the two mainstream opponents from the center-left and the center-right, a third pole constituted by the New Right has been established in all six countries by now. In Germany and the UK, the constitution of this third pole has been triggered by the crisis elections. Except for Switzerland, this third pole is no longer associated with Kitschelt’s (1995) winning formula but situated at almost equal distance from the left and right end of the economic dimension.

**Restructuration of party competition in Western Europe: long-term trends**

In approaching this subject, it is useful to distinguish between a structural and a strategic approach to party competition. The structural approach assumes that parties are constrained to operate within a given competitive space. From the perspective of the structural approach, new issues and dimensions of party competition emerge exogenously, from social conflicts which are the product of long-term social change. This is the Rokkanian perspective that links the structure of party competition in Western Europe to the long-term trends in society. The strategic approach, by contrast, focuses on party competition proper and does not relate it to underlying structural conflicts. From this perspective, the introduction of new issues and dimensions of competition into the political system is the endogenous result of the strategic actions of parties. This is the perspective of authors like Downs, Riker, Budge, or Schattschneider, who focus on the parties’ positioning, issue management and expansion of the scope of conflict (for a recent formulation, see Hobolt and de Vries’ (2015) theory of issue entrepreneurs). From our point of view, the two accounts should be considered as
complementary rather than competing: as posited by the structural perspective, broad processes of social change create structurally defined political potentials which are, as argued by the strategic approach, mobilized by strategic political actors.

An approach that views party competition as ultimately rooted in structural conflicts begs the question of which social conflicts have the capacity to fundamentally restructure the partisan space. We suggest that, in the aftermath of the ‘glorious’ post-war period which came to an end in the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s, two waves of political mobilizations articulated new types of social conflicts that were to become crucial for the structuration of the West European party systems. The first wave (the wave of the New Left) was an expression of structural transformations that were endogenous to the European nation-states – processes of deindustrialization, tertiarization, expansion of tertiary education, feminization of the workforce and occupational upgrading have been characteristic for this transformation. These processes brought about a ‘silent revolution’, a value change in Western Europe (Inglehart 1977, 1990). This change was driven by the expanding new middle class, or, more precisely, by the socio-cultural segment of the new middle class that articulated its demands in the so-called ‘new social movements’ (e.g. Kriesi 1989). This revolution gave rise to the ‘new politics’, which have mainly transformed the left (e.g. Müller-Rommel 1989): the new social movements stood at the origin of the rise of the Green parties and of the transformation of the West European social-democratic parties which, in the process, have become middle-class parties in almost all countries of Western Europe (e.g., Gingrich and Häusermann 2015, Häusermann 2015; Kitschelt 1994).

The second wave (the wave of the New Right) has started in the early eighties with the rise of the Front National (FN) in France and continues to the present day. Arguably, this second wave refers to social conflicts arising from ‘globalization’, or, more specifically, from the opening up of national borders in economic, political and cultural terms. Economically,
certain segments of the workforce (especially low-skilled workers) have become doubly squeezed by competition from abroad (in the form of offshoring of their jobs) and at home (in the form of competition from immigrants) (e.g. Dancygier and Walter 2015). Politically, the processes of economic internationalization and European integration, in particular, have increasingly undermined the sovereignty of the nation-states, led to an erosion of national democratic procedures and have given rise to a renaissance of nationalism (e.g. Hutter et al. 2016). Culturally, the immigration of migrants from culturally ever more distant shores has led to an increasingly multicultural composition of West European societies, which contributed to the spread of perceived threats to the ‘national identity’ (e.g. Hainmöller and Hiscox 2007). As we have argued, these processes created a heterogeneous set of ‘losers of globalization’ who have been most successfully mobilized by the radical populist right (or the New Right) (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). In this process, these parties of the New Right have become the party of the working class in many West European countries (Oesch 2008, 2013; Afonso and Rennwald 2015). Some of these parties have been newly emerging (such as the FN, VB, PVV, LN, FP, DF, or SD), while others (such as the FPÖ, the SVP, or the True Finns) are transformed (liberal-) conservative mainstream parties.

The two waves of mobilization have in common that they concerned above all cultural issues. They primarily transformed the meaning of the cultural dimension of the party space, which, in the European context, had traditionally been dominated by issues related to religion. Interpreting the impact of the New Left, Kitschelt (1994, 1995) re-baptized the cultural dimension as ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ dimension; focusing on the impact of the New Right, we chose to relabel it ‘demarcation-integration’ dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Theorizing the joint impact of both waves, Bornschier (2010, 2010a, 2015), whose terminology we adopt here, suggests that the reshaped cultural dimension refers to a fundamental conflict between universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values
(traditionalism invokes the rejection of universalism, while communitarianism makes reference to the populist right’s conception of community). As he argues, the crystallization of this conflict has remained partial as long as the New Right did not provide the counter-position of the New Left with a broader and more permanent basis.

If the increasing importance and redefinition of the cultural dimension of the party space is ultimately rooted in the rise of new structural conflicts, it has also been influenced by the decline of the traditional conflicts of religion and class that used to shape West European party competition in the past: secularization reduced the relevance of religious conflicts and contributed to the electoral decline of confessional parties (the Christian Democrats in particular), while the increasing affluence, the establishment and general acceptance of the welfare state, and the reduced manoeuvring space for macro-economic policy-making in an economically ever more integrated world reduced the relevance of the traditional class conflicts and contributed to the decline of Communist and Social-Democratic parties. For 15 West European countries, Martin (2013) has documented this double decline of mainstream parties, which constitutes the other side of the coin of the rise of the New Left and the New Right.

With the articulation of the new conflicts linked to the opening up of national borders and the rise of the new populist radical right, new cultural issues have become generally more important for party competition without, however, necessarily implying a corresponding decline in the importance of the economic dimension. To be sure, the decline of the traditional class cleavage has been accompanied by a convergence of the mainstream parties on the economic dimension. On the one hand, the Third-Way left has been moving to the right, on the other hand, and equally important, the mainstream right has been moving to the left (e.g. Morgan 2015). However, in spite of the reduction of polarization of the main protagonists on the economic dimension this dimension may still remain salient for party competition. As the
parties’ positions converge and economic issues become ‘valence issues’, parties are still seeking to differentiate themselves in terms of competence (i.e. the means proposed to achieve the shared goals) (Stokes 1963, 1992). For valence issues, issue ownership (the reputation to be a credible and competent defender of the common goal) and performance (evaluated retrospectively for incumbents, and prospectively for both incumbents and their opponents) become decisive for a party’s success. As issue ownership has proven to be more fluid and contested than initially assumed (Bélanger and Meguid 2008), competition on valence issues may remain intense. Parties may lose their reputation of competence to their main competitors as a result of exogenous shocks (e.g. the British Conservatives in the ERM crisis 1992 (Clarke et al. 2004)) or they may successfully ‘trespass’ (Sides 2006) on the opposing camp’s preferred territory (e.g. the Scandinavian centre-right parties on welfare issues (Arndt 2013)).

As a matter of fact, the rise of the New Right tends to go together with an overall increase of party competition, because it tends to give rise to a split on the right. While the rise of the New Left has led to a rapprochement between the mainstream social democratic left and the rising Greens on the universalistic (culturally liberal and cosmopolitan) side of the cultural spectrum, the right typically split between a culturally and economically liberal centre-right and the New Right, which originally adopted Kitschelt’s (1995) famous ‘winning formula’ (combining economically liberal with culturally nationalistic appeals). As a result of this split on the right the partisan configuration typically became tri-polar and the two dimensions of the partisan space – the economic and the cultural one – tended to be independent of each other in the North-West of Europe. Within this overall pattern, we have previously found

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1 France is the only one of the six countries with a traditionally split left between a strong (originally predominant) Communist and a Social-democratic (Socialist) party. However, as a result of the decline of the class cleavage, the Communists became as unimportant for the overall configuration of the political space in France as in the other countries.

2 In the religiously mixed (Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands) and in the Catholic countries (Austria, France), such a split on the right is nothing new, but it replaced the previous split between the religious and the liberal
country-specific differences which above all depend on the electoral system (the majoritarian system sets the UK and France apart from the other four, proportional countries), the national political legacies (e.g. of the traditionally split left in France or of the National-Socialist past in Germany) and the specific electoral strategies of the parties involved.

**Restructuring West European party competition in the Great Recession: our expectations**

The question is to what extent the Great Recession has modified these long-term trends: does it serve as a catalyst that accelerates the long-term processes or does it rather invert the long-term trends we have just described, reinforce the salience and polarization on economic issues and reconfigure the party system again in a classic bipolar left-right opposition? In trying to answer these questions, we do not focus on the electoral consequences of the crisis. In particular, we are not interested in the short-term electoral punishment of the incumbents which constitutes the focus of the economic voting literature. Our hypotheses concern the long-term trends that structure the party system. Let us just note that, in electoral terms, the Great Recession has accelerated the decline of the mainstream parties and reinforced new challengers in West European party systems (Hernandez and Kriesi 2015). The New Right’s experience has, however, been mixed in our six countries. In the four countries where it had established a strong presence before the crisis, up to and including 2015 it has only benefited from the fallout of the crisis in France. In the other three countries, it suffered from short-term factors which had nothing to do with the economic crisis – its association with the government (the Netherlands), or a political crisis that led to a split in its own ranks (Austria

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right. In the cases of Germany and the UK, where the New Right has only broken through in the elections of the Great Recession, the right was traditionally split between two mainstream parties, the liberals (Liberal Democrats and Freedom Party) and the conservatives (Conservatives and CDU-CSU), with the conservatives taking the functionally equivalent (if not equally extreme) position of the New Right.

3 Throughout Europe incumbents have been heavily punished, although not as severely in the West European countries under study here as in the hardest hit countries in Southern Europe and Ireland.
and Switzerland). In the two countries, where the New Right was virtually absent before the crisis – Germany and the UK, it rose in the course of the crisis, which brought these countries’ party systems more in line with the overall trends.

We formulate two sets of hypotheses on the long-term impact of the Great Recession on the restructuring of party competition in West European countries (explicitly excluding the countries of Southern Europe). The first set concerns the politicization of the two dimensions that structure the party space. Here, we use the term politicization to indicate the relative structuring capacity of a dimension that corresponds to the combined occurrence of salience and polarization (see Hutter and Grande 2014). A dimension is structuring party competition to the extent that the issues related to it are both highly salient and polarized. Relative changes in both salience and polarization imply changes in the capacity of a dimension to structure party competition. We discuss the two elements separately before we arrive at overall expectations about changes in the politicization of the two dimensions.

In terms of salience, we expect that in times of a deep economic crisis such as the Great Recession the economy becomes more salient for all the parties. Based on the economic voting literature, we expect that, in a period of economic turmoil, the economic performance of the government is likely to become more salient for the voters’ decisions to reward or punish the incumbent (e.g. Bartels 2014, Hernandez and Kriesi 2015). Although the incumbents may wish to avoid campaigning on economic issues, they may not be able to do so because these issues constitute a top priority for the electorate, and because the opposition parties are likely to seize the opportunity to campaign on the poor economic performance of the governing parties. Accordingly, these issues are likely to gain a high salience on the party-system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010).
However, given that economic issues have always been very prominent on the party system agendas in these countries during election campaigns (Kriesi 2012: 110), and given that the economy of these countries has recovered quite rapidly, we would expect a limited rather than an extraordinary increase of economic salience. Moreover, the Euro-crisis reduced the already limited macro-economic maneuvering space of the mainstream parties even more, which suggests that they intensified their attempts to avoid economic issues and to shift the competition to new issues in order to distinguish themselves from one another (Ward et al 2015). In this respect, the three new cultural issues which have been driving the rise of the New Left and the New Right – cultural liberalism, immigration and European integration – provide them with an obvious choice. Cultural liberalism (the extension of rights for minorities such as gay rights in particular) is the privileged domain of the left, while opposition to immigration (to the new wave of asylum seekers) and to European integration (under the impact of the Euro-crisis) are the privileged domains of the right. Such a shift is expected to have enhanced the long-term trend of increasing salience of the new cultural issues which, as we have argued, has been driven by the New Left and the New Right long before the crisis had started.

Turning to polarization of parties’ positions, it is well known that, after a short period lasting roughly up to the end of 2009, when governments countered the economic impact of the crisis by relying on some version of ‘liberal’ (Pontusson and Raess 2012) or ‘emergency Keynesianism’ (Hall 2013), all European governments reverted to austerity measures which became the only game in town, with no alternative political formulas in sight (Hall 2013). In the West European countries under study here, independently of whether they were in government or not, the Social-Democrats also accepted the shift to austerity: they not only supported the imposition of austerity on the ‘debtor’ countries, but they also pursued fiscal
austerity at home\textsuperscript{4}. However, this does not necessarily mean that the left converged with the right on the economic dimension. In terms of the labor market and social policies that they have traditionally owned and which still offer somewhat more leeway than macro-economic policies, we expect the Social-Democrats and especially the more radical left to have distinguished themselves from the more pronounced austerity positions of the moderate right. Both the mainstream and the radical left may have been rejuvenated by the economic crisis, which provided the left with the opportunity to defend the welfare state against the neoliberal attempts of retrenchment. We expect the left to have embraced this opportunity, in spite of its consent to the overall austerity agenda. This expectation implies an increased polarization on the economic dimension, provided the moderate right did not trespass on the territory of social policy traditionally owned by the left.

On the economic dimension, the New Right has shifted to the left already before the crisis, as a result of the declining importance of the anti-state, anti-tax petite bourgeoisie among its electorate\textsuperscript{5}. Thus, Michel (2015) has observed corresponding shifts to the left on welfare in the programs of no less than nine New Right parties in Western Europe (the notable exception in this respect being the Swiss SVP)\textsuperscript{6}. Given that its constituency of ‘globalization losers’ has been particularly hard hit by the economic crisis, we expect the New Right to increasingly abandon Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula’ during the crisis, by adopting a more social-democratic position on the economic dimension. However, since its position on the economic dimension tends not to be very prominent in the electoral campaigns, its move to

\textsuperscript{4} In four of our countries, the Social Democrats have participated in grand coalition governments (in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland) for some time since the fall of Lehman Brothers, and in the other two countries (France and the UK) they were the governing party. In addition, their support of austerity measures is likely due to demand-side factors (the perceived popularity of these policies among voters). A discussion of such demand-side factors is, however, beyond the purview of this paper. For such a discussion, see Bremer (2015).

\textsuperscript{5} Switzerland is a notable exception in this respect (see Afonso and Rennwald 2015).

\textsuperscript{6} He also notes that their shift has characteristically come with the definition of a strictly restrictive concept of redistributive politics in terms of the social groups expected to benefit: the foreign residents (but also some other groups such as the young unemployed) typically do not belong to the groups which are considered to deserve welfare support.
the left probably has not contributed significantly to the overall polarization on this dimension.

Summarizing the rather contradictory expected effects of the crisis on the salience and polarization of economic issues, we expect a return of economic politicization, but of limited proportions. This is our economic politicization hypothesis:

H1: in the Great Recession, the overall politicization of economic issues is expected to have increased, but only to a limited extent.

On the cultural dimension, we expect polarization to have become substantially more accentuated, as a result of expected strategic moves on the right. In general, the new cultural conflicts offer more strategic latitude to the right than to the left (Kriesi et al. 2012: 19). Given that the mainstream social-democratic left has adopted a universalistic position on the cultural dimension already during the first wave and (together with the Greens) has come to own the universalistic position on this dimension, its ability to appeal to the various groups of globalization losers is severely limited. By contrast, the mainstream right is not to the same extent tied to a culturally liberal position. Its legacy is more compatible with a traditionalist-communitarian position, and it stands to gain from shifting its position into the nationalist-conservative direction to outcompete the New Right. Accordingly, under the impact of the Euro-crisis and the corresponding renaissance of nationalism, its Euroscepticism is expected to have increased. Moreover, in an economic crisis the parties on the right are also likely to reassert their traditional cultural preferences and to move away from cultural liberalism in order to reassure their clientele in times of uncertainty. Most importantly, however, under the impact of the Euro-crisis, we expect the moderate right to have assumed a tougher stance on immigration in order to protect the national labor force and to shift the blame for the country’s economic predicament onto readily available scapegoats (the immigrants). The New Right, in turn, is unlikely to have moderated its positions on its core issues –
immigration and Euroscepticism, even if it has assumed (direct or indirect) government responsibility in at least three of our countries (Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland), and has tended to moderate its populist discourse accordingly.

Summing up the impact of the crisis on the cultural dimension, we arrive at our cultural politicization hypothesis:

H2: in the Great Recession, the overall politicization of cultural issues is expected to have increased as a result of the combined effect of their increasing salience and polarization.

Combining the hypotheses for the two dimensions, we arrive at the increasing structuring capacity hypothesis:

H3: in the Great Recession, the overall structuring capacity of the party systems is expected to have increased.

The second set of expectations refers to the impact of the crisis on the configuration of the parties in the partisan space. As a result of the combined effect of the expected increase in the structuring capacity of both dimensions, we anticipate that, under the impact of the Great Recession, the parties have increasingly diverged from each other in the party space. I.e. we expect that the vertices of the triangle (or the polygon in a more heavily fragmented party system) constituted by the major parties in the party space have moved further apart. This is our accentuation hypothesis:

H4: we generally expect an accentuation of the tri-polar (or polygon) structure we have found previously.

Note, however, that this hypothesis presupposes that the New Right, indeed, has moved towards the left on the economic dimension. If the New Right makes such a move, the
triangular configuration will be reinforced, whatever the centre-right’s strategy. If, however, the New Right does not move to the left on the economic dimension, and if the centre-right pursues a strategy of competition with the New Right on the cultural dimension, the configuration tends to become bipolar. This is our *bipolarity hypothesis*:

H5: If the New Right sticks to its originally neoliberal position on the economic dimension, the configuration tends to become bipolar, as simple division between left and right.

**Data and methods**

In order to analyse political parties and their positions in electoral campaigns, we rely on a relational content analysis of newspaper articles. Our results are based on the analysis of two newspapers per country: one quality newspaper and one tabloid. More specifically, we selected articles from *Die Presse* and *Die Kronenzeitung* (Austria), *Le Monde* and *Le Parisien* (France), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Bild* (Germany), *NRC* and *Algemeen Dagblad* (Netherlands), *NZZ* and *Blick* (Switzerland) as well as *Times* and *Sun* (UK). From these papers, we selected all articles that were published within two months before the relevant national Election Day and reported on the electoral contest and national politics more generally. We then coded the selected articles by means of core sentence analysis (CSA) (for more details on the method and data, see Dolezal, Hutter and Wüest 2012). Following this type of relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an article is reduced to its most basic ‘core sentence(s)’, which contain(s) only the subject, the object, and the direction of the relationship between the two. For this paper, we are only interested in relations between political actors (subject) and issues (objects) (actor-issue sentences). The direction
between actors and issues is quantified using a scale ranging from -1 to +1, with three intermediary positions.

The following analyses are based on an original dataset of around 48,700 actor-issue sentences from 42 election campaigns in the six countries: a benchmark election from the seventies, and all elections since the 1990s (including the French elections of 1988). For the analysis of the configurations in particular, we rely on a subset of around 28,100 actor-issue sentences from 23 election campaigns: all elections since 2000, i.e. 14 pre-crisis (pre-2008) and 9 crisis (post-2008) elections (two elections in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, as well as one each in the other three countries). For the study of the ‘crisis’ elections, we have between 992 (Switzerland) and 3235 (the UK) actor-issue statements. The actors were grouped according to their party affiliation. The issues were coded in great detail (with more than 200 coded categories per election campaign). We aggregated them into a set of eleven broader issue categories. Note that the eleven categories cover statements in favour and against the respective proposals.

To test our expectations, we are most interested in five of these issue categories (for a description, see Appendix). The first two – welfare and economic liberalism/austerity – refer to the traditional opposition between state and market. Conflicts over these two issues have usually structured the economic dimension of the two-dimensional political space. By contrast the other three issues – cultural liberalism, Europe, and anti-immigration – are labelled as new cultural issues because they have emerged since the 1970s and have restructured the second, non-economic dimension. The rise of cultural liberalism in the 1970s

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7 The Austrian campaign in 2008 is categorized as pre-crisis. Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15 2008; the Austrian election took place on September 28, 2008 (while there were some references to the financial crisis in the election campaign, these elections were but not really fought in the shadow of the Great Recession.

8 This new set of broad issue categories does not exactly correspond to the categorization we employed previously (Kriesi et al. 2008: 58ff.). With the benefit of hindsight, we reclassified some of the original issues into different summary categories.
predated the increasingly salient and polarized conflicts over immigration and Europe which have emerged since the 1990s. The remaining six categories are education, defense (including peace), domestic security (law and order), environment, institutional reform, and infrastructure. According to the empirical findings of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012), the first three issues are usually also integrated into the cultural dimension of the political space, whereas the last three are not consistently embedded in any of the two dimensions. In this paper, we report on them only marginally.

The components of party competition that we are interested in here are operationalized as follows: salience is measured by the share of core sentences on a given issue category in percent of all coded sentences related to any political issue. The indicator for the polarisation of party positions is based on Taylor and Hermann’s (1971) index, which was originally designed to measure the degree of left-right polarization in a party system. The polarization of positions on a given issue category is computed as follow:

\[ POLARIZATION = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \omega_k (x_k - \bar{x})^2, \]

where \( \omega_k \) is the salience of a particular issue category for party k, \( x_k \) is the position of party k on this issue category, and \( \bar{x} \) is the weighted average position of all parties, where weights are provided by the party-specific salience of the issue category. Since actor positions are always measured on scales ranging from -1 to +1, the distance to the average (and our measure of polarization) can range between 0 and 1. To measure the polarization of a group of issues (in our case, economic and new cultural issues), we calculate the average of the polarization of the individual issues, weighting them by the salience of the corresponding issue category.
For the analysis of the shifting party configurations, we shall use multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) for the spatial visualization of both issues and parties. MDS is a very flexible method, quite similar to factor analysis, which allows for a graphic representation of similarities or dissimilarities between pairs of objects. The unfolding technique we use here allows for the joint representation of actors (e.g., parties) and issues in a common space. In addition, the variant of MDS called weighted metric multidimensional scaling (WMMDS) enables us to account simultaneously for similarities between party positions with respect to a set of issues in our case and for the salience of the respective issues for each party as well as for the salience of the different parties in the party system. For the present purposes, we have calculated the weights separately for the two periods, i.e., pre- and post-crisis. Within a given period, some elections may have a higher impact on the results due to a higher number of core sentences. We present the configuration of actors for the two periods within a common space. This procedure assumes that the overall structure of a given national partisan space has not changed between 2000 and 2015, but – most importantly – it allows us to directly examine potential shifts in location of parties in the political space.9

Results

The structuring capacity of economic and new cultural issues

Let us first consider salience. Figure 1 presents the development of the salience of economic and new cultural issues from the 1970s up to the crisis (post-2008) period. With one exception, the resulting pattern fits the expectations derived from valence theory and theories of

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9 Separate analyses for each time period support this choice. The spaces for the periods 2000 to 2008 and 2009 to 2015 do not fundamentally differ in terms dimensionality and location of the key issues that we are interested in. Therefore, it seems more interesting to focus on potential changes in the configuration of the actors within the space as we do in the final step of our empirical analysis.
economic voting rather better than the alternative scenario of convergence theory and issue avoidance. What we see is that, in all the countries, the salience of economic issues has remained at a high level since the 1970s and has hardly increased during the Great Recession. With the exception of the Netherlands in the 1990s and early 2000s, economic issues never amounted to less than one third of the campaign issues, and they reached a maximum of 57 percent in France in the 1970s. Moreover, in all the countries, economic issues have always been more salient than the new cultural issues. To be sure, their salience decreased everywhere after the 1970s, but it picked up again in Germany and Switzerland already in the early 2000s, i.e. before the onset of the crisis, and in the crisis elections of Austria, the Netherlands and the UK, albeit to a limited extent. Only in France, we see a continuous decline of economic issue salience. By contrast, the salience of the new cultural issues has, indeed, systematically increased over the period covered. However, contrary to our expectations, in four of the six countries it reached its peak already before the crisis – either in the 1990s (in the Netherlands and Switzerland) or in the early 2000s (in Austria and the UK). Only in Germany and France, the salience of these issues peaked during the crisis elections. More detailed analyses indicate that their salience in the French and German crisis elections increased both for the mainstream parties and for the new challengers, which is in line with both the expectation about economic avoidance (mainstream parties) and the long-term trends (challenger parties). The French combination of a continuously declining salience of economic issues (from an exceptionally high level in the 1970s to an average level of 39 percent in the crisis elections) and of a markedly increasing salience of new cultural issues in the crisis elections (from a very low level of 9 percent in the 1970s up to the maximum of 33 percent) comes closest to the long-term trends that we postulated in our earlier analyses. It shows no sign of an impact of the crisis.

<Figure 1>
To fully appreciate the structuring capacity of the two types of issues in times of crisis, we need to take into account polarization, too. *Figure 2* presents the development of politicization and its two components (salience and polarization) for the two types of issues. To facilitate the assessment of the respective trends, the figure presents the levels of the three indices relative to the benchmark of the 1970s’ elections (the absolute values can be found in the Online Appendix, see Table A.2). The resulting patterns show that the structuring capacity of the economic dimension mainly depends on its polarization, which is, of course, a result of the fact that, except for France, the salience of the economic issues does not vary a great deal throughout the period covered. Compared to the 1970s, polarization increases on the economic dimension in all the countries except France. This result contradicts the expectations of both convergence and valence theory. By contrast, it lends some support to the idea that the left may have been rejuvenated by the crisis. More detailed analyses indicate that, with the exception of the Dutch PvdA, all social-democratic parties moved to the left in the countries under study. However, in France and Germany, their mainstream competitors on the right adopted a ‘trespassing’ strategy and also moved in their direction, limiting the overall increase in polarization (Germany) or even reducing it (France). By contrast, in Austria and the UK, the leftward shift of the Social Democrats was enhanced by the mainstream parties on the right moving further to the right. The increase in the structuring capacity of the economic dimension is most spectacular in the case of Austria. In Switzerland and Germany it accentuates a trend that, just as with respect to salience, has already set in previously (in the 1990s in Switzerland, and in the early 2000s in Germany). In the Dutch and British cases, there were more ups and downs in this regard, but the structuring capacity in the crisis reached the previous peaks in these two countries. In France both, the corresponding salience and polarization have decreased from their relatively high levels in the seventies. Overall, except for France, the structuring capacity of the economic dimension
has been higher in the crisis elections than at any time before\textsuperscript{10}. This confirms the notion that the crisis has led to a return of the politicization of economic issues.

As can be seen in the second part of Figure 2, the development of the structuring capacity of the new cultural issues depends on the development of both salience and polarization. In line with the expected long-term trends, in all the countries the structuring capacity of these issues has considerably increased since the 1970s. However, except for the Netherlands, where this long-term increase appears to be most sustained and in line with our expectations, it has reached a plateau already in the 1990s (in France, Switzerland and Germany, where it was even inverted to some extent) or in the early 2000s (in Austria and in the UK). This suggests that, with the exception of the Netherlands, the crisis has rather halted the trend of the increasing structuring capacity of the new cultural issues in the North-West of Europe. More specifically, the results show that, on the one hand, even if the salience of the new cultural issues has increased in the French and German crisis elections, due to limited polarization, the politicization of these issues has not increased in these two countries. On the other hand, the results also show that the polarization of these issues has increased in the other four countries (Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK), where it actually reached its peak in the crisis elections. But given the stagnation of their salience in three out of the four countries, we find support for the increasing cultural politicization hypothesis only for the Netherlands.

\textless{}Figure 2\textgreater{}

In combination, the results concerning the structuring capacity of the two sets of issues suggests that the crisis has, indeed, shifted the focus of party competition somewhat in the direction of economic issues, but not necessarily to the detriment of the new cultural issues.

\textsuperscript{10}At this point, we ought to mention that we do not have data for the 1980s. Thus, they do not cover the elections of the Thatcher era in the UK, which might have been highly structured by the economic issues, too.
(or, for that matter to the detriment of the remaining set of issues). Instead, it has raised the overall level of politicization to record levels not seen before in five out of our six countries. Only in France the level of politicization has remained relatively stable at a comparatively high level since the 1970s. As shown in Table 1, the overall level of politicization has been particularly high in the crisis elections in Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

<Table 1>

**The shifting configurations**

To discuss the shifts in the configurations, we focus on the shifts between the pre-crisis elections of the 2000s and the elections that took place after 2008. Figure 3 presents the details by country. Each country-graph shows two configurations – one for the elections of the pre-crisis period (the 2000s up to 2008) and one for the crisis elections (since 2008). The number of parties included in the configuration varies by country, because the number of important parties is not the same for each country. To simplify the picture, we exclude the Greens from our polygons. Their position tends to be close the mainstream left on the economic dimension, but more universalistic on the cultural dimension.

As expected, all six partisan spaces are two-dimensional. Except for the Dutch case, the two dimensions are, however, more or less correlated. The closest correlation between the two we find for Switzerland, where we already observed a similar result back in the 1990s. This is indicative of a shift by the parties of the centre-right in the direction of the New Right on the cultural dimension. Such a shift is most clearly visible in Austria, France, and Switzerland. Moreover, all configurations are at least tri-polar and the New Right, indeed, constitutes one of the poles. In line with the expected long-term trends, the New Right has taken its distance from the economically liberal pole in all the countries except Switzerland. With respect to the shifting configurations under the impact of the crisis, we can identify two patterns: the pattern
of Germany and France, which is characterized by the combination of a party system shifting
towards the left on the economic dimension with a somewhat greater polarization on this
dimension, and the pattern characterizing the other four countries, where the party system has
polarized on both dimension. Taken together, these patterns provide support for both the
accentuation and the increasing structuring capacity hypotheses. To substantiate this overall
assessment, let us have a brief look at the country-specific details.

In *France*, under the guidance of Nicolas Sarkozy, the mainstream right has already started to
move in the direction of the New Right in the 2007 Presidential elections. As the mainstream
left stayed put on both dimensions, this move into the direction of the New Right on the
cultural dimension tended to transform the originally tri-polar party configuration into a
bipolar one, opposing a united left and a still split, but similarly positioned right\(^{11}\). Gougou
and Labouret (2013) have made a forceful argument to this effect. *Figure 3a* shows that this
move of the mainstream right has been accentuated under the impact of the crisis. At the
same time, the FN has, in line with the long-term trends, moved to the left. Marine Le Pen’s
response to the Great Recession was ‘to accord top priority to the development of a
comprehensive, internally consistent socio-economic, which entailed a decisive break with
the dominant market ideology program’ (Betz 2015: 81). She promoted the notion of
‘economic patriotism’, called for ‘intelligent’ protectionism, and emphasized the revival of
traditional French policies of dirigisme and étatisme (Betz 2015: 83). In the crisis election
2012, the FN put almost equal weight on economic as on new cultural issues. However, as all
major parties had positioned themselves at quite a distance from economic liberalism already
before the crisis, and as all of them moved (somewhat) further to the left under the impact of
the crisis, the FN’s move on the economic dimension did not have a noticeable impact on the

\(^{11}\) This is not visible in *Figure 3a*, because the 2002 and 2007 Presidential elections are merged in the pre-crisis
elections’ category. However, a more detailed analysis (not shown) that separates these two elections brings out
this point quite clearly.
overall configuration. In the French case, the major parties distinguish themselves above all on the cultural dimension and they do so to an increasing degree under the impact of the crisis (Tiberj 2013). However, two economic issues were also introduced by the mainstream opposition into this campaign: on the one hand, Hollande took issue with the increase of the retirement age and the cuts in public sector jobs adopted by Sarkozy and proposed to overturn them. On the other hand, in a more prospective tone, Hollande also proposed the introduction of higher taxes for top incomes, a proposition that also became a central theme in this presidential campaign.

In Germany (see Figure 3b), the key change in the party configuration from our point of view took place at the periphery of the second crisis-elections of 2013: it is the combination of the rise of the radical populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) and the decline of the Liberals (FDP). While both parties missed the 5 percent threshold by little, the shift from the one to the other implies a decisive reconfiguration of the German party system that is in line with the general long-term trends. The Liberals had actually been the winners of the first crisis-elections in 2009, but the embrace by their CDU-CSU coalition partner during the following legislature, the change of the electoral law (Poguntke and van dem Berge 2014: 131), which made ‘second vote campaigns’ less attractive for prospective coalition partners, as well as the rise of the AfD did them in. Although our data basis is very thin for the AfD – as a matter of fact it had hardly any standing in the campaign and therefore hardly any impact on the overall configuration either\textsuperscript{12}, we trust that its position close to the traditional-communitarian pole is fairly adequately represented. Even if the party’s original leader may have had something else in mind, this position is what the party was associated with in public

\textsuperscript{12} This is a result of the fact that the AfD was largely ignored by the media during the electoral campaign, and of the fact that the established parties opted for a dismissive strategy, i.e. they chose to ignore the new party and its key issues (see Meguid 2005).
opinion. Both German crisis campaigns were rather depoliticized and either focused on the composition of future coalitions (2009) or on personal gaffes and assets of leading candidates (2013) (see Faas 2014). This is reflected in the rather limited polarization between the three traditional major parties – SPD, CDU-CSU, and FDP. However, as a combined result of the SPD’s rejuvenated left-wing agenda, which its moderate candidate for the chancellery in 2013 had difficulties to sell (Mader 2014), and of the CDU’s ‘trespassing’ strategy, the whole party system has moved to the left under the impact of the crisis.

In Switzerland (Figure 3c), the Social Democrats also moved to the left, which led to an increase in the polarization on the economic dimension. At the same time, the centre-right parties moved in a more traditional-communitarian direction. The strikingly close correlation between the two dimensions for Switzerland is not only due to this move by the centre-right parties, but also results from the fact that, contrary to the New Right parties in the other countries, which have all taken their distance from economic liberalism, the Swiss People’s party (SVP) has stuck to Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula’. Moreover, the SVP is also the only New Right party that has always put a greater emphasis on economic than on new cultural issues. As a result, the Swiss partisan space tends to become bipolar.

In Austria (Figure 3d), the campaign in the 2013 crisis elections was centred on the economy and the welfare state, with corruption scandals as a third issue (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014). The government parties put the emphasis on the former two and the relatively good economic performance of Austria compared to other European countries, while the opposition centered on the corruption scandals. The increasing polarization on the economic dimension and the high politicization level on economic issues are mainly due to the SPÖ proposals in favour of more distributive justice, including a proposal to introduce a wealth tax. On these issues, the Austrian left faced strong opposition from all its competitors on the right. The ÖVP heavily
opposed the proposed measures and the BZÖ also stressed economically liberal positions in an attempt to distance itself from the FPÖ. The FPÖ, by contrast, continued to focus on its anti-immigration stance. Overall, the fragmentation of the Austrian party system accentuated in the crisis elections, with the entry of two new competitors (Neos and Team Stronach) and the electoral gains of all the opposition parties (including the FPÖ) to the detriment of the two grand old parties (SPÖ and ÖVP), who together just obtained the barest of majorities for a continuation of their grand coalition.

In the UK (Figure 3e), both campaigns in 2010 and 2015 were very much focused on economic issues, i.e. spending cuts, when they should begin, how far they should go and how much protection should be afforded to specific public services (Whitaker 2011: 1169). The polarization on the economic dimension increased somewhat without, however, reaching the very high levels of Austria, Switzerland or the Netherlands. Issues related to the political and cultural boundaries of the nation-state, or, more specifically, about Scotland, the EU and immigration, were more important in 2015 than in 2011. The two parties that actually won the elections in terms of vote gains were the SNP – the Scottish National Party – and UKIP – the United Kingdom Independence Party, both of which posed the question of the future of the boundaries of the nation state, albeit from very different perspectives. While not sufficiently present in the campaign of the pre-crisis elections, these two parties are actually situated on the opposite ends of the cultural dimension in the crisis elections.

In the Netherlands (Figure 3f), both in the 2010 and the 2012 elections, austerity – cuts in health care, social security and the public administration – were the major issues. Most parties proposed such cuts, but they disagreed about the extent and the location of the reductions (Otjes and Voerman 2013, Lucardie and Voerman 2011). In the shadow of the

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13 Between them, these two parties 17.3 percent of the vote, but because of the very peculiar British electoral system, the SNP, which gained only 4.7 percent won 56 seats, while UKIP gained 12.6 percent, but obtained only one single seat!
crisis, the Dutch party system has become deeply divided, which is, in part at least, a result of the fact that, exceptional among our six countries, it includes two successful populist parties from opposing sides of the political spectrum – the radical right PVV and the radical left SP.

In the pre-crisis elections, the two were rather closely situated to each other in the partisan space, but they moved far apart in the crisis elections: the PVV, a classic radical right party, catered to the new cultural issues. In the 2012 elections, it mobilized against the EU in particular. It was the only party to campaign on this issue. Hoping to capitalize on unease about the European bail-out of Greece, it sought to make the elections a referendum on the European Union. Its leader, Geert Wilders, went as far as to support a Dutch withdrawal from the EU. By contrast, while also highly Eurosceptic, the SP has always focused on socio-economic issues. In a populist manner, it blamed bankers, shareholders and managers for the crisis and criticized the incumbent government for its austerity measures (Kessel 2015: 118-9). Overall, the configuration constituted by the two major parties (VVD and PvdA) and the two challengers on either side (PVV and SP) has led to the most polarized campaign among all the countries of our study in the crisis elections. However, in spite of this polarization, in 2012, the voters unexpectedly did not reward the populists from both sides, but returned a coalition of the pro-European center ground.

**Conclusion**

In summarizing our results, we would like to put the accent on the continuity of the long-term trends across the elections of the crisis period in all four countries. To be sure, the crisis reinvigorated the structuring capacity of the economic dimension in all the countries, with the exception of France. This result contradicts the convergence hypothesis and, to the extent that it reflects above all an increase in polarization and not in salience of economic issues, valence
theory as well. The return of the economic dimension is above all a consequence of a shift of the Social-Democrats to the left, who, even in France, introduced central economic concerns of the left into the campaign. Nevertheless, the crisis has not fundamentally modified the long-term trends that we have discerned before. The electoral campaigns continue to be structured by two dimensions and the party configuration continues to be (at least) tri-polar. In addition to the two mainstream opponents from the centre-left and the centre-right, a third pole constituted by the New Right has been established in all six countries by now. The New Left hardly constitutes a separate pole since it is generally situated closely to the mainstream left. In Germany and the UK, the constitution of the third pole of the New Right has been triggered by the crisis elections. Except for Switzerland, this third pole is no longer associated with Kitschelt’s winning formula, but situated at almost equal distance from the welfare state and the economic liberalism end of the economic dimension.

While the structuring capacity of economic issues has increased in the shadow of the crisis, it has not increased to an unprecedented degree. As a matter of fact, the maximum politicization of economic issues that has been attained in the Austrian crisis elections is of the same order of magnitude as the politicization of such issues in France back in the 1970s. This is in line with the limited economic politicization hypotheses. By contrast, unexpectedly, the structuring capacity of the new cultural issues has not increased during the crisis – a result that ultimately contradicts the idea that mainstream parties revert to new cultural issues in order to avoid competition on economic grounds. Except for France, the salience of new cultural issues has not increased, even if they became more polarized in four out of the six countries. Overall, the structuring capacity of these issues seems to have attained a plateau in these countries, at least up to the elections covered in this study. It is, of course, very likely that the European refugees crisis as well as the security crisis that results from the increasing terrorist threat will contribute to the long-term trend by enhancing the structuring capacity of
the new cultural issues once again. As a result of the combined accentuation effect on both dimensions, the politicization of the party system has, however, already reached unprecedented levels in all our countries except in Germany.
References


Arndt, Christoph 2013. Beating social democracy on its own turf: issue convergence as winning formula for the centre-right in universal welfare states, Scandinavian Political Studies, 37(2): 149-170.


Gingrich, Jane and Silja Häusermann 2015. The decline of the working-class vote, the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and consequences for the welfare state, *Journal of European Social Policy* 25, 1: 50-75.


Figure 1: Salience of economic and new cultural issues

Note: The figure shows the share of coded core sentences for economic and new cultural issues, respectively.
Figure 3: Structuring capacity of economic and new cultural issues

a) Economic issues

Note: The graph shows salience, polarization, and politicization (salience X polarization) of economic and new cultural issues by decade and country. As we are most interested in the long-term trends, the values are standardized by looking at relative changes (ln of x divided by 1970).

b) New cultural issues
Table 1: Overall level of politicization of economic and new cultural issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>NL</th>
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<td>1970s</td>
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Note: The table shows the weighted sum of the absolute level of politicization of economic and new cultural issues by country and time period. The weights are the relative salience of the two issue categories in percent of all statements on either economic or new cultural issues. The highest value recorded in a country is highlighted in bold.
Figure 3: Configuration of the partisan space, by country and period

a) France

b) Germany

Note: Dark gray triangles and indices _c refer to crisis period, light gray triangles and indices _pc to pre-crisis period.
Figure 3 continued

c) Switzerland

d) Austria
Figure 3 continued

e) UK

f) The Netherlands
Online Appendix

Table A.1 Issue categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Description (a position of +1 stands for ...)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Support for an expansion of the welfare state; objection to welfare state retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character; calls for employment and health care programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic liberalism</td>
<td>Opposition to market regulation, economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors of the economy; support for deregulation, more competition, and privatization; support for a rigid budgetary policy; reduction of the state deficit and of taxes without direct redistributive effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural liberalism</td>
<td>Support for cultural diversity, international cooperation, gender equality, homosexuals; opposition to national traditions and traditional moral values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Support for European integration (incl. enlargement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigration</td>
<td>Support for tough immigration and integration policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Support for education and scientific research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Support for military interventions, the armed forces, a strong national defence, and nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Support for more law and order, fighting crime, and denouncing political corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Support for environmental protection; opposition to nuclear energy;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional reform</td>
<td>Support for various institutional reforms of the political system, such as, decentralization or direct democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Support for improving the country’s roads, railways, and other physical infrastructure; support for media</td>
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</table>
Table A.2 Structuring capacity of economic and new cultural issues (absolute values)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Economic issue Salience</th>
<th>Polarization</th>
<th>Structuring capacity</th>
<th>New cultural issues Salience</th>
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<td>1970s</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2000-08</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2009-15</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows salience, polarization, and politicization (salience X polarization) of economic and new cultural issues by decade and country. In contrast to Figure 2, the table shows the absolute values of the three measures.