

**Reshaping of representation after the economic crisis?
Southern Europe**

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preliminary question

- How to define the economic crisis?
- are the definitions by economists acceptable to us?
- Reply?
 - Larger span of time
 - Also stagnation, or growth close to zero

Key research question

- how did economic crisis transform previous dominant patterns within and among the three main channels of expression (parties and party systems, non institutionalized participation, interests)

Cases and time

- Portugal
 - Spain
 - Italy
 - Greece
-
- 2008-15
 - Pre-2008

Is there a key mechanism?

- Not working the innovative destruction or something similar
- catalyst effect: there is change of the conditions for it are laid out

crucial factors to take into accounts

- diminishing resources
- negative reactions of citizens

Sub-dimensions to analyze

- participation
 - electoral
 - partisan
 - anti or extra party
 - non institutionalized participation
 - interest group activism (corruption?)
- competition
 - cleavages
 - party fragmentation
 - distance among extremist parties

What catalyst effect

economic crisis pushes for the emergence of two new aspects,

→ change of dominant patterns in representative and participatory channels, inside each channel and among channels

with possible additional salience of some leaders and plebiscitarian aspects

→ tripolar thrust within party systems with new radical parties

First phenomenon is likely to become stabilized

Second phenomenon likely to endure in the middle run


A few data to work on

partecipazione elettorale (1990-2015): declino

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Average	St.Dev.
Greece	83	76,3	75	76,6	74,1	70,9	65,1	62,5	63,9	71,93	6,49
Italy	86,3	82,9	81,4	83,6	80,5	75,2				81,65	3,74
Portugal	66,3	61,1	62,8	65,0	59,7	58,1				62,17	3,14
Spain	76,4	78,1	69,9	77	73,9	71,7				74,50	3,23
Germany	79	82,2	79,1	77,7	70,8	71,5				76,72	4,56
Sweden	86,8	81,4	80,1	82	84,6	85,8				83,45	2,67

Legenda: GRE: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2015; ITA: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013; POR: 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2011; SPA: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011; GER: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013; SWE: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014.

partecipazione elettorale (1990-2015): trend




electoral participation: European elections 2014

	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
Greece	73,2	70,3	63,2	52,6	60,0
Italy	73,6	69,8	71,7	65,1	57,2
Portugal	35,5	39,9	38,6	36,8	33,9
Spain	59,1	63,1	45,1	44,9	45,8
Germany	60	45,2	43	43,3	48,1
Sweden		38,8	37,9	45,5	48,9

partecipazione nei partiti (membership)(I)

- 1990: party membership, 15% of European electorate (Katz et al. 1992),
- continuous decline in Europe since then
 - decline of membership of ancillary organization, as well
- 2010: party membership 4.7% of European electorate (Biezen, Mair, Poguntke 2011)
- Last years continuing decline

partecipazione nei partiti(membership) (II)



Note. Gre: 1990, 1998, 2008; Ita: 1989, 1998, 2007; Port: 1991, 2000, 2008; Spa: 1990, 2000, 2008; Ger: 1989 (West), 1999, 2007; Swe: 1989, 1998, 2008.

Source, van Biezen, Mair, Poguntke 2011, Appendix (tab. 1).


non istituzionalized participation: raw data

Country	Year	Demonstrate or rally	Strike or boycott	Block	Riot
	2008	92	16	1	59
	2009	46	3	0	20
	2010	190	54	1	41
Greece	2011	227	66	12	92
	2012	207	55	2	82
	2013	168	38	3	26
	2014	144	22	4	24
	2008	40	7	0	28
	2009	128	19	1	16
	2010	127	13	2	33
Italy	2011	214	22	2	33
	2012	138	14	7	16
	2013	122	8	3	37
	2014	148	7	0	21
	2008	10	0	0	0
	2009	22	3	0	0
	2010	21	9	0	0
Portugal	2011	28	12	0	2
	2012	49	14	0	8
	2013	34	16	0	1
	2014	12	4	0	1
	2008	36	4	9	7
	2009	79	16	0	7
	2010	129	33	5	9
Spain	2011	193	12	3	52
	2012	303	57	4	51
	2013	223	16	0	25
	2014	180	8	1	34

non istituzionalized indexed participation

Country	Year	Demonstrat or rally	Strike or boycott	Blocchi	Sommosse	Totale eventi	Eventi dimostrativi	Eventi di scontro
Greece	2008	8,2	1,4	0,1	5,3	15,0	9,7	5,4
	2009	4,1	0,3	0,0	1,8	6,2	4,4	1,8
	2010	17,0	4,8	0,1	3,7	25,6	21,8	3,8
	2011	20,4	5,9	1,1	8,3	35,7	26,3	9,3
	2012	18,6	4,9	0,2	7,4	31,1	23,6	7,6
	2013	15,2	3,4	0,3	2,4	21,2	18,6	2,6
	2014	13,1	2,0	0,4	2,2	17,6	15,1	2,5
Totale Greece	2008-2014	13,8	3,3	0,3	4,4	21,8	17,1	4,7
Italy	2008	0,7	0,1	0,0	0,5	1,3	0,8	0,5
	2009	2,2	0,3	0,0	0,3	2,8	2,5	0,3
	2010	2,1	0,2	0,0	0,6	3,0	2,4	0,6
	2011	3,6	0,4	0,0	0,6	4,6	4,0	0,6
	2012	2,3	0,2	0,1	0,3	2,9	2,6	0,4
	2013	2,0	0,1	0,1	0,6	2,8	2,2	0,7
	2014	2,4	0,1	0,0	0,3	2,9	2,6	0,3
Totale Italy	2008-2014	2,2	0,2	0,0	0,4	2,9	2,4	0,5
Portugal	2008	0,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,9	0,9	0,0
	2009	2,1	0,3	0,0	0,0	2,4	2,4	0,0
	2010	2,0	0,9	0,0	0,0	2,8	2,8	0,0
	2011	2,6	1,1	0,0	0,2	4,0	3,8	0,2
	2012	4,6	1,3	0,0	0,8	6,7	6,0	0,8
	2013	3,2	1,5	0,0	0,1	4,9	4,8	0,1
	2014	1,2	0,4	0,0	0,1	1,6	1,5	0,1
Tot. Portugal	2008-2014	2,4	0,8	0,0	0,2	3,3	3,2	0,2
Spain	2008	0,8	0,1	0,2	0,2	1,2	0,9	0,4
	2009	1,7	0,3	0,0	0,2	2,2	2,1	0,2
	2010	2,8	0,7	0,1	0,2	3,8	3,5	0,3
	2011	4,1	0,3	0,1	1,1	5,6	4,4	1,2
	2012	6,5	1,2	0,1	1,1	8,9	7,7	1,2
	2013	4,8	0,3	0,0	0,5	5,6	5,1	0,5
	2014	3,9	0,2	0,0	0,7	4,8	4,0	0,8
Totale Spain	2008-2014	3,5	0,4	0,1	0,6	4,6	4,0	0,6

Competizione: volatilità elettorale



radicalization: the new parties

- Greece: Syriza, Golden Dawn
- Italy: 5 stars movement and new League (Salvini)
- Spain: Podemos, Ciudadanos
- Portugal: Livre (Rui Tavares); Partido da terra/
republican democratic movement (Marihno e
Pinto) (electorally small, but higher abstension)

radicalization: vote for radical parties

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Greece	4,5 (9)	5,6 (11)	5,5 (11)	9,2 (18)	13,2 (36)	12,4 (34)	42,9 (132)	45,8 (121)	52,9 (194)
Italy	11,0 (124)	14,4 (22)	18,7 (40)	10,6 (50)	15,0 (99)	12,7 (88)	32,9 (163)		
Portugal	8,8 (17)	8,6 (15)	11,4 (19)	9,8 (15)	14,0 (22)	17,7 (31)	13,1 (24)		
Spain	9,6 (18)	10,5 (21)	5,5 (8)	5,0 (5)	3,8 (2)	6,9 (11)			
Germany	4,9 (17)	6,4 (30)	7,3 (36)	5,0 (2)	11,0 (54)	13,9 (76)	14,9 (64)		
Sweden	11,3 (41)	7,7 (22)	12,4 (43)	9,8 (30)	9,4 (22)	11,3 (39)	18,8 (70)		

short excursus 1: Movimiento 5 Stelle - Podemos

- Similarities:
 - channeling and institutionalization of protest and growth of anti-party sentiments ;
 - innovation in political communication (esp. web and social network) to strengthen the direct participation and involvement into the new party of sympathizers ;
 - focus on direct forms of democracy diretta against old, traditional parties, secluded from the people.
- Differences:
 - Podemos developed an ideological narrative that is richer and more complex than the one by 5SM by setting up policy proposals that are also present within the European radical left. During last months Podemos also expressed more moderate policy proposals , still within the leftist camp;
 - 5SM developed similar policy proposals, such as the so-called 'minimal citizen income', but eventually never has achieved a consistent party programme (see e.g proposals on immigration);
 - Podemos seems more open to accept the cooperation with other parties (e.g. PSOE) than 5SM (e.g. PD).

short excursus 2: Grecia - Portogallo

Three reasons explain the survival/continuity of Portuguese traditional parties and the failure of Greek parties such as Pasok and ND:

1. Greece: widespread clientelism so that eventually Greek electors vote for those who actually commit to continuity and against austerity measures.
Portugal: no widespread clientelism (episodes of corruption) and austerity measures already experienced before the economic crisis. Thus, no expectations and smaller disappointment.
2. Greece: PASOK, in a single party cabinet, is the obvious responsible of austerity measures;
Portugal: Socialists with José Socrates were in the cabinet, but without parliamentary majority; so they had to lean on Socialdemocrats to decide austerity measures; consequently, there was a shared responsibility.
3. Greece: strong protest vote
Portugal: Portuguese citizens abstain.

short excursus 3: the political context for the success of neo-populist parties

- widespread corruption at local and central levels;
- widespread clientelism;
- growth of dissatisfaction (in case brought about the economic crisis);
- competitive patterns of policy outbidding
- Tradition of ideological radicalization

A mix of the above conditions, not necessary all present


bipolarization as vote for the two major parties

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Average	St.Dev.
Greece	86,2	79,6	86,5	86	79,9	77,4	35,7	56,6	64,1	72,4	17,2
Italy	41,4	41,7	46	55	70,6	51				51,0	11,0
Portugal	77,9	76,4	78	73,8	65,7	66,8				73,1	5,5
Spain	73,6	76,4	78,7	80,3	83,8	71,3				77,4	4,6
Germany	77,9	76	77	69,4	56,8	67,6				70,8	8,1
Sweden	67,6	59,3	55,2	61,2	60,8	54,3				59,7	4,8

competition: restructuring of cleavages




- different reshaping per country, per cleavage:
 - reshaping of centre/periferia: Italy and Spain
 - reshaping within the left: PD/SEL, podemos, Syriza;
 - stronger salience of pro/anti EU cleavage.

fattori intermedi: soddisfazione per la democrazia



Source: Eurobarometro. Not2: 1) % di coloro che hanno risposto molto o abbastanza soddisfatti; 2) I dati della Germania dal 1992 al 2010 sono la media dei valori della Germania occidentale e della ex Germania dell'Est; 3) i dati della Svezia per il 1994 e il 1996 sono, rispettivamente, del 1995 e del 1997.

fattori intermedi : fiducia




Connessioni/continuità rispetto a prima della crisi

- electoral participation: continuity within a trend
- crisis of political parties: alternative channels of expression
- weakening or fading of cleavages without solid socio-economic roots
or
- deepening of existing cleavages and weakening of others;

As for intermediate factors,

- already existing sectors of dissatisfaction, growth of dissatisfaction;

Competizione: numero effettivo dei partiti



Legend: GRE: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2015; ITA: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013; POR: 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2011; SPA: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011; GER: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013; SWE: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014.