Autore: Alistair Clark

  • Another Surprise at the Polls: Cameron Wins a (Small) Majority at the 2015 UK General Election

    Another Surprise at the Polls: Cameron Wins a (Small) Majority at the 2015 UK General Election

    Dr. Alistair Clark,

    Newcastle University

    E: Alistair.clark@ncl.ac.uk

    T: @ClarkAlistairJ

    In my earlier blog for CISE on the UK’s 2015 general election, I noted how uncertain the polls were, with none of the two main British parties – Conservative or Labour – able to make a decisive break prior to polling day. I ended by suggesting that there was likely to be an investigation into the polling industry after election day. One of those predictions came true. Unfortunately for the reputation of political science predictions, it was that there will be an inquiry into the performance of the polling industry.

    Expectations were of a hung parliament and weeks of post-election coalition negotiations. Instead, the results surprised everyone. The Conservative Party were returned to office with a small majority of 11 seats. There was no need for coalition or post-election deals. Labour had its worst performance since 1987. In Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) achieved 50% of the vote and 56 (out of 59) Scottish seats.

     

    Table 1: UK General Election 2015 Results

    Vote share %

    +/- %

    Seats

    +/-
    Conservative

    36.8

    + 0.8

    330

    +24
    Labour

    30.4

    + 1.5

    232

    -26
    Liberal Democrat

    7.9

    – 15.2

    8

    -49
    SNP

    4.7 (50.0)

    +3.1 (+30.0)

    56

    +50
    UKIP

    12.6

    +9.5

    1

    -1
    Others

    7.5

    +0.3

    23

    –

    Note: SNP share in brackets refers to the party’s vote share in Scotland only. Source: House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP7186.

     

    Table 1 shows the final results. There were two big losers on the night. The first was the Labour Party under the leadership of Ed Miliband. I noted in my earlier blog that Miliband was regarded as a poor leader by the public. While he seemed to grow in stature during the campaign, this was far too little, and far too late. While Labour increased its share of the vote by 1.5%, it lost 26 seats across Britain. Many of these losses came in Scotland, where the party was reduced to only 1 MP by the SNP surge. However, the South of England has the highest concentration of seats in Britain. Labour made no gains there, except in London where it won an additional 7 seats and increased its share of the London vote by 7.1%. This was Labour’s largest gain anywhere in the country. Having led the party to its worst result since 1987, Miliband stood down as party leader the morning after the election. Labour now embarks upon a period of introverted debate about its direction before deciding on a new leader in September 2015.

    The second big losers were the Liberal Democrats. Having participated in coalition with the Conservatives between 2010-15, the party was always expected to have a bad night at the polls. However, local incumbency was expected to help them win more seats than the polls were predicting. This did not happen. While party leader Nick Clegg kept his seat, only 7 other Liberal Democrats were elected across Britain. The party lost 49 seats, failed even to achieve 8% of the vote, and saw itself go from being the third largest party in the House of Commons, to being overtaken by the SNP. The Liberal Democrats were caught in the classic squeeze that affects many smaller coalition partners. They were blamed by Labour voters for having supported the Conservatives, blamed by Conservative voters for having stopped the Conservative Party’s more radical measures, and they were also hindered by having to relinquish so many of their own high-profile promises, most notably on student tuition fees. Clegg resigned the morning after the election and the Liberal Democrats now also embark on the search for a new leader from their much reduced group of parliamentarians.

    The stars of the election were the Scottish National Party. Many commentators suggested that their rise in support is rooted in the 45% of Scots who voted for independence in the Scottish independence referendum in September 2014. While certainly important, singling that out as the sole cause is to misunderstand the party’s development over a longer period. It is often forgotten that the SNP won a majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament election of 2011 in a semi-proportional electoral system (a variant of MMP) designed explicitly to try to prevent any party winning a majority. It had governed Scotland as a minority administration from 2007-2011, and as a majority government from 2011. The core of the SNP’s strategy has been to present the image of a competent government, reasoning that without showing competence, they would be unlikely to win independence for Scotland. Party leader Nicola Sturgeon had a popular touch during the campaign. Indeed, many in England were asking if they could vote for her (they couldn’t as the SNP only stands in Scotland) and after the UK-wide leadership debates, she was one of the most searched for terms on Google in Britain. The SNP’s main competitors in Scotland, Labour, have been in long-term decline, but despite being on the winning side of the Independence referendum in 2014, have had no answer to the SNP who have seen a remarkable groundswell of support since then. The SNP went on to win 50% of the Scottish vote, a remarkable achievement against a background of general antipathy towards politics and politicians.

    The other big winners were the Conservatives. Most Conservatives did not expect to win a majority in 2015, and expected some sort of post-election deal would be necessary if they were to retain power. Instead, from the moment the exit poll was released, a single-party Conservative government was always likely. That this was a majority was a surprise to virtually all commentators. The results bolster Cameron’s position considerably. He was heavily, but unreasonably, criticised for not winning a majority in 2010. The decision to hire Australian election strategist Lynton Crosby worked well for the party. The core message was economic competence, and that any Labour government with support from the SNP would put that at risk. This message was driven home time after time. At times the Conservatives anti-SNP rhetoric appeared to be putting the very Union at risk as it was very much perceived as anti-Scottish in Scotland. Yet it had the desired effect in England, driving voters into supporting the Conservatives. Cameron no longer has a coalition partner to deal with. This means that the Conservative manifesto will no longer be watered down by Liberal Democrats, and also that Cameron now has more positions in government to offer Conservative MPs to try to ensure their loyalty.

    Finally, the right-wing populists of UKIP failed to meet the expectations generated by their winning performance in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Despite winning almost 4 million votes, and becoming the third largest party by votes, they won only 1 seat, which they already held after securing it in a by-election late in 2014. Party leader Nigel Farage yet again failed to win the seat he chose to contest, while they also fell short in other party target seats. However, the UKIP performance was noteworthy for two things. Firstly, the party won 118 second places. Some analysts suggest that this places the party in a good position for future gains. Secondly, the party made some major gains in votes against Labour, particularly in the north of England. In the North East of England, UKIP achieved a vote share of 16.7% and one constituency recorded a swing of around 19% away from Labour to UKIP. After almost every election, the party experiences a period of organisational in-fighting. 2015 has been no different. After initially resigning as party leader, Nigel Farage’s resignation was, bizarrely, rejected by the Party Executive. This led to an intra-party split over Farage’s leadership. Farage remains leader for the moment.

     

    Analysis

     

    A full analysis of the results will be undertaken in the months to come. Some points however are already clear. The first explanation is that economic competence won the day for the Conservative Party. By allowing themselves to be portrayed as the party of fiscal responsibility, the Conservatives were able to make this their key electoral issue, while also placing Labour in a position where it was always having to defend itself against claims of economic incompetence when in office at the beginning of the crash. Most Conservative themes were variations on this topic. For example, Labour’s potential reliance on the SNP in a hung parliament was cast by the Conservatives as being a recipe for chaos and undermining progress in clearing the deficit. Competence more generally also helped win the day for the SNP; being a competent government has been at the root of their appeal in Scotland since 2007.

    Secondly, Labour were always on the defensive against a combined Conservative and, in Scotland, SNP challenge. It hoped that the UK had turned left in the aftermath of the financial crisis and that a ‘core vote’ strategy would be enough. Yet, Labour’s voters deserted the party in droves in Scotland, speeding up the decline the party had been going through there for some time. In England, Labour’s heartlands still largely voted for the party, but in much reduced numbers, particularly in the North of England. These are the ‘left behind’ working class voters who an elite-led Labour Party have been struggling to communicate with for more than a decade. Miliband was always unlikely to be able to reconnect with what once were traditional Labour voters. In the South of England, the problem was slightly different. Again, the traditional working class are part of the picture. However, the aspirational working class and middle class voter that Tony Blair was so good at appealing to also deserted the party and returned to the Conservatives. The ‘Big Tent’ Downsian strategy pursued by Blair and his colleagues will feature in debates of how to reposition the party.

    Liberal Democrat voters have often been perceived to be centre-left. In 2015, the majority of Liberal Democrat voters in 2015 turned not to Labour, as some within Labour were hoping, but to their party’s coalition partners between 2010-15. The Conservatives appear to have done better among Liberal Democrat switchers, while in Scotland the sizeable Liberal Democrat vote turned to the SNP.

    Turnout rose slightly to 66.2%, up from 65.1% in 2010. This small rise was largely because the election was much more competitive than some recent general elections have been. Scottish turnout was higher than the rest of the UK however at 71%. Such higher levels of participation are a legacy of the politicising nature of the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014 which had registration levels of 97% and a turnout of 85%. Across the UK only 112 of the 650 constituencies actually changed hands between parties.

     

    Consequences

     

    A range of consequences flow from Cameron’s victory. The first and most important is that the UK will hold a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the European Union. This will happen in either 2016 or 2017. While it has been promised before the end of 2017, Cameron’s majority has led to pressure to hold the ‘Brexit’ referendum in 2016. What is put to voters will depend on what Cameron is able to claim he has ‘renegotiated’ from the EU. Already the consequences of this referendum are being felt with EU citizens resident in the UK to be denied the vote in this particular decision. Most polls have staying in the EU as the preferred option, ahead of those who wish to leave. However, many newspapers are Eurosceptic if not explicitly for leaving. The ‘out’ campaign will be a very noisy one based on much misinformation, and led by some notoriously Eurosceptic Conservatives and UKIP. While Cameron has said he wishes to remain in, as have Labour, the Liberal Democrats and SNP, this is a referendum which could be lost.

    Cameron’s position is now much stronger than it has ever been. However, his majority is small and his parliamentary party is very rebellious. Arguably he is now more at the mercy of his backbenchers than he was when in coalition when he could blame compromises on the Liberal Democrats. While the EU referendum will keep them in line for a while, there are numerous other issues they could rebel over, including the UK leaving the European Convention on Human Rights and replacing it with a ‘British Bill of Rights’.

    Labour’s position is the most problematic. It is now 98 seats behind the Conservatives. The scale of its defeat suggests that it is likely to take two parliaments to even begin to think about getting back into office. While losing Scotland has become a high profile symbol of Labour’s problems, in truth Labour could have won every Scottish seat and still have fallen well short at Westminster. England is therefore crucial to the party’s renewal, and a vigorous internal debate is underway about how to appeal to the three diverse groups of voters that deserted the party: in Scotland; in Northern England; and in the Conservative voting south. Left-right and Blairite-Brownite distinctions are not necessarily helpful here. This is a very complex picture, and more so than simple dichotomies might suggest. While the leadership contest was inevitable, the risk for the party is that its internal debate again leaves political space free for the Conservatives to define the terms of competition in this parliament.

    Finally, to the opinion polls which misled most commentators. More polling was done in the general election than at any previously, including extensive constituency polling. Yet, the results were wrong. Granted, opinion polls are snapshots, not predictions. However, it is inevitable that they will be used to form the basis of predictions. By being so consistently wrong, they are to undergo an inquiry. This was announced by the British Polling Council immediately after the election. It comes after criticism not just in the general election, but also in the Scottish Independence Referendum (see my previous CISE Blog). Differences between telephone polling and internet samples were found during the campaign. In reality, whatever interviewing method was used, the results remained well adrift from the eventual outcome. Numerous potential culprits have been identified – ‘shy Conservatives’ and ‘Lazy Labourites’ for example. The difficulty for pollsters is that if those they survey do not tell them who they will vote for, and then go and vote for them, there is little that polling companies can do. Expect considerable criticism and a report that will be pored over by political scientists, analysts and those interested in the political process. Whether some calls to ban the reporting of polls in the last few days of an election, as in France for example, will be implemented remains to be seen.

     

    Biography

    Dr Alistair Clark is currently Senior Lecturer in Politics at Newcastle University, a member of the UK Political Studies Association Executive and co-editor of British Journal of Politics and International Relations. His publications include Political Parties in the UK (Palgrave 2012) and recently in Public Administration an assessment of electoral integrity in Britain. He was Visiting Professor in Political Science & School of Government at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome in February-March 2015. E: alistair.clark@ncl.ac.uk. Twitter: @ClarkAlistairJ

  • Il Regno Unito verso le urne: le elezioni più incerte da decenni

    Dr. Alistair Clark

    Newcastle University

    Alistair.clark@ncl.ac.uk

    Il Regno Unito va al voto il prossimo 7 maggio in quelle che vengono considerate le elezioni più competitive e incerte sin dagli anni ’70. Come molti altri paesi, anche il Regno Unito deve fare i conti con un elettorato sempre più scettico e volatile, con la crescita della destra populista, le pressioni dei secessionisti e la rottura di quella che per lungo tempo è stata – secondo molti studiosi – la caratteristica fondante della politica britannica, ovvero il sistema bipartitico. Le prossime elezioni sono interessanti per molti aspetti. Sei di questi sono quelli che seguono.

    Nessun vincitore assoluto

    Sebbene i due principali partiti, conservatori e laburisti, dichiarino di competere per ottenere la maggioranza, la principale aspettativa fra gli esperti è che le prossime elezioni non produrranno alcun vincitore. Come mostra la Figura 1, i sondaggi danno un margine molto risicato tra i due partiti, e tale margine si va restringendo man mano che ci si avvicina al giorno delle elezioni. Verso la fine del 2012 e l’inizio del 2013 il Labour veleggiava attorno al 40%, mentre i conservatori erano attorno al 30%. Nei 103 sondaggi a copertura nazionale condotti tra l’inizio di gennaio e il 17 marzo 2015 (data in cui viene scritto questo articolo), i conservatori hanno una media del 32,3%, i laburisti vengono accreditati del 33,2%, i liberal-democratici ricevono in media il 7,5%, lo UKIP il 14,8% e i Verdi il 6,5%. Il distacco tra i due principali partiti si è attestato nella maggior parte dei casi ben al di sotto del margine di errore. Un partito sta ottenendo grande successo: si tratta dello Scottish National Party (SNP), che nei quattro sondaggi condotti in Scozia ha ricevuto in media il 46% delle intenzioni di voto fra gli scozzesi, staccando così i laburisti di 19-20 punti.

    Figura 1: Intenzioni di voto, Gennaio-Marzo 2015.

    Fonte: UK Polling Report, https://ukpollingreport.co.uk/voting-intention-2 [17/3/15].

    Dal momento che i seggi alla Camera sono 650, un partito ha bisogno di ottenere 326 seggi per avere la maggioranza. In realtà ne bastano un po’ di meno perché il Partito Repubblicano Irlandese, il Sinn Fein, non siede in Parlamento, lasciando così vuoti i seggi conquistati nelle urne. Le previsioni relative alla conquista dei seggi alle elezioni sono diventate una sorta di piccola industria nel Regno Unito. Recenti previsioni assegnano ad entrambi i partiti circa lo stesso numero di seggi. Un recente sondaggio condotto da elettoralisti ed altri esperti (principalmente giornalisti politici) della UK Political Studies Association assegna ai conservatori 278 seggi, 282 ai laburisti, 25 ai liberal-democratici, 7 allo UKIP e 29 allo SNP e i rimanenti vinti da altri partiti, inclusi quelli del Nord Irlanda. Il sito ‘UK election forecast’ dà attualmente 286 seggi ai conservatori, 274 ai laburisti, 42 allo SNP, 25 ai liberal-democratici e solo uno allo UKIP, con i partiti minori che vincono i seggi rimanenti. Riassumendo, perfino fra gli esperti emerge una considerevole incertezza. Gli elementi chiave che si segnalano sono: i due principali partiti che ottengono circa lo stesso numero di seggi, i liberal-democratici che ne perdono più della metà ma mantengono un sostanzioso gruppo parlamentare, lo SNP che vince la stragrande maggioranza dei seggi scozzesi e lo UKIP che non va così bene come i media sembrerebbero suggerire.

    La crisi dei maggiori partiti e dei leader

    La Gran Bretagna non è estranea al sentimento antipartitico circolante in Europa. L’identificazione di partito è in forte declino da decenni e coloro che si definiscono come fortemente identificati sono non più del 10%. Il rapporto fra iscritti ai partiti ed elettori è fra i più bassi d’Europa. I partiti sono stati colpiti da una serie di fattori. Tra questi, la loro incapacità di risolvere la crisi economica senza colpire i servizi pubblici e le finanze delle famiglie, un’apparente impotenza di fronte agli eventi economici e politici globali e una lunga serie di promesse eccessive che non hanno avuto riscontro in termini di politiche. Recenti studi sulle elezioni britanniche hanno enfatizzato l’importanza della credibilità e delle performance di partiti e leader. Eppure, le performance dei partiti al governo sono state spesso deludenti e tutti e tre i maggiori partiti possono adesso essere ritenuti responsabili per le politiche portate avanti durante la lunga crisi economica.

    Tabella 1: valutazioni sui leader e sui partiti

    Leader %

    Partito %

    Differenza +/- %
    Cameron

    39

    33

    6
    Miliband

    30

    52

    -22
    Clegg

    31

    40

    -9

    Fonte: IPSOS-MORI (Fieldwork 8-11 March 2015).

    Recentemente anche i leader dei principali partiti sono apparsi poco convincenti. David Cameron è stato criticato per lungo tempo dalla destra del Partito Conservatore per essere troppo centrista e per non essere riuscito ad ottenere la maggioranza nel 2010. Nonostante ciò la sua leadership rimane una risorsa per i conservatori. Un recente sondaggio IPSOS-MORI evidenzia uno scarto di 6 punti percentuali tra coloro che dichiarano di apprezzare Cameron e coloro che dichiarano di apprezzare il Partito Conservatore. Milliband resta invece un leader problematico per il Labour e in termini di popolarità si attesta ben 22 punti percentuali sotto il suo partito. Nick Clegg soffre di un simile scarto negativo rispetto al Partito Liberal-democratico, conseguenza delle decisioni impopolari assunte nei primi giorni successivi alla formazione della coalizione di governo. I tempi in cui i leader erano popolari appaiono superati e ci si aspetta che il leader del partito che perderà le elezioni rassegnerà le dimissioni subito dopo.

     Frammentazione territoriale

    Dimenticate ciò che vi dicevano I vecchi manuali riguardo alla Gran Bretagna e al suo sistema bipartitico. A livello elettorale non è più così da un po’ di tempo, anche se il sistema maggioritario ha protetto i due maggiori partiti in Parlamento (Clark, 2012: 12). Ciò che è diventato particolarmente evidente in tempi recenti è la territorializzazione del voto. E’ infatti possibile parlare al plurale di ‘sistemi partitici’ del Regno Unito, ognuno dei quali presenta differenti modelli di competizione e opposizione. Il sud dell’Inghilterra è largamente dominato dai conservatori. Il nord dell’Inghilterra è tradizionalmente un territorio laburista, con i conservatori radicati in alcune aree più ricche. Sia il nord che il sud hanno visto l’ascesa dei liberal-democratici in alcune aree e nei governi locali. Le assemblee locali mostrano alti livelli di frammentazione partitica, sia a livello elettorale che parlamentare (Clark, 2012: cap. 7). Il Nord Irlanda rappresenta un caso a sé da lungo tempo, con cinque diverse opzioni partitiche che si contendono il voto. In Galles e Scozia i due partiti nazionalisti sono attori fondamentali del sistema ed entrambi hanno preso parte ai rispetti governi decentrati. Plaid Cymru, il partito dei nazionalisti gallesi, rappresenta al momento la principale opposizione nel Parlamento gallese. Lo SNP detiene la maggioranza dei seggi e governa in Scozia ed è indirizzato per la prima volta verso la vittoria della maggior parte dei 59 seggi scozzesi a Westminster. L’incapacità dei due principali partiti di ottenere la maggioranza dei seggi fa sì che questa territorializzazione possa avere serie conseguenze costituzionali dal momento che lo SNP o il Partito democratico unionista del Nord Irlanda (DUP) potrebbero essere necessari per supportare la formazione di un governo di minoranza Se questo dovesse accadere, è probabile che ci sarebbero ripercussioni in Inghilterra.

    La crescita dei piccoli partiti

    Il declino della popolarità dei due partiti principali ha concesso ai partiti più piccoli lo spazio per aumentare il loro consenso. Lo United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) ha cavalcato il sentimento euroscettico, ed è andato particolarmente bene alle elezioni europee del 2014 arrivando primo con 24 seggi e il 27,5% dei voti. Ha inoltre vinto due elezioni suppletive verso la fine del 2014. Ha fatto appello a coloro che si sentono “lasciati indietro” dalla società moderna, spesso raggruppati in zone costiere del sud dell’Inghilterra. È importante sottolineare che ha preso voti sia al Partito Conservatore che al Partito Laburista, e anche nel nord dell’Inghilterra. I suoi principali temi della campagna elettorale sono stati principalmente le tematiche anti-UE e anti-immigrazione. Il leader del partito, Nigel Farage, ha coltivato l’immagine di un uomo senza peli sulla lingua che dice le cose come stanno. Tuttavia, lo UKIP soffre di indisciplina, e si affida eccessivamente alla figura di Farage. Anche se andasse bene in termini elettorali, è probabile che ottenga molto meno seggi rispetto a quanto la sua performance alle elezioni europee del 2014 possa far supporre, anche perché il Partito Conservatore sta già promettendo un referendum sulla permanenza nella UE.
    L’altro partito più piccolo che ha goduto di un certo successo di recente è il partito dei Verdi. Nel 2010 è riuscito ad avere un deputato eletto al parlamento a Brighton, una zona di forza del partito. Da allora ha registrato un aumento nelle iscrizioni al partito e nei sondaggi. Ha anche beneficiato in Scozia del sentimento pro-indipendenza dopo il referendum. Tuttavia, una recente cattiva performance sui media da parte del leader del partito Natalie Bennett ha fatto sì che il partito ha fatto notizia per le ragioni sbagliate. Anche se possono mantenere il loro seggio, a causa del sistema elettorale i Verdi avranno difficoltà a fare progressi altrove. La loro inclusione in un dibattito televisivo tra leader di partito, tuttavia, è un’importante opportunità per ottenere un ulteriore riconoscimento.

    La formazione del governo

    Ipotizzando che nessuno dei due partiti principali faccia progressi e ottenga la maggioranza, il Regno Unito sperimenterebbe di nuovo una situazione politica poco familiare: la necessità di formare o un governo di coalizione o un governo di minoranza. Ufficialmente, entrambi i partiti principali stanno facendo campagna per ottenere la maggioranza. Ma, come sottolineato in precedenza, quasi nessuno pensa che ciò accadrà. A metà marzo, ciò che appare più probabile è o un governo di minoranza con un solo partito o eventualmente una coalizione tra uno dei due parti maggiori e i liberal-democratici. Meno probabile è una qualche forma di coalizione di destra tra i conservatori e il DUP dell’Irlanda del Nord, con o senza lo UKIP. Recentemente il Labour, in seguito alla pressione dei conservatori e dei media inglesi, è stato costretto a escludere una coalizione ufficiale con lo SNP, partito in generale di centro-sinistra. Infatti, sia lo SNP che il DUP avevano già di fatto escluso una coalizione ufficiale. Tuttavia, ciò lascia aperta la possibilità di un sostegno su singoli punti programmatici e qualche forma di accordo generale, cosa che rimane possibile, se non probabile, su entrambi i lati dello spettro sinistra-destra.
    Il processo di formazione del governo sarà molto più complesso rispetto alla precedente esperienza del 2010. Allora, in realtà, non c’era che una sola opzione praticabile: l’alleanza tra i conservatori e i liberal-democratici. Questa volta ci sono potenzialmente molti più attori coinvolti, con interessi che dovranno essere negoziati. Nel 2013, per formare un governo in Italia ci sono voluti 61 giorni. Nel 2010 nel Regno Unito ci sono voluti solo 5 giorni. E’ probabile che ci vorrà più tempo dopo il 7 maggio se le elezioni non produrranno nessuna maggioranza, anche se ci sarà una notevole pressione mediatica per fare veloce. Il processo è anche non ben compreso in Gran Bretagna, anche perché i politici britannici hanno poca esperienza con le trattative di coalizione e con i negoziati con le minoranze. Costituzionalmente, il governo uscente ha il diritto di vedere se per primo può formare un governo. Resta in carica come un custode fino a quando un nuovo governo non è formato. In pratica, nel 2010 i liberaldemocratici hanno ignorato tutto ciò dichiarando pubblicamente che avrebbero aperto le trattative in primo battuta con il partito più votato (i conservatori). Come avverrà il processo di formazione del governo nel 2015 non è chiaro, così come molte altre cose in presenza di una costituzione non scritta in Gran Bretagna.

    Altri problemi

    Molte altre questioni sono suscettibili di venire poste all’attenzione dell’opinione pubblica dopo le elezioni. In primo luogo, il sistema elettorale first-past-the-post (FPTP) produce notoriamente risultati disproporzionali. E’ probabile che sia così anche questa volta, con i piccoli partiti e quelli con un ampio sostegno sul territorio nazionale che vengono svantaggiati. La possibilità di riformare il sistema elettorale è stata mancata nel 2011, quando in un referendum la maggioranza ha votato contro il passaggio al cosiddetto sistema di voto alternativo. Attualmente il sistema avvantaggia il Labour, soprattutto a causa di una serie di motivi legati alla demografia e al modo in cui è distribuito il consenso elettorale. Le modifiche dei confini delle circoscrizioni elettorali e i tentativi di ridurre il numero di parlamentari a 600 (da 650), finalizzati a rendere il sistema più equo, sono falliti a causa dei disaccordi interni alla coalizione di governo durante la legislatura 2010-15. Se i conservatori costituiranno l’asse del nuovo governo, tali modifiche possono essere riproposte. Tuttavia, coloro che vogliono riformare il sistema elettorale in un senso più proporzionale rischiano di essere delusi: è difficile capire quali incentivi avrebbero i due maggiori partiti nel rinunciare ai vantaggi che hanno grazie al FPTP.

    In secondo luogo, il Regno Unito è in procinto di cambiare il proprio sistema di registrazione elettorale passando da quello attuale in cui il capofamiglia garantisce che coloro che vivono al suo indirizzo sono stati registrati, ad uno di iscrizione individuale in cui gli elettori sono tenuti a mostrare un documento d’identità alle urne. La preoccupazione era che la registrazione della famiglia lasciasse uno spazio maggiore per i brogli elettorali. Tuttavia, il risultato è stato che un gran numero di persone sono state tolte dal registro elettorale, con un problema specifico che è evidente nella registrazione degli studenti universitari che sono scomparsi dalle liste elettorali. Attualmente sono in corso vari programmi per cercare di incoraggiare la registrazione. Sapremo quanto questo avrà successo mano a mano che ci avviciniamo alle elezioni. Inoltre la registrazione individuale è probabile che causerà problemi il giorno delle elezioni. Diversamente dall’Italia, il Regno Unito non ha alcuna forma di carta di identità personale e i britannici non sono tenuti a sottoporsi a tale identificazione. In questo modo c’è la possibilità che ad alcuni venga negata la possibilità di votare in quanto privi di passaporto, patente di guida o altro documento d’identità riconosciuto. Sarebbe quindi molto sorprendente se non ci fossero alcune controversie relative alla registrazione dopo le elezioni.

    Infine, l’industria dei sondaggi è stata fatta oggetto di pesanti critiche negli ultimi mesi. In parte ciò è avvenuto perché il referendum scozzese si è concluso con un risultato molto ravvicinato, e i sondaggisti non lo avevano previsto fino all’ultimo. Un altro motivo è che i sondaggisti non sono riusciti a individuare chiaramente un partito che avesse un chiaro vantaggio nella corsa per il 2015. Questo però certo non è colpa dei sondaggisti. Ricordando la spirale del silenzio di Noelle-Neumann e i ‘timidi’ conservatori che hanno permesso la nascita di un governo conservatore nel 1992, contro le aspettative di una vittoria laburista, molti elettori scozzesi non sono riusciti a riconoscere le loro preferenze nel referendum 2014. E’ del tutto possibile che la stessa dinamica si stia verificando nelle elezioni generali.

    Biografia

    Dr Alistair Clark è attualmente Senior Lecturer in Scienza Politica presso l’Università di Newcastle, membro dello UK Political Studies Association Executive Board e co-editore del British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Tra le sue pubblicazioni ci sono Political Parties in the UK (Palgrave 2012) e recentemente in Public Administration una valutazione dell’integrità elettorale in Gran Bretagna. Questo post è stato scritto mentre era Visiting Professor in Political Science & School of Government presso la LUISS Guido Carli di Roma. E-mail: alistair.clark@ncl.ac.uk. Twitter: @ClarkAlistairJ

  • The UK General Election of 7th May 2015: The Most Uncertain for Decades

    The UK General Election of 7th May 2015: The Most Uncertain for Decades

    Dr. Alistair Clark

    Newcastle University

    Alistair.clark@ncl.ac.uk

    The UK goes to the polls on the 7th May 2015 in what is widely expected to be the tightest and most uncertain general election contest since the 1970s. Like many other countries, the UK is facing a highly sceptical and volatile electorate, a populist right-wing insurgency, pressure from secessionists and the breakdown of what many comparative scholars have long held to be a defining characteristic of British politics, the two-party system.  There are a number of things that are likely to be major issues in the election. Six of the most important are as follows.

    No overall ‘winner’

    Although the two main parties, Conservatives and Labour, say that they are working for a majority, the main expectation for the 2015 general election among experts is that there will be no overall ‘winner’.  As figure 1 shows, the polls are very tight, and they have narrowed considerably as the election gets closer. At one point in late 2012-early 2013, Labour was in the high 30%-low 40% range, with the Conservatives in the low 30% area. However, in the 103 Britain-wide polls conducted between the start of January 2015 and 17th March 2015 (the date of writing), the Conservative Party has averaged 32.3%, Labour 33.2%, the Liberal Democrats 7.5%, UKIP 14.8% and the Greens 6.5%. The gaps between the two main parties have mostly been well within the margin of error. One party is making large gains however. In the last four polls conducted in Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) have averaged around 46% of the Scottish vote and a lead of 19-20 points over Labour.

    Figure 1: Opinion Polls, Jan-Mar 2015

    Source: UK Polling Report, https://ukpollingreport.co.uk/voting-intention-2 [17/3/15].

    With 650 seats, a party needs 326 to form a majority. In reality they need a couple less because the Irish Republican party Sinn Fein does not take up its seats. Seat forecasting has become a minor industry in the UK. Recent predictions have both main parties on roughly the same number of seats. A recent UK Political Studies Association poll of psephologists and other experts (mainly political journalists) put the Conservatives on 278 seats, Labour on 282, Liberal Democrats on 25, UKIP on 7, the SNP on 29 with the rest taken up by various others including the Northern Irish parties. The academic ‘UK election forecast’ site currently puts the Conservatives on 286, Labour on 274, SNP on 42, Liberal Democrats 25, and UKIP only 1, with others filling the balance. In short, there is considerable uncertainty even amongst experts. The key themes are the main two parties on roughly the same number of seats, the Liberal Democrats losing more than half but still having a sizeable parliamentary group, the SNP winning the vast majority of Scottish seats and UKIP not doing as well as their media coverage would suggest.

    Crisis of Major Parties and Leadership

    Britain is no stranger to the anti-party mood circulating Europe. Party identification has been in steep decline for decades with strong identifiers at no more than 10%. Party membership levels are among the lowest in Europe assessed as a ratio of members to electors. Parties have been affected by a range of factors. These include their inability to resolve the economic crisis without causing damage to public services and household finances, a seeming powerlessness in the face of global economic and political events, and a history of over-promising and under-delivering in policy terms. Recent British election studies have emphasised the importance of valence and performance. Yet parties’ performance in office has often disappointed and all three main parties can now be held responsible for policies during the long economic crisis.

    Table 1: Leadership and Party Ratings

    Leader %

    Party %

    Difference +/- %
    Cameron

    39

    33

    6
    Miliband

    30

    52

    -22
    Clegg

    31

    40

    -9

    Source: IPSOS-MORI (Fieldwork 8-11 March 2015).

    Recently, some highly unconvincing leadership has been evident for all the main parties. David Cameron has long been criticised by the right of the Conservative Party for being too centrist and failing to win a majority in 2010. Yet, he remains an asset for the Conservatives amongst voters. A recent IPSOS-MORI poll found 6% more of those polled liked Cameron as compared to those who liked the Conservative Party. Miliband remains a problematic leader for Labour and is 22% behind his party in popularity. Nick Clegg suffers a similar disadvantage for the Liberal Democrats, the result of unpopular decisions made in the early days of coalition. The days of popular leaders appear long over. Expect whichever of the two main party leaders loses the election to resign shortly afterwards.

    Territorial Fragmentation

    Forget what the old textbooks tell you about Britain being a two-party system. At the electoral level, it has not been that way for some time even if the first-past-the-post electoral system protected the two main parties in parliament (Clark, 2012: 12). What has become particularly acute in recent years is a territorialisation of the vote. Indeed, it is possible to talk of the UK’s party systems in the plural, not singular, each of which has different patterns of competition and opposition. The south of England is largely dominated by the Conservatives. The North of England has traditionally been Labour territory, with the Conservatives embedded in some wealthier areas. Both North and South have seen Liberal Democrat insurgencies in areas and in local government. The devolved assemblies all have higher scores on the effective number of parties (ENP) indicator, whether in parliament or the electorate (Clark, 2012: Ch. 7). Northern Ireland has long been a case apart, with five different party options there. In Wales and Scotland, the two nationalist parties are major actors and both have participated in devolved government. Plaid Cymru, the Welsh Nationalists, are currently the main opposition in the Welsh Assembly. The SNP are a majority government in Scotland and on the way to winning the majority of the 59 Scottish seats at Westminster for the first time. The inability of the two main parties to secure a majority means that this territorialisation has potentially severe constitutional consequences as potentially the SNP or Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) may be needed to support a minority government. If this happens, there is likely to be a backlash in England.

    Rise in Small Parties

    The decline in the two main parties’ popularity has given smaller party options the space to develop their support. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has risen on the back of Euro-sceptic feeling, and done particularly well in European elections coming first in 2014 on 24 seats and 27.5%. It also won two by-elections towards the end of 2014. It has appealed to those feeling ‘left behind’ by modern society, often clustered in coastal areas of Southern England. Importantly, it has taken votes from both Conservative and Labour parties, and also in the North of England. Its main campaign themes have primarily been anti-EU and anti-immigration. Party leader, Nigel Farage, has cultivated an image of the straight-talking man who tells it like it is. However, UKIP suffers from regular indiscipline, and an over-reliance on Farage. Even if it does well in vote share, it is likely to win many fewer seats than its performance in the 2014 European elections might have suggested, not least since the Conservative Party is already offering an in-out referendum on the EU.

    The other smaller party to have enjoyed some success recently is the Green Party. It succeeded in having an MP elected to parliament in Brighton in 2010, an area of local strength for the party. It has since experienced a rise in membership and in its polling numbers. It has also benefited in Scotland on the back of pro-Independence feeling after the referendum. However, a recent poor media performance by party leader Natalie Bennett has meant that the party made headlines for the wrong reasons. While it may hold on to its seat, the electoral system means that the Greens will find it difficult to make progress elsewhere. Their inclusion in a party leaders’ televised debate however is an important opportunity for them to gain further recognition.

    Government Formation

    Assuming that none of the two main parties makes a breakthrough and wins a majority, the UK will again experience an unfamiliar political process: the need to form either a coalition or minority government. Officially, both main parties are campaigning for a majority. As highlighted above, next to no-one thinks that will happen. In mid-March, what appears most likely is either a single-party minority government or potentially a coalition between either main party and the Liberal Democrats. Less likely is some form of right-wing coalition between the Conservatives, and the DUP from Northern Ireland, with or without UKIP. Labour, on the back of pressure from the Conservatives and English media, have recently been forced to rule out a formal coalition with the broadly centre-left SNP. Indeed, both the SNP and DUP had already actually ruled out formal coalition. However, that leaves open the possibility of issue-by-issue support and some form of broad understanding short of coalition, which remains very possible, if not likely, on both sides of the left-right spectrum.

    The process of government formation will be much more complex than the previous experience of 2010. Then in reality there was only one feasible option – Conservative and Liberal Democrat. This time there are potentially many more actors involved, with interests which will have to be negotiated. In 2013, government formation in Italy took 61 days. In 2010 in the UK, it took a remarkably short 5 days. It is likely to take longer after 7th May if no majority emerges, although there will be considerable media pressure to do so sooner. The process is also not well understood in Britain, not least since British politicians have little experience of coalition and minority negotiations. Constitutionally, the incumbent government has the right to see if it can form an administration first. It stays in office as caretaker until a new government is formed. In practice, in 2010 the Liberal Democrats ignored this and publicly stated they would open negotiations with the largest party (the Conservatives) first. How the process of forming a government will run in 2015 is unclear, as with many things under Britain’s uncodified constitution.

    Additional problems

    Several other issues are likely to come to public attention after the elections. Firstly, the first-past-the-post electoral system famously delivers unrepresentative results. It is likely to do so again, with small parties and those with broad support disadvantaged. The chance to reform the electoral system was missed in 2011 when a referendum voted against a change to the alternative vote system. Currently the system benefits Labour, mainly because of a range of demographic and vote distribution reasons. Changes to constituency boundaries and to reduce the number of MPs to 600 (from 650), aimed at making the system more equitable, were dropped as a result of internal coalition disagreements during the 2010-15 parliament. If the Conservatives form the basis of a government, they may be revived. However, electoral reformers seeking a more proportional electoral system are likely to be disappointed; it is difficult to see what incentive either of the two largest parties would have in giving up their advantage under FPTP.

    Secondly, the UK is in the process of changing its electoral registration system from one where the head of household ensured those living at an address were registered, to one of individual registration where voters are required to show some form of identification at the polls. The concern was that household registration was more open to fraud. However, the result has been large numbers of people dropping off the electoral register, with a particular problem evident in the registration of university students who have all but disappeared from electoral rolls. Various programmes are currently underway to try to encourage registration. We will know how successful this was closer to the election. Individual registration is also likely to cause problems on polling day. Unlike Italy, the UK does not have any form of personal identification card and the British are not required to carry such identification. There is potential here for people being denied the vote because they are not carrying their passport, driving licence or other approved identification. It would therefore be very surprising if there were not some registration controversies post-election.

    Finally, the polling industry has come in for heavy criticism in recent months. Partly this was because the Scottish referendum ended up being so close, and pollsters did not pick this up until late in the day. Partly it is also because they have failed to identify one party or another establishing a clean lead in the run up to 2015. This is however hardly the pollsters’ fault. Reminiscent of Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence and the ‘shy Conservatives’ who delivered a Conservative government in 1992 against expectations of a Labour victory, many Scottish voters failed to identify their preferences in the 2014 referendum. It is entirely possible that the same dynamic is happening in the general election. Whatever the case, watch out for some calls to investigate the polling industry.

    Biographical note

    Dr Alistair Clark is currently Senior Lecturer in Politics at Newcastle University, a member of the UK Political Studies Association Executive Board and co-editor of British Journal of Politics and International Relations. His publications include Political Parties in the UK (Palgrave 2012) and recently in Public Administration an assessment of electoral integrity in Britain. This blog was written while he was a Visiting Professor in Political Science & School of Government at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome. E: alistair.clark@ncl.ac.uk. Twitter: @ClarkAlistairJ