To cite the article:
Marco Improta (2023): A Crowded Room? The Destabilising Effect of Oversized Coalitions on Cabinet Survival in Southern Europe, Mediterranean Politics, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2023.2170033
The article, published on Mediterranean Politics, can be accessed here
Abstract
Political science has traditionally devoted considerable attention to the issue of cabinet survival in several political systems. This study contributes to this established research agenda by investigating the dynamics of cabinet survival in Southern Europe – a region where cabinets have recently been striving to remain in office until the constitutionally mandated end of term. The study tests the impact of cabinet attributes, economic conditions, and the government formation process on different types of cabinet termination. It performs Cox survival analysis based on an original longitudinal multilevel dataset comprising 165 cabinets in six countries: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. The results show that oversized coalitions significantly increase the risk of cabinet termination, demonstrating the ingrained destabilizing effect of such ruling configurations on cabinet survival in Southern Europe. The study discusses the implications of this finding for the quality of democracy in this politically-sensitive region.