Ricerca

Ricerca

Ricerca

This article analyzes the results of the Italian municipal elections held in May 2011. First, we make a simple count of the municipalities won by the various political blocs, and secondly we make a comparison with the results of regional elections of 2010. We have compared data concerning both the electoral performances of political blocs and those of the political parties who appeared in this election. We also present the results as disaggregated data, both from a demographic standpoint and from a geographical point of view. The analysis shows a clear electoral defeat of the center-right coalition, both in terms of municipalities lost and in terms of percentages of votes obtained. The fact that these two phenomena have occurred especially in the North, its traditional area of electoral strength, makes this defeat particularly significant. The center-left coalition, due to the difficulties of its opponent, gets a good result in terms of number of municipalities won, while not improving its performance in terms of percentages of votes obtained. The centrist coalition, finally, does not get a great performance in terms of votes obtained, but it often proves decisive in forcing the other two coalitions to the second ballot.

Segnalazione bibliografica. Autore: Richard S. Katz Party Politics January 2012 18: 3-6, Full Text: http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/18/1/3.full.pdf+html?rss=1

The left/right semantic is used widely to describe the patterns of party competition in democratic countries. This article examines the patterns of party policy in Anglo-American and Western European countries on three dimensions of left/right disagreement: wealth redistribution, social morality and immigration. The central questions are whether, and why, parties with left-wing or right-wing positions on the economy systematically adopt left-wing or right-wing positions on immigration and social morality. The central argument is that left/right disagreement is asymmetrical: leftists and rightists derive from different sources, and thus structure in different ways, their opinions about policy. Drawing on evidence from Benoit and Laver’s (2006) survey of experts about the policy positions of political parties, the results of the empirical analysis indicate that party policy on the economic, social and immigration dimensions are bound together by parties on the left, but not by parties on the right. The article concludes with an outline of the potential implications of left/right asymmetry for unified theories of party competition.

Segnalazione bibliografica. British Journal of Political Science (2011), 41: 287-314 Autori: David Sanders, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart, Paul Whiteley Abstract A six-wave 2005–09 national panel survey conducted in conjunction with the British Election Study provided data for an investigation of sources of stability and change in voters’ party preferences. The authors test competing spatial and valence theories of party choice and investigate the hypothesis that spatial calculations provide cues for making valence judgements. Analyses reveal that valence mechanisms – heuristics based on party leader images, party performance evaluations and mutable partisan attachments – outperform a spatial model in terms of strength of direct effects on party choice....

Abstract Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.