Ricerca

Ricerca

Ricerca

Segnalazione bibliografica. British Journal of Political Science (2011), 41: 229-257 Autori: Samuel Abrams, Torben Iversen, David Soskice Abstract Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their...

-. (2001). Perché ha vinto il centro-destra?

D'Alimonte R., Chiaramonte A. (a cura di), Proporzionale ma non solo. Le elezioni politiche del 2006, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007. ISBN 978-88-15-12047-5 Abolendo i collegi uninominali, la nuova legge elettorale del 2005 ha suscitato l'impressione di un ritorno al passato. Al pari del precedente, in realtà, quello adottato è un sistema misto, dove certamente il meccanismo proporzionale pesa di più, ma è affiancato da una robusta componente maggioritaria (il premio di maggioranza). In compenso, le coalizioni sono diventate più deboli e gli elettori meno influenti a vantaggio dei partiti, che nominano i candidati grazie alle liste bloccate. Come documentano le rigorose analisi sulle...

CHIARAMONTE, A. C. A. (2014). The Elections of 2013: A Tsunami with No Winners. In C. Fusaro & A. Kreppel (Eds.), Italian Politics. Still Waiting for the Transformation (pp. 45–63). NEW YORK: Berghahn Books.

A vast literature suggests that voters in new democracies ‘sell’ their vote to patrons providing private or small-scale club goods, or, alternatively, that such goods are distributed along ethnic lines to reinforce ethnic voting. In either case the outcome is undermining democratic accountability. This study finds that citizens in one new democracy – Ghana – expect (and get) the patronage but at the same time engage in economic voting. Eighty-five percent of citizens first and foremost expect their legislators to supply private or small-scale ‘club’ goods. This acts as a strong incentive for politicians to actually supply such goods, which is confirmed by participants’ observational data and more than 250 interviews conducted by the author. Despite this, citizens do not vote based on how well or how poorly incumbent MPs provide clientelistic goods. A multivariate analysis reveals that voting for the opposition or the incumbent is determined by evaluations of the state of the national economy and of the government’s policies. What the literature has portrayed as an ‘either-or’ is ‘both’, and this is perfectly rational: Extract as much as one can in terms of private and small club goods but vote based on economic factors. The literature suggests that clientelism dominates elections in newer democracies and thus undermines democracy. The findings from this study suggest that while distribution of clientelistic goods is common, this does not necessarily undermine the mechanism of democratic accountability in elections.