A large literature examines the composition of cabinets in parliamentary systems, but very little attention has been paid to the size of those cabinets. Yet not only is the size of the cabinet related to the division of portfolios that may take place, cabinet size is also related to policy outcomes. In this article, a theory of party size is considered which examines how coalition bargaining considerations, intra-party politics and efficiency concerns affect the size of cabinets. Hypotheses derived from the theory are examined using an extensive cross-national dataset on coalition governments which allows us to track changes in cabinet size and membership both across and within cabinets.

Le elezioni politiche del 24 e 25 febbraio 2013 hanno sancito un forte cambiamento della struttura del sistema partitico italiano. In un contesto di altissima volatilità elettorale e di accelerato declino della partecipazione al voto, il sistema è divenuto sostanzialmente tripolare, dopo vent’anni di strutturazione e tenuta del bipolarismo. A questo esito hanno concorso da un lato l’erosione dei principali schieramenti politici che a partire dal novembre 2011 avevano sostenuto l’esperienza del governo Monti (nonché la deludente prova elettorale dello stesso Presidente del Consiglio uscente), e dall’altro lo straordinario successo del Movimento 5 stelle. Quest’ultimo, al primo test elettorale di livello nazionale, ha raccolto un risultato sorprendente, giungendo ad oltre un quarto dei voti validi. Siamo di fronte ad una parentesi momentanea dovuta all’effetto combinato di crisi economica e crisi politica, oppure le contraddizioni interne alla Seconda Repubblica l’hanno condotta effettivamente al suo crepuscolo? Come uscirà il sistema partitico italiano da questa nuova fase di destabilizzazione? Questo quarto Dossier CISE, che raccoglie contributi apparsi sul sito web del Cise prima e dopo le elezioni, fornisce una prima analisi del voto, presentando elaborazioni su dati aggregati, stime dei flussi elettorali, alcune prime analisi su dati di sondaggio, nonché una panoramica dei nuovi eletti e un’appendice ricca di tabelle e mappe riassuntive del risultato elettorale. Come i precedenti Dossier, si tratta di uno strumento prodotto rapidamente all’indomani del voto, con l’intento di suggerire primi spunti di interpretazione da approfondire in seguito, cercando di contribuire alla lettura di un risultato elettorale cruciale, in una delicata fase di cambiamento del sistema partitico italiano.

Multidimensional scaling (or MDS) is a methodology for producing geometric models of proximities data. Multidimensional scaling has a long history in political science research. However, most applications of MDS are purely descriptive, with no attempt to assess stability or sampling variability in the scaling solution. In this article, we develop a bootstrap resampling strategy for constructing confidence regions in multidimensional scaling solutions. The methodology is illustrated by performing an inferential multidimensional scaling analysis on data from the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES). The bootstrap procedure is very simple, and it is adaptable to a wide variety of MDS models. Our approach enhances the utility of multidimensional scaling as a tool for testing substantive theories while still retaining the flexibility in assumptions, model details, and estimation procedures that make MDS so useful for exploring structure in data.

Saliency theory is among the most influential accounts of party competition, not least in providing the theoretical framework for the Comparative Manifesto Project – one of the most widely used data collections in comparative politics. Despite its prominence, not all empirical implications of the saliency theory of party competition have yet been systematically tested. This article addresses five predictions of saliency theory, the central claim of which is that parties compete by selective issue emphasis rather than by direct confrontation. Since a fair test of the theory's assumptions needs to rely on data that measures party issue saliency and party positions independently, this article draws on new manifesto data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). Analysing all manifestos issued for the 2002, 2006 and 2008 general elections, it shows that saliency theory correctly identifies some features of party competition. For instance, parties disproportionally emphasise issues they ‘own’. Yet, the core assumption of saliency theory that parties compete via selective issue emphasis rather than direct confrontation over the same issues fails to materialise in the majority of cases.

Abstract This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.