Kriesi, H. (2013). Hans Daalder, State formation, parties and democracy: Studies in comparative European politics, reviewed by Hanspeter Kriesi. Party Politics, 19(2), 365–367. http://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812472763 Vai al sito web

Segnalazione bibliografica. West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 5, 1 September 2011 , pp. 1044-1069(26) Autori: Dennis Spies ; Simon T. Franzmann. Abstract: Previous studies on the electoral fortunes of extreme right parties (ERPs) have pointed to the importance of variables of party competition for the success - or failure - of ERPs. These studies vary greatly when it comes to describing the political opportunity structure of the extreme right. Apart from their methodological differences, existing studies differ especially with regard to the assumed underlying dimension of party competition. This article tests the impact of three frequently...

Come vedono i toscani la politica? Che rapporto hanno con essa? C'è qualcosa di diverso rispetto alla «subcultura rossa» della Prima Repubblica? Da questa ricerca, commissionata dalla Regione Toscana e condotta dal Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali con un approccio misto, quantitativo e qualitativo, emergono risposte articolate. Da un lato, è viva e in salute la partecipazione associativa, espressione di una tradizione che viene da lontano. Dall'altro, emerge invece un declino della partecipazione politica, assieme a elementi di tensione nel rapporto tra cittadini, partiti e istituzioni. Segni inevitabili del grande cambiamento simbolico e organizzativo che ha investito i partiti...

In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.

This article provides a detailed set of coding rules for disaggregating electoral volatility into two components: volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit, and volatility caused by vote switching across existing parties. After providing an overview of both types of volatility in post-communist countries, the causes of volatility are analysed using a larger dataset than those used in previous studies. The results are startling: most findings based on elections in post-communist countries included in previous studies disappear. Instead, entry and exit volatility is found to be largely a function of long-term economic recovery, and it becomes clear that very little is known about what causes ‘party switching’ volatility. As a robustness test of this latter result, the authors demonstrate that systematic explanations for party-switching volatility in Western Europe can indeed be found.