Electoral Research Abstracts - Segnalazioni bibliografiche

Electoral Research Abstracts - Segnalazioni bibliografiche

Electoral Research Abstracts - Segnalazioni bibliografiche

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 937-954(18) Autori: Garrett Glasgow; Matt Golder;  Sona N. Golder Abstract The prime ministership is the preeminent political post in parliamentary democracies. Yet few studies examine PM party choice, perhaps under the assumption that the choice is a simple function of party size. In this article, we argue that key strategic actors and the context in which government negotiations take place can play a critical role in PM party choice. We test our hypotheses using a mixed logit with random coefficients on an original data set...

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 516-529 Autore: Jérôme Mathis Abstract In committee deliberation, requiring a unanimous vote intuitively provides the strongest incentives for actors to share fully their opinions and private information. It is also believed that full revelation of (decision-relevant) information occurs when personal biases are made clear before deliberation. However, recent literature suggests that both intuitions are flawed. Austen-Smith and Feddersen propose a model in which the unanimity rule performs worse than other rules in promoting fully revealing deliberation, and uncertainty about individuals' preferences promotes full sharing of information. We extend this work by incorporating the possibility...

Segnalazione bibliografica West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 568-586(19) Autori: Jean-Benoit Pilet; Damien Bol Abstract: Most of the literature asserts that political parties rationally define their preference for electoral reform with respect to their possible gains and the balance of power between and within parties. Other scholars moderate this rationality, underlining the role of the uncertainty inherent to any change in the electoral system. This article shows how risk and expected gains interact. Through an analysis of the preferences of 84 parties in 13 different electoral reform debates, it shows that risk impedes parties from supporting even advantageous change....

Abstract This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 852-868(17) Autori: Michael M. Bechtel; Jens Hainmueller Abstract Dominant theories of electoral behavior emphasize that voters myopically evaluate policy performance and that this shortsightedness may obstruct the welfare-improving effect of democratic accountability. However, we know little about how long governments receive electoral credit for beneficial policies. We exploit the massive policy response to a major natural disaster, the 2002 Elbe flooding in Germany, to provide an upper bound for the short- and long-term electoral returns to targeted policy benefits. We estimate that the flood response increased vote...