Electoral Research Abstracts - Segnalazioni bibliografiche

Electoral Research Abstracts - Segnalazioni bibliografiche

Electoral Research Abstracts - Segnalazioni bibliografiche

This article analyses the impact of party systems on human well-being and argues that multiparty systems are associated with better welfare outcomes for two primary reasons: first, multiparty systems provide representation to multiple issue-dimensions in society, thereby indicating a more inclusive system, which ensures that diverse societal interests are taken into account during formulation of welfare policies. Second, multiparty systems also indicate a competitive party system, which provides incentives for parties to perform effectively while in office and propels parties to appeal to multiple segments of society by providing broader welfare services. The impact of party systems on human well-being is tested on a global sample of 68 democratic countries from 1975–2000. The findings show support for the hypothesized relationship between party systems and human well-being.

Segnalazione bibliografica. Acta Politica - Issue, 13/07/11 Autore: Daniel Bochsler Abstract Electoral rules have long been held as important for the success of new political parties, but research has neglected the dimension of territory in this equation. This article argues that the territorial structure of social groups, in interaction with the electoral system, makes a crucial difference for the ability of new parties to enter parliament. In district-based electoral systems, social groups that are highly concentrated face much lower hurdles with an own party than groups that are spread throughout the country. The argument is tested on a novel database on ethnic minority...

Segnalazione bibliografica. British Journal of Political Science (2011), 41: 259-285 Autori: John Bartle, Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda, James Stimson Abstract The political ‘centre’ is often discussed in debates about public policy and analyses of party strategies and election outcomes. Yet, to date, there has been little effort to estimate the political centre outside the United States. This article outlines a method of estimating the political centre using public opinion data collected for the period between 1950 and 2005. It is demonstrated that it is possible to measure the centre in Britain, that it moves over time, that it shifts in response to government activity...

We propose a framework for analysing party elite perceptions of voting behaviour based on four party competition and voting behaviour models: the Downsian proximity, saliency, competence and directional models. We analyse whether and to what extent party elite perceptions support these theories of party competition and voting behaviour. Empirical analysis is based solely on internal party documents from two Swedish parties, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, from 1964 to 1988/1991. We demonstrate that elements of all four party competition models have characterized Swedish party elite thinking and reasoning about voting behaviour in recent decades. Discussion in the Social Democratic elite was most in line with Downs' model. Until the mid-1970s, Downs' model tended to be combined with the competence model and thereafter with the saliency model. The Conservative elite clearly favoured the salience and competence models until the early 1970s and the saliency and Downs' models since then.

In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.