Redazione CISE

In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.

JSprimarieShare Domenica si svolgerà il secondo turno delle elezioni primarie per la scelta del candidato premier del centrosinistra. Al primo turno Bersani ha raccolto il 44,9% dei voti contro il 35,5% di Renzi e appare saldamente in testa. E' possibile che lo sfidante possa superarlo? Cosa deve succedere perché ciò accada? Qui puoi simulare il risultato del secondo turno. Ogni elettore ha tre opzioni a disposizione: votare Bersani, votare Renzi oppure astenersi. Devi solo decidere come si divideranno fra queste tre possibilità gli elettori che al primo turno hanno scelto i diversi candidati. Puoi anche ipotizzare la partecipazione di nuovi elettori che...

Segnalazione bibliografica. Autori: Kathleen Bawn e Zeynep Somer-Topcu American Journal of Political Science, Volume 56, Number 2, 1 April 2012 , pp. 433-446(14) Abstract We argue that governing status affects how voters react to extreme versus moderate policy positions. Being in government forces parties to compromise and to accept ideologically unappealing choices as the best among available alternatives. Steady exposure to government parties in this role and frequent policy compromise by governing parties lead voters to discount the positions of parties when they are in government. Hence, government parties do better in elections when they offset this discounting by taking relatively extreme positions. The...

Segnalazione bibliografica. Autori: Luigi Curini, Willy Jou e Vincenzo Memoli British Journal of Political Science April 2012 42 : pp 241-261 Abstract Previous authors have found greater political support among electoral winners than losers, but they define winners and losers at a single time point, and employ a dichotomous categorization that neglects possible variations within each group. This study considers both the past history of winning or losing and the impact of ideological distance from the government on a political support indicator – satisfaction with democracy. Using a multilevel model covering thirty-one countries, the authors show that the relationship between winner/loser status and satisfaction...

Segnalazione bibliografica. Autori: Nils D. Steiner e Christian W. Martin West European Politics, Volume 35, Number 2, 1 March 2012 , pp. 238-265(28) Abstract Recent research provides evidence that economic integration has a negative effect on electoral turnout. Taking up these recent findings, this article explores the causal chain in more detail. Specifically, it argues that one way by which economic integration affects the calculus of voting is through the positioning of political parties. The expectation is that the polarisation between parties on an economic left-right scale is lower the more integrated an economy is. Consequently, electoral turnout should be lower with less polarisation...