Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science (April 2011), Vol. 55, N. 2: pp. 307-325 Autori: Kim L. Fridkin, Patrick Kenney Abstract Do negative advertisements lower voters' evaluations of the targeted candidate? We theorize that there is much to be gained by examining the variance in the content and tone of negative campaign messages and the variance in voters' sensitivity to negative political rhetoric. We employ data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to investigate the impact of negative campaigning in U.S. Senate campaigns. We sampled 1,045 respondents in 21 of the 28 U.S. Senate races featuring a majority party incumbent and challenger....

D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R. (2013). I risultati elettorali: bipolarismo addio ? In ITANES (Ed.), Voto amaro. Disincanto e crisi economica nelle elezioni del 2013 (pp. 17–32). Bologna: Il  Mulino.

D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R. (2007). Il nuovo sistema elettorale:dal collegio uninominale al premio di maggioranza. In R. D’Alimonte & A. Chiaramonte (Eds.), Proporzionale ma non solo (pp. 51–89). Bologna: Il Mulino.

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review (2011), 105: 115-134 Autori: Henry E. Brady, John E. McNulty Abstract Could changing the locations of polling places affect the outcome of an election by increasing the costs of voting for some and decreasing them for others? The consolidation of voting precincts in Los Angeles County during California's 2003 gubernatorial recall election provides a natural experiment for studying how changing polling places influences voter turnout. Overall turnout decreased by a substantial 1.85 percentage points: A drop in polling place turnout of 3.03 percentage points was partially offset by an increase in absentee voting of 1.18 percentage...

In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.