There is a contradiction between theory and empirics with respect to portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. While the canonical model of legislative bargaining predicts the existence of a ‘formateur bonus’, empirical studies show that portfolios are allocated in a manner that favours smaller parties. This article argues that the difference between the empirical pattern and the theoretical predictions can be explained by the vote of no confidence, which provides an incentive for large formateur parties to overcompensate smaller coalition partners in exchange for their sustained support over time. This argument is tested by exploiting variations in the presence of no confidence votes across national and regional levels in France. As predicted, we find that larger formateur parties receive a greater share of portfolios if the vote of no confidence is absent than if it is present.

D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R., & R., D. (2002). La maggioranza ritrovata. La competizione nei collegi uninominali. In D. R & B. S. (Eds.), Maggioritario finalmente? La transizione elettorale 1994-2001 (pp. 199–248). BOLOGNA: Il Mulino.

De Sio, Lorenzo, Emanuele, Vincenzo, & Maggini, Nicola. (2014 21). “Something Olde, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue…”. On the twenty-eight separate European elections of 2014. Retrieved from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisis...

CHIARAMONTE, A. C. A., & D’Alimonte, R. (2013). Sistemi elettorali. In G. Pasquino, M. Regalia, & M. Valbruzzi (Eds.), Quarant’anni di scienza politica in Italia (pp. 121–136). BOLOGNA: Il Mulino.

The Issue Yield model predicts that parties will choose specific issues to emphasise, based on the joint assessment of electoral risks (how divisive is an issue within the party support base) and electoral opportunities (how widely supported is the same issue outside the party). According to this model, issues with high yield are those that combine a high affinity with the existing party base, together with a high potential to reach new voters. In previous work, the model showed a remarkable ability to explain aggregate issue importance as reported by party supporters, as well as issue emphasis in party manifestos. This paper tests the implications at the individual level by comparing a conventional model where issue salience is determined from manifesto data with a revised model where issue salience is determined by issue yield. The empirical findings show that issue yield is a more effective criterion than manifesto emphasis for identifying the issues most closely associated with party support in the minds of voters.