Ricerca

Ricerca

Ricerca

Lorenzo De Sio Party systems across the Western world appear increasingly challenged. After the 1990s and 2000s saw the prevalence of a two-bloc (or two-party) competition by mainstream parties with relatively similar, moderate policies, recent years have seen an unprecedented emergence of successful challenger parties (and leaders), with examples both on the right-wing (e.g. Donald Trump, the UKIP, the Front National) and on the left wing (e.g. Bernie Sanders, SYRIZA, Podemos, Jeremy Corbyn and Benoît Hamon). Such new, challenger parties and leaders share instead a conflictual emphasis on a relatively small set of controversial policy issues that have proved electorally...

The Issue Yield model predicts that parties will choose specific issues to emphasise, based on the joint assessment of electoral risks (how divisive is an issue within the party support base) and electoral opportunities (how widely supported is the same issue outside the party). According to this model, issues with high yield are those that combine a high affinity with the existing party base, together with a high potential to reach new voters. In previous work, the model showed a remarkable ability to explain aggregate issue importance as reported by party supporters, as well as issue emphasis in party manifestos. This paper tests the implications at the individual level by comparing a conventional model where issue salience is determined from manifesto data with a revised model where issue salience is determined by issue yield. The empirical findings show that issue yield is a more effective criterion than manifesto emphasis for identifying the issues most closely associated with party support in the minds of voters.

Emanuele, Vincenzo. (n.d.). Ite, missa est: dove sono andati i praticanti? In C&LS Candidate and Leader Selection, Forza Doria. Divertissements seri sulle elezioni primarie (pp. 107–112). Novi Ligure: Edizioni Epoké. Retrieved from http://www.ed...

Il modello prevalente per spiegare i comportamenti degli elettori e le scelte dei partiti si basa sul cosiddetto "teorema dell'elettore mediano", secondo cui i partiti, per vincere le elezioni, devono spostarsi progressivamente verso il centro, fino a diventare indistinguibili l'uno dall'altro. Ma questo modello non funziona. Se funzionasse, dovrebbe vincere sempre chi si trova al centro dello spazio politico, mentre sappiamo che possono avere successo candidati fortemente sfavoriti dalla loro "collocazione spaziale", ovvero lontani dal punto mediano. Determinante a questo proposito è il grado di interesse per la politica: gli elettori meno coinvolti sono maggiormente capaci di esprimere un voto svincolato dall'orientamento politico. Questo interessante modello alternativo, che spiega risultati altrimenti incomprensibili, viene testato sulla base di dati di sondaggi relativi a venti consultazioni elettorali in Italia, in Francia e negli Stati Uniti nell'arco degli ultimi trent'anni.

A large literature examines the composition of cabinets in parliamentary systems, but very little attention has been paid to the size of those cabinets. Yet not only is the size of the cabinet related to the division of portfolios that may take place, cabinet size is also related to policy outcomes. In this article, a theory of party size is considered which examines how coalition bargaining considerations, intra-party politics and efficiency concerns affect the size of cabinets. Hypotheses derived from the theory are examined using an extensive cross-national dataset on coalition governments which allows us to track changes in cabinet size and membership both across and within cabinets.