Ricerca

Ricerca

Ricerca

Per citare l'articolo: Carolina Plescia, Sylvia Kritzinger & Lorenzo De Sio (2019) "Filling the Void? Political Responsiveness of Populist Parties", Representation, 55:4, 513-533, DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2019.1635197 Scarica l'articolo qui. Abstract: This paper examines the responsiveness of populist parties to the salience of issues amongst the public focusing on a large number of issues on which parties campaign during elections. The paper investigates both left- and right-wing populist parties comparatively in three countries, namely Austria, Germany and Italy. We find that while populist parties carry out an...

Segnalazione bibliografica. Autori: Nils D. Steiner e Christian W. Martin West European Politics, Volume 35, Number 2, 1 March 2012 , pp. 238-265(28) Abstract Recent research provides evidence that economic integration has a negative effect on electoral turnout. Taking up these recent findings, this article explores the causal chain in more detail. Specifically, it argues that one way by which economic integration affects the calculus of voting is through the positioning of political parties. The expectation is that the polarisation between parties on an economic left-right scale is lower the more integrated an economy is. Consequently, electoral turnout should be lower with less polarisation...

De Sio, L. (2009). Oltre il modello di Goodman. La stima dei flussi elettorali in base a dati aggregati. Polena, 9–35.

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 869-885(17) Autori: Taylor C. Boas; Hidalgo, F. Daniel Hidalgo. Abstract: Direct influence over communication media is a potent resource during electoral campaigns, and politicians have an incentive to gain control of the airwaves to advance their careers. In this article, we use data on community radio license applications in Brazil to identify both the causal effect of incumbency on politicians' ability to control the media and the causal effect of media control on...

Abstract Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.