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Spring 2020: Six CISE-sponsored seminars within the Luiss DiSP Seminar Series
Spring 2020: starting from February 19th, the regular Department Seminar Series resumes at the Luiss Department of Political Science (DiSP). Within the Department Seminar series, we at CISE have contributed by organizing six seminars, related to our research interests in political representation.
19 February 2020, h 13:00-14:30 (Room 409, Viale Romania 32)Party Competition in Western Europe: Introducing the Issue Competition Comparative Project (ICCP)Lorenzo De Sio (Luiss)
13 May 2020, h 13:00-14:30 (Room 411, Viale Romania 32)A Cleavage Theory of Political PartiesLiesbet Hooghe (European University Institute) Gary Marks (European University...
Come e perché il centrosinistra ha vinto le elezioni 2005
D’Alimonte, R., & De Sio, L. (2007). Come e perché il centrosinistra ha vinto le elezioni 2005. In A. Chiaramonte & G. Tarli Barbieri (Eds.), Riforme istituzionali e rappresentanza politica nelle Regioni italiane (pp. 145–174). Bologna: Il...
Il verdetto elettorale
D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R. (2008). Il verdetto elettorale. In Itanes (Ed.), Il ritorno di Berlusconi. Vincitori e vinti nelle elezioni del 2008 (pp. 15–18). Bologna: Il Mulino.
Comparing and Contrasting the Uses of Two Graphical Tools for Displaying Patterns of Multyparty Competition. Nagayama Diagrams and Simplex Representations
GROFMAN, B., CHIARAMONTE, A., D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R., & FELD, S. (2004). Comparing and Contrasting the Uses of Two Graphical Tools for Displaying Patterns of Multyparty Competition. Nagayama Diagrams and Simplex Representations. PARTY POLITICS, 10,...
Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity
In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.