Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.

Segnalazione bibliografica West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 607-625(19) Autore: Csaba Nikolenyi Abstract This article examines the failure of three attempts to replace proportional representation with a majoritarian alternative in post-communist Eastern Europe: Slovenia in 1996; the Czech Republic in 2000; and Romania in 2008. The central argument of the article is that majoritarian electoral reform is both incompatible with and prevented by the institutions of consensus democracy. The constitutional design of consensus democracy creates multiple veto points and veto players that limit major policy and legislative change, such as electoral reform. As such, they also provide for self-enforcing...

This article analyses the impact of party systems on human well-being and argues that multiparty systems are associated with better welfare outcomes for two primary reasons: first, multiparty systems provide representation to multiple issue-dimensions in society, thereby indicating a more inclusive system, which ensures that diverse societal interests are taken into account during formulation of welfare policies. Second, multiparty systems also indicate a competitive party system, which provides incentives for parties to perform effectively while in office and propels parties to appeal to multiple segments of society by providing broader welfare services. The impact of party systems on human well-being is tested on a global sample of 68 democratic countries from 1975–2000. The findings show support for the hypothesized relationship between party systems and human well-being.

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 738-752(15) Autori: John R. Hamman; Roberto A. Weber; Jonathan Woon Abstract How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not...

A large literature examines the composition of cabinets in parliamentary systems, but very little attention has been paid to the size of those cabinets. Yet not only is the size of the cabinet related to the division of portfolios that may take place, cabinet size is also related to policy outcomes. In this article, a theory of party size is considered which examines how coalition bargaining considerations, intra-party politics and efficiency concerns affect the size of cabinets. Hypotheses derived from the theory are examined using an extensive cross-national dataset on coalition governments which allows us to track changes in cabinet size and membership both across and within cabinets.