Autore: Redazione CISE

Konstantinos Athanasiadis

Abstention ruled supreme in the European elections held on the divided island of Cyprus (divided between the Republic of Cyprus and the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” recognised only by Turkey). According to the Ministry of the Interior more than the half of the electorate (56%) (Ministry of the Interior 2014) opted for abstention from the electoral process as a token of growing discomfort against the political system and the austerity measures put forward since last year. Paradoxically though, the high abstention rate provided a crucial lifeline to the political system of Cyprus as it enhanced the rather meagre results of almost all political formations on the island.

The results

Specifically, the governing centre-right party of the Democratic Rally (DISY) managed to hold its ground despite the unpopular reform package implemented as part of the rescue plan between Cyprus and the EU. Thus, the party of the currently serving President of the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus has a presidential system), Nicos Anastasiades gained 37.8% of the votes increasing by 1.8% its share in comparison to the last European elections of 2009. Interestingly, this figure reflects the highest score achieved in the European elections for the party of the Cypriot centre-right.

Konstantinos Athanasiadis is a PhD Candidate at LUISS Guido Carli University. Mr Athanasiadis earned an MSc in International Politics from SOAS, University of London and a BA in International and European Studies from the University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki. His research interests include among others international relations and comparative politics.

Yet it should be noted that DISY was joined in this campaign by the European Party (EVROKO), which in the last 2009 elections received 4.2% of the Cypriot vote. Interestingly, EVROKO has actually ‘repatriated’ since it seceded from DISY in 2004, due to the latter’s support for the island’s reunification plan sponsored by the then serving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004).

The former Communists of the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) came at the second place attaining 27% of the votes, which represented a 8% diminution of its political influence since 2009. Both DISY and AKEL won 2 seats out of 6 that Cyprus is allotted in the European Parliament. Moreover, the centre-left leaning Democratic Party (DIKO) also saw its forces growing diminishing in comparison to the 2009 elections for the European Parliament (-1.5%) as in the meantime it struggled to overcome internal frictions that reflected differences of opinion related to its participation in a coalition government with DISY (it won one seat). The social democratic party of EDEK secured the last seat, whilst losing 3.8% of its 2009 share (Table 1). Finally, Symmachia Politon (Citizens’ Alliance) led by Giorgos Lillikas -former Foreign Minister and candidate in the last presidential elections (2013)- failed to elect any representative gaining 6.8% of the votes.

Ironically, the face-saving value of abstention is mirrored clearly if the electoral results are translated into absolute terms (number of votes gained in 2009 elections). The conservative ruling-party of DISY loses 14% of the popular vote, AKEL 35.5%, DIKO 25% and EDEK43% (Persianis 2014).

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Cyprus
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Democratic Rally (DISY)	EPP	37.8	2		+1.8	+0
Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL)	GUE-NGL	27.0	2		-8.4	+0
Democratic Party (DIKO)	S&D	10.8	1		-1.5	+0
Movement for Social Democracy EDEK-Green Party (KS/EDEK)	S&D	7.7	1		-3.8	+0
Citizens’ Alliance (Symmachia Politon)		6.8	0		+6.8
Other		9.9
Total		100	6			_
Turnout (%)		44.0			-15.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		none
EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI=Non-Inscrits.

 

The campaign

Public discussions in the period that preceded the elections were dominated by the so called ‘national issue’ –that is the renewed effort towards reunification-, and the struggle to overcome the effects of the financial crisis. Related to attempts of economic recovery is the endeavour by the government of Cyprus to turn the country into a transit point of energy networks that bind together the Middle East and the EU in consistence with the latter’s policy of energy diversification. Hence, public discourse was captured to a great extent by the endeavour to extract natural gas from the Cypriot continental shelf that aims exactly at underlining the island’s geostrategic value for the EU. The official visit paid by the US Vice President John Biden in Cyprus just a few days before the European elections, and the results ensuing from it did contribute further to ‘displace’ discourse on the EU elections to the fringes of public dialogue.

Equally preponderant to the discussions on energy security is the impact of the financial crisis that badly hit the island’s thriving services’ sector. Cyprus has signed in March 2013 a bailout agreement with the Eurogroup, the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF that entailed an €10 billion funding package in exchange for significant reforms in the banking sector, increased scrutiny over money-laundering and privatisations that endangered the country’s status as tax haven. Therefore, the debate on the role of the EU was framed also in connection to the ramifications of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the consequences associated to it such as the rising unemployment, the deconstruction of the welfare state and reduced salaries.

It is against this background that the low turnout should be interpreted. Cypriots chose to demonstrate their disapprobation to the political system by turning their backs to the elections for the European Parliament. Low turnout should also be evaluated as a sense of dissatisfaction and injustice committed against the citizens of Cyprus as reflected in the painful bailout plan.

It is noteworthy, that according to the latest Eurobarometer, Cypriots show an immense distrust to their political parties (91%) thus revealing a raging latent institutional crisis. Pessimism regarding the prospects of the national economy is also pervasive since Cypriots evaluate as ‘bad’ the state of the national economy (97%) coming second after the Greeks. Regarding the EU, Cypriots feel that it is responsible for the austerity (77%), whilst the vast majority (86%) expresses its reluctance whether Brussels takes into serious consideration its preoccupations (Phileleftheros 2014).

An interpretation

In conclusion, the conservative Democratic Rally shines as one of the few examples of ruling parties that managed to increase their share in the European elections. Although its share in absolute numbers followed the general decreasing trend as mentioned above, its gains in proportional terms must be appraised as an indication of support for reforms and recovery by a significant segment of the electorate. Besides, the opposition leftist AKEL is undergoing a process of re-organisation that followed its defeat in the 2013 presidential elections, which is to be attributed partially to the controversial management of the national economy by the then serving leftist President of the Republic, Demetris Christofias.

Therefore, the results of the European elections in Cyprus do not imply an earthquake of the magnitude observed elsewhere. Yet abstention confirms that Cypriots feel disillusioned with the EU, and ultimately with their political system. Moreover, abstention rings the bell of a looming social crisis, which for the time being remains latent as the Republic of Cyprus tries to tackle the challenges of reunification, economic recovery and energy security.

References

Kathimerini. “Apochorei to DIKO apo Kyvernisi Anastasiade” (DIKO withdraws from Anastasiade’s Government). Kathimerini, 22 February, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.gr/755169/article/epikairothta/kosmos/apoxwrei-to-dhko-apo-kyvernhsh-anastasiadh

Kathimerini Cyprus. “56,03% ton Politon Epeleksan na Apechoun Apo tis Kalpes.” (56,03% Opted for Abstention). Kathimerini Cyprus, 26 May, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/index.php?pageaction=kat&modid=1&artid=172584

Kyproekloges.com. “European Elections 2014.” https://www.kyproekloges.com/index.php/ipopsifioi-eurovouleftes-kypros-2014

Ministry of the Interior. “European Elections 2014.” https://live.elections.moi.gov.cy/English/EUROPEAN_ELECTIONS_2014/Islandwide

Persianis, Michalis. “Pos I Apochi Volepse ta Kommata.” (How Absention Benefited Political Parties). Kathimerini Cyprus, 26 May, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/index.php?pageaction=kat&modid=1&artid=172567

Phileleftheros. “Evrovarometro: Oi Kyprioi den Empistevontai Thesmous. (Eurobarometer: Cypriots do not Trust Institutions).” Phileleftheros, 26 February 2014. https://www.philenews.com/el-gr/eidiseis-politiki/39/187447/evrovarometro-oi-kyprioi-den-empisteyontai-thesmous

 

 

Patrick Dumont and Raphaël Kies

The context

For the first time since 1979, European elections were held separately from national elections in Luxembourg. The simultaneity of elections decided on before the first direct European elections (as Luxembourgish MPs were already elected for a five-year mandate and that the next scheduled election was to be held in 1979 anyway) and government stability made all seven previous national and European elections fall on the same day, with a number of consequences ensuing. For instance, as European elections are fought on a unique, nationwide constituency until 2009 all party heavyweights used to be present on both lists to ensure a good result for their European list (in Luxembourg voters can cast a vote for a party, one or several candidates on the same or on different lists, what is termed inter-party panachage). As their leaders were elected on both accounts, they would subsequently decide on which mandate they would choose according to the expected results of the national government formation. In 2009 it was decided among the main parties that there would be no more double candidacies (the smaller parties kept on practicing it however). A second consequence was that the European election campaign was continuously eclipsed by the concurrent national one, making the election even more of a second-order type.

This context changed for the coming 2014 elections, as the Christian democrat-Socialist (CSV) government led by PM Juncker (who had been PM since 1995) collapsed in July 2013 – for a series of affairs concerning, among others, the lack of governmental control of the national intelligence – leading to the first anticipated elections since the late 1950s. Not only this made the elections bound to be distinct, opening for the possibility of a genuinely ‘European’ campaign for the May 2014 elections, but these anticipated elections held in October 2013 led to the formation of a coalition excluding the largest party of the country that had only been out of government for five years (1974-1979) in the post-war era. The CSV electoral losses (from 26 to 23 seats out of 60) allowed for the formation of an alternative coalition made of the Liberals (13 seats), the Socialists who had triggered the government crisis by not supporting the Christian democrat PM (13 seats) and the Greens (6 seats), leaving Juncker the experienced and European-wide known leader (often cited as potential President of the European Commission and chairmain of the Euro group for eight years) in the opposition (Dumont, Kies: forthcoming).

The 2009 national elections had been a high for the CSV who also kept its three seats out of six at the European parliament, for only one for the LSAP (Socialists), the DP (Liberals), and the Greens despite losing about 6% at the EP election compared to their 2004 score (in 2004 PM Juncker headed the CSV list for EP election as well as the list of his party for the national election in the South constituency; in 2009 he was only candidate for the national election). In a country where there has never been a real cleavage amongst parties and voters on European issues, the main stakes of this first separate European election are 1) again the fate of ex-PM Juncker chosen by the European People’s Party as lead figure and potential President of the European Commission despite not being candidate for the EP election and 2) the electoral fate of the new coalition parties and whether or not one the largest of these three (the DP or the LSAP) will manage to gain a second seat to the detriment of the CSV. The few opinion polls published since the national elections are not quite informative regarding the likely distribution of seats after the 25 May election. They however show that despite this campaign being the first ‘Europe-only’ one,[1] and that their previous PM is candidate for the presidency of the Commission (more than 80% support this candidacy and his party is still, by far, considered to be the most credible to represent the interests of Luxembourg in the EU) about a third of respondents are not interested in it.

Campaign strategies

Altogether no less than nine parties compete for the six Luxembourgish MEP seats, most of which without any hope of getting any of these but with the only ambition of displaying their continuous presence on the political scene after national elections where all of these small parties fared relatively well. This is the case for the PID (Party for Integral Democracy) that wants to reach the 2% it almost got at the October 2013 election, the Pirate Party that had managed to reach almost 3% then, and the KPL (Communist Party, 1.5% at the national election). The Left (on the rise in 2013) and the sovereignist ADR (which always fared worse at European elections than in national ones and is continuously losing votes since 1999) cannot expect to score the double-digit result that would allow them to dream about being allowed to express their less Euro-enthusiastic stances in Brussels and Strasbourg. These five parties, that altogether make for 5 out of 60 seats in the national parliament, are indeed the less Euro-enthusiastic: for instance The Left competes under the slogan ‘Basta! Rebuild Europe’ (a critique of the neoliberal conduct of the current Europe), ADR under ‘Less Europe, more Luxembourg’ (with a Europe of sovereign nation states, stricter immigration policies) and the PID would want the Euro to be abandoned and national currencies re-introduced. Surprisingly for a Luxembourgish party (as it would lead to a move of the general secretariat from Luxembourg to Brussels) the Pirate Party campaigns for a single site of the EP, Brussels, and for the abolishment of any form of veto rights in the Council. The four larger parties see in a stronger Europe the possibility of a stronger Luxembourg. The CSV campaigns along these lines and on its image of competence outside of the borders of the Grand Duchy, acquired in part by its quasi permanence at the helm of the national government and capacity for seeking consensus in European spheres under the slogan ‘For Europe, for Luxembourg’. Together with the Socialists the Christian democrats want a more social and solidary Europe (a message brought by Juncker as well in his campaign for the presidence of the EU Commission, that fits with his home party message but may fit less with the rest of the EPP) and highlight the Community method. The DP and the Greens largely share the latter stance but also campaign for a more democratic and transparent Europe. The first would like a convention followed by a European-wide referendum held on the same day to revise the treaties and to give the EP a real right of legislative initiative. The Greens also want to keep on enlarging EP powers but also support more recourse to popular initiatives. Finally, a number of parties (Greens, The Left, PID, Pirate Party and KPL) oppose TAFTA and would cancel its negociation (Esch-sur-Alzette, the second largest city of the Grand Duchy, even adopted a motion supporting this goal). The other parties consider that we are only at an early stage of the negociations and await for further information, while declaring that they will devote a great attention to its scrutiny. Viviane Reding outgoing Commissioner and currently on leave for the electoral campaign declared she would suggest a pause of TAFTA negotiations to inform citizens and stakeholders.

Results

The CSV is by far the winner of the 2014 European elections with over 37.6% of votes, 6.3% more than the 2009 elections and even beating its record established at the 2004 election when PM Juncker was pulling the EP list. For the first time it was the plurality winner in all municipalities of the country. This exceptional and largely unforeseen score, is due to the participation of Juncker for the presidency of the European Commission (also defined as the seventh candidate of the list), to the good personal score of their chief candidate and incumbent European commissioner Viviane Reding and probably as well to the frustration of some voters that the CSV had been excluded from the outgoing national government despite remaining by fact the first party of the country at the unscheduled 2013 national election.

Another surprise was the score of the LSAP, which fell to 11.75%, losing 7.75% over 2009, a score that corresponds to exactly half of its average result in the preceding seven direct EP elections (it had already lost 3.5% in 2009 compared to 2004, making its worst score at EP elections by crossing for the first time the 20% thresholds). With this score, the Luxembourg Socialists became only the fourth political force in the European elections, behind the Greens and the DP, while in they had been the second force from 1984 to 2009. This important drop can be explained not only as a reaction of some voters to the coalition change after the anticipated national election but also, and probably more essentially, by the good score of the Left party (5.8%; +2.4%) and the absence of strong candidates on the LSAP list. Their six candidates competing for the election were all indeed newcomers in the European arena and their leading candidate, Mady Delvaux-Stehres, a well-known figure in the country, had lost in terms of popular appeal by undertaking a controversial reform of the national educational while minister in the government that collapsed in 2013.

The elections were finally characterized by the fact the Green party, despite also losing votes, became this time the second largest party with only 15%, bypassing the LSAP but also the Liberals, party of the new PM, who lost about 4%. This change in rankings of the parties was made possible by the good personal result of their leading candidate and incumbent MEP Claude Turmes, and conversely the disappointing personal score of the liberal head of list and also MEP candidate Charles Goerens.

Overall then, the parties of the new coalition lost no less than 13% compared to the previous EP election, a result as explained above that must be read as a reaction against the composition and first months of the new government as well as due to the usual better result of the CSV at the EP election when its leader is either candidate on the list or as this time competing to become President of the European Commission. The CSV gains do not however correspond to the losses of the coalition parties (and the CSV result is only half a percent higher than the one obtained in 2004 and was its record until 2014). The other winners are the smaller parties who competed for the EP election. With their much less Euro-enthusiatic stances, and without much hope of reaping one seat, these all (except the Communist KPL) gained in votes in 2014: the sovereignist ADR reached 7.53% (+0.1%, still far for its 8.99% of 1999), Déi Lénk progressed to 5.75% (+2.4%) and the Pirate Party made a successful first appearance with 4,3%.

Despite these changes in the score of the parties, the distribution of MEPs’ seats remained the same. CSV kept its 3 seats, while DP and Déi Gréng, and LSAP managed to keep their seat.

References

Dumont, P., Kies R. (forthcoming), “Luxembourg”, EJPR.

Peter Spáč

On May 24 the election to European parliament was held in Slovakia. This election was the third since the country`s entry to the EU. As in the previous contests, the turnout was extremely low and in 2014 it reached its historical minimum as only 13 per cent of the Slovak citizens participated on the polls.

The elections to EP in Slovakia are held under a proportional electoral system with a single nationwide constituency where all 13 MEPs are elected. Originally Slovakia had 14 MEPs, but after Romania and Bulgaria entered the Union, this number was slightly reduced. In the election only political parties may compete and the country applies a 5 per cent threshold what limits the chances for smaller parties. This system was adopted before the country`s first European election in 2004 and has not been modified so far.

The campaign

The election to European parliament was affected by presidential election which was held in March 2014. Since 1999 Slovak citizens choose their head of state directly and the president`s term last for five years. (https://annalee.com) [1] This means that the presidential elections in Slovakia always precede the competition to European parliament as the former are held only about two months before the latter.

Peter Spáč is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, and Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, FSS MU. His main areas of interest include electoral systems, political parties, and Slovak politics.

The main consequence here is quite straightforward. The contest for the head of state is of great importance in the domestic politics and the one in 2014 was no exemption. At least two factors played a role here. First, the campaign was very intensive and lasted for a long time. Some of the candidates started with their presentation during summer 2013 and such the campaign lasted for nearly a whole year. Second, the presidential election in 2014 received great attention as the Prime Minister and the leader of dominant party Smer – Social Democracy (Smer-SD) Robert Fico entered the competition. The race thus provided a strong rivalry between the candidate of the ruling party with nominees of the opposition and a few independents. The presidential contest ended in the end of March leaving citizens tired from the long lasting campaign.

Until the new head of state was decided, the topic of European election in fact did not exist in Slovak politics. Even in the following days it did not become the prime question as the media were more occupied with the victory of non-partisan Andrej Kiska and even more with the failure of the Prime Minister. This was an important point as it was less than two months before the election to EP and the campaign for it did not even start.

Based on the above mentioned, the campaign for the European election was not intense in Slovakia and it was not far from being invisible. The main political parties did not open any conflicting debate and they presented rather moderate views on the European Union and its functioning. The valence issues as the importance of the country`s position in the Union, lower bureaucracy, support of education and research etc. ruled the campaign what was quite striking when compared to previous presidential election which included repeated clashes between candidates.

From the relevant parties, only the right-wing liberal Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) presented itself as the only true advocate of Slovakia in Europe. With the main campaign quote All for Brussels, we for you! it tried to visibly distinguish itself from the remaining mainstream parties by claiming that it only protects the country`s economic interests.[2] Although SaS is the parliamentary party with the most reserved opinion on the EU, it is still far from stances held by the British UKIP led by Nigel Farage. For example it criticizes the adoption of the Euro by Slovakia as premature, but as a solution it does not call for its abandoning and return to previous currency, but only for a higher responsibility of the member states.

Results

The election was won by the ruling social democratic Smer-SD which got four out of 13 seats. Although the party won with a fairly high margin, its result of 24,1 per cent was rather a disappointment. When compared to European election in 2009 the party lost nearly eight per cent of its votes and one seat in the European parliament as it dropped from five to four mandates.

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Slovakia
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Smer – Social Democracy (Smer-SD)	S&D	24.1	4		-7.9	-1
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	EPP	13.2	2		+2.3	+0
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS)	EPP	7.8	2		-9.2	+0
Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO)	NI	7.5	1		+7.5	+1
NOVA, Conservative Democrats of Slovakia (KDS), Civic Conservative Party (OKS)	ECR	6.8	1		+6.8	+1
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	ALDE	6.7	1		+2.0	+1
Party of Hungarian Community (SMK)	EPP	6.5	1		-4.8	-1
Bridge (Most)	EPP	5.8	1		+5.8	+1
Other lists		21.5	0
Total		100	13			–
Turnout (%)		13			-6.6
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		5
EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.

 

The remaining nine seats were divided between seven parties. The strongest oppositional party, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) slightly increased its vote share from 2009 (+2,3 per cent) and equaled its seat gain, as it got two mandates. On the other hand a more liberal Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS) lost more than half of its support from the previous European election, but due to the formula of the system it was able to remain at two seats.

All the other parties were able to secure one mandate each. Out of this group only the Party of the Hungarian Community (SMK), representing the Hungarian minority living in southern parts of Slovakia, had MEPs even before election 2014. The other four subjects contested in the European election for the first time as they were mostly created after 2009. Most of them may be labeled as centre-right and their vote shares were quite similar as they ranged between 5,8 to 7,5 per cent of votes.[3]

Despite the anticipated trends in recent Europe, the far right parties failed in election 2014 in Slovakia. The once popular nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) secured only 3,6 per cent of votes and lost its only MEP from the previous term. Even lower result was gained by the continuously rising extreme right People`s Party – Our Slovakia (LSNS), whose leader succeeded in regional election in 2013 when he got the office of a regional president. The party however got only 1,7 per cent of votes and was not even close to obtain a seat. The Slovak far right will thus be not represented in EP for the following five years.

Interpretation

The European election 2014 in Slovakia provided several interesting insights. First of all, for the third time the parties grouped in European People`s Party (EPP) gained the most seats. Although they were not able to match their success in 2004, when they acquired 9 mandates, their share remained the same as in 2009 with six seats. As before the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), represented by Smer-SD ended as second with one lost seat when compared to election 2009.

Note: In 2004 Slovakia had 14 MEPs, in 2009 and 2014 only 13 MEPs.
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.

As for the results of respective political parties, the victory of Smer-SD was clear, but rather unsatisfying for the party. Since its emergence in 1999 the party of Robert Fico became the dominant subject of the party system with hegemony of the centre-left ideological axis (Leška 2013). It won all general elections since 2006, continuously increasing its results. In the last parliamentary election in 2012, Smer-SD got more than 44 per cent of votes, thus receiving a majority in Slovak parliament which allowed it to form a government without any need for coalition partners (Spáč 2014). However, in recent years some signals indicating the party`s decline have been shown, f.e. the regional election in 2013 and presidential contest in March 2014. The European election in 2014 confirmed this potential trend.

The election also showed that important discussions regarding potential increase of far right and populist parties in Europe have avoided Slovakia so far. Both far right parties have failed to secure any seat. The potential explanation lies in the fact, that these parties typically mobilize their voters on domestic topics. This is especially true for the extreme LSNS which is oriented strongly negatively against Roma minority in Slovakia while the EU and its aspects are of secondary importance to it.

However, the most striking result of the election 2014 was the extremely low turnout. Despite fairly high support of EU institutions in Slovakia, only 13 per cent of citizens participated on the polls, thus creating a negative record in the history of European elections.[4] This outcome may be partly attributed to the crucial presidential race held only two months earlier, as this competition took enormous attention and led to some fatigue of voters. The weak and short campaign before European election only supported this contrast. Although the poor turnout may be rated as a negative factor, it opened discussions about a possible change of the electoral system to mobilize more voters in later contests. In 2014 a grand codification of all electoral laws is being prepared in Slovakia, thus creating a chance to modify the current system and its parts.

References

Henderson, Karen (2002). Slovakia. The escape from invisibility. London: Routledge.

Leška, Dušan (2013). The Main Phases of the Formation of System of Political Parties in Slovakia After 1989. Sociologia 45 (1), pp. 71-88.

Spáč, Peter (2014). The 2012 parliamentary elections in Slovakia. Electoral Studies 33 (1), pp. 343-346, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.07.006.

Spáč, Peter (2012). Slovakia: In Vlastimil Havlík and Aneta Pinková (eds.) Populist Political Parties in East-Central Europe. Brno: Masaryk University, pp. 227-258.

Vlastimil Havlík

Twenty-one MEPs representing the Czech Republic (1 MEP less in comparison to the 2009 EP election) were elected on 23 – 24 May. An electoral system of proportional representation with closed lists, one nationwide electoral district and 5% threshold is applied in the Czech Republic. The d`Hondt divisor is used for allocation of seats among political parties (Chytilek et al. 2009).

Electoral Campaign

The term “invisible” is perhaps the best descriptor for the campaign which preceded the election. It does not mean that the political parties (and the media) ignored the election at all but the intensity of electoral campaign (in terms of number of party billboards, posters and media coverage) was much lower in comparison to the early general election which had taken place in October 2013.
Another important feature of the campaign was its Europeanization. For the first time since the Czech Republic entered the European Union, the vast majority of political parties focused on European issues and did not use the EP election as just another arena of national political contestation and an opportunity to attack the national government (as it was the case of the 2004 EP election in particular). This may have been related to the fact that the last general election was held just seven months before the European election and the national government consisting of ČSSD, ANO and KDU-ČSL was formed not earlier than in the end of January. Having been in the office just few months, the government did not pass any controversial measures (actually hardly any at all). Therefore, there was only limited space for protest voting which is usually seen as an important motivation for voting in so-called second-order elections (Reif, Schmitt 1980). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that according to a opinion poll conducted just before the election, the EP election were perceived as “meaningless” by 50% of voters (Česká televize 2014). Moreover, the presence of European issues in the campaign did not mean that the political parties presented complex and detailed visions of the European integration process.

Vlastimil Havlík is a Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University (FSS MU), and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, FSS MU. His teaching and research activities include Czech politics, Europeanization and populism. He is also the managing editor of the Czech Journal of Political Science (www.politologickycasopis.cz).

ANO, a new successful populist party founded by the billionaire Andrej Babiš, the latter winner of the EP election, published a manifesto full of general valence statement best expressed by the main electoral slogan of the movement “For Our Children to Have a Chance in Europe”. Similarly, the title of the ČSSD election manifesto in which the party emphasized especially social issues, was “Together in Europe”. In addition, the party wanted “to play the first fiddle in Europe”. KDU-ČSL, the old Christian democratic party, with the motto “We Protect the Czech Interests” did not fall behind the other parties in this respect. Conservative TOP 09 tried to present themselves as a clearly pro-European party (a slogan “I am an European” under the picture of the chairman of the party Karel Schwarzenberg clearly expresses the positive attitude of the party towards the EU) and persuaded the voters about importance of the European Union with the slogan “Don`t give up on Europe“. What got substantial media attention (even abroad), was the anti-immigration campaign ran by The Dawn, a populist political party chaired by a Czech-Japanese businessman Tomio Okamura. The party “borrowed” a well-known sheep-poster firstly used by the Swiss People`s Party. The Eurosceptic camp included liberal-conservative ODS and The Free. The main issue of the ODS campaign was the rejection of the entrance of the Czech Republic to the European Monetary Union. The party organized a petition against the Euro during the campaign and managed to collect more than 40.000 of signatures. The campaign of the libertarian Free party was also based on criticism of – in their words – „Euro-nonsenses“ including not only the Euro but also e.g. the regulation of bulbs or flushing of toiletes; KSČM, usually labeled as an Eurosceptic party (Kopecký 2004, Havlík 2011), did not invest much effort and money into the campaign and relied on its usually very disciplined voters (Linek 2006). All in all, the campaign preceding the election was hardly visible, lacking any contentious issues.

The Results

The low intensity of the campaign, which lacked any contentious issues, and its unusually high level of Europeanization may have been the main reasons for the lowest turnout in the history of the EP elections in the Czech Republic. The turnout record of 18.2% was more than 10 p.p. lower than in 2009 which made the Czech Republic the country with the second lowest electoral turnout among all member states (see Table 1, for a detailed comparison with the 2009 EP election see Hloušek, Kaniok 2009).

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – the Czech Republic
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
ANO 2011 (ANO)	ALDE	16.1	4		+16.1	+4
Coalition of TOP 09 and Mayors (TOP 09)	EPP	16	4		+16.0	+4
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	S&D	14.2	4		-8.2	-3
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	GUE-NGL	11	3		-3.2	-1
Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People`s Party (KDU-ČSL)	EPP	10	3		+2.3	+1
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	ECR	7.7	2		-23.8	-7
Party of Free Citizens (The Free)		5.2	1		+3.9	+1
Tomio Okamura`s Dawn of Direct Democracy (The Dawn)		3.1	0		+3.1	0
Others		16.7	0
Total		100	21			-1
Turnout (%)		18.2			-10.1
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		5%
EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.

The election brought a narrow victory for ANO with Pavel Telička, a former member of the EU Commision, on the top of the party list. TOP 09 led by a former vice-governor of the Czech National Bank Luděk Niedermayer ended as the runner-up. Having taken into consideration the traditionally low discipline of social democratic voters, 14.2% of votes (and 4 seats) can be interpreted as a success for ČSSD led by a sociologist Jan Keller. KSČM with MP Kateřina Konečná as the leader of the party`s list, ended on the fourth place closely followed by KDU-ČSL. Both the parties will be represented by 3 MEPs. Only 7.7% of voters cast their votes far ODS led by MEP Jan Zahradil which meant decrease of support of the party by more than 20 p.p. since the 2009 EP election. The Free with 5.2% of votes and 1 seat for the leader of the party Petr Mach was the last political party which managed to pass the threshold. The Dawn did not win any seat in the EP and ended with 3.1% of votes.

Interpretation

The low electoral turnout made any substantial interpretation of the results hardly possible. Nevertheless, several subtle comments can be made. The result of just a little bit more than 16% of votes showed that the populist ANO was able to mobilize voters even after it entered the government. On the other hand, the result was disappointing for ANO which was predicted to win up to 30% of votes. The pro-European campaign of TOP 09 may have played an important role in the success of the party which may have been attractive to the mostly pro-European right-centre voters who did not agree with Eurosceptic attitudes of ODS. Nevertheless, one should mention that the success of TOP 09 was probably also driven by the candidacy of Jiří Pospíšil, a former ODS Minister of Justice who joined TOP 09 just few month before the election. With more than 77.000 of preferential votes, Pospíšil became the most successful candidate in this respect. Almost 10 % of votes and 3 seats for KDU-ČSL seems to be a big victory for the Christian Democrats. However, taking into account the level of turnout and traditionally high discpline of the KDU-ČSL voters, the result of the party could have been even better. After the fall of the cabinet led by the former chairman of ODS Petr Nečas in 2013, which was caused by Nečas`s and his wife`s corruption allegation ,and after a huge slump of popularity of the party, almost 8% votes for ODS signals that the party still have a small but stable electoral base. On the other hand, the success of the Free, who present themselves not only as an Eurosceptic party but also a subject “purifying” the right-side of the Czech political space, limited the electoral renaissance of ODS. The success of the Free might be seen as another piece of puzzle of the undergoing transformation of the right-centre part of political space in the Czech Republic. The worst result of KSČM since the 2004 EP election means that even the communists should not take their electoral support for granted.

Conclusion

The lowest electoral turnout since 2004 was perhaps the most important part of the story of the 2014 election in the Czech Republic. The lack of additional stimulus to vote with the newly formed government limiting the possibility to cast protest votes, almost invisible campaign full of valence “European” statements issued by almost all political parties were probably the most important reasons for the fact that less than less than one fifth of voters finally participated in the election. Therefore, one can make only few basic observations concerning the results of political parties: the populist ANO was able to mobilize voters even after it entered the government, ODS retained some “hard-core” voters. ČSSD, usually having problems to mobilize voters in the EP elections, recorded an average result. A significant share of voters decided to vote for a more pro-European right-centre party (TOP 09) and also for a purifying right-centre Eurosceptic alternative (The Free). KSČM was not able to attract as many voters as it had in the past and KDU-ČSL did not use the potential of a disciplined voter base.

References:

Česká televize (2014). Volby do EP jsou nepotřebné – tento názor sídlí na 50 procent voličů (https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/274432-volby-do-ep-jsou-nepotrebne-tento-nazor-sdili-na-50-procent-volicu/).

Havlík, V. (2011): A Breaking-Up of a Pro-European Consensus. Attitides of Czech Political Parties towards the European Integration (1998-2010). Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44 (2), 129-147.

Hloušek, V. and Kaniok, P. (2009): European Parliament Election Briefing No 29. The 2009 European Parliament Election in the Czech Republic, June 5-6 2009 (https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-no-29-czech-republic-2009.pdf&site=266).

Chytilek, R., Lebeda, T., Šedo, J. and Čaloud, D. (2009): Volební systémy. Praha: Portál.

Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980): Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research 8 (1), 3-44.

Kopecký, P. (2004): An Awkward Newcomer? EU Enlargement and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic. In: Harmsen, R. and Spiering, Menno: Euroscepticism. Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 225-246.

Linek, L. (2006): Vliv volební účasti na zisky jednotlivých politických stran: případ voleb do Poslanecké sněmovny v roce 2006. Czech Journal of Political Science 14 (3), 205-223.

Volby.cz (www.volby.cz)

Liisa Talving and Lukas Pukelis

Estonia

The third European Parliament elections in Estonia were considered a preview of upcoming general elections in spring 2015, above all providing insight to power relations in domestic political scenery. Implementing open party lists as opposed to 2009 enabled the heavy artillery of Estonian politics to go against each other in competing for the title of the most popular politician in the country. Amid the low overall turnout (36.4%), the proportion of e-voters notably increased compared to 2009, reaching to 11.45% of those eligible to vote and to 31% of actual voters (in 2009, 6.5% and 14.7% respectively). Estonia introduced electronic voting in 2007 when it held the world’s first general elections with the possibility to cast the vote over the internet and has since then successfully used e-voting in parliamentary, local as well as European Parliament elections.

During the otherwise drab and eventless electoral campaign, the opposition Center Party attempted to undermine the trust in the Estonian e-voting system by initiating a malicious attack against it only a few days prior to the elections. The team of international experts, brought in by Center, criticized the “serious security vulnerabilities” of the system, with the party then requesting its immediate cancellation. These accusations were publicly announced unconstructive and politically loaded, and the voting procedure went on to take place as planned. The social liberal Center Party has been long known to oppose e-voting claiming that using it leads to politically biased results by structurally favoring some parties over the others. No scientific evidence has been found to support this claim (Vassil, 2014). Ultimately, the campaign against e-voting failed and roughly twice as many people as in previous EP elections voted electronically, showing their support towards the system.

Liisa Talvingwas born in Tallinn, Estonia. After studying sociology in University of Tallinn, she has spent more than ten years working in opinion polling, including in leading polling agencies in Estonia. Liisa is currently a Political Science PhD candidate at the Institute of Government and Politics in University of Tartu, with her research focusing on analyzing voting behavior.Lukas Pukelis was born in Vilnius, Lithuania. He graduated from Vilnius University International Relations and Political Science Institute with a BA in Political Science and went on to continue his postgraduate studies in University of Tartu, Estonia. In Tartu, he received a Master’s degree in Baltic Sea Region Studies and is currently a Political Science PhD student at the Institute of Government and Politics in University of Tartu.

Somewhat unexpectedly, the winner of the elections was the ruling Reform Party gaining 24.3% of total votes and claiming 2 out of 6 seats allocated to Estonia in the European Parliament. The centre-right Prime Ministerial party profited from recent changes in government, having replaced their long-time coalition partner center-right The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) with the ideological rival social democrats just two months prior to the EP elections. Although most pre-election public opinion polls predicted the victory to the opposition Center Party, the latter seems to have failed to mobilize their voters. Traditionally known to be more popular among the Russian minority, Centre is further reinforcing its image as a party for Russian-speakers. The only MEP elected from the Center Party, an ethnic Russian Yana Toom, has previously evoked wide public reaction with her radical statements towards Estonia. To the surprise of many, the long-time leader of Center, Edgar Savisaar, did not get elected. The largest opposition party seems to be losing touch with its Estonian voters, which has likely to do with ethnic divide among the electorate following the Ukraine crisis.

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Estonia
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Estonian Reform Party (ERe)	ALDE	24.3	2		+9.0	+1
Estonian Center Party (EK)	ALDE	22.3	1		-3.8	-1
The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL)	EPP	13.9	1		+1.7	+0
Social Democratic Party (SDE)	S&D	13.6	1		+4.9	+0
Indrek Tarand (independent candidate)	G-EFA	13.2	1		-12.6	+0
Total		100	6			0
Turnout (%)		36.4%			+7.5
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		none
Candidates are elected using PR system in one national electoral district. Seats are allocated using the d’Hondt formula. As opposed to 2009, the EP elections in 2014 in Estonia were held using the open party lists.EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.

Various opinion polls indicate that voting in Estonia is typically more candidate- than party-oriented. Support can be found from the fact that the second popular politician right after the recently resigned Prime Minister Andrus Ansip is the independent candidate Indrek Tarand. Despite a more modest result than in 2009, 13.2% of votes firmly ensured Tarand a seat in the European Parliament. Large support for independent candidates is generally not a wide-spread phenomenon in party-centered Europe but has been considered voting for an “informal opposition” in Estonia. While many other countries face protest voting through the rise of right- or left-wing extremes or Eurosceptics, it has been argued that Estonian voters rather punish the incumbent by voting independent in second-order elections (Ehin & Solvak 2012). Even though the relative victory this time was gained by the incumbent, voters’ strong support for independent candidates does indicate an ongoing frustration with party politics.

Latvia

The overall election results in Latvia signal widespread support to incumbent government parties and satisfaction with government policies, despite persisting difficulties in the aftermath of financial crisis. Very low election turnout (30.25%), however, is a serious cause for concern and sends out a clear message that Latvian voters consider EU-level issues a distant second to domestic politics.

The firm winner of the elections is the center-right Prime Ministerial party Unity, receiving 46.2% of all votes and yielding 4 out of 8 seats in the EP. The overall vote share of Unity rose by appr. 15% compared to 2009, although due to the formula by which MEP mandates are allocated in Latvia, this did not result in more seats. Keeping in mind the low turnout, it must still be stressed that Unity kept but did not gain a lot more votes compared to 2009 when looking at absolute numbers. Unity’s electoral campaign was run on the basis of economic growth. Party leadership has emphasized the necessity to continue the present day governmental policies of austerity and fiscal discipline, underlining this as the best way to preserve economic growth and reduce unemployment. Similarly to Estonia, in Latvia, too, the popularity of party leaders is considered one of the reasons for its success.

Unity’s coalition partner National Alliance remained a distant runner-up receiving just over 14% of votes and getting one seat in the EP. Just like Unity’s, the vote share of National Alliance has increased since 2009 but did not result in more mandates. With only 6% support predicted in most pre-election polls, the overall performance of National Alliance comes as a bit of a surprise. The reason behind the success might be the prevailing anxiety in Baltic States over the events in Ukraine. The right-wing National Alliance has earned a reputation as always taking a hard stance against Russia and has based their electoral campaign on a wide array of security issues, ranging from energy security (i.e. the need for the EU to have a unified energy policy) to tougher foreign policy and the need to strengthen the EU’s Russia sanctions over the annexation of Crimea. Latvian party system is characterized by ongoing friction between ethnic Latvians and Latvian Russian speakers (Pabriks & Stokenberga, 2006), and National Alliance seems to have managed to turn the security issues into electoral gain. The third partner in Latvian incumbent coalition government, the agrarian Union of Greens and Farmers, received 8.3% of the votes and is entering the EP for the first time.

Table 2 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Latvia
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Unity (V)	EPP	46.2	4		+15.4	+0
National Alience (NA)	ECR	14.3	1		+6.8	+0
Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS)	N/A	8.3	1		+4.5	+1
Harmony Center (SC)	GUE-NGL	13.0	1		-6.5	+0
Latvian Russian Union (LKS)	G-EFA	6.4	1		-3.2	+0
Total		100	8			0
Turnout (%)		30.3%			-23.4
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		none
Candidates are elected using PR system in one national electoral district. Seats are allocated using the highest averages (d’Hondt) formula.EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.

The main losers of the elections in Latvia were the parties supported by the Russian minority. The largest party for Russian-speakers and currently also the largest party in the national parliament, Harmony Center, received just over 13% of the votes (6% less than in 2009) and Latvian Russian Union 6.4% (3% less than in 2009), both ending up with one seat in the EP. The result is even more unexpected since the leftist Harmony Center was predicted high numbers in the pre-election polls, now leaving the party wondering why it failed to mobilize its electorate. Many experts attribute Harmony Center’s failure to the dominance of the topic of Ukraine crisis in Latvian domestic political debate.

Lithuania

In Lithuania, the EP elections were somewhat overshadowed by the second round of presidential elections taking place on the same day. This prompted a notably higher electoral turnout than in other two Baltic States (47.3%). Although the largest proportion of votes and 6 out of 11 MEP positions went to incumbent coalition parties, the actual winner of the elections by a narrow margin was a conservative Homeland Union, currently in opposition in the national parliament. Receiving 17.4% of the votes ensured the opposition party 2 seats in the EP. Coming in a close second was the Prime Ministerial Lithuanian Social Democratic Party with 17.27% of the votes and 2 seats. These two were followed by the Liberal Movement (16.5%) and right-wing Order and Justice Party (14.3%), receiving 2 mandates each. The remaining three seats were divided between the leftist-populist Labor Party, Coalition – the party representing local Russian and Polish minorities, and the agrarian Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (12.8%, 8.1% and 6.6% respectively). The latter is entering the EP for the first time.

Table 3 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Lithuania
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Homeland Union (TS-LKD)	EPP	17.4	2		-8.3	-2
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)	S&D	17.3	2		+1.3	-1
Lithuanian Liberal Movement (LRLS)	ALDE	16.5	2		+9.1	+1
Order and Justice (TT)	EFD	14.3	2		+2.0	+0
Labor Party (DP)	ALDE	12.8	1		+4.0	+0
Coalition (K)	ECR	8.1	1		-0.3	+0
Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVZS)	N/A	6.6	1		+4.8	+1
Total		100	11			-1
Turnout (%)		47.28			+26.3
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		none
Mandates are allocated proportionally in one national electoral district, to all the lists which received more than 5% of the votes using the method of largest remainders (Hare method). EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.

Prior to the elections, the incumbent coalition parties ran rather similar campaigns on the basis of more socially responsible policy, ending austerity measures imposed by the previous government and vowing to get more EU structural funding to Lithuania. Order and Justice demanded a popular referendum on whether or not Lithuania should adopt euro (Lithuania will join the Eurozone on the 1^st of January 2015), while the party Coalition emphasized issues related to ethnic minorities. The ethnicity question, however, is not nearly as polarizing in Lithuania as it is in Latvia or Estonia due to different national composition, broad citizenship opportunities and favorable legal framework (Jurkynas, 2004).

The relative proximity of coalition parties’ platforms resulted in the fact that during the second round of the presidential elections, incumbent parties rallied behind Zigmantas Balcytis, a presidential candidate of the ruling Social Democratic Party and also a number one candidate on the party’s EP elections list. The opposition parties Liberal Movement and Homeland Union supported the incumbent president Dalia Grybauskaite, who, in turn, expressed her indirect support for these parties in the EP elections. The relative success of the two opposition parties in the EP elections came as a bit of a surprise but Grybauskaite’s victory in presidential elections with a fair margin would allow speculating that a substantial share of her electorate also expressed their support for the opposition candidates who had backed her presidential bid. Furthermore, the general tendency in Baltic States in these EP elections points to the fact that center-right parties have managed to mobilize their electoral base better than their competitors on the left side of the political spectrum.

References:

Jurkynas, Mindaugas (2004). “Emerging cleavages in new democracies: The case of Lithuania”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 35:3, 278-296.

Ehin, Piret & Mihkel Solvak (2012). “Party Voters Gone Astray: Explaining Independent Candidate Success in the 2009 European Elections in Estonia”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 22:3, 269-291.

Pabriks, Artis & Aiga Stokenberga (2006). “Political Parties and Party System in Latvia” in Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and party systems, Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Ashgate, Burlington.

Vassil, Kristjan (2014). “Does Internet Voting Bias Election Results? Evidence from Estonia”, Unpublished manuscript available online at https://www.ut.ee/kristjan.vassil/?p=705.

Michał Kotnarowski and Mikołaj Cześnik

Introduction: the context

The European Parliamentary (EP) Elections held on 25th May were the third EP elections in modern history of Poland. The first election took place in 2004, just after joining European Union, and the second in 2009. The main characteristics of previous Polish EP elections were low voter turnout and relatively good results of small and radical parties.

Voter turnout in 2004 EP elections in Polish case was 21% and it was the second lowest rate among EU countries in 2004 EP elections. The only country with lower voter turnout was Slovakia (17%). The voter turnout in 2004 EP elections was also low in relation to the closest in time elections on national level. Voter turnout in national Parliamentary Elections held in 2005 was 41% and in Presidential Elections held in the same year 50%. Voter turnout was also relatively low in 2009 EP elections –25%. It was one of the lowest turnout rate in Europe in 2009 EP elections. Voter turnout in the closest in time national elections was also substantially higher – 54% in Parliamentary elections held in 2007 and 55% in Presidential Elections held in 2010. As one can see, voter turnout in Polish EP elections was low in comparison to both EP elections in other EU countries and national level elections.

Mikołaj Cześnik, PhD, works at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw. He is a member of the Polish National Election Study team. His research interests include elections and voting behavior. Michał Kotnarowski is a PhD student and researcher at the Comparative Politics Division at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Specializes in electoral research and political methodology. Member of the Polish National Election Study.

In the first Polish EP elections (held in 2004), small parties achieved relatively good scores. They were either anti-EU parties as League of Polish Families (16% vote share), and Self-Defence (11%) or pro-EU parties as Freedom Union (7%) and Social Democrats of Poland (5%). Small parties did not attain good score in the second EP elections (2009) and elections results were very similar to national parliamentary results had held two years before. This lack of difference could be caused by relative stabilization of Polish party system and weakness or absence of small parties at that time.

Because of low turnout and relative good results of small and radical parties (only in 2004 case) Polish EP elections could be classified as second order elections, the term introduced by Reif and Schmitt (1980). It means that EP elections in Poland were viewed by voters as less important and dependent on first order elections, which are national elections.

The Important contextual information about EP elections in Poland is high public support for European integration among Polish citizens. Around 60% of Poles supported joining European Union in June 2004, while 30% was against European integration in the survey conducted a few weeks after joining European Union and a few weeks before first Polish EP elections. Public support for European Union was growing in subsequent years until mid-2008, when European integration was supported by almost 90% of Poles. From the second half of 2008 share of supporters of integration slightly decreased, however it still remained on high level. Almost 75% of Polish citizens supported European integration at the beginning of 2014. Massive support for European integration is probably related to huge financial support from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund of European Union. Almost every person could notice in his/her surrounding many investments co-financed from EU funds. One point should be mention here. While Poles in general support presence of Poland in European Union, their opinions are divided as far as further and deeper integration with European Union is concerned. In May 2013 one third of Poles supported strengthening European Integration, another one third declared that integration already gone too far and the remaining one third did not have an opinion in this matter.

There is important contextual information. 2014 EP elections were first elections in Poland after four years period without any election (excluding local elections or local referenda in a few places). The last nation-wide election before 2014 EP ones, were local ones held in November 2010. Moreover, this year EP elections are first in the ‘four-election marathon’ which is taking place from spring 2014 to autumn 2015. The next will be local elections planned for autumn 2014, then Presidential election on spring 2015 and the last one, national parliamentary elections which will be held autumn 2015. Such a long period without elections could make media as well as political parties yearning for important political event. On the other hand, as a first election in this ‘four-election marathon’, EP elections could be treated as a first skirmish before serious battle in first order elections (national one) which will be held next year.

Main issues in the campaign

The main topic of the campaign was Ukraine. Due to geopolitical reasons Ukrainian issues have always been a central topic in Polish politics. Therefore the last crisis in Ukraine has been very closely monitored in Poland from its very beginning. In the campaign, in the 2-3 months before the EP election, the issue of Ukraine dominated political discussions and public discourse.

Obviously most of discussions focused on safety issues, including predominantly military and external security. Poland is a country bordering Russia, exposed to its imperial attempts. Ukrainian crisis provided evidence that the previous Polish security policy (which was inter-correlated with the politics of the EU towards Russia), characterised by spirit of co-operation and agreement and focused on rapprochement with Russia, was ineffective. The Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who was ‘the face’ of this policy, has been heavily criticized during the campaign, especially by the main opposition party Law and Justice. Moreover, he during the crisis (and the campaign) changed quite importantly his position and accepted a more militant attitude towards Russia.

Another important issue raised in the campaign was the topic of energy’s security. Main directions of the country’s energy policy have been thoroughly discussed. Poland is the biggest hard coal producer in the EU and nearly all of its generated electricity (around 92-94%) comes from coal-fired power plants fuelled principally by hard coal and lignite. But Poland imports nearly 90% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural gas. Its main supplier remains Russia. This heavy reliance on external supplies of gas and oil to Poland remains a threat to the security of energy supply to the nation. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict (including gas disputes) undoubtedly endangers the security of gas and oil supply to Poland.

In general, the campaign was rather rational and programmatically structured (at least for the Polish standards). Meritocratic and programmatic discourse prevailed; political quarrels, scandals and clashes were relatively infrequent (especially in comparison to previous electoral campaigns in Poland).

Election results

Voter turnout in the 2014 EP election in Poland was 23.83%. The turnout rate is similarly low as in previous EP elections held in Poland. The fact that in three other European Union countries voter turnout level was even lower (Slovakia 13%, Czech Republic 19.5% and Slovenia 21%) is not very heartening.

Polish voters elected 51 Members of European Parliament (MEP). The best result in the elections was won by senior incumbent party Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO, EPP group in European Parliament) – 32.13% votes. However very close results was won by the main opposition party Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PIS, ECR in group in European Parliament) – 31.78%. In fact, this result could be treated as draw. Apart of very similar vote share, both parties gained 19 seats in EP. The third place in the election race was taken by Left-Democratic Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – SLD). This party received 9.44% of votes and won 5 seat in EP. SLD is member of S&D group in EP. The real surprise of these elections was fourth result of New Right (Nowa Prawica Janusza Korwin-Mikke – NP). This party got 7.15% vote share and 4 seats in EP. This party is strongly against European Union. One of the points of its manifesto is dissolution of European Union. The leader of the party (Janusz Korwin-Mikke) is a person with a strong charismatic personality, who quite often used populist slogans. This is the best results of the leader of this party ever – the party is not present in national parliament. Fifth position in election race was taken by Polish Peasants Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL, EPP group in EP). PSL won 6.80% vote share and 4 seats in EP. PSL is junior incumbent party and belongs to EPP group in EP.

According to Polish electoral system there is 5% electoral threshold in EP elections. Among parties which did not cross the threshold the best result won Solidary Poland (Solidarna Polska – SP) – 4%. SP was establish by former PIS politicians – all SP members of national Parliament were elected from PIS electoral lists. The next position in electoral race was taken by Europe+ Your Move (Europa + Twój Ruch – E+TR) – 3.57%. E+TR is a liberal-left coalition of different parties or groups, but a base of it was Palikot Movement, the third power in national Parliament. In the last national Parliamentary elections Palikot Movement got 10% vote share. The result of this coalition is a surprise at least for the three reasons. Firstly, E+TR was one of the left alternative for the rightist parties, which are dominant in Polish party system (rightist or centre-rightist parties got together at least 69% of votes in each elections since 2007). Secondly, former President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who is still popular in Poland, officially supported E+TR and was presented as patron of this coalition. And lastly, group of popular politicians with leftist or liberal origins run in EP elections as leaders of electoral lists of E+TR.

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Poland
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Civic Platform (PO)	EPP	32.1	19		-12.3	-6
Law and Justice (PIS)	ECR	31.78	19		+4.4	+4
Democratic Left Aliance (SLD)	S&D	9.44	5		-2.9	-2
New Right (NP JKM)	new in EP	7.15	4		+6.1	+4
Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL)	EPP	6.8	4		-0.2	+1
Solidary Poland (SP)	EFD	3.98	0		+4.0	+0
Europe+ Your Move (E+TR)	ALDE	3.58	0		+3.6	+0
Others		5.15	0
Total		100.0	51			–
Turnout (%)		23.83			-0.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		5%
EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.

Likewise in other elections held in Poland, there is a strong and clear territorial diversification of results of 2014 EP elections. The highest support for PO is observed in North and West part of Poland. These are former German territories incorporated to Poland after Second World War and settled mainly by people from former Polish territories on the East, which became part of Soviet Union after the War. High support for PO was also present in Silesia region (South-West part of Poland). People living there have strong local identification and cultural identity. Very good results PO won in the capital, Warsaw, and other big cities. On the other hand, high support for main opposition party PIS was noted mainly on East part of Poland. People living on these areas did not experience strong migration movements – they are mainly settled there for generations. People from East regions of Poland are also more religious and attached to traditional values. High support for PIS, which is conservative party, is understandable from this perspective. PIS got high vote shares also in smaller towns and villages.

Conclusions

Polish MEP’s are going to constitute the sixth largest group in European Parliament. PO and PSL MEP’s are going to join the EPP group, SLD MEP’s will join the S&D group. Still rather unknown is the future of the right-wing parties; PIS MEP’s will most probably join the ECR group; the NP MEP’s can form an anti-EU group with other euro-sceptics. It is worth noting that the Polish MEP’s are going to constitute the second largest group in the EPP.

Unquestionably the 2014 EP elections results are going to influence Polish politics. In the context of previously mentioned ‘four-election marathon’ they have provided a new impetus for all the political parties. The winners – PO and PIS – have strengthened their hegemonic role in electoral politics of Poland. Without a doubt they are going to dominate the upcoming electoral campaigns (local elections in fall 2014, presidential election in late spring or early summer 2015, parliamentary election in fall 2015). SLD and PSL have fortified their positions, NP has grown as an important player on the right-wing of Polish politics. The losers of the 2014 EP election in Poland – SP, E+TR etc. – need to rethink their political appeals, in order not to be annihilated in the next elections.

References:

Reif, K. & Schmitt, H., 1980. Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), ss.3–44.

Roguska, B., 2013. Stosunek Polaków do integracji europejskiej (No. BS/72/2013). Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), Warszawa.

Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2009 [WWW Document]. URL https://pe2009.pkw.gov.pl/PUE/PL/WYN/F/index.htm (accessed 5.29.14).

Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, n.d. Wybory do Parlementu Europejskiego 2014 [WWW Document]. URL https://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl/pl/ (accessed 5.28.14).

 

Luana Russo

France went to the polls on Sunday 25^th May[1]. France elected 74 MEPs (two more than in 2009) using a proportional system with a 5% electoral threshold and closed lists[2]. Political parties establish the order of candidates on the lists; voters can only cast a vote for the list and not for individual candidates. Seats are thus attributed according to the order in which the candidates are presented on the list. The national territory is divided up into eight constituencies (including one for all of the overseas territories).

The election campaign

In France, as in several other European countries (e.g. the Netherlands, UK or Italy), the electoral campaign has been influenced by the strong presence of a Eurosceptic party – Front National (FN) – the extreme-right party headed by Marine Le Pen. Beforehand, the pre-election polls already captured the unprecedented result Front National was heading for, estimating (correctly) that FN would become the largest party in France.

Luana Russo is a lecturer in Research Methods at Maastricht University. She has completed her PhD in 2011 at the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna and was a visiting scholar at Columbia University in 2010. Between 2011 and 2013 she was a postdoc researcher at Sciences-Po Paris and Université Lille 2. Her research interests include electoral geography, vote change and voting behaviour, volatility and electoral participation.

The fervently anti-European FN campaign was supported on the national level by the strong economic crunch that heavily affected President François Hollande’s popularity (which went from 61% in March 2012 to 18% at the beginning of May 2014[3]) and that of his party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), in power since 2012.

Front National did not meet strong opposition, not even on the right, even though the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP, the main conservative party) gave it a try by reintroducing ex-President Nicolas Sarkozy into the political fray and in turn launching a unequivocally anti-European campaign by using slogans that talked about the suspension of the Schengen treaty and the transfer of half of the EU’s competences back to member states.

In general, it was Front National that dictated the terms and issues of the campaign to the two large moderate parties, who did not succeed in imposing a different agenda nor managed to sufficiently mobilize voters. In fact, according to the pre-election polls, abstention would reach a new record high, beating the already historical level of the 2009 European elections (59,9%).

Besides the issues, the tone of the campaign was way calmer compared to other countries. Marine Le Pen conducted a campaign void of shouting matches, merely pointing to the simple nature of its program and the clarity of its message: no Europe, more France, exit from the Euro and abolition of the Schengen treaty.

The results

Forecasts did not lie: according to official results FN confirmed expectations by becoming the largest party in France, with a whopping 25.0%, while the two big moderate parties (PS and UMP) underwent a substantial erosion of their popular mandate compared to the 2009 European elections, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – France
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
National Front (FN)	NI	25.0	24		+18.6	+21
Union for a popular movement (UMP)	EPP	20.8	20		-7.1	-9
Socialist Party (PS)/ Radical Leftist Party (PRG)	S&D	14.0	13		-2.5	-1
Alternative (Alt)	ALDE	9.9	7		+1.4	+1
Ecology Europe – The Greens (EELV)	G-EFA	8.9	6		-7.4	-8
Leftist Front (FG)	GUE-NGL	6.3	3		-0.1	-1
Different Left (DVG)	NI		1
Others		15.1	–
Total		100	74			–
Turnout (%)		43.5			+2.9
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		5%
EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.Note: Vote totals have been calculated, as is customary in France, by taking into account metropolitan France (thus excluding the overseas departments)Source: French Ministry of Interior[4]

As far as the PS is concerned, the loss is dramatic, especially when compared to the results of the 2012 Presidential elections in which Hollande won the second round with 58.5% of the votes (in the first round he scored 35.4%). The day after the election the prime minister of the current socialist government, Manuel Valls, described the 2014 electoral results as being “an earthquake”, declared that the government will not change its course, but that they already scheduled a tax reduction[5].

Also for the UMP the comparison with the Presidential elections shows a net decline: in 2012 Sarkozy got 26.1% of the votes in the first round and 41.5% in the second one. FN not only quadrupled its vote share in comparison with the 2009 European elections, but they also gained 15 percentage points compared to the 2012 Presidential one in which they got 10.1%.

Among the other parties, the centre-right party Alternative (a union of the two centre parties: the Union des democrats et independents founded by Jean-Luis Borloo in 2012, and the Mouvement Démocrate of the centrist leader François Bayrou) is the only one that – together with FN – managed to increase its vote share compared to 2009. The good result of Alternative and the hard loss suffered by its natural ally UMP could lead to a readjustment of the power-balance within the centre-right. We also see a net decline for Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV – the left-wing, ecologist party) that goes from 14 MEPs to 6. At the 2009 European elections it scored exceptionally well (16.3%) under the leadership of the famous French-German writer Daniel Marc Cohn-Bendit (who officially withdrew from politics in April 2014).

Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of Front de Gauche (FG), which hoped to clear the 10% threshold but instead stayed level compared to 2009, declared they were disappointed by the results[6]. Finally, one seat also went to the candidate of Divers Gauche who got elected by the overseas departments. Divers Gauche is not a party per se, but rather a group that includes left-wing candidates that are members of minor parties or are do not belong to any party.

An interpretation

The main result of the election, however, remains the fact that FN for the first time in its 30-year existence managed to become the largest party at the national level, beating its eternal rival UMP. For the European level it is also worth remembering that FN presented itself to the voters not being part of any EU party group. When asked which party group they would join after the elections, Marine Le Pen answered that she wants to found a new party group.

Apart from being the largest party in France, FN is also the largest extreme-right party in a Europe in which the expansion of the right-wing Eurosceptics is undisputable[7]: the Eurosceptics now hold 142 seats compared to 64 in 2009.

Concerning the levels of participation, contrary to the predictions of a new abstention record, the level of abstention actually even diminished slightly: 56.5% compared to 59.5% in 2009.

Several scholars have underlined the second-order nature of the European elections, which means that instead of being an expression of preferences concerning European issues, it tends to assume the role of a referendum on the national government in power (see, for instance, Reif & Schmitt, 1980). In this sense, considering the low levels of appreciation for the current socialist president François Hollande, a good result for the opposition should not have come as a big surprise – if it wouldn’t be for the fact that traditionally this result should have been achieved by the moderate, conservative UMP party and not, as has been the case, the extreme-right.

Notwithstanding the fact that the victory of FN was largely forecasted, the width of the gap between FN and the centre-right UMP remains an impressive result. If we look at the result of the 2009 European elections, in five years the balance of power on the right-hand side of the French political spectrum has radically changed and the roles have been reversed: looking at the 6% FN vote share in 2009, it has practically quadrupled its support (24%), while UMP lost 7 percentage points and got 21% (down from 28%) and has thus become the second right-wing party in the country instead of the leading one.

The PS debacle (and to a lesser extent that of the UMP as well) and the success of FN become even more evident when we look at the geographical distribution of the votes. Figure 1 shows the largest political party in each of the eight electoral constituencies for the European elections.

Figure 1: Largest political party by constituency

The map of the votes shows the picture of a country that is skewed to the right. FN is the largest party in five of the constituencies. In the other ones the UMP leads the way.

When we take a look at the role of age groups, FN – differently from PS or UMP – is characterized by a young electorate. According to Ipsos-Steria FN scores best among voters under 35 years of age (about 30%) while with the electoral over 60 y. the results are below the national median (21%).

On the contrary, the UMP is remarkably more popular among those over 60 y. with a vote share of 25%, which is about 4% more than the national median. Also the PS cannot claim it was successful amongst young voters: only 15% of voters under 30 y. chose PS.

Finally, it is interesting to note that it is amongst lower social strata that FN gets its best scores: in the last European elections 43% of the workers voted FN, while only 8% voted PS[8].

In conclusion

European Parliament elections are not general elections, which is why we should be very careful in interpreting these shifts in popular support at the polls. It has in fact been remarked that because it is in the very nature of European elections that they do not have a direct national effect, and that voters therefore tend to express their vote free from considerations on government formation and favour smaller parties (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). However, the French result clearly carries weight on the European level, but especially on the national one. It suffices to refer to the fact that it were in fact the 1984 European elections that marked the historical rise of Front National in the first place (Hainsworth, 2004).

Interpreting the victory of FN solely as an anti-European vote would definitely be a mistake. The European elections in France were held in a context of economic crisis, high unemployment levels and low support levels for President Hollande. These elements could have played an important role in reinforcing the tendency to use the European elections as an opportunity to voice protest (Pertusot & Rittelmeyer, 2014). This interpretation appears to be plausible in the light of some results recently put forward by the Pew Research Center (2014) according to which the majority of French is in favour of the European Union and supports the common currency (i.e. the Euro).

References

Hainsworth, Paul (2004). The Extreme Right in France: The Rise and Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National. Representation, 40(22) pp. 101-114.

Pertusot ,Vivien and Rittelmeyer, Yann-Sven (2014). The European Elections in France: The paradox of a more European yet more eurosceptic campaign. EPIN Commentary No. 16 / 6 February 2014.

Pew Research Center (2014). A Fragile Rebound for EU Image on Eve of European Parliament Elections. EU Favorability Rises, but Majorities Say theis Voice Is Not Heard in Brussels. Consulatbile Online: https://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/2014-05-12_Pew-Global-Attitudes-European-Union.pdf

Reif, Karlheinz and Schmitt, Hermann (1980). Nine Second Order National Elections: a Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research 8, pp. 3-44.

Nina Liljeqvist

In the 2009 European elections, Swedish voters favoured government parties on the centre-right and gave the cold shoulder to alternatives on both the far-left and far-right. Come 2014, things could not be more different. This is the fifth European Parliament election for Swedish voters and while voter turnout is on the up, support for the mainstream parties on both the centre-left and centre-right is decreasing.

From the campaign to the result: the winners

The voters are instead rewarding those that have emphasised specific issues and concrete alternatives in the campaign, namely green politics, feminism, and nationalism. The Green Party (Mp) achieved an impressive election result, receiving an unprecedented 15% of the votes (Table 1) to become the second largest Swedish party in the European Parliament. Mp considers that this success is the result of focusing on the ‘right’ issues, that is, on issues that are regulated at the European level and where the party knows how to make a difference. Media has paid attention to how Green MEP Isabella Lövin has single-handedly managed to bring about a fundamental change of the European Union’s fisheries policies in the last few years, which arguably has had considerable traction with voters.

Nina Liljeqvist is a PhD researcher in political science at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy and a research fellow at the Swedish parliament for the parliamentary session 2014/15. Her research interests lie in the area of comparative politics, and more specifically in representative democracy, European integration, and Nordic politics.

The other two parties that have advanced this year are located at both extremes of the political spectrum. As in several other countries in Europe, the far-right is also experiencing a surge in support in Sweden. The Sweden Democrats (SD), with its anti-immigration and EU-skeptic stance, received 10% of the votes and thereby enters the European Parliament for the first time with two seats. Despite the SD having to cancel a number of public election meetings due to violent protests – or, perhaps rather because of this – the party has almost tripled support received in the 2009 election. Besides the Left Party (V), which openly argues for an eventual exit from the European Union, the SD certainly offers voters an alternative EU-stance compared with the centre parties. The party wishes to renegotiate Swedish EU membership, reinstate national border controls, remain outside the EMU, but also, ensure free trade with the rest of Europe. In other words, the party wants to keep Swedish access to the inner market, although without complying with the corresponding regulations. How the party intends to work to advance these issues, which are all regulated at the national level, is uncertain to say the least. There is also uncertainty surrounding what parliamentary party group that they will join, which is essentially a question of whether or not the SD will shift even further right by joining Marine Le Pen’s proposed more extreme far right group. Possibly for strategic reasons to avoid ‘guilt by association’, party leader Jimmie Åkesson has refused to discuss potential affiliations, and it is reasonable to expect that the SD will not reveal what group to sit in until after the national elections this September.

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Sweden. NB: Preliminary election results, definite results not yet published
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Swedish Social Democratic Party (S)	S&D	24,2	5		-0,2	-1
Moderate Party (M)	EPP	13,7	3		-5,1	-1
Green Party (Mp)	G-EFA	15,4	4		+4,4	+2
Liberal People’s Party (Fp)	ALDE	9,9	2		-3,7	-1
Centre Party (C )	ALDE	6,5	1		+1,0	+0
Sweden Democrats (Sd)		9,7	2		+6,4	+2
Left Party (V)	GUE-NGL	6,3	1		+0,6	+0
Christian Democrats (Kd)	EPP	5,9	1		+1,2	+0
Pirate Party (PP)	G-EFA	2,2	0		-4,9	-2
Feminist Initiative (Fi)		5,5	1		+3,3	+1
Others	n/a	0,7	0		-3,1	+0
Total		100,0	20			–
Turnout (%)		51,1			+5,5
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		4%
The 20 seats are distributed in proportional elections, using a modified form of the Sainte-Laguë method of party-lists. The entire country is a single electoral constituency with a threshold limit of 4 per cent.EP group abbreviations: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy;NI=Non-Inscrits.

The second Swedish newcomer is located at the opposite end of the spectrum. For the first time in Swedish history, as indeed European, Feminist Initiative (Fi) enters the European Parliament. A new type of political movement based on feminism, the party’s ideology cuts across the socio-economic left-right dimension, but is probably best positioned on the far-left. Having scored around 2% in the 2009 election, thereby falling far below the 4-percentage-threshold, the party just garnered 5% of the votes. While the one seat this grants Fi may sound meagre, it is monumental because feminism has entered the political landscape for real. Party leader Gudrun Schyman has run a remarkable campaign over the last few months, getting considerable media attention by pressing ministers and party leaders on the importance of gender equality and human rights. Their slogan ‘Out with the racists, in with the feminists!’ has found particular traction with voters in urban areas with higher education. At the time of writing, it is still not revealed whether Fi will join the group of the Nordic Green Left or European Free Alliance in the parliament.

From the campaign to the result: the losers

A loser in this election is the Pirate Party (PP), the Swedish initiative that has spread to over 30 countries worldwide. As transparency of state administration has become a key issue for the party, along with free communication and personal integrity on the web, the Snowden affair put wind in the sails of the PP throughout last year. However, the party just scored only 2% and thereby loses its two seats in the parliament. While not as catastrophic as for the PP, parties on the centre-left and centre-right all had a mediocre election. The Social Democrats (S) attracted a disappointing 24% of the vote share, one of their worst results, which grants the party six seats. The S thereby remain the largest party in Sweden and, together with the 6% vote share of the armour-bearer Left Party (V) and the 15% of possible coalition partner Mp, they easily bested their rivals on the centre-right. This includes the Alliance of four centre-right parties that has formed the government since 2006. The liberal conservative Moderate Party (M), the party of current Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and finance minister Anders Borg, went “all in” during the last few weeks of the campaign, but perhaps too little, too late. Instead, the Moderates slumped to its worst European Parliament election to date, with support dropping from 19 to 13%, and the number of seats decreasing from four to only three. The situation is not much better for its coalition partner the Liberal People’s Party (Fp), which, as the most pro-EU of the bunch, is fighting against the EU-critical winds of the time. While the winners in the 2009 election, the Fp lost almost four percentage points, reduced to a measly 10% and two seats. Things do not look as grim for the Centre Party (C) and the Christian Democrats (Kd), both improving their results with about one percentage point each. As both parties have been hovering around the four-per cent-threshold for the last few months, there was first and foremost a sense of relief in the C and Kd camps Sunday evening as they secured 6.5 and 6% of the votes respectively, thereby keeping one seat each in the Parliament.

In conclusion

Overall, Swedish voters rewarded the Greens and parties on both extremes of the left-right continuum, thus leaving the established parties at the centre in an unattractive state. It is true that parties in government position usually perform badly in European Parliament elections, and that the centre-left has traditionally been poor at mobilising its voters in this election. It is also true that voters cast their ballot more expressively and with fewer calculations in mind in European vis-à-vis national elections. But, a lot was at stake in this year’s European election campaign, and it is obvious that established parties failed to rise to the occasion. For the first time ever, the European Parliament party groups have put forward candidates for the next President of the European Commission, a democratic experiment that Swedish parties have remained surprisingly indifferent to. Neither the parties nor the media paid any real attention to this in their campaigns. Also, with the particular situation Europe finds itself in, and with voter dissatisfaction with the political elite, new policies and ideas are called for. Parties have had ample opportunity to politicise the EU more than in previous elections. Instead, a large part of debates tend to focus on issues that the European Parliament does not legislate, or a confusing set of goals for the EU in the future. Mainstream parties in Sweden have settled on a meaningless mantra perhaps summarized as ‘a slimmer, but sharper Europe’, without any coherent policy programme to go with it: the social democrats want common rules to avoid competition over minimum wages, but at the same time want to keep the right to protect Swedish wages and workers’ conditions. The Moderates want to cut red tape and decrease bureaucracy, but also want to set up a new commissioner portfolio for an improved surveillance of national implementation.

A lot was at stake in this election also because it coincides with national elections in September. Parties have one big campaign this year with extra money to splash. One possible spill-over effect that the European election will have on the national one is more focus on individual MPs, rather than on parties, which was very much the case this spring with top candidates attracting a lot of attention in TV and radio. With regard to actual election results, we can only speculate. The fiasco of M and Fp does not bode well for the survival of the Alliance. Conversely, Mp and Fiare cheered on with this recent success in the next few months of campaigning, if not at least psychologically. At the same time, voters behave differently in national elections and the success of Mp is not very likely to be repeated at the national level. Also, the SD’s 10% vote share yet again reminds us of the fact that nationalism has entered the Swedish political arena and that is seems here to stay. But, the situation is not all bleak. With the success of environmentalism and feminism, at least it looks as if new ideas and new visions are back on the scene.

References

Oscarsson, H & Holmberg, S (2011). Swedish voting behavior. Report 2011:4 of the Swedish National Election Studies Program. University of Gothenburg: Department of Political Science.

Poguntke, T., Aylott, N., Ladrech, R., & Luther, K. R. (2007). The Europeanisation of national party organisations: A conceptual analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 46(6), 747-771

24,2	5		-0,2	-1
13,7	3		-5,1	-1
15,4	4		+4,4	+2
9,9	2		-3,7	-1
6,5	1		+1,0	+0
9,7	2		+6,4	+2
6,3	1		+0,6	+0
5,9	1		+1,2	+0
2,2	0		-4,9	-2
5,5	1		+3,3	+1
0,7	0		-3,1	+0
100,0	20			–
51,1			+5,5

Konstantinos Athanasiadis

The elections of the 25^th May in Greece were realised amidst pronounced polarisation, deep fragmentation and collapse of partisan identities. Interestingly, the elections coincided with the 40^th anniversary of the collapse of the military junta that ruled Greece for seven years (1967-1974) and the subsequent consolidation of democracy as inculcated in the era of Metapolitefsi (change of regime/ new ethos in the conduct of politics).

Konstantinos Athanasiadis is PhD Candidate at LUISS Guido Carli University. Mr Athanasiadis earned an MSc in International Politics from SOAS, University of London and a BA in International and European Studies from the University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki. His research interests include among others international relations and comparative politics.

The 2014 European elections hallmark a historic victory for the Greek Left, since for the first time a party residing in the left fringes of the political spectrum, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) –whose leader Alexis Tsipras ran also as a candidate for the presidency of the European Commission for the European Left- won an election. Simultaneously, the 2014 European elections will be evoked for the continuous rise of the neo-nazi party of Golden Dawn (GD). Finally, the results nurture conflicting interpretations regarding their exact meaning: is it the Left that will drive the ship of Greece far from the murky waters of austerity and the memoranda? Or is it rather a ringing bell of frustration by the Greeks to the ruling coalition of New Democracy (centre right/ND) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) with an eye to the upcoming legislative elections (formally 2016)?

The results

Greece marches since 2009 (bipolarity’s last stand given the emergence the pro- anti-Memorandum cleavage) towards party system transformation (Mair 1997) in the form of polarised pluralism (Sartori 1976), expressed in terms of intense ideological polarisation and a fragmented parliament (seven effective parties). This transformation is coupled with a deep institutional crisis (Verney 2014), albeit latent before 2010 (adoption of the first Memorandum of Understanding) which was articulated as anger and distrust vis-à-vis the political system at large under the catalysing pressure of the austerity measures.

In this context, serious contradictions became embedded in the political and social landscape that emerged also in the period that preceded and followed the European elections. Firstly, 42 lists competed for the 21 seats Greece is allotted in the European Parliament, which is translated into 1299 candidates (News.gr 2014). Greece is thus first in the per capita number of candidates in the EU, and third in absolute numbers behind France (3753) and Italy (2106). Secondly, the closed party list, preferred until the last European elections, was replaced by the open one as a means to contain abstention (the 3% threshold remained in place). The turnout was indeed quite satisfactory (60% against 53% in 2009), -as Greeks voted for the runoff of the local elections too-. Yet a significant segment of the electorate has paradoxically cast its ballot in favour of representatives of the old political class, who were to be found on almost all winning lists but also in favour of famous TV personalities (Margomenou 2014).

The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA- umbrella organisation for 12 political groups of the Left) achieved a historical victory (26,58% of the votes and six seats in the European Parliament). This share is very close to the percentage gained in the June 2012 legislative elections, when SYRIZA came second with 26,89%, whilst by far exceeding its 2009 European elections’ share of 4,70%. The conservative centre right party of ND, on the other hand, major pillar of the coalition government since June 2012, saw its political influence dropping by 9,6% since 2009 (and losing three seats), and by almost 7% since the last legislative elections held two years ago.

The performance of the neo-nazi party of Golden Dawn still, confirmed a shared fear: the party has indeed acquired a solid basis of support. Its meteoric rise continues (9,4% and 3 seats, 0,46% in 2009, 6,92% in 2012) against the background of an ongoing judicial investigation that likens the party to a ‘criminal gang’ (Kathimerini 2014).

Table 1 – Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections – Greece
Party	EP Group	Votes (%)	Seats		Votes (change from 2009)	Seats (change from 2009)
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	GUE-NGL	26,6	6		+21,9	+5
New Democracy (ND)	EPP	22,7	5		-9,6	-3
Golden Dawn (GD)		9,4	3		+8,9	+3
Elia/Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	S&D	8,0	2		-28,6	-6
To Potami (The River)	S&D	6,6	2		+6,6	+2
Communist Party (KKE)	GUE-NGL	6,1	2		-2,3	+0
Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Hellenes)		3,5	1		+3,5	+1
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	EFD	2,7	0		-4,5	-2
Greek European Citizens (Hellenes Evropaioi Polites)		1,4	0		+1,4	+0
Democratic Left (DIMAR)	S&D	1,2	0		+1,2	+0
Union for the Homeland and the People (Enosi gia tin Patrida kai to Lao)		1,0	0		+1,0	+0
Greek Hunters’ Party (Komma Hellenon Kinigon)		1,0	0		-0,3	+0
Green Party/ Pirates (Ecologoi Prasinoi/Peirates)	G-EFA	0,9	0		-2,6	-1
Other		8,8
Total		100	21			–
Turnout (%)		60,0			+7,4
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)		3%
Abbreviations for EP groups: EPP=European People’s Party; S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ALDE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; G-EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists; GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left; EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy; NI=Non-Inscrits.

Moreover, the socialist party of PASOK, which ran under the rubric of the Olive Tree (inspired by the respective Italian scheme) together with various PASOK splinter groups, gained 8,02% in stark comparison to the 36,65% of 2009 and the 12,28% of 2012. Yet, the party leadership evaluated the share as face-saving given the adverse conditions of the participation in the coalition government. The centre-left/liberal ‘To Potami’ (The River), founded some months before the elections, fared impressively (6,60%) as its leader, a prominent journalist, speaks for a new way of conducting politics, whilst expressing his volition to share part of the responsibility in a future coalition government (Kathimerini 2014).

The Communist Party instead, whilst slightly ameliorating its share from the 2012 elections (+1,5%), lost 2,3% in comparison to the 2009 European elections. The rightist Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Hellenes), -a ND splinter group that argue against the Memoranda and the loss of national sovereignty-, whilst debuting in these European elections and securing one seat (3,46%)- lost significant part of their dynamic amassed in 2012 (7,51%). Finally, special reference should be made to relevant parties that did not reach the 3% threshold. The ultra-conservative Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) made a significant comeback (2,70%) after it has hit rock bottom in the 2012 general elections (1,58%) and its short participation in the coalition government of Lucas Papademos (technocrat-former Vice President of the European Central Bank). Moreover, the Green Party lost its unique seat although joining forces with the Pirates. Last but not least, the party of the Democratic Left (DIMAR) –splinter group of SYRIZA-, which portrayed itself as the ‘Left of responsibility’, occupying the ground between SYRIZA (radical Left) and PASOK (social democracy) utterly failed (1,20% from 6,26% in the 2012 general elections), revealing a sort of ‘existential crisis’ since DIMAR left the coalition government (the party is on the verge of dissolution).Moreover, the socialist party of PASOK, which ran under the rubric of the Olive Tree (inspired by the respective Italian scheme) together with various PASOK splinter groups, gained 8,02% in stark comparison to the 36,65% of 2009 and the 12,28% of 2012. Yet, the party leadership evaluated the share as face-saving given the adverse conditions of the participation in the coalition government. The centre-left/liberal ‘To Potami’ (The River), founded some months before the elections, fared impressively (6,60%) as its leader, a prominent journalist, speaks for a new way of conducting politics, whilst expressing his volition to share part of the responsibility in a future coalition government (Kathimerini 2014).

The campaign

The campaign was in line to the pattern established in the June 2012 national elections. It essentially revolved around the dominant cleavage of pro- and anti-Memorandum which in turn denotes a particular posture vis-à-vis Europe. Thus, Alexis Tsipras likened the elections to “a historic referendum” (Ethnos 2014) as choice between two options: change –“that will close the book of Metapolitefsi” (Antoniou 2014) or continuation of austerity.

On the other hand, the Greek Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras played the card of stability conveyed by the coalition government, whilst posing the dilemma of being with Europe or against Europe (Athanasopoulos 2014) blaming SYRIZA for sheer populism. Both coalition partners, ND and PASOK tried to emphasise the achievement of surplus in the national budget (Naftemporiki 2014) as the first breakthrough towards recovery.

An extra point of controversy emerged a few days before the elections regarding a segment of the electorate that voted for GD in the first round of the local elections. Alexis Tsipras invited them to “return to the road of democracy” as being deeply convinced that “those people are not in their vast majority neo-nazis” (Antoniou 2014). This was in turn reciprocated by members of the coalition government, who characterised “flirting with GD” as “a disgusting act” (Imerisia 2014).

Interpreting the Greek oracle

The electoral result in Greece followed the general pattern remarked elsewhere in Europe: ruling parties crumbled. Indeed, the former three parties (DIMAR included) of the coalition lost in absolute terms 1,2 million votes since 2012 (Zoulas 2014). SYRIZA has undoubtedly achieved a historic victory at least at the symbolic level. It managed to gain almost the same result it has scored in the first order national elections of 2012, although losing 140000 votes (Ibid.).

Yet this victory will not imply a subversion of the government in the short- and medium-term as the party discourse had it. The outcome of the 25^th May elections underlined the fact that even if SYRIZA wins the next general elections it will need coalition partners (coalition governments will be the rule of the day after the collapse of bipolarism). Unless the party moves to the centre, finding partners on the Left would require some adept brinkmanship given the negative stance of the Communist Party (Mailis 2012) and the broader re-arrangements taking place within the Greek centre-left. On the right, SYRIZA and Independent Greeks have already established a front against the Memoranda (in.gr 2013). The meager results of last Sunday’s elections are not very promising though for the party of the populist Right.

On the other hand, the electoral result is a clear indication of frustration by the vast majority of the Greek electorate against the continuing policies of austerity and fiscal discipline by the coalition government of ND and PASOK. The process of internal devaluation has hit fatally the middle class and the lower strata of the population giving rise to extreme unemployment and limited spending. Given that the much promised growth is yet to come, -and the results of the fiscal discipline are not immediately felt- the coalition partners will attempt to take some initiatives in the short- and medium term. Firstly, cabinet reshuffle is to be expected (Terzis 2014). Secondly, ND plans to endorse constitutional reform which among other will entail the direct election of the President of the Republic (Ravanos 2014). National elections will be avoided at the moment as both ND and PASOK interpret the result as not condemning for the coalition, whilst the majority of Greeks are contemptuous of a new electoral Odyssey (Express 2014).

Finally, the worrying resilience of Golden Dawn shows that the party has been squarely entrenched in the electorate. This implies that the vote for GD was intentional. Greeks have henceforth no excuse since they now know for what this party stands for.

Bibliography

Antoniou, Dora. “Al. Tsipras: Tapeinomeni tin Ellada Thelei I Sygkyvernisi.” (Al. Tsipras: The Coalition Government Wants Greece Humiliated). Kathimerini, May 22, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.gr/768257/article/epikairothta/politikh/al-tsipras-tapeinwmenh-thn-ellada-8elei-h-sygkyvernhsh.

Athanasopoulos, Angelos. “Ant. Samaras: Stis Evroekloges oi Hellenes tha Epileksoun an Theloun tin Evropi i Ochi.” (Ant. Samaras: In the European Elections Greeks will Decide if They Want Europe or Not). To Vima, January 8, 2014. https://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=555118.

Ethnos. “Tsipras: Istoriko Dimopsifisma oi Evroekloges.” (Tsipras: Historical Referendum the European Elections). May 22, 2014. https://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22767&subid=2&pubid=64011554.

Express. “Nike SYRIZA se 5 Nees Dimoskopiseis gia tis Evroekloges.” (5 New Polls Indicate Victory for SYRIZA in the European Elections). May 23, 2014. https://www.express.gr/news/ellada/750509oz_20140523750509.php3.

Imerisia. “Venizelos: Apechthis Praxi to Flirt tou SYRIZA me ti Chryssi Avgi.” (Venizelos: SYRIZA’s Flirt with Golden Dawn, a Disgusting Act). May 23, 2014. https://www.imerisia.gr/article.asp?catid=26509&subid=2&pubid=113278352.

in.gr. “Synergasia symfonisan SYRIZA kai Anexartitoi Hellenes (SYRIZA and Independent Greeks agreed on Cooperation).” https://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231240686.

Kathimerini. “To Potami Anoichto se Synergasies.” (The River is Open to Cooperation). May 13, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.gr/766830/article/epikairothta/politikh/to-potami-anoixto-se-synergasies.

Kathimerini. “Vari to Katigoritirio gia Tesseris Vouleftes tis Chrysis Avgis.” (Indictment on Serious Offenses for Four Golden Dawn PMs). May 6, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.gr/765807/article/epikairothta/politikh/vary-kathgorhthrio-gia-tesseris-voyleytes-ths-xryshs-ayghs.

Mailis, Makis. “Epikindini gia to Lao i ‘Aristeri kyvernisi’ (A Government of the Left

would be Pernicious to the People).” Rizospastis, April 8, 2012. https://www.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=6791713&publDate=8/4/2012.

Mair, Peter. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Margomenou, Marili. “Epilogi Evrovoulefton me Kritira…Eurovision.” (Voting for the European Parliament according to… Eurovision Standards). Kathimerini, May 27, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.gr/768995/article/epikairothta/politikh/epilogheyrwvoyleytwn-me-krithria-gioyrovizion.

Ministry of the Interior. “Euroelections May 2014.” https://ekloges.ypes.gr/may2014/e/public/index.html?lang=en#{%22cls%22:%22level%22,%22params%22:{%22level%22:%22epik%22,%22id%22:1}}.

Naftemporiki. “Ant. Samaras: Na min ‘Pane Ola Strafi’ stis Evroekloges.” (Ant. Samaras: Let’s Don’t Ruin Everything in the European Elections). May 23, 2014. https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/810536/ant-samaras-na-min-pane-ola-strafi-stis-euroekloges.

Naftemporiki. “Ev. Venizelos: Megalo Epitevgma tou Laou to Pleonasma.” (Ev. Venizelos: The Surplus is the People’s Achievement). April 23, 2014. https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/798807/benizelos-gia-pleonasma-megalo-epiteugma-tou-ellinikou-laou.

News.gr. “Se Arithmo Rekor oi Hellenes Ypopsifioi gia tis Evroekloges!” (Greek Candidacies for the European Elections Hit Record Number). May 23, 2014. https://www.news.gr/politikh/ekloges-2014/article/150958/se-arithmo-rekor-oi-ellhnes-ypopshfioi-gia-tis.html.

Ravanos, Aris. “Syntagmatiki Anatheorisi Proothei I Kyvernisi.” (The Government Endorses Constitutional Reform). To Vima, April 28, 2014. https://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=590684.

Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Terzis, Giorgos P. “Anaschematismos pro ton Pylon.” (Cabinet Reshuffle Looms Large). Kathimerini, May 27, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.gr/768987/article/epikairothta/politikh/anasxhmatismos-pro-twn-pylwn.

Verney, Susannah. “ ‘Broken and Can’t Be Fixed’: The Impact of the Economic

Crisis on the Greek Party System.” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 49 (2014): 18-35.

Zoulas, Konstantinos. “Magiki Eikona i ‘Epelasi’tou SYRIZA.” (SYRIZA’s ‘March’ Fallacious). Kathimerini, May 27, 2014. https://www.kathimerini.gr/768990/article/epikairothta/politikh/magikh-eikona-h-epelash-toy-syriza.