D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R., & CHIARAMONTE, A. (1993). Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: quali opportunità? RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA, 23, 513–547.

The Issue Yield model predicts that parties will choose specific issues to emphasise, based on the joint assessment of electoral risks (how divisive is an issue within the party support base) and electoral opportunities (how widely supported is the same issue outside the party). According to this model, issues with high yield are those that combine a high affinity with the existing party base, together with a high potential to reach new voters. In previous work, the model showed a remarkable ability to explain aggregate issue importance as reported by party supporters, as well as issue emphasis in party manifestos. This paper tests the implications at the individual level by comparing a conventional model where issue salience is determined from manifesto data with a revised model where issue salience is determined by issue yield. The empirical findings show that issue yield is a more effective criterion than manifesto emphasis for identifying the issues most closely associated with party support in the minds of voters.

D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R. (2012). La legge elettorale fra illusioni e pericoli. IL MULINO, 402–412.

CHIARAMONTE, A., D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R., & SIO, L. D. (2008). La riforma elettorale: oltre il premio di maggioranza? In R. D’Alimonte & C. Fusaro (Eds.), La legislazione elettorale italiana. Come migliorarla e perché (pp. 45–68). Bologna: ...

In the three Italian political elections held with the 75%-plurality, mixed-member electoral system, a systematic difference can be observed in vote shares obtained by the two major party coalitions in the plurality versus proportional vote. The article analyses the sources of these differences in the 2001 political elections. Based on precinct data for the whole country, separate analyses are carried out - using the Goodman model - in order to build "turnover tables" between the two arenas for each district of the country. Differentiated behaviours are thus quantified and commented at the national level. An explanatory analysis is then presented, in order to ascertain significant relations between such behaviours and district-level variables such as geographical area, urban setting, number of candidates contesting the district and party affiliation of coalition candidates. The overall result is that differentiated behaviours are dictated both by evaluation of the national competition setting and historical legacy regarding the perception and evaluation of the political space.