Deliberation with Evidence

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Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 516-529 Autore: Jérôme Mathis Abstract In committee deliberation, requiring a unanimous vote intuitively provides the strongest incentives for actors to share fully their opinions and private information. It is also believed that full revelation of (decision-relevant) information occurs when personal biases are made clear before deliberation. However, recent literature suggests that both intuitions are flawed. Austen-Smith and Feddersen propose a model in which the unanimity rule performs worse than other rules in promoting fully revealing deliberation, and uncertainty about individuals' preferences promotes full sharing of information. We extend this work by incorporating the possibility...

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Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 496-515 Autore: John G. Bullock Abstract An enduring concern about democracies is that citizens conform too readily to the policy views of elites in their own parties, even to the point of ignoring other information about the policies in question. This article presents two experiments that undermine this concern, at least under one important condition. People rarely possess even a modicum of information about policies; but when they do, their attitudes seem to be affected at least as much by that information as by cues from party elites. The experiments also measure the extent...

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An international scientific conference organized by the CISE, in collaboration with the LUISS School of Government and the ITANES Association - Italian National Election Studies. Rome, 6-7 October 2011 Main Meeting Room LUISS School of Government Via di Villa Emiliani 14 Participants: Paolo Bellucci University of Siena David Brady Stanford University Bruno Cautres CNRS and CEVIPOF - Paris Pasquale Colloca University of Bologna Piergiorgio Corbetta University of Bologna Chistophe Crombez University of Leuven, Stanford University Roberto D’Alimonte LUISS Guido Carli  - Rome Lorenzo De Sio LUISS Guido Carli - Rome Morris Fiorina Stanford University Donald Green Columbia University Bernard Grofman University of California, Irvine Nicola Maggini SUM - Florence Radoslaw Markowski Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities Douglas Rivers Stanford University Hans M.A. Schadee University of Milano-Bicocca Hermann Schmitt University of...

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Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 530-551 Autori: Boris Shor; Nolan McCarty Abstract The development and elaboration of the spatial theory of voting has contributed greatly to the study of legislative decision making and elections. Statistical models that estimate the spatial locations of individual decision-makers have made a key contribution to this success. Spatial models have been estimated for the U.S. Congress, the Supreme Court, U.S. presidents, a large number of non-U.S. legislatures, and supranational organizations. Yet one potentially fruitful laboratory for testing spatial theories, the individual U.S. states, has remained relatively unexploited, for two reasons. First, state legislative...

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Segnalazione bibliografica West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 568-586(19) Autori: Jean-Benoit Pilet; Damien Bol Abstract: Most of the literature asserts that political parties rationally define their preference for electoral reform with respect to their possible gains and the balance of power between and within parties. Other scholars moderate this rationality, underlining the role of the uncertainty inherent to any change in the electoral system. This article shows how risk and expected gains interact. Through an analysis of the preferences of 84 parties in 13 different electoral reform debates, it shows that risk impedes parties from supporting even advantageous change....
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