The 2012 municipal election in Palermo produced an unexpected outcome. In the Sicilian city - for a long time a conservative stronghold - the center-right candidate, Massimo Costa did not succeed to reach the second ballot and the election was won by the former Major Leoluca Orlando, supported by a radical left coalition. Orlando prevailed with a sensational 72% of the vote share against the winner of the center-left primary elections, Fabrizio Ferrandelli. What happened in the 2012 Palermo municipal election? Does the Sicilian capital moved suddenly toward the left? Which factors fostered this sharp and unpredictable electoral change that altered the long-time-established political landscape of the City? To answer these questions, the article analyzes the results of the 2012 municipal election in Palermo through an electoral geography approach and the use of a quantitative methodology with ecological data. In particular, the article makes use of both the territorial study of turnout and election results and the voting ecological estimates generated with the traditional Goodman model. The empirical analysis shows that this election was strongly influenced by factors linked to the local context more than by authentically political ones. In other words, Palermo did not move toward the left. Moreover, the internal electoral segmentation of the City between central and peripheral neighborhoods persisted as the main determinant of the vote choice.

A vast literature suggests that voters in new democracies ‘sell’ their vote to patrons providing private or small-scale club goods, or, alternatively, that such goods are distributed along ethnic lines to reinforce ethnic voting. In either case the outcome is undermining democratic accountability. This study finds that citizens in one new democracy – Ghana – expect (and get) the patronage but at the same time engage in economic voting. Eighty-five percent of citizens first and foremost expect their legislators to supply private or small-scale ‘club’ goods. This acts as a strong incentive for politicians to actually supply such goods, which is confirmed by participants’ observational data and more than 250 interviews conducted by the author. Despite this, citizens do not vote based on how well or how poorly incumbent MPs provide clientelistic goods. A multivariate analysis reveals that voting for the opposition or the incumbent is determined by evaluations of the state of the national economy and of the government’s policies. What the literature has portrayed as an ‘either-or’ is ‘both’, and this is perfectly rational: Extract as much as one can in terms of private and small club goods but vote based on economic factors. The literature suggests that clientelism dominates elections in newer democracies and thus undermines democracy. The findings from this study suggest that while distribution of clientelistic goods is common, this does not necessarily undermine the mechanism of democratic accountability in elections.

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 631-641 Autore: Andrew Rehfeld Abstract In this reply to Jane Mansbridge's “Clarifying the Concept of Representation” in this issue (American Political Science Review 2011). I argue that our main disagreements are conceptual, and are traceable to the attempt to treat the concept of representation as a “single highly complex concept” as Hanna Pitkin once put it. Instead, I argue, it would be more useful to develop the various concepts that emphasize the underlying forms of representation. Against the view that empirical regularity should guide concept formation, I suggest that the failure to find...

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 516-529 Autore: Jérôme Mathis Abstract In committee deliberation, requiring a unanimous vote intuitively provides the strongest incentives for actors to share fully their opinions and private information. It is also believed that full revelation of (decision-relevant) information occurs when personal biases are made clear before deliberation. However, recent literature suggests that both intuitions are flawed. Austen-Smith and Feddersen propose a model in which the unanimity rule performs worse than other rules in promoting fully revealing deliberation, and uncertainty about individuals' preferences promotes full sharing of information. We extend this work by incorporating the possibility...