Ricerca

Ricerca

Ricerca

D'Alimonte R., Bartolini S. (a cura di), Maggioritario per caso. Le elezioni politiche del 1996, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997. ISBN 978-88-15-05786-0 A due anni dalle "rivoluzionarie" elezioni del 1994, nell'aprile del 1996 il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano - maggioritario ma non troppo - è stato di nuovo chiamato alla prova. Il voto ha prodotto tre dati sorprendenti: una maggioranza alla Camea e al Senato; la stessa maggioranza in entrambe le Camere; una maggioranza completamente diversa da quella di centro-destra emersa nel 1994 e presto disgregatasi. Il volume fornisce un'analisi completa e dettagliata della campagna elettorale e dei risultati del voto, cogliendo ciò che...

De Sio, L. (2007). For a Few Votes More. The Italian General Elections of 2006. South European Society and Politics, 12(1), 95–109. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608740601155534?journalCode=fses20 Vai al sito web

Abstract This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.

Emanuele, Vincenzo, & Rombi, Stefano. (2013). Il voto nei circoli: cosa rischia Renzi. Candidate & Leader Selection (a Cura Di) [2013], Questioni Primarie, Www.rivistailmulino.it, (2), 7–8. Retrieved from http://www.rivistailmulino.it/item/23...

Segnalazione bibliografica West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 568-586(19) Autori: Jean-Benoit Pilet; Damien Bol Abstract: Most of the literature asserts that political parties rationally define their preference for electoral reform with respect to their possible gains and the balance of power between and within parties. Other scholars moderate this rationality, underlining the role of the uncertainty inherent to any change in the electoral system. This article shows how risk and expected gains interact. Through an analysis of the preferences of 84 parties in 13 different electoral reform debates, it shows that risk impedes parties from supporting even advantageous change....