Autore: Redazione CISE

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American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 552-566

Autori: Timothy Besley; Marta Reynal-Querol

Abstract

This paper uses a unique data set on over 1,400 world leaders between 1848 and 2004 to investigate differences in educational qualifications between leaders who are selected in democracies and autocracies. After including country and year fixed effects, we find that democracies are around 20% more likely to select highly educated leaders. This finding is robust to a wide range of specifications, choices of subsamples, controls, and ways of measuring education and democracy.

Full Text: https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8368204

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American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 516-529

Autore: Jérôme Mathis

Abstract

In committee deliberation, requiring a unanimous vote intuitively provides the strongest incentives for actors to share fully their opinions and private information. It is also believed that full revelation of (decision-relevant) information occurs when personal biases are made clear before deliberation. However, recent literature suggests that both intuitions are flawed. Austen-Smith and Feddersen propose a model in which the unanimity rule performs worse than other rules in promoting fully revealing deliberation, and uncertainty about individuals’ preferences promotes full sharing of information. We extend this work by incorporating the possibility that individuals may provide verifiable evidence for their private information. Under this circumstance, we demonstrate that Austen-Smith and Feddersen’s results are reversed. First, a unanimous voting rule performs better than any other, as unanimity is the only rule that always promotes fully revealing deliberation. Second, under fairly general conditions, uncertainty about individuals’ preferences prevents full sharing of information.

Full Text:https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8368192

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American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 496-515

Autore: John G. Bullock

Abstract

An enduring concern about democracies is that citizens conform too readily to the policy views of elites in their own parties, even to the point of ignoring other information about the policies in question. This article presents two experiments that undermine this concern, at least under one important condition. People rarely possess even a modicum of information about policies; but when they do, their attitudes seem to be affected at least as much by that information as by cues from party elites. The experiments also measure the extent to which people think about policy. Contrary to many accounts, they suggest that party cues do not inhibit such thinking. This is not cause for unbridled optimism about citizens’ ability to make good decisions, but it is reason to be more sanguine about their ability to use information about policy when they have it.

Full text: https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8368177

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American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 530-551

Autori: Boris Shor; Nolan McCarty

Abstract

The development and elaboration of the spatial theory of voting has contributed greatly to the study of legislative decision making and elections. Statistical models that estimate the spatial locations of individual decision-makers have made a key contribution to this success. Spatial models have been estimated for the U.S. Congress, the Supreme Court, U.S. presidents, a large number of non-U.S. legislatures, and supranational organizations. Yet one potentially fruitful laboratory for testing spatial theories, the individual U.S. states, has remained relatively unexploited, for two reasons. First, state legislative roll call data have not yet been systematically collected for all states over time. Second, because ideal point models are based on latent scales, comparisons of ideal points across states or even between chambers within a state are difficult. This article reports substantial progress on both fronts. First, we have obtained the roll call voting data for all state legislatures from the mid-1990s onward. Second, we exploit a recurring survey of state legislative candidates to allow comparisons across time, chambers, and states as well as with the U.S. Congress. The resulting mapping of America’s state legislatures has great potential to address numerous questions not only about state politics and policymaking, but also about legislative politics in general.

Full Text: https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8368174

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West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 568-586(19)

Autori: Jean-Benoit Pilet; Damien Bol

Abstract:

Most of the literature asserts that political parties rationally define their preference for electoral reform with respect to their possible gains and the balance of power between and within parties. Other scholars moderate this rationality, underlining the role of the uncertainty inherent to any change in the electoral system. This article shows how risk and expected gains interact. Through an analysis of the preferences of 84 parties in 13 different electoral reform debates, it shows that risk impedes parties from supporting even advantageous change. However, it also points out that not all parties are equally sensitive to risk. Parties that are dissatisfied with the current system are more willing to favour a reform from which they expect gains. In other words, dissatisfaction makes parties more seat-maximising.

Full Text: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/wep/2011/00000034/00000003/art00009?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=pulsenews

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West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 607-625(19)

Autore: Csaba Nikolenyi

Abstract

This article examines the failure of three attempts to replace proportional representation with a majoritarian alternative in post-communist Eastern Europe: Slovenia in 1996; the Czech Republic in 2000; and Romania in 2008. The central argument of the article is that majoritarian electoral reform is both incompatible with and prevented by the institutions of consensus democracy. The constitutional design of consensus democracy creates multiple veto points and veto players that limit major policy and legislative change, such as electoral reform. As such, they also provide for self-enforcing stability in the electoral system by making it very difficult for political actors to build a winning coalition to reform it.

Full Text: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/wep/2011/00000034/00000003/art00011?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=pulsenews

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West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 644-663(20)

Autore: Gianfranco Baldini

Abstract

Italy is the only established democracy where two major electoral reforms took place inthe last 20 years (respectively in 1993 and 2005). Adopting Renwick’s approach, which distinguishes between elite majority imposed and elite-mass interaction reforms, the article analyses electoral reforms in Italy in the post-World War II period. By examining the long-term importance of electoral rules in Italian politics, it argues that PR played a uniquely fundamental role in shaping both the so-called Italian ‘First Republic’ and the still unfulfilled transition towards a reformed political system. (Valium) By focusing on the main determinants which brought about the two most recent reforms, it becomes apparent that, in the last two decades, the ever-changing party system format contributes to the cyclical salience of electoral reform as a possible means of accomplishing the never-ending transition towards a more stable political settlement.

Full Text: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/wep/2011/00000034/00000003/art00013?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=pulsenews

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Party Politics, July 2011 vol. 17 no. 4488-504

Autori: Richard Dunphy, Tim Bale

Abstract

This article raises questions about how best to assess the performance of radical left parties participating in coalition governments. Drawing in part on interviews (see Appendix 1), it covers parties that have participated in coalition government (Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway), or have acted as ‘support parties’ (Denmark, Sweden), or are debating the ‘pros and cons’ of coalition participation (Netherlands). It undertakes a comparative analysis of how radical left parties themselves evaluate the measure of their achievements and failings in coalition government — a critical exercise for such parties that can influence their tactical and strategic decisions about future government participation, as well as the ability of the parties to survive political and electoral setbacks. The approach we adopt is one that takes the policy, office and votes triad developed by political scientists seriously, but also factors in the principles, political outlook and goals of the parties themselves. It concludes that the experience of coalition government for radical left parties is far from encouraging to date. Their few achievements have to be set against many potential pitfalls. Whilst there may be no alternative to government participation if these parties wish to be taken seriously as actors, a more strategic and cautious approach to coalition formation seems advisable in many instances.

Full Text: https://ppq.sagepub.com/content/17/4/488.abstract?rss=1&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=pulsenews

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European Journal of Political Research, 08/07/11

Autore: Will Jennings

Abstract

This article develops the reward-punishment issue model of voting using a newly collated aggregate measure of issue competence in Britain between 1971 and 1997, revealing systematic differences between governing and opposition parties in the way citizens’ evaluations of party competence are related to vote intention. Using monthly Gallup ‘best party to handle the most important problem’ and vote intention data, time series Granger-causation tests give support to a classic issue reward-punishment model for incumbents. However, for opposition parties this reward-punishment model does not hold: macro-issue competence evaluations are Granger-caused by changes in vote choice or governing party competence. An explanation is offered based upon the differentiating role of policy performance and informational asymmetries, and the implications are considered for comparative studies of voting, public opinion and for political party competition.

Full Text: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02004.x/abstract