CHIARAMONTE, A. C. A., & Sio, L. D. (2014). Premessa. In A. Chiaramonte & L. D. Sio (Eds.), Terremoto elettorale. Le elezioni politiche del 2013 (pp. 7–14). BOLOGNA: Il Mulino.

Segnalazione bibliografica. European Journal of Political Research, 20/07/2011 Autore: Joaquìn Artés Abstract The extent of strategic voting in the Spanish general elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008 is estimated using a new measure of strategic incentives suitable for proportional representation systems that avoids some of the problems associated with lagged variables. Strategic behaviour increased from 12 to 33 per cent of the electoral base of the United Left Party, the major victim of strategic defection. This estimate is a conservative one as elite mobilisation is controlled for in the constituencies, which is unusual in the literature on strategic voting that uses regression-based methods. Full...

D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R., & CHIARAMONTE, A. (1993). Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: quali opportunità? RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA, 23, 513–547.

CHIARAMONTE, A. C. A., & Maggini, N. (2013). The 2013 Election Results. Protest Voting and Political Stalemate. STUDIA POLITICA, XIII, 641–658.

A wide range of studies find that democracies experience more terrorism than non-democracies. However, surprisingly little terrorism research takes into account the variation among democracies in terms of their electoral institutions. Furthermore, despite much discussion of the differences in terrorist groups’ goals in the literature, little quantitative work distinguishes among groups with different goals, and none explores whether and how the influence of electoral institutions varies among groups with different goals. The argument in this article posits that electoral institutions influence the emergence of within-system groups, which seek policy changes, but do not influence the emergence of anti-system groups, which seek a complete overthrow of the existing regime and government. The study finds that within-system groups are significantly less likely to emerge in democracies that have a proportional representation system and higher levels of district magnitude, while neither of these factors affects the emergence of anti-system groups.