The 2013 Italian general elections produced a largely unexpected and destabilizing outcome. The major surprise came from the Movimento 5 stelle (M5s, Five star movement), a brand new, anti-establishment political force which got more than 25% of the valid votes and turned out to be the largest party list in the domestic arena of the Chamber of deputies. The destabilizing nature of the outcome stemmed from the lack of a real winner which ended up in political stalemate. In fact, the center-left won in the Chamber of deputies, but not in the Senate and could not form a cabinet by itself. In the end, the Partito democratico (Pd, Democratic Party) was left with the only unpalatable option to have to form a ‘grand governing coalition’ with Berlusconi’s Popolo delle libertà (Pdl, People of freedom). Indeed, the widespread expectation was that the center-left would win with a large margin. For a long time before the vote most of the polls had indicated that Bersani’s lead was large enough to make his coalition gain the absolute majority of seats in both chambers either alone or together with the Monti’s coalition. It was not the case. Actually, what really happened in the ballot box on February 24th and 25th is still unclear to some extent. Here we will try to give a brief and preliminary explanation, analyzing the background to the election, the results and the role played by the electoral systems, the aggregate vote shifts between the 2013 and 2008 elections, the geographical distributions of the vote, and, finally, the transformation of the party system.

CHIARAMONTE, A. C. A., & Maggini, N. (2013). The 2013 Election Results. Protest Voting and Political Stalemate. STUDIA POLITICA, XIII, 641–658.

Operationalizations of the Rokkanian centre-periphery cleavage have traditionally focused on the presence of specific regional political cultures, as well as on cultural fragmentation within a country (at the aggregate level) or on proxy indicators such as town size (at the individual level). We suggest that geographical remoteness from political centres – a key element of the centre-periphery cleavage in the Rokkanian framework – could provide a more accurate measurement of the subjective position of individuals in relationship to the cleavage. As new indicators of this concept, we introduce measures of distance between the place of residence of a citizen and political centres at different hierarchical levels, based on road distances and travel times along traditional roads (also accounting for differences in orography and geography among different countries and regions). We empirically test the impact of such indicators on vote choice on the Italian and French cases. We use survey data from the 2006 ITANES and the 2002 PEF, and information about road distances and travel times obtained through online mapping/routing services. We first assess differences between the two countries in terms of orography and geography. We then estimate multivariate models of vote choice at the individual level, in order to te st the following hypotheses: a) that the new indicators add significant explanatory power, compared to traditional indicators related to the centre-periphery cleavage; b) that the new indicators have different effects on vote choice for different parties, expressing different affinities of these parties with the cleavage.

CHIARAMONTE, A. C. A. (2013). Il voto diviso tra elezioni nazionali ed elezioni regionali. Ipotesi esplicative e potenziali effetti sulle riforme istituzionali. LE REGIONI, XLI, 15–18.

The third Eurozone economy and one of the six founders of the EEC (the direct ancestor of the European Union) in 1957, Italy is experiencing in recent years a season of political instability and uncertainty, especially after the crisis of Silvio Berlusconi’s leadership in the centre-right camp. A situation which has not improved after the results of the general election held in February 2013, whose overall outcome can be described as a dangerous stalemate. A new, anti-establishment party (the 5-Star Movement led by comedian Beppe Grillo) becoming the largest party with 25,6% of votes; the absence of any cohesive political majority in the Senate (whose vote of confidence is required); the installation of a government based on an oversized, hardly manageable political majority, led by Enrico Letta. How did all this happen? What are the political and the institutional factors that produced this outcome? What is the size and scope of the success of Beppe Grillo? Where are his votes coming from? Who paid the “cost of government” for the previous legislature? What are the likely scenarios for the future? First answers to such questions are presented in this book, which collects revised versions of short research notes published in Italian on the CISE website between February and April 2013, along with additional material published in Italian and English by CISE scholars on the Italian and international media. The goal of this book is to provide – in a timely fashion – a set of fresh, short analyses, able to provide a non-technical audience (including journalists, practitioners of politics, and everyone interested in Italian politics) with information and data about Italian electoral politics. Even electoral scholars will find interesting information, able to stimulate the construction of more structured research hypotheses to be tested in more depth. Too often international commentators portray Italian politics in a superficial fashion, without the support of fresh data and a proper understanding of the deeper processes involved. With this book, in spite of its limited scope, we hope to contribute to filling this gap.