Segnalazione bibliografica. West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 5, 1 September 2011 , pp. 1070-1091(22) Autore: Pontus Odmalm Abstract Why is `the immigration issue' rarely polemical for the Swedish mainstream when it divides parties across Europe? Several factors suggest fertile ground for conflict, yet parties hesitate to capitalise on anti-immigration cues. Based on interviews with Swedish MPs, the article discusses two interlinked issues. First, immigration crystallises conflicting ideological streams: market liberalism vs. value conservatism (for the centre-right) and international solidarity vs. welfare...

Birch, S. (2012). Daniel Bochsler, Territory and electoral rules in post-communist democracies, reviewed by Sarah Birch. Party Politics, 19(1), 167–167. http://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812465706 Vai al sito web

This article analyses the impact of party systems on human well-being and argues that multiparty systems are associated with better welfare outcomes for two primary reasons: first, multiparty systems provide representation to multiple issue-dimensions in society, thereby indicating a more inclusive system, which ensures that diverse societal interests are taken into account during formulation of welfare policies. Second, multiparty systems also indicate a competitive party system, which provides incentives for parties to perform effectively while in office and propels parties to appeal to multiple segments of society by providing broader welfare services. The impact of party systems on human well-being is tested on a global sample of 68 democratic countries from 1975–2000. The findings show support for the hypothesized relationship between party systems and human well-being.

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 738-752(15) Autori: John R. Hamman; Roberto A. Weber; Jonathan Woon Abstract How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not...

A large literature examines the composition of cabinets in parliamentary systems, but very little attention has been paid to the size of those cabinets. Yet not only is the size of the cabinet related to the division of portfolios that may take place, cabinet size is also related to policy outcomes. In this article, a theory of party size is considered which examines how coalition bargaining considerations, intra-party politics and efficiency concerns affect the size of cabinets. Hypotheses derived from the theory are examined using an extensive cross-national dataset on coalition governments which allows us to track changes in cabinet size and membership both across and within cabinets.