The left/right semantic is used widely to describe the patterns of party competition in democratic countries. This article examines the patterns of party policy in Anglo-American and Western European countries on three dimensions of left/right disagreement: wealth redistribution, social morality and immigration. The central questions are whether, and why, parties with left-wing or right-wing positions on the economy systematically adopt left-wing or right-wing positions on immigration and social morality. The central argument is that left/right disagreement is asymmetrical: leftists and rightists derive from different sources, and thus structure in different ways, their opinions about policy. Drawing on evidence from Benoit and Laver’s (2006) survey of experts about the policy positions of political parties, the results of the empirical analysis indicate that party policy on the economic, social and immigration dimensions are bound together by parties on the left, but not by parties on the right. The article concludes with an outline of the potential implications of left/right asymmetry for unified theories of party competition.

Segnalazione bibliografica. Autori: Brian Greenhill; Michael D. Ward; Audrey Sacks American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Number 4, 1 October 2011 , pp. 991-1002(12) Abstract We present a visual method for assessing the predictive power of models with binary outcomes. This technique allows the analyst to evaluate model fit based upon the models’ ability to consistently match high-probability predictions to actual occurrences of the event of interest, and low-probability predictions to nonoccurrences of the event of interest. (https://www.speedclean.com/) Unlike existing methods for assessing predictive power...

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 552-566 Autori: Timothy Besley; Marta Reynal-Querol Abstract This paper uses a unique data set on over 1,400 world leaders between 1848 and 2004 to investigate differences in educational qualifications between leaders who are selected in democracies and autocracies. After including country and year fixed effects, we find that democracies are around 20% more likely to select highly educated leaders. This finding is robust to a wide range of specifications, choices of subsamples, controls, and ways of measuring education and democracy. Full Text: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8368204

Segnalazione bibliografica West European Politics, Volume 34, Number 3, May 2011 , pp. 644-663(20) Autore: Gianfranco Baldini Abstract Italy is the only established democracy where two major electoral reforms took place inthe last 20 years (respectively in 1993 and 2005). Adopting Renwick’s approach, which distinguishes between elite majority imposed and elite-mass interaction reforms, the article analyses electoral reforms in Italy in the post-World War II period. By examining the long-term importance of electoral rules in Italian politics, it argues that PR played a uniquely fundamental role in shaping both the so-called Italian ‘First Republic’ and the still unfulfilled transition towards a reformed political system....

Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.