D’ALIMONTE, R. D. R., & BARTOLINI, S. (1997). Electoral Transition and Party System Change in Italy. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 20, 110–134.

There is a contradiction between theory and empirics with respect to portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. While the canonical model of legislative bargaining predicts the existence of a ‘formateur bonus’, empirical studies show that portfolios are allocated in a manner that favours smaller parties. This article argues that the difference between the empirical pattern and the theoretical predictions can be explained by the vote of no confidence, which provides an incentive for large formateur parties to overcompensate smaller coalition partners in exchange for their sustained support over time. This argument is tested by exploiting variations in the presence of no confidence votes across national and regional levels in France. As predicted, we find that larger formateur parties receive a greater share of portfolios if the vote of no confidence is absent than if it is present.

The economic crisis, the fall of the Berlusconi’s cabinet in November 2011 and the formation of the technocratic cabinet led by Mario Monti provided the ground for the general elections held in February 2013, which reached a stalemate, contrary to what most observers expected. The center-left coalition won in the Chamber but not in the Senate. The result in the Senate made it impossible to form a majority coalition between Bersani’s left and Monti’s center, which many considered the most likely outcome of these elections. In the end, the only available option for the PD, the winner in the Chamber, was to form a cabinet with Berlusconi’s PdL. There are many factors explaining this destabilizing result. The first and most important is the success of a brand new anti-establishment party, the Five Star Movement, which attracted voters from across the political spectrum and became the largest party in the country. The second is the inability of the center-left not only to extend its electoral base at a time when the center-right lost almost half of the votes received in 2008, but also to keep its previous electorate. The third factor is the peculiar nature and functioning of the electoral system for the Senate.

A promising strand of research is adopting survey experimental approaches to assess the extent to which parties not only aggregate preferences, but are also able to shape them - a research question which becomes crucial as the economic crisis is weakening trust in parties and the party system in many European countries. Typical survey experimental designs adopt party-mention treatments, in order to assess difference in policy support based on the mention of a party to which the respondent has some kind of affinity. Results obtained so far in a variety of countries show the significant presence of party-cuing effects; however, existing research has been mostly experimenting on artificial, low-saliency issues, thus raising concerns of external validity. In this paper we report findings from a survey experiment on real-world, high-saliency issues, which was included in the 4th wave of the CISE (Italian Center for Electoral Studies) Electoral Panel. The panel started in early 2012, covering about 12 months before recent general elections, a period of time during which the economic crisis expressed his deepest effects. The design included three issues selected in order to maximize variance on issue complexity and content: rights for gay couples, house property tax and electoral reform. On each policy issue, respondents in the control group were asked to choose among four different policy options, while respondents in the treatment group received the same options, but each accompanied by a proponent party. Results show effects of party cuing that are large and significant. Respondents tend to support more a policy if they are informed that such policy is proposed by their preferred party. This effect however varies across issues. The paper also investigates variation across party identification, with findings that confirm theoretical expectations: party identifiers show stronger cueing effects than non-identifiers, although different levels of party closeness do not always correspond to cueing effects that are significantly different. Finally we compare cueing effects across groups characterized by different levels of exposure to the economic crisis: we hypothesize that among those who are experiencing economic difficulties such effects should be weaker, expressing less trust in the party system and in specific parties.

De Sio, Lorenzo, Emanuele, Vincenzo, & Maggini, Nicola. (2014 21). “Something Olde, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue…”. On the twenty-eight separate European elections of 2014. Retrieved from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisis...