Una vittoria del centrosinistra, ma in un contesto decisamente turbolento: un aumento dell’astensione, il crollo del centrodestra e l’exploit del Movimento 5 Stelle. Queste in estrema sintesi le direttrici fondamentali con cui interpretare la tornata di elezioni comunali del maggio 2012. Questo primo Dossier CISE raccoglie tutte le analisi sul tema pubblicate sul sito web Cise prima e dopo le elezioni, da cui emergo endono fornire una base di dati per la discussione e l’interpretazione di un risultato elettorale che marca in modo chiarissimo una fase cruciale dell’evoluzione del sistema politico italiano.

This article analyzes the results of the Italian municipal elections held in May 2011. First, we make a simple count of the municipalities won by the various political blocs, and secondly we make a comparison with the results of regional elections of 2010. We have compared data concerning both the electoral performances of political blocs and those of the political parties who appeared in this election. We also present the results as disaggregated data, both from a demographic standpoint and from a geographical point of view. The analysis shows a clear electoral defeat of the center-right coalition, both in terms of municipalities lost and in terms of percentages of votes obtained. The fact that these two phenomena have occurred especially in the North, its traditional area of electoral strength, makes this defeat particularly significant. The center-left coalition, due to the difficulties of its opponent, gets a good result in terms of number of municipalities won, while not improving its performance in terms of percentages of votes obtained. The centrist coalition, finally, does not get a great performance in terms of votes obtained, but it often proves decisive in forcing the other two coalitions to the second ballot.

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Political Science Review 01 August 2011 105: 516-529 Autore: Jérôme Mathis Abstract In committee deliberation, requiring a unanimous vote intuitively provides the strongest incentives for actors to share fully their opinions and private information. It is also believed that full revelation of (decision-relevant) information occurs when personal biases are made clear before deliberation. However, recent literature suggests that both intuitions are flawed. Austen-Smith and Feddersen propose a model in which the unanimity rule performs worse than other rules in promoting fully revealing deliberation, and uncertainty about individuals' preferences promotes full sharing of information. We extend this work by incorporating the possibility...