Ricerca

Ricerca

Ricerca

How do global sources of information such as mass media outlets, state propaganda, NGOs, and national party leadership affect aggregate behavior? Prior work on this question has insufficiently considered the complex interaction between social network and mass media influences on individual behavior. By explicitly modeling this interaction, I show that social network structure conditions media's impact. Empirical studies of media effects that fail to consider this risk bias. Further, social network interactions can amplify media bias, leading to large swings in aggregate behavior made more severe when individuals can select into media matching their preferences. Countervailing media outlets and social elites with unified preferences can mitigate the effect of bias; however, media outlets promulgating antistatus quo bias have an advantage. Theoretical results such as these generate numerous testable hypotheses; I provide guidelines for deriving and testing hypotheses from the model and discuss several such hypotheses.

There is a contradiction between theory and empirics with respect to portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. While the canonical model of legislative bargaining predicts the existence of a ‘formateur bonus’, empirical studies show that portfolios are allocated in a manner that favours smaller parties. This article argues that the difference between the empirical pattern and the theoretical predictions can be explained by the vote of no confidence, which provides an incentive for large formateur parties to overcompensate smaller coalition partners in exchange for their sustained support over time. This argument is tested by exploiting variations in the presence of no confidence votes across national and regional levels in France. As predicted, we find that larger formateur parties receive a greater share of portfolios if the vote of no confidence is absent than if it is present.

Nel corso degli ultimi 20 anni il sistema partitico del nostro paese è stato attraversato da profondi mutamenti. Dopo la lunga stagione del pluralismo estremo e polarizzato degli anni della Prima Repubblica, a partire dal 1994 si è progressivamente mosso verso un sistema bipolare con alternanza caratterizzato da alti livelli di frammentazione e discontinuità dell’offerta politica, fino alla svolta quasi-bipartitica delle elezioni del 2008. Il capitolo ha l’obiettivo di analizzare il cambiamento del sistema partitico italiano avvenuto con le elezioni del 2013 dalle quali è emerso un sistema sostanzialmente tripolare che ha stravolto l’assetto bipolare precedente in un quadro di crescente destrutturazione e di fluidità elettorale che ha pochi eguali nella storia elettorale dell’Europa occidentale. Quali sono le caratteristiche del nuovo sistema partitico italiano? Quali fattori lo hanno determinato? Cosa spiega la sua perenne instabilità? Servendosi di molteplici indicatori e attraverso un approccio empirico e attento alla comparazione con altri casi europei il capitolo cercherà di dare risposta a questi interrogativi.

Per citare l'articolo: Emanuele, V., Marino, B. and Angelucci, D. (2020), The congealing of a new cleavage? The evolution of the demarcation bloc in Europe (1979–2019). Italian Political Science Review. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2020.19 Scarica l'articolo qui Abstract Over recent years, a new transnational conflict has been deemed to be structuring political conflict in Europe. Several scholars have posited the emergence of a new ‘demarcation’ vs. ‘integration’ cleavage, pitting the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalization against each other. This new conflict is allegedly structured along...

Segnalazione bibliografica. American Journal of Political Science (April 2011), Vol. 55, N. 2, pp. 340-355 Autori: John T. Gasper, Andrew Reeves Abstract Are election outcomes driven by events beyond the control of politicians? Democratic accountability requires that voters make reasonable evaluations of incumbents. Although natural disasters are beyond human control, the response to these events is the responsibility of elected officials. In a county-level analysis of gubernatorial and presidential elections from 1970 to 2006, we examine the effects of weather events and governmental responses. We find that electorates punish presidents and governors for severe weather damage. However, we find that these effects are dwarfed...